

**Political Representation of Minorities:
A Comparison of the Greek-Orthodox Minority of Istanbul
and Muslim-Turkish Minority of Western Thrace**

by

BURCU TAŞKIN

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

**Istanbul Bilgi University
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POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES: A COMPARISON OF THE
GREEK-ORTHODOX (ROMIOI) MINORITY OF ISTANBUL AND MUSLIM-
TURKISH MINORITY OF WESTERN THRACE


AZINLIKLARIN SİYASAL TEMSİLİYETİ: İSTANBUL RUMLARI VE BATI
TRAKYA TÜRK-MÜSLÜMAN AZINLIKLARININ KARŞILAŞTIRMASI

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Anahtar Kelimeler:

- 1) Siyasal Temsiliyet
- 2) Mütakabiliyet İlkesi
- 3) Rum Azınlık
- 4) Müslüman Türk Azınlık
- 5) Tarihsel Kurumsalcılık
- 6) Türk-Yunan İlişkileri

Key Words:

- 1) Political Representation
- 2) Reciprocity Rule
- 3) Greek- Orthodox Minority
- 4) Muslim- Turkish Minority
- 5) Historical Institutionalism
- 6) Turkish- Greek Relations

ABSTRACT

Lausanne Treaty's (1923) section on the 'minority protection' has a unique character as it brought the concept 'mutual responsibility'. Since then, highly related to Turkish-Greek relations, 'mutual responsibility' has been perceived as 'reciprocity rule' which is implemented usually negatively but also positively by Greek and Turkish states for the Muslim minority in Western Thrace and Greek-Orthodox minority living in Istanbul respectively in cultural, social and economic fields.

Whereas, reciprocity rule has not been applied in the political field. The thesis mainly aims to understand *why two minority communities have different characteristics of political representation?* Inspired by Fredrik Barth's theory, the study claims that ethnic political behavior is not primordial but shaped according to the political institutions of the society they live in, and tests the assumptions by comparing the macro-level and micro-level factors that are expected to influence the possibility of minorities' political representation. For this purpose the thesis utilizes a qualitative comparative method 'historical institutionalism' analysis, where for each electoral period (7 elections in Turkey and 31 elections in Greece in which minorities are represented in the national parliament) the political events and changes in the political institutions that are expected to influence the conditions of the minorities are examined.

Historical institutionalism analysis; archival work on the minority MPs' Parliamentary speeches, minority press evaluations and interviews conducted with prominent figures of the minority communities showed that despite the common assumptions, political representation potential is independent from bilateral relations and international organizations, however Muslim-Turkish minority continues to base its political choices on being part of Greek-Turkish relations. 'Reciprocity rule' has not been applied in political sphere due to legal issues; lack of political will; mutual distrust; and problems in negotiations. In general micro-level and macro-level factors matter for the political representation of Romioi and Muslim-Turkish minority: 'party-identification' is low; 'localism', 'political cleavages' and 'ethnic bloc-voting' are higher in Muslim community; while better 'language skills' increased the effectiveness of Romioi MPs and the community's integration to the society. Increase in the professional skills of the Muslim MPs in Greece after 1977 improved their effectiveness in the parliament despite the fact that their number reduced. As expected, minority MPs are more effective in the parliament when the host-country has a more democratic atmosphere. Interviews with the minority members stressed a common point: the minority members respect the political system of the country they live in, and believe they should play within the same political game; however they do not trust the political system and they believe 'quota system' for political representation will increase the ethnic tension rather than diminishing it. 'Reciprocity rule' has negative associations for the Romioi community, while Lausanne Treaty has been perceived as a constitution by the Muslim-Turkish minority. Close-list PR electoral system with dominant party has potential to offer higher political involvement for the Romioi community; while it increases the ethnic tension in Western Thrace. Open-list PR system with multi-party systems provides the best conditions for Muslim-Turkish minority's political representation. Minority MPs' work in the parliament is more effective when they are elected with a party ticket (especially party in power) versus independent ticket.

Key Words: Political Representation; Reciprocity Rule; Greek-Orthodox Minority; Muslim-Turkish Minority; Historical Institutionalism; Greek-Turkish Relations.

ÖNSÖZ

1923 Lozan Anlaşmasında yer alan ‘azınlıkların korunması’ bölümünün benzersiz bir özelliği ‘karşılıklı sorumluluk’ kavramını getirmesidir. 1923 yılından bu yana ‘karşılıklı sorumluluk’la güvence altında olması gereken haklar Türk-Yunan ilişkilerine bağlı olarak ‘mütekabiliyet ilkesi’ olarak algılanmış, ve Yunan ve Türk devletleri tarafından Batı Trakya Müslüman azınlığı ve İstanbul’daki Rum azınlığı için kültürel, sosyal ve ekonomik alanlarda çoğunlukla olumsuz, bazen de olumlu şekilde uygulanmıştır.

Ancak ‘mütekabiliyet ilkesi’ siyasal alanda uygulanmamaktadır. Bu tezin temel amacı ‘bu iki azınlık cemaatinin neden farklı siyasal temsiliyet özellikleri gösterdiğini’ anlamaktır. Fredrik Barth’ın teorisine dayanarak bu tez etnik grupların siyasal davranışlarının ilkel (*primordial*) olmadığını, ama içinde yaşadıkları toplumun siyasal kurumlarına göre biçimlendiğini savunarak, argümanlarını makro ve mikro faktörleri her iki azınlık için de analiz etmiş ve bu azınlıkların siyasal temsiliyetleri üzerindeki etkilerini ölçmeyi hedeflemiştir. Bu çalışma için tezde kalitatif karşılaştırmalı yöntem olan ‘tarihsel kurumsalcılık’ analizi kullanılarak her seçim dönemi için (azınlıkların temsil edildiği Türkiye’de 7 ve Yunanistan’da 31 seçim) tarihsel/siyasal olaylar; siyasal sistemlerdeki değişiklikler ve bunların azınlıkların durumları üzerindeki etkileri incelenmiştir.

Tarihsel kurumsalcılık analizi; azınlık milletvekillerinin konuşmaları ve dönemin azınlık basını değerlendirmesi için yapılan arşiv çalışması; ve azınlığın önde gelenleri ile yapılan mülakatlar göstermiştir ki ortak varsayımın aksine siyasal temsiliyet potansiyeli Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasındaki ikili ilişkiden ve uluslararası kuruluşlardan bağımsızdır; ancak, Müslüman Türk azınlık siyasal tercihlerinin Türk-Yunan ilişkileri temelinde oluşmasına devam etmektedir. ‘Mütekabiliyet ilkesi’ yasal unsurlar; siyasal niyetin olmaması; karşılıklı güvensizlik;pazarlıklarda ortaya çıkan problemler dolayısıyla siyasal alanda uygulanmamıştır. Genel olarak mikro ve makro faktörler Rum ve Müslüman Türk azınlığın siyasal temsiliyetinde etkili olmaktadır. Müslüman azınlıkta ‘parti ile özdeşleşme’ oranı düşük; ‘yerelcilik’, ‘siyasal bölünme’ ve ‘etnik blok-oy verme’ daha yüksekken, Rum azınlığın ‘kullanılan resmi dildeki’ yeterliliği mecliste etkili olmalarını ve topluma entegre olmalarını arttırmıştır. 1977’den sonra Müslüman azınlık milletvekillerinin meclisteki sayısı azalsa da, eğitimlerinin ve dil hakimiyetlerinin ilerlemesi onların meclisteki etkinliğini arttırmıştır. Beklendiği gibi azınlık temsilcilerinin yaşadıkları ülkenin siyasal rejimine bağlı olarak, demokratikleşme ilerledikçe meclisteki etkinlikleri artmıştır. Azınlık mensupları ile yapılan mülakatlar ortak bir noktayı vurgulamaktadır: azınlık üyeleri yaşadıkları ülkenin siyasal sistemine saygı göstermekte, aynı kurallar ile rekabet etmeleri gerektiğini belirtmekte ancak siyasal sisteme tamamiyle güvenmemekte ve ‘kota sisteminin’ azınlık ve çoğunluk arasındaki etnik gerilimi arttıracığına inanmaktadırlar. ‘Mütekabiliyet ilkesi’ Rum cemaat için negatif çağrışım oluştururken, Müslüman azınlık Lozan Anlaşmasını anayasa gibi algılamaktadır. Egemen partinin olduğu kapalı-liste nisbi temsil seçim sisteminin Rum azınlığın siyasete katılmasını arttırma potansiyeli varken Batı Trakya’da etnik gerilimi arttırmaktadır. Çok-partili rekabetin yüksek olduğu ve açık-liste nisbi temsilin uygulandığı siyasal sistem Müslüman- Türk azınlığa siyasal temsiliyet için en uygun durumu sunmaktadır. Azınlık temsilcileri bir partiden seçilmişlerse (özellikle iktidar partisi) bağımsız seçilme durumuna göre mecliste daha etkili oldukları gözlenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasal Temsiliyet; Mütekabiliyet İlkesi; Rum Azınlık; Müslüman Türk Azınlık; Tarihsel Kurumsalcılık; Türk- Yunan İlişkileri.

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List of Abbreviations and Special Terms

| | |
|---------------|---|
| ABTTF | Avrupa Batı Trakya Türk Federasyonu (Federation of Western Thrace Turks in Europe). The federation was founded in 1978 in Hessen. |
| AKP | Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party). Turkish political party founded by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2001. |
| ANAP | <i>Anavatan Partisi</i> (Motherland Party). Turkish political party founded by Turgut Özal in 1983. |
| AP | Adalet Partisi (Justice Party). Founded in 1961 by the ex-elites of the Democrat Party. The party was closed after 1980 military coup. |
| AYK(-YK) | <i>Azınlık Yüksek Kurulu</i> (Supreme Minority Council-AYK), and its <i>Yürütme Komitesi</i> (Executive Committee-YK). |
| Barış | (Peace) The independent minority ticket in Ksanthi in the 1985 parliamentary elections. |
| BTTDD | <i>Batı Trakya Türkleri Dayanışma Dernekleri</i> (Western Thrace Turks' Solidarity Association) founded in 1946. The main association is in Istanbul, but there are several branches. |
| BTTÖB | <i>Batı Trakya Türk Öğretmenler Birliği</i> (Western Thrace Turkish Teacher's Union). |
| <i>cemaat</i> | The Muslim community. The term is commonly applied to the communities in Komotini and Ksanthi. It is also used for the religious groups in Turkey. |
| CHP | <i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i> (Republican People's Party/RPP). Turkish political party founded by Kemal Atatürk in 1923. |
| CUP | Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The party of the Young Turks, founded in 1908. |
| DIANA | <i>Dimokratikí Ananéosi</i> (Democratic Renewal). Splinter party of ND, founded by Kostis Stefanopoulos in 1985. |
| DIKKI | <i>Dimokratikó Kinonikó Kínima</i> (Democratic Social Movements). Splinter party of PASOK, founded by Dimitris Tsovolas in 1995. |
| DK | <i>Danışma Kurulu</i> (Consultation Council). The successor of AYK-YK after the parliamentary election in October 1993. |
| DSE | <i>Dimokratikós Stratós Elladás</i> (Democratic Army of Greece). |

| | |
|----------------|---|
| DSP | <i>Demokratik Sol Partisi</i> (Democratic Left Party). Bülent Ecevit's party, founded in 1985. |
| DYP | <i>Doğru Yol Partisi</i> (True Path Party). Süleyman Demirel's party, founded in 1984. |
| DP | Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party). Party of Adnan Menderes, founded in 1945. |
| EAM | <i>Ethnikó Apeleftherotikó Métopo</i> (National Liberation Front), which was active during the Second World War and the civil war. |
| EC | European Community |
| EDA | <i>Eniéa Dimokratikí Aristerá</i> (United Democratic Left). Greek political party founded in 1951. |
| EDE | <i>Ethnikí Dimokratikí Enosis</i> (National Democratic Union) Ultra right Greek party founded in 1974 and led by Petros Garufalias. |
| EDIK | <i>Enosis Dimokratikú Kéndru</i> (Union of the Democratic centre). Fusion of EK and <i>Néas Dinámis</i> in 1976. |
| EEC | European Economic Community |
| EK | <i>Enosis Kéndru</i> (Centre Union). Major Greek political party founded in 1961, and led by Yeoryios Papandreu. After 1974 it was first led by Yeoryios Mavros. |
| EP | <i>Ethnikí Parataxis</i> (National Camp). Ultra right Greek party founded in 1977 and led by Stefanos Stefanopoulos. |
| EP | European Parliament. |
| EPATH | <i>(E)idiki Pedagogiki Akademia Thessalonikis</i> . Greek college for educating minority teachers. |
| EPEN | <i>Ethnikí Politikí Enosis</i> (National Political Union). Originally an alliance in the 1946 elections. The ultra right regrouped under this name before the European Election 17 June 1984. |
| ERE | <i>Ethnikí Rizospastikí Enosis</i> (National Radical Union). Major Greek political party founded by Konstantinos Karamanlis in 1956. |
| ES | <i>Ellinikós Sinayermós</i> (Greek Rally). A political group created by Aleksandros Papagos in 1951, which passed from the scene after his death in 1955. |
| <i>établis</i> | Term (French) for those who were “established” in the areas exempted from the population exchange |

| | |
|--------------|---|
| EU | European Union |
| <i>ezan</i> | Muslim call to prayer. |
| Golden Dawn | (Hrisi Avgi). Ultra-nationalist (fascist) Greek party founded in 1980 under the leadership of Nikolaos Michaloliakos. |
| GTGB | <i>Gümülcine Türk Gençler Birliği</i> (Komotini Turkish Youths' Union). |
| Güven | (Trust) the independent minority ticket in Rodopi in the 1989–1993 elections. |
| <i>hatim</i> | social celebration made for the Muslim children who finish a complete reading of the Koran. |
| <i>hatip</i> | Muslim preacher. |
| <i>imam</i> | Muslim prayer leader. |
| IA | <i>Inoméni Aristerá</i> (United Left). Election alliance in the 1974 Greek elections. |
| İkbal | (Good Fortune) the independent minority ticket in Ksanthi in the 1989–1990 parliamentary elections. |
| İTB | <i>İskeçe Türk Birliği</i> (Ksanthi Turkish Union). |
| <i>kadi</i> | Islamic judge. |
| KAE | <i>Kómma Agrotón ke Ergatión</i> (Party of Peasants and Workers). Greek political party led by Aleksandros Baltatzis in the 1981 elections. |
| KF | <i>Kómma Fileléftheron</i> (Liberal Party). Greek political party founded by Eleftherios Venizelos in 1910. |
| KKE | <i>Kommunistikó Kómma Elládas</i> (Communist Party of Greece), founded in 1918. |
| KKE (e) | <i>Kommunistikó Kómma Elládas-esoterikú</i> (Communist Party of Greece-Interior). The Greek Euro-communists' party, which emerged after the KKE split in 1968. |
| KP | <i>Kómma Proodeftikón</i> (Party of the Progressives). The party was originally founded by Spiros Markezinis in 1954. He revived it for the 1981 parliamentary elections, when it represented the far right. |
| MHP | <i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i> (National Action Party). Turkish ultra right party founded by Alpaslan Türkeş in 1969 as a continuation of the <i>Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi</i> (Republican Peasant's People Party) |

| | |
|-----------------|--|
| <i>müderriş</i> | Muslim higher religious teacher. |
| <i>mufti</i> | In Turkish <i>müftü</i> . Muslim religious leader learned in Islamic law. |
| <i>müftülük</i> | The Mufti Office (the Turkish term). |
| ND | <i>Néa Dimokratía</i> (New Democracy). Major Greek political party founded by Konstandinos Karamanlis in 1974. |
| <i>omoyenís</i> | Kinsman. Greek term characterising the members of the Greek nation. Similar in scope to the Turkish <i>soydaş</i> . |
| PADE | <i>Proodeftikí Agrotikí Demokratikí Enosis</i> (Progressive Agrarian Democratic Union). Coalition of parties in the 1958 elections. |
| PASOK | <i>Panellinio Sosialistikó Kínima</i> (Panhellenic Socialist Movement). Major Greek political party founded by Andreas Papandreu in 1974. |
| PEKEM | (BAKEŞ) Culture and Education Foundation of Western Thrace Minority |
| Politiki Aniksi | “Political Spring Party”. Splinter party from ND, founded by Andonis Samaras in 1993. |
| PR | Proportional Representation Electoral System |
| Refah Partisi | “Welfare Party”. Necmettin Erbakan’s political party, founded in 1983. |
| Sinaspismos | [<i>Sinaspismós tis Aristerás ke tis Proódu</i> (Coalition of the Left and the Progressive)]. This coalition was founded in 1989 and included the parties on the left of PASOK. KKE later broke out, and ran as a separate party in the 1993 elections. |
| <i>soydaş</i> | Kinsman. Turkish term characterising the members of the Turkish nation. Similar in scope to the Greek <i>omoyenís</i> . |
| SYRIZA | [<i>Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás</i> (The Coalition of the Radical Left)]. As a continuity of Sinaspismos, founded in 2004. |
| UN | United Nations. |
| <i>vakıf</i> | Pious foundation based on the Ottoman social administration. |
| YTD | <i>Yüksek Tahsilliler Derneği</i> (University Graduates’ Association). Association of people with higher education (full name BTAYTD: <i>Bati Trakya Azınlığı Yüksek Tahsilliler Derneği</i>). |

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War brought back the ‘minority issue’ and ‘identity politics’ back to the agenda of political science, which began to analyze the newly erupted ethnic conflicts in Balkans, Caucasus, and in Eastern Europe. As the new nation-states were emerging, minority rights and protection of their rights became the focus of the researches. For Turkey and Greece, which were both established on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, the provisions concerning the protection of national minority rights were included in the Lausanne Peace Treaty signed in 1923 after the First World War. According to Articles 37-45 of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), the Greek and the Turkish governments are obliged to protect the respective minorities in their territories. The countries both agreed to provide to their minorities equality before the law, protection of life and liberty, free use of any language, free exercise of religion, the right to establish and control their own institutions and schools, the right to give instruction in their own languages, freedom of movement and all other rights enjoyed by the majority. These provisions introduced a new variable in terms of domestic relations—that of minority rights conceived as collective rights.

Similar to the First World War treaties, the new nation-states established after the post-Cold War perceived minority rights as collective rights. On the other hand, Lausanne Treaty’s section on the ‘minority protection’ has a unique character as it brought the concept ‘mutual responsibility’ by saying “the rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory”. Since then, highly related to Turkish-Greek relations, ‘mutual/parallel responsibility’ has been perceived as ‘reciprocity rule’ which is implemented usually negatively but also positively by Greek and Turkish states for the Muslim minority in Western Thrace and Greek-Orthodox minority living in Istanbul respectively, in cultural, social and economic fields. Since the enforcement of the Lausanne Treaty, although the articles regarding the minority rights have been violated by both states, the ‘ethnic tension’ has never been converted to an ‘ethnic conflict’ like the ones that are witnessed in former Yugoslavia or in the former USSR states.

It is observed that in the newly established nation-states 'political rights' are also guaranteed with institutional designs such as 'quota system' for the minority groups in order to end the ethnic conflict and to diminish the ethnic tension. At this point, political representation of the minorities became a key process for the democratization of the states and became a tool for the minorities to protect their rights. The system and government become more legitimized in the eyes of the under-represented communities such as minorities when their members are also included. As a result, several scholars have analyzed the macro-level and micro-level factors that are likely to improve the political representation of the minorities.

Research Design, Rationale and Methodology

As Hanna Pitkin describes, political representation is the activity of making citizens' voices, opinions, and perspectives "present" in the public policy making processes. Political representation occurs when political actors speak, advocate, symbolize, and act on the behalf of others in the political arena. In short, political representation is a kind of political assistance.¹ For the Greek and Turkish case, when the political representation of Muslim minority and Greek-Orthodox minority has been analyzed, it is observed that 'reciprocity rule' has not been applied in the political field, as the periods of their representation (or non-representation) in the Parliaments do not intersect with each other. Although in the Lausanne Treaty, rights in social, cultural, religious and economic areas have been conceived as collective rights; rights regarding the political sphere have been perceived as 'individual rights'. Article 39 asserts "Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems" and article 40 declares "Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals". However, equal political opportunities do not guarantee equality in terms of outcome, particularly not in the midst of considerable inequality in terms of resources. Consequently, the conditions for political integration in a given political regime cannot be assessed only by its theoretical potential, but must also be evaluated on the basis of practice. This thesis perceives political participation and representation of the minorities a salient tool to break their bonds to the reciprocity rule.

Greek Orthodox minority was politically represented like the other non-Muslim minorities after the transition to parliamentary monarchy in 1876, in 1877; 1908; 1912;

¹Hanna Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation*, (University of California Press, 1967), p. 38.

1914 Ottoman Parliament, but excluded in 1920-23 Turkish National Assembly, and this exclusion continued until 1935 parliamentary elections. Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, 24 parliamentary elections have been conducted, within those Greek-Orthodox minority has been represented only in 7 parliamentary terms with 8 deputies in total. These represented periods are between 1935 and 1960, a period after which they have never been represented in the Turkish Parliament. Since the accession of the Western Thrace to Greece (1920) 32 parliamentary elections have been done, and within those elections Muslim-Turkish minority has been represented in all of them except 1993 parliamentary elections in which they ran with the independent ticket despite the fact that it was impossible to elect an independent MP with the 3% electoral threshold. Between the years 1936-1946; and 1967-1974 Greek Parliament was not functioning due to the junta regimes. Hence, the periods of political representation of the respective minorities in the national parliaments do not coincide.

Research Question and Design

Depending on the Turkish-Greek relations, ‘reciprocity rule’ has been negatively or positively applied regarding the Greek-Orthodox and Muslim-Turkish minority’s rights in education, freedom of belief, property, establishing associations etc. The study drives from the fact that it has not been applied in the political field, suggesting that ‘political representation’ of the minorities is independent from the ‘reciprocity rule’ and Greek-Turkish relations. From this point, the main research question of the thesis emerges: Why two minority communities have different characteristics of political representation? Some would explain that is due to the difference between the sizes of their population. This statistical difference is not sufficient to explain why Greek-Orthodox community was excluded from politics until 1935, while Muslim-Turkish group (which has the same size) managed to send 4 deputies to the Greek Parliament in 1920.

To understand ‘why reciprocity rule has not been applied in the political field’ and ‘why two minority communities have different characteristics of political representation?’ the thesis examines the determinants that influence the possibility of minority’s political representation. With this aim, this thesis depends on two works, one for the theoretical ground and the other for the institutional design. The thesis utilizes Fredrik Barth’s approach, which claims that “ethnic identities are not primordial and they are socially

constructed through the competition of the groups for the distribution of resources”². Barth’s theory on ethnic groups suggests that the ethnic identities of the groups, which came from the same ethnic origin but interacted with different social groups display different qualifications. Hence the political representation of the minorities will be shaped not according to their intrinsic ethnic features, but through their interaction with the other groups, where the social structure, relations with outside, type of production and cleavages are the determining factors. Similar to other minority groups, the political behavior of the Greek minority in Istanbul and Turkish minority of Western Thrace have been shaped by the political, social, economic conditions they have been living in rather than their own ethnic identity. For the institutional design, Karen Bird’s work on the opportunities and constraints related to the political representation of minorities is used, by which the micro-level and macro-level factors have been tested for the Roum and Muslim-Turkish minority.³ Micro-level factors expected to influence the political representation of the minority are: group size; spatial concentration; participation in minority associational life; political cohesiveness and mobilization; language skills and length of residency. Macro-level factors are: electoral rules; candidate nomination and selection processes and party competition. In addition to these institutional factors, this study also analyzed ‘reciprocity rule’ as a macro-level factor for the political representation of the respective minority groups. Karen Bird does not include ‘localism’ and ‘cleavages’ as a micro-level factor; and ‘level of democracy in the country the minorities live in’ as macro-level factors; however the findings of this thesis study suggest that they should be included in the general literature.

With this regard, the thesis mainly tries to seek answers to the following questions: 1) If ethnic identities of respective minorities are shaped by structural constraints (macro-level and micro-level factors), rather than intrinsic variables. How they define themselves, and how they are perceived by the society they are living in; 2) If political participation (mainly electoral representation) of Greek-Orthodox and Turkish-Muslim minority is influenced, restricted or supported as a result of the ‘reciprocity principle’ (macro-level factor); 2.a) If the difference of political representation of Turkish and Greek minority

² Fredrik Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organization of Culture Difference*, (Little Brown: University of Michigan, 1969).

³ Karen Bird, “The Political Representation of Women and Ethnic Minorities in Established Democracies: A Framework for Comparative Research”, Working Paper presented for the Academy of Migration Studies, Denmark, 2003.

emerges due to their numerical differences, although they are granted with similar social, economic, political and civil rights, and recognized as the citizens of the countries they are living in, due to the Lausanne Treaty and the reciprocity principle (micro-level factor); 2.b) If the relations between Greece and Turkey influence the political representation of these communities (macro-level factor); 2.c) Why bilateral restrictions or opportunities on economic, social and cultural rights of these communities have not been applied in the political sphere?; 3) If international conjecture, mainly the accession process of Turkey to EU influences the political representation of these communities (macro-level factor); and 4) Even if the minority group has strong micro-level factors to produce ethnic electoral power such as the full electoral mobilization of the ethnic minority, an ethnic bloc vote, a strategic location of this ethnic vote in marginal constituencies; whether quality of the representation and party-identification is high. (Parliamentary Speeches).

Methodology

To understand the main research question of the thesis “why two minority communities have different characteristics of political representation?” and to test the micro-level and macro-level factors, the study utilized Most Similar System Design (MSSD) comparative method. Until now, political representation of Greek-Orthodox and Muslim-Turkish minority has not been analyzed in comparison with each other. Uniqueness of ‘reciprocity rule’ as a macro-level factor also increases the contribution of this thesis to the literature. As the number of the national elections and minority MPs are not sufficient for a quantitative study; and the main aim of the thesis is a detailed analysis of the political representation process, the thesis utilizes a qualitative comparative method ‘historical institutionalism’ method, where for each electoral period the historical/political events, regime types and changes in the political institutions (electoral system, party system) that expected to influence the conditions of the minorities are examined. The purpose of this study is not trying to find which country treats its minority worse. In order to maintain the objectivity of this academic study and generalize the findings the main focus will be on the macro-level and micro-level factors. On various occasions the treatment of minorities in Greece and Turkey are compared in this thesis, but only when it is appropriate for understanding the underlying patterns in the political representation of the minorities.

This thesis focuses on the political representation on a national level, and the activities of minority representatives are scrutinized in order to understand their effective roles. In this thesis ‘representatives’ refer to Members of Parliament or Congress who have been authorized by the process of election to exercise certain powers. To examine the effectiveness of the minority MPs in the national assemblies, ‘Content Analysis/text analysis’ method is used. For each electoral period, the parliamentary work of the minority deputies is studied; the number of their parliamentary speeches and written interpellations, and proposals regarding the minority they represent are analyzed. By benefiting from text analysis, whether the minority MPs use the word ‘minority’ and mention the ethnicity of the minority is scrutinized. In order to understand the ‘effectiveness’ of the minority MPs, Greek and Turkish national parliamentary archives are mainly utilized. Turkish parliament archives are online and easier to access compared to the Greek national archives. The fact that Muslim-Turkish minority representatives did not take the floor in the parliament until 1977, but expressed their opinions at their own newspapers, made the minority press analysis a worthy research material.

In the research on the political representation of Greek Orthodox minority in Turkey, 7 national elections (1935, 1939, 1943, 1946, 1950, 1954, and 1957) and 7 parliamentary terms in which Roum MPs were elected are examined. In total (excluding the founding parliament in 1961) 8 different Roum MPs served in the Turkish Parliament, among which only 3 of them were re-elected more than 1 parliament term. Greek-Orthodox community was represented for the last time in 6 January-25 October 1961 Founding Parliament which was established after the 1960 military coup. In Greece, since the accession of the Western Thrace in 1920, Muslim-Turkish minority has been represented in 31 national elections (1920; 1923; 1926; 1928; 1932; 1933; 1935; 1936; 1946; 1950; 1951; 1952; 1956; 1958; 1961; 1963; 1964; 1974; 1977; 1981; 1985; 18 June 1989; 5 November 1989; 1990; 1996; 2000; 2004; 2007; 2009; 6 May 2012; 17 June 2012) and in 3 Senate elections (1929; 1932; 1934). In total they got 85 seats in the national elections and 3 seats in the Senate elections. 19 minority MPs have been elected for more than 1 parliamentary term. Except the senate and founding parliament elections, the study analyzed each election and electoral term, by focusing on the nomination process; the number of votes the minority MPs got; the party they were elected from; their competition with the other candidates and their work in the parliament as much as the data and materials allow. The online access to the archives has been through these

channels: For MPs speeches in the Turkish Parliament http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/tutanak_sorgu.html; for the Greek Parliament archive <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Vouleftes>. Online access to the Greek Parliamentary Archive is available only for the period after 2009 national elections.

The interviews made by the prominent figures and minority MPs (current and previous) reveal how minority communities perceive the ‘principle of reciprocity’, its implementations, the other minority community, the Turkish-Greek relations, political representation, the nomination and process of candidacy. For this aim between the years 2011-2013, in total 8 interviews were made in Greece (Komotini and Ksanthi) including Muslim-Turkish MPs, association presidents, and minority members. 4 interviews were made in Turkey with 3 minority prominent figures and with 1 Turkish MP. As both minority groups have good command in Turkish, all the interviews were made in Turkish and translated into English.

In the general literature, the titles ‘Greek-Orthodox minority of Turkey’ and ‘Muslim minority in Western Thrace’ have been used. On the other hand, these minority groups identify themselves as ‘Romioi’ (Roum) and Muslim-Turkish. That’s why throughout this thesis these titles (*Roum* and *Muslim-Turkish*) have also been used when these communities are mentioned. The numbers of the minority groups vary in the general literature and in the statistics the communities use. When the Lausanne Treaty was signed in 1923, the total number of the minority group was equal as 100,000. The population of the Roum community in Turkey has been reduced drastically since this date. In this study, the total number of the Roum community is accepted as 4000; and the Muslim minority in Thrace as 104,000 (section 3.1 Table 1 & section 3.2 Table 2).

Scope of the Study

To analyze the political representation of the Roum minority in Turkey and Muslim-Turkish minority in Western Thrace (Greece) the thesis will follow a path that goes from general to specific. In each Chapter, one or two assumptions of the thesis is questioned and tested by qualitative data. In Chapter 1 the objective is to combine theory with the institutional design, in which the focus will be on two works: Fredrik Barth’s argument that “ethnic identities are not primordial but shaped according to the social structure the minority lives in” and Karen Birds’ study on the macro-level and micro-level factors that

are expected to determine the political representation of the minorities. For this aim, first the articles of the international organizations on ‘minority’ and the variations of the term ‘minority’ are discussed (1.1), which is followed by constructing the link between democracy and political representation (1.2). Then, the theoretical foundation of the thesis will be spelled out (1.3). After giving the methodology to be utilized in the study is mentioned with its limitations, research question of the thesis and its main arguments are constituted.

In Chapter 2 the analysis starts by depicting the definition ‘reciprocity rule’, its emergence with the Lausanne Treaty and its role in the protection of minority rights. In addition to the institutional factors determining the representation in the general literature, ‘reciprocity rule’ is added as a macro-level factor and one of the contributions this thesis makes. By showing the general implementation of the reciprocity rule by Greek and Turkish states, Chapter 2 makes it possible to test the role of reciprocity rule and the supranational institutions on the political representation of the Roum and Muslim-Turkish minority (arguments 2 and 3).

Chapter 3 analyzes the general characteristics of the respective minority communities. The first part of the chapter (3.1) looks at the demographic features of the Roum community, discusses the ‘identity’ of the group, and scrutinizes their organizational abilities in foundations, educational institutions and in press. The second part of the chapter (3.2) does the same study for Muslim-Turkish minority. The last part of this chapter (3.3) compares the general characteristics of the minorities, and discusses whether the differences on the micro-level factors have an influence on the political behavior of the minority communities (argument 1).

Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 construct the core of the thesis study, where the parliamentary work of each minority MP is examined and their effectiveness is discussed (argument 4). Chapter 4 focuses on the political representation of the Greek-Orthodox minority in Turkey. In each section of the chapter, the historical/political events that affect the daily life of the Roum community are depicted in addition to the changes in the political institutions that are expected to influence their political representation. The first part (4.1) includes a brief picture of the political life and representation of the Roum population during the late Ottoman period (1908-1923), which enables to show the main changes and

continuities from the Ottoman time. The second part (4.2) focuses on the period (1923-1935) when Roum minority is excluded from parliamentary representation and tries to understand the reasons behind that. The third part (4.3) evaluates the period (1935-1946) when the minority is represented in the Turkish parliament, but with several limitations. The section 4.4 (years of representation) shows the change in the political life of the minority with the transition to democracy. The section 4.5 is one of the crucial parts of the thesis, where the political representation of the Roum minority within the periods is compared in terms of the number and effectiveness of the minority MPs. As the Roum community has not been represented since 1961, the section 4.6 tries to full-fill the gap with interviews by the community's prominent figures and with a Turkish MP. The answer to the main research question: '*why two minority communities have different characteristics of political representation?*' begins to turn concrete in this section.

Chapter 5 makes a similar research on the political representation of the Muslim-Turkish minority in Western Thrace, and because it analyzes 31 electoral terms in which the minority has been represented with 85 seats in total, this chapter constructs the longest part of the thesis. The sections in this chapter are organized according to the political life in Greece. In each section, the important political events and institutional changes are depicted to give the background of the political atmosphere, and to analyze the arguments of the thesis (argument 4). With this objective, the first part (5.1) examines the political representation of the minority between the accessions of the region to Greece (1920) to the rise of Metaxas regime (1936). The third part (5.3) includes the period from transition to democracy to the junta regime (1946-1967), which also briefly compares the period with the previous one on the date of political representation, cleavages, number of minority MPs, their background, and their parties. The section (5.5) examining the political life and political representation of the minority since 1974, is one of the most salient research findings of the thesis, where although the number of the minority MPs in the parliament decreases, their effectiveness increases. Interviews with the current and previous minority MPs, prominent figures and other members of the minority enable to test the common assumptions, to build the link between the institutional factors and political representation; and enrich the study by displaying the differences in two minorities' political behavior.

The Conclusion evaluates the research question of the thesis by referring to the data found in the previous chapters. Here, in the first part the constraints and opportunities for the political representation of the minority communities are compared within the framework of micro-level and macro-level factors. With the findings received in the first part, the second part analyzes the questions of the study. The conclusion chapter ends with the suggestions for the following researches and recommendations to both minorities and to the host-states.

CHAPTER 1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK of POLITICAL REPRESENTATION of MINORITIES

Political participation of minorities is crucial not only for maintaining the implementation of the minority rights, but also for the functioning of stable democracy as well. However, it is observed that the political participation of the minority community has not been the primary focus of minority rights as much as linguistic, religious and educational rights. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) guarantees the right of all citizens to participate in the political life of the country.⁴ The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) also only contains a rather general clause regarding political participation in Article 15: “the Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular those affecting them”⁵. However, similar to the definition of minority and minority rights, political representation of the minorities lacks a minority-specific dimension, ignoring the ‘politics of difference’ that alienate the social identities of minority groups. On the other hand, compared to economic, cultural and social rights of the minorities, their right to political participation seems to be less likely limited by the states, due to the fact that political participation constructs the foundation of citizenship rights which all the citizens of the countries enjoy equally. Moreover, while larger minorities found their primary voice through minority parties or through gaining representation in national parties, smaller minorities more frequently express their concerns when it comes to minority-specific interests through institutions for cultural autonomy, international organizations, minority associations, or local-level political activism.

Compared to the political representation opportunities and constraints of the general minority groups, Greek-Orthodox minority community of Istanbul and Turkish-Muslim minority in Greece has a unique case. It is seen that the implementation and protection of the minorities’ economic and cultural rights in these communities have not been

⁴ Florian Bieber, “Introduction: Minority Participation and Political Parties”, in *Political Parties and Minority Participation*, (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Office Macedonia, 2008), pp.5-31.

⁵ <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuideMinorities8en.pdf>

guaranteed mainly by their political participation, but also through the ‘principle of reciprocity’⁶ which was settled by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923⁷ between Turkey and Greece. Even though Muslim minority in Greece is the larger minority groups, which has been concentrated in Western Thrace, cannot be represented by a minority party or independent candidates due to 3% national threshold, and they can only participate into Greek Parliament through majority parties. Parliamentary political participation of the Greek-Orthodox minority of Istanbul has been totally left impossible since 1964, as the number of this community has diminished to around 3000. Despite these facts, both of these communities have managed to have a voice on their cultural and economic rights through the channel of ‘reciprocity’.

However, as the thesis study focuses on the political representation of minorities, particularly comparing the cases of Muslim-Turkish minority in Western Thrace of Greece and Greek-Orthodox (Roum) minority community in Istanbul, in this chapter first the definitions of minority will be given. Here the debate primarily focuses on the definition of ‘national minority’. After the historical evolution of minority rights protection, the question on whether minority rights are accepted, as ‘individual or collective rights’ will be discussed. Following the literature on political representation and its relation to democracy, the theoretical foundation of the thesis will be explained and its connection to the determinants of representation of minorities will be given. In each debate, examples from Greek and Turkish case will be analyzed. Finally the arguments of the thesis and the methodology that the study utilizes will be structured in details.

1.1 Debates on the Conceptualization of Minority by International Organizations and Minority Rights Protection

Minority issues have long been a sensitive topic for governments. Given that governments make international law, it is not a surprise that international minority rights have lagged behind the definition of other branches of human rights. The use of human rights language to improve the treatment of minority and disadvantaged groups became increasingly popular in the latter half of the twentieth century. Up until 1990s, there were no significant international human rights institutions addressing minorities. At the same

⁶ ‘Rule of reciprocity’ is discussed in details in Chapter 2.

⁷ Lausanne Treaty of 1924 and its section on minority rights protection are given in detail in Appendix A.

time, there was a rapid growth in the number of minority-related non-governmental organizations, particularly since the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, and the ‘minority issue’ has now been firmly placed on the agenda at both regional and international levels.

Juhn Raikka expresses this definition problem succinctly: ‘it is unclear what “minorities” are’⁸. He highlights the disagreements over immigrant minorities and the practical problems of defining linguistic minorities and goes on to pose several related questions, namely who belongs to these minorities and what kind of obligations are envisaged by minority protection.⁹ The problem of defining a minority for the purposes of international law has troubled international lawyers and academics since the League of Nations first became concerned with minority protection. Almost a century later and there is still no accepted definition as to what constitutes a minority in international law.¹⁰ Furthermore, the types of minority protected by international documents vary from ‘ethnic, linguistic and religious’ minorities (in the ICCPR) to ‘national’ minorities (in the CSCE and Council of Europe documents). This lack of definition is generally blamed on the complexity of the subject. However, other commentators have also pointed to the traditional antipathy and ‘fear’ that any mention of minority rights invokes in national governments.

1.1.1 Definition of Minority by International Organizations

The concept of minority was first incorporated in international treaties in the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference, in peace treaties with the emerging states from dissolution of Austro-Hungarian Empire, Ottoman Empire and the Prussian Kingdom.¹¹ The treaties were obliging the new states of East and Central Europe (Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia), states which had increased their territory (Romania and Greece), and states which had been defeated (Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey) to grant religious and political equality as well as some special rights to their minority peoples.¹² In the first

⁸ Juhn Raikka, *Do We Need Minority Rights? Conceptual Issues* (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996), p. 3.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p.9.

¹⁰ UN Declaration on the rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities UN Res 47/135 of 18 December 1992.

¹¹ Jennifer Jackson Preece, *National Minorities and the European Nation-States System*, 1st Edition, (Oxford University Press, NY, 1998), p.15

¹²Carole Fink, “The League of Nations and The Minorities Question”, *World Affairs*, Vol.157 No.4, Spring1995,p.197.

international treaties containing minority provisions, minority was defined as ‘persons who belong to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities’. This definition was based on objective criteria; belonging to a different race, religion, language. Inclusion of the adjective ‘racial’ in the definition also reveals that what was meant by minority in this era was undoubtedly ‘national minority’. National minority is the one who has a kin- state; the state dominated by the fellowmen. The state where the minority lives and is bound by citizenship is called the host state.¹³

Following the collapse of the League of Nations regime, the concept of a general, universal protection of human rights evolved. The United Nations Charter was proclaimed by the General Assembly as ‘a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations’ which ‘seeks to enlist every individual and every organ of society in a universal human rights movement’.¹⁴ That’s why the most comprehensive and widely used definition of minority was made by United Nations Human Rights Commission’s “Deterrence of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities” report in 1978. According to this report, “A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members- being nationals of the State- possess ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language” are defined as minority. Later in 1985 the sentence “a collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law” is added to the definition.¹⁵ An important distinction of UN’s definition from the League’s is the substitution of the adjective ‘ethnic’ instead of ‘racial’. This is intended to refrain from the negative connotations of ‘race’; racism and the disastrous experiences of World War II. On the other hand, UN’s definition holds for autochthonous or historical minorities. Immigrants, permanent residents, or migrant workers are excluded, although they also share the cultural distinctiveness of a minority group.

¹³ See Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), pp 10-33. According to Kymlicka, national minorities refer to those long-standing minority groups whose presence in a state may be the result of colonization, conquer, or forced migration. These groups are characterized by the maintenance of (at least some) separate institutions, and by demands for some level of political autonomy. Poly-ethnic minorities refer to those who (or whose ancestors) arrived more recently. These groups are not usually characterized by demands for political autonomy, but rather by demands for greater inclusion in the institutions of the state.

¹⁴ <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter4.shtml>

¹⁵ (UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub.2/1985/31). Naz Çavuşoğlu, *Uluslararası İnsan Hakları Hukukunda Azınlık Hakları*, (Su Yayınları: İstanbul), 2001.

The Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) definition of minority includes the kin-state variable. Although not every minority has a kin state, most of the minorities do. Non-dominant population that is numerical minority within a State but that shares the same nationality/ethnicity as the population constituting a numerical majority in another, often neighboring or "kin" state.¹⁶ In 1992 at Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) minorities are defined as: "separate or distinct groups, well defined and established on the territory of a state, the members of which are nationals of that state and have certain religious, linguistic, cultural or other characteristics which distinguish them from the majority of the population".¹⁷ Finally, the European Union used its level of conditionality in order to influence the minority performance of all states applying for EU-membership. Although EU has quite limited legal competences in minority protection (e.g. Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU prescribes that members of national minorities shall not be discriminated against), the political criteria for accession to be met by the candidate countries, as laid down by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, stipulate that these countries must have achieved "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities".

In addition to internationally binding agreements on minority rights, Turkey and Greece also bilaterally obliged to protect and implement the rights of the minorities living in their territory as indicated in Lausanne Treaty of 1923. The Treaty is significant not only for being the international recognition agreement of Turkish Republic, but beyond that it's a document on minority rights, and structuring the population exchange between Turkey and Greece.¹⁸ The Greek and Turkish Government's obligations to guarantee the rights of the Turkish and Greek community respectively stems from a number of treaties and agreements. According to Articles 37-45 of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), the Greek and the Turkish governments are obliged to protect the respective minorities in their

¹⁶ Pamphlet No.9 of the UN Guide for Minorities, p.5, available online at <http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/minorities/guide.htm>, 02.05.2006.

¹⁷ <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuideMinorities8en.pdf>

¹⁸ According to its provisions all Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory and all Greek nationals of Muslim religion established on Greek territory, were forced to migrate. Following it, approximately 1,1 million Orthodox Greeks fled Turkey and became refugees in Greece, and 400.000 Muslims left Greece. This was the first time this method was adopted, the compulsory exchange of large ethnic groups as a means to separate nationally intermingle people in order to solve the problem.

territories. They agreed to provide equality before the law, protection of life and liberty, free use of any language, free exercise of religion, the right to establish and control their own institutions and schools, the right to give instruction in their own languages, freedom of movement and all other rights enjoyed by the majority. To be more precise, all these guarantees were mentioned (in Articles 37-44)¹⁹ in respect to the Greek minority in Istanbul and the last one (Article 45)²⁰ shortly but equally bindingly stated that the same rights were recognized by Greece in relation to its Muslim minority.

1.1.2. Minority Rights Protection (Debate on Collective vs. Individual Rights)

As discussed above, apart from the specific provisions of the Lausanne Treaty, there is also a network of international agreements protecting human rights. Though in most cases there are no enforcement mechanisms, the deeper incorporation of Greece and Turkey into the international community became dependent on the application of human rights. As aforementioned there is not a universally accepted definition of minority or an agreement on the extent of human/minority rights protection. Often, the most reliable criterion for the existence of a minority is the personal faith and will of a person to be a part of it.²¹ Wartime experiences urged the international community to replace minority rights with the protection of human rights, thus avoiding any reference to minorities in the UN Charter (1945) or in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). It was believed that the latter concept based on non-discrimination on racial, ethnic and religious grounds would provide an efficient framework of minority protection.²²

¹⁹ Section III of the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923) Concerning Protection of Minorities. Given in Appendix A. In these articles it is explicitly mentioned that The Muslims of Western Thrace in order to be treated as equal citizens of the Greek state were granted civil, political and cultural rights. Equality before the law is guaranteed and discrimination on the ground of ethnic characteristics is prohibited. With the respect to the political rights, apart from the fact that the convention implicates full exercise of political rights of the members of minority, as the Christians, there is no reference that political equality requires territorial autonomy or quotas for the representation of the minority group in the parliament. Distinct rights did not involve maintenance of the group as a distinct body with its own legislative and executive powers. As regards the cultural rights, according to the provisions of the convention, Greece was obliged to secure and maintain rights of the Muslim minority linked to their language, education and religion. In particular the Greek state undertakes the responsibility that in areas where a large number of the minority is established the group receives an equitable share of the funds in order to be able to maintain its own religious, social and educational institutions. The non-Muslims (Roums, Armenians, Jews) in Turkey will enjoy the same rights granted to the Muslim minority of Greece.

²⁰ “The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory”.

²¹ Ibid. Preece, “National Minority Rights vs. State Sovereignty in Europe”, p. 349.

²² Çiğdem Nas, “Avrupa Parlamentosu’nun Etnik Azınlıklara Bakışı ve Türkiye”, *Uluslararası Politikada Yeni Alanlar, Yeni Bakışlar*, (ed.) Faruk Sönmezoğlu, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1998), pp. 388-389.

The acceptance of the above mechanisms and the respect of human rights constitute a basic criterion and decisive factor for the admission of new states inside the EU. Yet, the main disadvantage of the system is that it applies to countries already in the EU and in full compliance with human rights and has no global appeal.²³ FCNM entered into force on 1 February 1998, as of 15 July 2004, has been ratified by thirty-five states.²⁴ Many countries, considering their own political interests ‘deny’ the existence of minorities within their borders, while others support a wider definition in order to include their kin populations that live in neighboring states. Post-war international law never gave in to the connection of minority rights and the right of minorities to secede. On the contrary, international organizations found their policy on the principle of respect of borders and often formulate a very vague terminology and regime on minority protection.²⁵ This policy allows the countries to abstain from fulfilling their minority duties, as no one will force them to abide by certain parts of international conventions and to accept other obligations with ‘reservations’.²⁶

Individual vs. Collective Rights

Even though the drafters of the United Nations Charter and Declaration were proud to leave behind the language of minority rights endorsed by the League of Nations regime, it is apparent that many of the positive rights in the International Covenants of 1966 have collective dimensions; without acknowledgement of the group these rights become redundant. Such is the case with freedom of religion and association, both of which entail a collective element. However, the way that these rights are framed both in the United Nations Covenants and in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is abstract, applying only to the individuals who comprise the groups in question. This abstraction is also applicable to the minority rights provision in Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which vests in ‘members of

²³<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuideMinorities8en.pdf>

²⁴ FCNM has been signed, but not yet ratified by Belgium, Georgia, Greece, Iceland, Latvia, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Three Council of Europe member states have not yet taken any action with a view to being bound by FCNM: Andorra, France, and Turkey.

See. Marc Weller, *Rights of Minorities in Europe: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*, (Oxford University Press, 2005), p.2.

²⁵ Ibid. Preece, p. 330.

²⁶ Georgios Niarchos, *Between Ethnicity, Religion and Politics Foreign Policy and the Treatment of Minorities in Greece and Turkey, 1923-1974*, (unpublished PhD Thesis), submitted to The European Institute London School of Economics and Political Science, 2005.

minorities’.²⁷

The recognition of collective rights is further complicated by the recognition of different types of minorities in various international documents. Article 27 of the ICCPR refers to ‘ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities’ whereas the regional provisions such as the Helsinki Final Act and the Framework Convention prefer instead the term ‘national minority’, it is not only international law that suffers from this imprecision. Academics have afforded group rights recognition to a variety of specific beneficiaries, including ‘conations’ and ‘homogenous, constitutive communities’.²⁸

Another argument on the definition and recognition of minority rights emerges, whether they should be regarded as individual or collective rights.²⁹ It is argued after WWII that the rights given to individual will provide the protection of minorities. On the other hand, some believes “collective rights” guarantee the survival of the group, as emphasizes by the ethnic, linguistic and religious difference of that group from the others.³⁰ Whereas, it can also lead to suppression of the individual’s preferences by the group as well.

The extent to which individual rights are bound up in the realization of group rights is essentially a subjective issue that depends on the nature of the group boundaries as well as the extent of ostracism from the dominant culture. In explaining the needs of certain groups for collective rights recognition, Sandel contrasts the needs of cultural minorities with other discriminated groups where there is no cohesive group identity:

“In contrast, cultural minorities seek more than the right of their individual members to equality and participation within the larger society. They also seek distinct group survival. Because economic and social forces, as well as state policies, tend to promote assimilation, the leaders of cultural minorities often look to the state for support. They seek either protection or autonomy as the means to ensure that their collectivities can survive and develop”.³¹

In addition, Will Kymlicka’s distinction between immigrant groups and national minorities interpret ‘national minority’ as requiring a common homeland and historical

²⁷ Ian Macdonald, ‘Group rights’ *Philosophical Papers* Vol. 18, No.2, (1989), p. 121.

²⁸ *Ibid.* p. 128.

²⁹ Will Kymlicka, “Introduction”, in Will Kymlicka (ed.), *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, (Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.13-14.

³⁰ Darlene M. Johnston, “Native Rights as Collective Rights: A question of Self- Preservation”, in Will Kymlicka (ed.), *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, (Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 179, 182.

³¹ Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and Its Critics*, (New York University Press, 1984), p. 198.

language.³² For many human rights theorists, minority rights are regarded as essentially disruptive and separatist, thus the only way to protect cultural interests is through the application of non-discrimination and equality. In his criticism of Rawls, Walzer argues that there are no common goods and that all goods are socially constructed.³³ Yet he is keen to confine rights to the spheres of non-discrimination and equality in order to avoid differentiated citizenship that would privilege particular cultural groups.³⁴ In Affirmation, some of the harshness of the individualist approach was recognized during the drafting of Article 26 of the ICCPR, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of natural or social categories.³⁵ Whether minority rights are recognized as collective or individual rights, both perspectives create new problems in accepting and implementing them.³⁶

Problems with the individualist perspective

The first problem emerges with equal treatment that leads to unequal consequences. It is apparent that a purely individualistic approach to human rights is theoretically flawed. Treating people equally without regard to their cultural specificity and positions of inequality can lead to gross injustices and there are many examples of people coerced into accepting the dominant cultural values. Examples include the recognition of one official state language and the imposition of the national curriculum on all state schools irrespective of religious and ethnic denomination³⁷. Second problem with this perspective is related to the principle of liberal neutrality. Liberal writers often argue that state must not favor a particularistic conception of the good life and should remain neutral in the different choices which individuals seek.

Problems with the group rights approach

Peter Jones argues that it is impossible to allocate human rights to any entity other than individuals as human rights must vest in all people equally and therefore they must be conceived of individually.³⁸ This is indeed a theoretical dilemma but perhaps it is possible

³² Ibid. Kymlicka, p. 23.

³³ Michael, Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*, (Basic Books, 1983), p. 47.

³⁴ Ibid. Kymlicka (1995), p. 10.

³⁵ <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm>

³⁶ Helen Onions, *Minority Rights Protection in International Law: The Roma of Europe*, (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007).

³⁷ Ibid. p.50

³⁸ Peter Jones, "Human Rights, Group Rights and Peoples' Rights", *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No.1, (February 1999), pp. 80–107.

to solve it practically with a flexible and localized conception of group rights that supplements individual human rights and indeed provides them with meaning. This is why group rights theorists have limited the application of such rights to particular groups such as Kymlicka's 'national minorities' and Galenkamp's 'homogeneous constitutive communities'.³⁹

Beyond the definition of minority, and debate on collective-individual rights, being a minority cannot be limited to only material differences such as linguistic, religious, ethnic and racial elements. It can be claimed that minority groups display similar characteristics. Most theorists underline the fact that minority peoples not only feel themselves bound together by race, nationality, culture, common history, but also share a common fate, and common experiences of discrimination and social disadvantage- all of which serve to strengthen in-group cohesiveness and solidarity and to enhance self-consciousness of their minority group membership. Anthropologists Wagley and Harris suggested five criteria, which describe the essence of minority group membership⁴⁰:

1. Minorities are subordinate segments of complex state societies.
2. Minorities have special physical or cultural traits, which are held in low esteem by the dominant segments of society.
3. Minorities are self-conscious units bound together by special traits which their members share, and by the special disabilities these traits bring.
4. Membership in a minority is transmitted by rule of descent, which is capable of affiliating succeeding generations even in the absence of readily apparent special cultural and physical traits.
5. Minority peoples by choice or necessity tend to marry within the group.

According to these five criteria, we can assume membership in a minority group entails the many social consequences of being unlike the majority. It also means suffering the structural disadvantage of being relatively deficient in power and resources. This implies that members of a minority are excluded from taking a full share in the life of the society because they differ in certain ways from the dominant group.

³⁹ Marlies Galenkamp, 'Collective Rights: Much Ado about Nothing', *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights*, Vol. 9, No.3, (1991), pp. 291-307.

⁴⁰ Charles Wagley and Marvin Harris, *Minorities in the New World: 6 Case Studies*, (Columbia University Press, 1964).

It should be noted that Lausanne Treaty of 1923 eliminates this confusion on the definition of minority and implementation of minority rights for the Greek-Orthodox minority in Turkey and Turkish-Muslim minority living in Turkey and Greece respectively. Both of these communities are regarded as national minorities and their rights are accepted and protected as collective rights. On the other hand, because the Lausanne Treaty only recognizes the minorities based on their religious distinctions, it creates new problems such that Greece can legally deny the existing of Turkish minority in her territory and ignores their ethnic identity. Moreover, although the cultural, economic and social rights of these two communities have been internalized as ‘collective rights’, their rights to political representation have been implemented within ‘individual citizenship rights’ framework.

1.1.3 Turkish and Greek Case

If we look at the minority regime in Turkey and Greece, a huge gap is noticed between the minority schemes which these countries recognized and the schemes which emerged from the implementation of international standards.⁴¹ For both Turkey and Greece, the definition of ‘national minority’ is problematic. Turkey has not signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), and even though Greece signed this convention it has not yet ratified it.⁴² In Turkey, ignoring the minority definition of UN Charter regarding ethnic, religious and linguistic difference, only three historical non-Muslim groups are recognized as minorities (Armenians, Jews and Roimoi). In other words, Chaldeans, Assyrians, other non-Muslim groups and some Muslim citizens (such as Alevis, Circassians and Kurds) who have differences from the rest of the society through various dimensions (ethnic, religious, linguistic) have not been included to the minority definition that is accepted in Turkey.⁴³ A similar case is evident in Greece, where historically only Muslim community (Turks, Pomaks) are recognized as national minorities⁴⁴, whereas other Muslim groups such as Albanians, Muslim-immigrants or Christian population such as Macedonians have not been included to the

⁴¹ Murat Saraçlı, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye’de Azınlıklar*, (Lotus Yayınevi: Ankara, 2007).

⁴² Ibid. Marc Weller, *Rights of Minorities in Europe*, p. 2.

⁴³ Baskın Oran, *Türkiye’de Azınlıklar: Kavramlar Teori Lozan İç Mevzuat İçtihat Uygulama*, (İletişim Yayınları, 2004).

⁴⁴ Greece avoids using the word Turk, but regards the entire minority group as Muslims.

minority definition.⁴⁵ Here an important point has to be mentioned, as a EU-member state since 1981, the conditions of minorities in Greece has been monitored by EU and Helsinki Watch, while to gain EU-membership accession Turkey has to fulfill Copenhagen criteria on the protection of minority rights.

Regarding the five criteria suggested by Wagley and Harris that describe the essence of minority group membership, these characteristics are feasible for the Greek-Orthodox minority of Turkey and the Turkish-Muslim minority of Greece, which are not likely for assimilation both by the group members and the state as well, because of their ethnic, religious and linguistic differences from the majority of the society they live in. Moreover, as Fredrik Barth argues, even if the ethnic groups become behaviorally assimilated, they still maintain a strong sense of ethnic identity. Hence ethnic boundaries remain.⁴⁶

As aforementioned the definition made by United Nations Human Rights Commission's "Deterrence of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities" report in 1978 says minorities are: "a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members- being nationals of the State- possess ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language" with "a collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law". Therefore, types of minorities can be categorized as: national minorities; ethnic minorities; religious minorities; and linguistic minorities. Although this definition encompasses problems on differing national minority from ethnic minority⁴⁷, this debate is not relevant for the case of Turkey and Greece. Both Greek-Orthodox minority of Istanbul and Turkish-Muslim minority of Western Thrace are accepted legally and actually as national minorities regarding the Lausanne Treaty. These two minority groups have different characteristics than the

⁴⁵ Stephanos Stavros, 'Citizenship and the protection of minorities', in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (ed.), *Europe in Change, Greece in a Changing Europe, Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), pp.117-128.

⁴⁶ Fredrik Barth, *Etnik Gruplar ve Sınırları: kültürel farklılığın toplumsal organizasyonu*, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organization of Culture Difference, (Istanbul Bağlam Yayıncılık, 2001).

⁴⁷ Again the definition of 'national minority' is not certain. It can mean both 'group that lives under the territory of another state, but has historical, cultural and religious ties with kin-state' like Turks of Bulgaria and Macedonia; and 'national minority' also used to encompass 'ethnic, religious and linguistic minority living under the national boundaries of one state and also has citizenship ties toward that state'.

majority of the society in terms of ethnicity, religion and language. On the other hand, it should be noted that these two minority groups, are perceived as minorities regarding their religion not on linguistic or ethnic difference.⁴⁸ That's why the Turkish speaking Muslim minority of Western Thrace is recognized as Muslim minority (also in literature in Political Science), whereas Greek- Orthodox minority of Turkey is accepted as Roum in Turkey (to differentiate from the Greeks of Greece).

Both Greek-Orthodox minority of Istanbul and Turkish-Muslim minority of Western Thrace are numerically inferior to the rest of the population of the State. Today in Turkey, the number of Roum has decreased from 119,822 (according to 1927 population census, number of citizens speaking Greek-includes Muslim immigrants came from Greek lands) to a few thousands.⁴⁹ According to the first census of Republic, Roum language was the 4th widespread spoken language, and 12,3% of Istanbul's population was speaking it. In 1965 census⁵⁰, this percentage diminishes to 1,5%. In total around 70,000 Roum-Orthodox left Turkey since 1923 Lausanne Treaty due to political, social and economic difficulties. Samim Akgönül claims this number can differ according to one's definition of 'Roum-Orthodox'. If only Roum-Orthodox group speaking Greek and lives in Istanbul are taken, then the number is around 3,000. If the Roum-Orthodox living in Tenedos and Imbros are included than this number increases to 3,500. If we add Arabic speaking Orthodox to these two communities, then in total it reaches to 4,000-5,000. And at last, if all the Turkish citizens with identity cards written Roum-Orthodox on it are calculated, the number varies between 8,000 and 10,000.⁵¹ As indicated in Introduction, this thesis will focus only to Roum-Orthodox group speaking Greek and living in Istanbul. A similar complexity is observed for the number of Turkish speaking Muslim minority of Greece. Number of Muslim minority has not diminished as drastically as Greek-Orthodox minority. It still remains around 112,000 (approximate 2001 census data) in total of which majority are from the Turkish-Muslim minorities. The number assumed by Culture and Education Associations of Western Thrace is around 150,000. Baskın Oran points out,

⁴⁸ It should be noted, even Orthodox living in both Istanbul and Antiochia are recognized as religious minority based on Lausanne, they have ethnic and linguistic differences, where Orthodox of Antiochia are Arabs and of Istanbul are Helen.

⁴⁹ Ali Güler, *Rakamlarla Türkiye'de Azınlıklar*, (Berikan: Ankara, 2001) ,pp. 163-175.

⁵⁰ After 1965, the questions on mother language at home and religion have not been asked in the population censuses.

⁵¹ Samim Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları: Ulus-Devlet Çağından Küreselleşme Çağında Bir Azınlığın Yok Oluş Süreci*, (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul), 2007, p. 347.

regarding 3% birthrate among Turks, since 1923 380,000 Turkish speaking Muslim minorities had left Greece due to unfriendly conditions.⁵²

Minority rights of these two groups are recognized as ‘collective rights’ based on Lausanne Treaty. The articles of this Agreement guarantee their rights; they cannot be worsened or improved.⁵³ However, democratization processes of both Greece and Turkey are expected to improve individual rights of minority members. On the other hand, it should be noticed that their political participation and representation emerges from their individual-citizenship rights, not given as a collective right.⁵⁴

There is no international agreement that forces the political representation of minorities. Only, the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) contains a rather general clause regarding political participation in Article 15: “the parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular those affecting them”. However, this Article is not political-representation specific, neither is it binding. On the other hand, political representation and participation of minorities are crucial for minority communities to express their demands, problems, improve their rights and monitor the implementation of their rights. The opportunities and constraints related to the political representation of minorities can differ from the political representation process of the majorities.⁵⁵

1.2 Political Representation and Democracy

Before analyzing the determinants that affect the representation of minorities, it is

⁵² Baskın Oran, *Türkiye-Yunanistan İlişkilerinde Batı Trakya Sorunu*, (Ankara Bilgi Yayınevi, 1991).

⁵³ Stephanos Stavros, ‘The Legal Status of Minorities in Greece Today: The Adequacy of their Protection in the Light of Current Human Rights Perceptions’, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 1, (1995), pp.1-32.

⁵⁴ In some countries, quota system is being applied for the representation of minority groups, not in Greece and Turkey. For instance according to the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of Ethnic and National Communities or Minorities (Article 17) and the 1992 Electoral Law, in Croatia, 8 seats should be assured for the minority representatives. In Bulgaria, minority groups have rights to establish an ethnic party, while Romania has set aside one seat for every minority which does not manage to cross the threshold. In Kosovo, 20 seats in the 120-member Parliament have been set aside for minorities. See Florian Bieber, “Introduction: Minority Participation and Political Parties”, in *Political Parties and Minority Participation*, (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Office Macedonia, 2008), pp.5-31.

⁵⁵ Karen Bird, “The Political Representation of Women and Ethnic Minorities in Established Democracies: A Framework for Comparative Research”, Working Paper presented for the Academy of Migration Studies, Denmark, 2003, p.8.

important to explain what we mean by ‘political representation’ and its expected functions for the foundation and maintenance of democracy.

1.2.1. Political Representation and Its Functions

Political Representation has a more limited definition and application than political participation. The forms of political participation can be categorized as “canvassing or campaigning in elections; active membership of a political party or a pressure group; political demonstrations; various forms of civil disobedience; membership of government advisory committees or consumer’s councils for publicly owned industries; client involvement in the implementation of social policies; and various forms of community actions”.⁵⁶ On the other hand, representation is a concept that has given rise to more disputes at the level of practical politics than at the level of political theory or philosophy. Within the period of the modern democratic state there have been three kinds of public dispute about representation in legislative assemblies, about other forms of representation within systems of government. First, there have been disputes about who should be represented. Should it be sections of the country or economic interests, such as the land-owning interest, the farming interest, the merchants and bankers, the manufacturing and mining interests? Should it be social classes, with the franchise confined to citizens who have a stake in the country, to use the term used in British debates in the nineteenth century to describe people with a certain amount of property? Should women have the vote as well as men?

A second type of dispute is about how representatives should be chosen. Should they be appointed or elected? If members are elected, how should they be elected? Should it be by simple plurality, as in Britain, the United States and Canada, or by some form of proportional representation, as in all the members of the European Community apart from Britain? A third type of dispute is about how elected representatives should behave. Should they act as if they were mandated to pursue policies favored by their constituents or should they act independently of constituents’ wishes, as trustees for the public interest?⁵⁷ It is now accepted everywhere, even (since 1990) in South Africa, that all adult citizens should be represented through the electoral system. In states where elections are not competitive the process may not give any substantial degree of influence to the

⁵⁶ Anthony H. Birch, *Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy*, (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 105.

⁵⁷ Hanna Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation*, (University of California Press, 1967), p. 38.

electors, but at least the proper extent of the franchise has passed out of dispute.

There are other meanings of the term as well. We may refer to representation in the symbolic sense, as when the Queen represents or embodies the nation, or when a hockey team represents its country. Or we may refer to a representative as a delegate or spokesperson for a particular interest, as a lawyer represents the interests of his or her client, or as a Member of Parliament speaks on behalf of his or her constituency. Yet, over the last ten or so years, there has been growing concern within democratic societies with the facial composition of representative assemblies.

It is a common observation that political representatives tend to be drawn from the elite stratum of society. Even where representatives are chosen through fair and democratic elections, it is often said that legislative assemblies remain “unrepresentative,” and, in particular, that they are under-representative of women, ethnic minorities, and the poorer and less educated social classes. This is especially true of representation at the national level. When we say that a parliament is unrepresentative of certain groups, we are referring to a concept of descriptive or demographic representation, and implying that a parliament should be a microcosm of the nation. To some extent at least, it should mirror the population from which it is drawn. The concern that legislatures be demographically representative of the diverse classes of citizens is not new.⁵⁸

This thesis study is focusing on the representation in National level, and the activities of minority representatives is analyzed in order to understand their effective role. In this thesis the term ‘representatives’ refers “Members of Parliament or Congress who have been authorized by the process of election to exercise certain powers”.⁵⁹ This is their defining characteristic, and they remain legal representatives until they step down, die or are defeated, no matter how they behave in the assembly. It has become increasingly important that parties and legislatures be inclusive and demographically representative of the broader society. One under-represented group, the ethnic minority has been of special concern.

⁵⁸ Most advocates of descriptive representation do not agree that a parliament should exactly mirror society, such that children represented children, lunatics represented lunatics and so on, but rather that it should be more representative than it actually is.

⁵⁹ Ibid. Anthony Birch, p. 73.

According to Anthony Birch, there are six functions of political representation and these functions are highly related to the functioning of democracy. These functions can be summarized as ‘political recruitment’ which provides a mechanism for the recruitment of the politicians; ‘public competition for office’; ‘responsiveness and responsibility in the conduct of government’; ‘ensuring political leaders’ accountability to the electorate for their actions’; ‘legitimizing function’; and lastly ‘mobilization of consent’.

These functions of representation in general aim to create popular control of government, which provides the main purpose of democracy ‘government by and for people’. Their first advantage of this kind is that they help to legitimize the system and the powers of those who direct the government. The system and government becomes more legitimized in the eyes of any under-represented community such as minorities when their members are also included.

1.2.2. Political Representation of Minorities

Although political representation of minorities are essential for the functioning of democracy and legitimizing the political system, Karen Bird asserts that the presence of ethnic minorities represents a double challenge for a democracy: firstly, ethnic minorities do not use their political rights as much as the majority. Secondly, the majority does not want interference in what they perceive as ‘their’ political decisions.⁶⁰ Michael Walzer argues that ‘ultimately, they have to bring themselves in’.⁶¹ In other words, minorities must promote their own issues and interests. The role of society, then, is to ensure that social or political institutions do not prevent mobilization on ethnic or other grounds. However, equal political opportunities do not guarantee equality in terms of outcome, particularly not in the midst of considerable inequality in terms of resources. Consequently, the conditions for political integration in a given political regime cannot be assessed only by its theoretical potential, but must also be evaluated on the basis of practice.

In practice, political participation can take many different forms. Voting is perhaps the most important in terms of power, but other forms of involvement and influence can also be very significant. As minorities are usually under-represented at National-level, they

⁶⁰ Ibid. Karen Bird, p. 17.

⁶¹ Ibid. Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*, p. 55.

can achieve representation in different forms.⁶² Minority associations are primary institutions that have a formal role in representing minority interests. This can have the advantage of depoliticizing certain minority-relevant decisions, but it might exclude parts of the community. Second, minorities can be represented through specific institutions, which are established to represent minority interests. Third, minority interests can be articulated by parties or bodies, which do not represent minorities per se, but rather a broader constituency that also includes a particular minority. In theory, such an inclusive form of representation can avoid overemphasizing difference and ethnicity. Moreover, while diminishing the concerns of the majority, it also enables Walzer's suggestion which is 'to bring themselves in'. In reality, the record suggests that minority interests are easily ignored in this format and thus does not address the challenge of minority representation. Fourth, most minorities have opted for their own political representation, as has been the case with the largest and geographically most concentrated minorities, whereas others have withdrawn from the political system altogether.

In general, it is seen that majority of mainstream parties have been unable to attract the votes of minorities. The configuration of the party system along ethnic lines is largely a consequence of the willingness of majority parties to seriously incorporate minority community concerns, often due to the fears of alienating the majority. Moreover, while the larger minorities are generally represented in parliaments, smaller minorities are often excluded due to electoral threshold or lack of political organization. It is also observed that, even if the parliamentary representation of smaller minorities is achieved; the lack of influence of such MPs have creates additional problems. Generally, they cannot influence parliamentary procedure and at times have been described as mere 'window-dressing'.⁶³

Regarding the subject of this thesis, similar features have been observed in political representation of Roum and Turkish-Muslim minorities.⁶⁴ Except a shorter term in late 1980s (2 June 1989, 5 November 1989, and 8 April 1990 Greek National Elections)⁶⁵ when Turkish-Muslim representatives were elected as Independents, Turkish-Muslim minority has been represented in parliament through major national parties. For Turkish-Muslim MPs, effectiveness in representation of their own community had accelerated

⁶² Ibid. Florian Bieber, p. 13.

⁶³ Helena, Catt, *Voting Behavior: a Radical Critique*, London: Leicester University Press, 1996.

⁶⁴ Political Representation of these communities is analyzed in details in following chapters.

⁶⁵ See Appendix C, List of Turkish- Muslim Minority Deputies In Greek Parliament since 1920s.

after 1980s.⁶⁶ Compared to Greek-Orthodox minority of Turkey, Turkish-Muslim minority has institutional opportunities such as being geographically concentrated, and constitutes around 1% of the total population of Greece, while Rourm minority in Turkey constitutes only 0,0041%. Nevertheless, until 1961, Rourm minority also gained representation in parliament both as independents and as members of a major party.⁶⁷ However, their effectiveness in expressing the interests and demands of their community is in question. Their involvement in the parliament can even be described as ‘window dressing’.⁶⁸ In order to ‘bring themselves in’, Rourm minority community utilizes minority associations, international organizations, and it is assumed ‘principle of reciprocity’ rather than having representation in the assembly.

1.3 Theoretical Foundation of Thesis

Despite their numerical, economic, social differences, ‘recognition’ is the primary goal of political representation of minorities. Representation in national and local level increases minorities’ integration to the society, makes them more noticeable, and decreases the ‘fears’ of the majority. The importance of ‘recognition’ for minority groups, the recognition’s relation to political representation, and micro-level/macro-level institutions that limit or enforce this representation constructs the theoretical foundation of this thesis.

1.3.1 From Recognition to Representation

The demand for recognition, Charles Taylor argues is fundamental to our understanding of ourselves⁶⁹. The attitude of the enveloping society towards our culture has profound effects on our identity:

“The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves”⁷⁰.

Minorities that have suffered misrecognition will have a negative image of them and will have internalized their inferiority. This demand for recognition, according to Gutmann, necessitates both the protection of individual rights and the recognition of particular needs

⁶⁶ Vemund Aarbakke, *The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace*, (Unpublished PhD Thesis, 2000).

⁶⁷ See Appendix B, List of Greek-Orthodox Minority Deputies In Turkish Parliament since 1935.

⁶⁸ Rifat N. Bali, “Cumhuriyet Döneminin Azınlık Milletvekilleri”, *Toplumsal Tarih*, Vol. 186, (2009).

⁶⁹ Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’ in Taylor and Amy Gutmann (ed.) *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, (Princeton Univ. Press, 1994), pp 25–73.

⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 25.

of members of cultural groups.⁷¹

One of the fundamental questions here is whether cultural membership can be formed as a good in itself, or whether it is deemed to be a value in its facilitative capacity. That's why it is agreed that the state cannot remain indifferent to the difficulty of these cultural groups. At that point, Charles Taylor argues that the affirmation of certain rights is tied to the affirmation of particular capacities and thus defines certain standards by which a life may be judged full or reduced. Furthermore, the conception of ourselves as autonomous individuals could not have been sustained alone or in a different type of society.⁷² Similarly 'recognition' of ethnic groups cannot only be achieved through international laws. The attitude and institutions of the society matters for the minority lives also. There is a widespread understanding that participation and integration are two sides of the same coin.⁷³ That is to say, integration of minorities to the political system can be achieved through managing their political participation. This would increase their recognition, in addition to diminishing political tensions.

This thesis mainly argues that political representation of minorities is an essential tool for minority communities to protect and monitor their economic, social and cultural rights. Turkish-Muslim minority of Greece and Greek-Orthodox minority of Turkey have a unique case as 'principle of reciprocity' which emerged with Lausanne Treaty of 1923 compared to other minority groups. However, they also have common problems of 'recognition' and 'political representation'. In order to find solutions to improve their political representation and integration, we should first understand the factors which affect their political representation.

Similar to other minority groups, the political behavior of the Greek minority in Istanbul and Turkish minority of Western Thrace is shaped by the political, social, economic conditions they are living in rather than their own ethnic identity. With this regard, the thesis utilizes Fredrik Barth's approach, which claims that "ethnic identities are not primordial and they are socially constructed through the competition of the groups for the

⁷¹ Ibid. Taylor and Gutmann, p. 48.

⁷² Charles Taylor, *The Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*, (Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 59.

⁷³ Gunnar Myrberg and Jon Rogstad, *Patterns of Participation: Engagement among Ethnic Minorities and the Native Population in Oslo and Stockholm*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

distribution of resources”.⁷⁴ Hence the political representation of the minorities will be shaped not according to their intrinsic ethnic features, but through their interaction with the other groups, where the social structure, relations with outside, type of production and gender are determining factors. Barth’s theory on ethnic groups suggests that the ethnic identities of the groups, which came from the same ethnic origin but interacted with different social groups display different qualities. Culture changes within time, that’s why focus of investigation should shift from the cultural factors exemplified by the group to the process of persistence and maintenance of ethnic boundaries and the continuing dichotomization between members and outsiders.

For the minorities, this interaction can be categorized as a process of recognition, un-recognition and/or misrecognition of a certain group by surrounding groups.⁷⁵ It is argued that special measures for the representation of minorities help to incorporate marginalized citizens into the political process, the assumption being that citizens will become more engaged in politics once they sense that representatives of their own group are in a position to promote policy responsiveness to their interests. Here, ‘representation, under-representation and misrepresentation’ of the minorities highlights more information on the institutional structure of the country they are living in, rather than the features of the minority groups. Thus a social group is usually inclined to form and articulate its identity as a response to stereotypes and general perspectives produced by “others”. Moreover, according to the ‘institutional channeling theory’ legal and political institutions both shape and limit the minorities’ choice of possibilities, and institutional forces such as citizenship laws and the actions of authorities determine what forms minority mobilization takes, more than any intrinsically ethnic particularities or socio-professional status, along which lines minority mobilization occurs.⁷⁶

The forms of political representation the minorities have (associations, ethnic party or majority party) are salient. However, to compare the political representation of minorities in general, one should analyze the micro-level and macro-level factors that determine the institutional opportunities and constraints to understand the similarities and differences in

⁷⁴ Fredrik Barth, *Etnik Gruplar ve Sınırları: kültürel farklılığın toplumsal organizasyonu*, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organization of Culture Difference, (İstanbul Bağlam Yayıncılık, 2001).

⁷⁵ Ibid. Charles Taylor, “*The Politics of Recognition*”, p. 28.

⁷⁶ Patrik Ireland, “Reaping what they saw: institutions and immigrant political participation in Western Europe”, in *Challenging immigration and ethnic relations politics: comparative European perspectives*, edited by Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

political representation process. With this regard, Karen Bird's study on the determinants of political representation of minorities is used and analyzed in Turkey and Greece cases.

1.3.2 Determinants of Political Representation of Minorities

The scholarly literature addressing the political representation of marginalized groups offers little help in sorting out the disparities and differences in representation among groups and across countries. This literature can be categorized into two main bodies: theoretical and empirical. Theoretical and normative approaches address the question of whether quotas and similar measures to enhance the descriptive representation of politically marginalized groups can be justified in modern democracies. Exemplary of this work is the writing of Iris Young, Will Kymlicka, and Jane Mansbridge,⁷⁷ where each argue that there are certain groups who have been largely absent from elected political bodies, and that we need to develop mechanisms to ensure that minorities are adequately included in representative assemblies.

However, this kind of theoretical approach has been criticized in several ways. The first concern is special measures and preferential treatment (including separate candidate selection procedures, for example) to assist groups such as ethnic minorities and women to obtain their fair share of representation, may undermine the idea of equal treatment for all individuals. The second concern is that such mechanisms can unintentionally serve to reify groups, and fail to acknowledge or invite diversities within them. The third concern (related to the second) is that mechanisms for group representation, intending to overemphasize the differences between groups and to underemphasize their commonalities, may undermine the cohesiveness of the nation and promote its fragmentation. The fourth is that linking representation to group-based characteristics may weaken political accountability, especially where descriptive representatives (and their constituents) accept the idea that a representative's identity matters more than the policy ideas and party platform that they presumably stood for when they were elected. Despite these concerns, these theorists argue that special measures to enhance the

⁷⁷ Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1990), and *Inclusion and Democracy* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000); Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship* (Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1995), pp 131-151, 1998); Jane Mansbridge, "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes'," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 61 (1999), pp 628-57.

representation of women and minorities are justified by existing practices of representation in liberal democracies.

These theorists reject the principle that the legislature should exactly mirror the general population, as this would lead to an unworkable proliferation of group representation and undermine the process of representative government. In some cases, they suggest criteria for identifying groups that have a valid claim to special representation. Women and ethnic minorities are deemed to meet these criteria, because they have suffered some degree of historic, systematic exclusion from electoral politics. It is acknowledged that group representation rights for ethnic minorities are more problematic than similar measures for women, because the former may present a greater threat to social cohesion.

The second body of literature on group representation is largely empirical.⁷⁸ Included here are studies of the situation of women or ethnic minorities in elected assemblies of various countries, with a view to understanding how particular institutional structures (including electoral systems and party recruitment and selection practices) contribute to low levels of female and minority representation, and what effects enhanced representation for these groups can have upon policy directions and outcomes. Here, it should be noted although in terms of macro-level factors, women and minorities have struggled within the same/similar institutional processes, the main difference in their political representation has originated due to micro-level elements. At the domestic level, the focus for addressing the under-representation of these groups has been on electoral rules, on the role of political parties in candidate recruitment and selection, and on rules for affirmative action or quotas. Besides these macro-level factors, micro-level factors also needed to be analyzed.

1.3.2.1 Macro-level Factors

There is a need for detailed empirical work that pays close attention to different macro-institutional arrangements within countries – including the effects of electoral rules, candidate nomination and selection processes, and party competition, – upon the election

⁷⁸ See Helen Onions *Minority Rights Protection in International Law: The Roma of Europe*, (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007); Benjamin Bishin, *Tyranny of the Minority: The Subconstituency Politics Theory of Representation*, (Temple University Press, 2009); Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel, *Euro-Turks a Bridge or a Breach Between Turkey and The European Union?: A Comparative Study of German-Turks and French-Turks*, (CEPS, 2005).

of ethnic minority representatives. Here the focus is on macro-level institutional arrangements of Turkey and Greece. In analyzing the political representation of the Turkish-Muslim minority and Greek-Orthodox minority, 'reciprocity rule' can be also included in macro-level factors, which is only unique to these communities.

Electoral Rules:

Electoral systems are commonly categorized into three types. Proportional systems of representation (PR) work on the basis of multi-member districts and party lists, which may be open or closed, and in which seats are distributed to candidates on a party list based on the proportion of the vote won by that party. Majoritarian systems work on the basis of single-member districts, where one candidate is elected once he or she receives more than 50 percent of the vote, or in Plurality in which one candidate is needed to gain more vote share than its competitors in that single-member district. Finally, under mixed systems some representatives to an assembly are elected following majoritarian rules, while others are added using proportional rules.⁷⁹

The First-Past-the-Post electoral system has the feature of excluding dispersed minorities from representation.⁸⁰ But it favors territorially concentrated groups. The circumstances of residential concentration and strongly cohesive political identity do not apply to women to the extent that they apply to ethnic minorities, making multiple members-district systems more uniformly disadvantageous for women's representation. Women's organizations interested in increasing the level of female political representation are right to focus on the adoption of PR, while for ethnic minority groups, PR alone (i.e., without preference voting features) may not be sufficient.

In Southeastern Europe, and also in Greece and Turkey, countries opted for proportional representation (PR), however in combination with relatively high thresholds (3% in Greece since 1990, and 10% in Turkey since 1982) might actually be a greater

⁷⁹ Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris, "Introduction: Comparing Democratic Elections", *Comparing Democracies 2: new challenges in the study of elections and voting*, edited by Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, Pippa Norris., (London: Thousand Oaks, 2004). For detail information on the electoral systems of the democracies look at Ibid. p.10-12. This study shows that in many democratic countries PR and mixed electoral system has been used in large numbers, whereas the number of countries which prefers to use the plurality electoral system is very limited.

⁸⁰ Venice Commission, "Electoral Law and National Minorities", CDL-INF (2000) 4, Strasbourg, 25.1.2000.

disadvantage to minorities than majoritarian systems when these are geographically concentrated. Thresholds were not established to prevent minority participation, but rather to avoid excessive fragmentation of the Parliament. As a result of PR electoral system with high national thresholds, only the parties of the largest minority would be able to secure parliamentary representation, and only if they were to run on a single ticket. Coalitions among several smaller minority groups to overcome the threshold have been rare. The latter cases (obstacles on their representation) are evident in Greece and Turkey. The fact that both Greece and Turkey altered their electoral system since 1920, the influence of the electoral system on the representation of the respective minorities is an interesting factor to be analyzed in this study.

Candidate Nomination and Selection Processes:

The candidate recruitment and selection process is a key factor in accounting for the social biases of a representative assembly. Parties face “supply-side” problems in attracting sufficient numbers of minority candidates. But there are also significant “demand-side” problems in failing to select as candidates qualified minority members who do come forward. Yet parties will also be cautious to avoid being identified exclusively with the interests of ethnic minorities: in order to win the election, they need to aggregate votes not only from the ethnic community but also from the rest of the population. Finally, constituencies that contain a diversity of ethnic groups (including competing groups) may yield more ethnic candidates as parties seek to mobilize and capture distinctive portions of the ethnic vote. Thus one party may nominate a Turkish-Muslim, while another nominates a Pomak-Muslim, while still another tries to bridge the cleavage by nominating an ethnic Albanian candidate.

For Greece and Turkey case, as they apply PR electoral system Greece with open-list system since 1974, and Turkey with close-list system since 1961, the candidate nomination process is different. In Turkey we witness the monopoly of the party leaders; whereas in Greece the candidates make their own electoral campaign and should be a favored person to attract the votes. Moreover, compared to Roum minority of Turkey, Turkish-Muslim minority of Greece with its number constructing 1% of the total population has a stronger electoral power in both demand-side and supply-side.

Party Competition:

Party competition is an element within the macro-level factors that can both deter or enhance the political representation of minority groups. If the minority community is geographically concentrated, competing parties might prefer to nominate minority members as candidates in order to attract minority votes. On the other hand when political system is highly fragmented and volatility of votes is evident, this might cause the major parties to ignore minority votes to appeal to the majority of the population. High turnover rates among the minority group in a competitive system would also increase their representation possibility.

In Greece, if we consider that since 1920s Turkish-Muslim community has managed to send at least one representative to the Greek Parliament where 50% of the confidence vote is needed to form the government, among 300 Parliamentarians they construct an important electoral power to influence the political system. They have been a relatively stable fixture in highly volatile political party system. This consistency has been a reflection of the cleavages between majorities and minorities. There has been overall a degree of moderation in the demands of minorities, linked to their inclusion in the mainstream political system through major parties. In Turkey it is seen that the peak of minority involvement in the Turkish political system was just after the transition to democracy (1946), until when minority deputies were elected mostly as independent representatives. Party competition among the years 1946-1961 enabled the minorities of Turkey (Roum, Armenians, and Jews) to be more effective in the Parliament.

Reciprocity Rule:

In literature on the political representation of minorities, 'reciprocity rule' is only unique to Greek-Orthodox and Turkish-Muslim minorities. Reciprocity is a universal concept in international law and in international relations that encourages the parties to adhere to a contractual agreement. It is also binding, as it allows the possibility of sanctions under the international law. Within the framework of reciprocal treatment of the minorities in Greece and Turkey, the policies have been based on the Lausanne Treaty (24 July 1923). In Lausanne summit, it was launched for the first time a brand new, brutal practice, the

compulsory population exchange.⁸¹ After the end of the Greco- Turkish war, Greek orthodox were forced to leave Turkey, as well as Muslims who had been living in Greece were required to do the same. For the minority groups remained in the existing territories ‘reciprocity rule’ has been applied between Greece and Turkey considering their nationals in the other country.

Reciprocity rule is expected to increase their political representation. Although Greek-Orthodox minority in Turkey suffers from small group size and electoral power, due to reciprocity rule they are expected to benefit from the advantages the Turkish-Muslim community gets in Greece, mostly in economic, social, cultural and legal spheres. However, as this thesis study argues, reciprocity rule has not been applied to the political area; their involvement in political system has been accepted mostly in terms of ‘individual-citizen rights’ rather than ‘collective rights’. That’s the reason, the study also aims to examine why ‘reciprocity rule’ is not applied in political representation, and the other macro-level and micro-level factors that are expected to determine political representation of the minorities.

In general, the nature of representation will vary depending on the type of mechanism used to enhance the level of group representation. As aforementioned, by representatives, it is meant those who sit in reserved seats, or in majority-minority districts or highly ethnic constituencies, that have been elected more or less exclusively by group members. This gives them more incentive to speak for the interests of that group. In some countries, quota system is used to set seats for the minority members; in contrast, those elected through quotas will find it necessary to act as representatives of a more general constituency. The quality of representation – how well is the group represented by the descriptive representative – can vary as well. That’s the reason this thesis, also focuses on the effectiveness of their representatives in the Greek and Turkish Parliaments, beside the elements and characteristic of political representation of Turkish-Muslim and Greek-Orthodox minority communities respectively. The findings of this study portrayed that beside the profile of the minority MPs (their education, language skills and occupation), for the effectiveness of the minority representatives, the political regime in the host-state (democratic or authoritarian); whether the minority MP is an independent deputy or a

⁸¹ Dimitris Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Population and its Impact on Greece*, (London: Hurst and Company, 1962) p. 52.

party member; whether it is a party in power or not; and the ideology of the parties also matter.

Macro-level factors cannot be evaluated separately than micro-level features of the minorities. As Ivor Crewe has suggested there are four characteristics of ethnic voting behavior that produce ethnic electoral power, and that therefore tend to produce ethnic candidacies within traditional parties:⁸²

a) the full electoral mobilization of the ethnic minority, i.e., high registration and high turnout; b) an ethnic bloc vote, i.e., uniform support for one party, or at least against one party; c) a strategic location of this ethnic vote in marginal constituencies such that it has the potential to deliver seats to one party at the expense of another; d) a net effect in terms of seats over the country as a whole that outweighs that of the white/anti-ethnic vote.

In general, an ethnic group must form a substantial enough part of the population to attract attention in terms of the competition among traditional political parties (or to form their own parties). Additionally, the group must express a fairly strong collective identity, such that members will tend to vote as a bloc for a party that appeals to group identity and interests. The geographic location and concentration of a group are important as well: the likelihood of a traditional party selecting an ethnic candidate is greatest where the party believes that such a candidate can deliver new voter support where the party has historically not performed well.

1.3.2.2 Micro-Level Factors

Comparative micro-analysis pays attention to the effects of group size, spatial concentration, participation in ethnic associational life, political cohesiveness and mobilization, educational attainment and language skills, and length of residency in host country among ethnic groups. Karen Bird suggests, intra-group dynamics, especially the complex and contingent nature of relationships between minority groups and the majority, as well as relations among different minority groups, to see how these affect levels of minority ethnic representation should also be examined.

⁸² Ivor Crewe, "Representation and the Ethnic Minorities in Britain" in Nathan Glazer and Ken Young (eds.), *Ethnic Pluralism and Public Policy* (London, Heinemann Educational Books, 1983), p. 268.

Group Size:

According to Karen Bird, to guarantee the full political representation the magnitude of a minority must constitute at least 9 percent. This percentage of minority population is not valid either in Turkey or in Greece. When Lausanne Treaty was signed in 1923 number of Turkish-Muslim minority in Western Thrace and Greek-Orthodox minority in Istanbul were equivalent as around 120,000, where the population of Greece and Turkey was 3,5 million (Greeks and Roum exchangees) and 10 million respectively.⁸³ Today, this equivalency is changed while Turkish-Muslim community maintains its population in Greece which is 11 million, Greek-Orthodox population diminished to 3,000 (excluding Arab Orthodox) in the around 72 million populated Turkey.

Spatial Concentration:

Besides the group-size, spatial concentration of the minority in a region increases their electoral power, compared to a dispersed minority population within a territory. Ethnic minorities enjoy the benefits and sometimes suffer the disadvantages of spatial concentration. In some constituencies, an ethnic minority candidate will seem the natural choice to represent the interests of the people, while if elected, an ethnic minority representative may find it difficult to establish his or her credibility within the party as anything other than the ethnic spokesperson, and they are sometimes limited to this role.

Both Greek-Orthodox minority and Turkish-Muslim minority have spatial concentration, in Istanbul and Western Thrace respectively. In Turkey, Greek-Orthodox minority is populated in Imbros and Tenedos, and also in Antiochia (Arab-Orthodox) as well, however, compared to Turkish-Muslim minority in Western Thrace they lack significant population magnitude.

Participation in minority associational life:

Culture of attitudes toward minorities (especially, the existence of state policies of

⁸³ As aforementioned Samim Akgönül claims this number can differ according to one's definition of 'Roum-Orthodox'. If only Roum-Orthodox group speaking Greek and lives in Istanbul are taken, then the number is around 3,000. If the Roum-Orthodox living in Tenedos and Imbros are included than this number increases to 3,500. If we add Arabic speaking Orthodox to these two communities, then in total it exceeds to 4,000-5,000. And at last, if all the Turkish citizens with identity cards written Roum-Orthodox on it are calculated, the number varies between 8,000 and 10,000.

multiculturalism) plays significant role in enhancing participation of minorities in associational life. However, multicultural character of the society is relevant with macro-level factors, rather than micro-level effects. On the other hand, it also influences the role of ethnic associations (e.g., stable lines of communication between minority groups and administrative bodies), which fosters political representation of minority communities.

Both Greek-Orthodox minority and Turkish-Muslim minority have strong associational life, mostly through foundations, schools and worship places. Even though Greek-Orthodox population in Turkey is around 3,000, they own around 100 foundations has remained since Ottoman period. Regarding the history of emergence of a vivid press-life and management of foundations, it can be said that Roum community is more advanced in organization compared to Turkish-Muslim minority of Western Thrace. However, this organizational skill cannot be reflected on political mobilization and representation due to their numerical size.

Political Cohesiveness and Mobilization:

Political cohesiveness and mobilization of minority groups can be achieved both through minority parties, leaders and majority parties. Until 1961, within Greek-Orthodox community political cohesiveness and giving bloc-votes was evident, and still they vote for the parties that serve the best for their interests, not in terms of ideological cleavages. On the other hand, Samim Akgönül's survey study on Greek-Orthodox minority falsifies this belief that the community supports only rightist parties. According to this survey, 62% of community is interested in politics. 32% of the respondents take place in center of the spectrum; 37% in left; and 13% on right of the spectrum. None of them are located in radical left or radical right.⁸⁴ However, people's ideological preferences are not directly reflected in their party preferences as well. Turkish minority groups lead campaigns as 'Turk's vote is for Turk' in order to give forth to deputies as many as possible, where Greek parties introduce different Turkish-origin candidates in order to divide but also gain the Turkish votes. In each of prefecture of the region Ksanthi (İskeçe) and Rodopi the deputites are shared, with the largest party taking 2 and the smaller 1. When the

⁸⁴ Ibid. Samim Akgönül, Rum Azınlık, p. 358.

minority candidates were first set up in 3rd place on each party ticket this meant in practice their exclusion.⁸⁵

Language skills:

To enhance the political representation of the minorities, accommodation of language barriers (e.g., preparing electoral information and ballots in non-official languages) is crucial. In Turkey, in elections only the official-state language (Turkish) have been used, and all the Greek-Orthodox minority population are fluent in Turkish language. In the late Ottoman period, they were advantaged due to their literacy rate and proficiency in Turkish, which enabled them to have high positions in state offices. This advantage began to decrease in early Republican Period, when literacy rate among the Turkish-Muslim population increased as well.

In Greece, Turkish-Muslim minority is not that advanced in Greek, and in Greece during the electoral campaigns Turkish is also being used. However, since 1970s Turkish-Muslim community began to elect the Muslim deputies who are university graduates and have a good command in Greek. Before 1970s, Muslim deputies were elected to the Greek Assembly; however they were not effective in the Parliament because they did not have proficiency in Greek.

Length of residency:

Length of residency makes differences when national minorities and immigrants/new minorities of a nation are compared. Both Turkish-Muslim minority of Western Thrace and Greek-Orthodox minority of Turkey are recognized long-lived communities of their host countries. If this micro-level factor is compared, there is no difference between these minority communities.

1.4 Arguments and Methodology

In general for the representation of minority groups, while there are some common explanations for the under-representation of historically marginalized groups, there are also vast differences within and between countries in the steps that have been taken to increase

⁸⁵ Vemund Aarbakke, "Concept of reciprocity and its significance for the political organization of the Muslim minority in Greece", in *Reciprocity: Greek and Turkish Minorities law, religion and politics*, (ed.) by Samim Akgönül., (Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2008), p. 130.

their political representation. To enhance political representation of minorities, macro-level and micro-level factors can be compared between the countries and among the minority groups respectively. The opportunities and constraints for ethnic minorities are shaped by many of the same macro-level factors, but also by micro-level factors, which play out at the local level as aforementioned. While macro-level factors are related to political system of the home-countries; features of the relevant minority community determine micro-level factors.⁸⁶

To summarize, macro-level factors are: political integration and participation of ethnic minorities (full voting rights), presence of minorities within parties (e.g., opening party membership to resident non-citizens); electoral system (PR- list with preference features); culture of attitudes toward minorities (state policies of multiculturalism); accommodation of language barriers (e.g. preparing electoral information and ballots in non-official languages); and incumbency factors (high turnover rates). Important micro-level factors include degree of ethnic concentration in a particular constituency, collective political mobilization within ethnic community (collective political identity); strategic location of ethnic vote in marginal constituencies, strong ethnic associational life; as well as the characteristics of individual candidates and the nature of their ties to a given ethnic community. These micro-level factors tend to be more important than macro-level factors in determining the political opportunities for ethnic minority candidates.

Referring to Fredrik Barth it is indicated that their ethnic identity and ‘political participation’⁸⁷ strategies are determined by the Greece-Turkey relations, which affect the implementation (negative or positive) of the reciprocity principle, which as a fact limit or enlarge the social, economic, civil and political rights of the minorities within the framework of legal structures and binding international agreements. Compared to the general literature on the determinants of political representation of minorities, it can be said that for the Greek minority and Turkish minority case, Turkish and Greek political system

⁸⁶ Karen Bird, “The Political Representation of Women and Ethnic Minorities in Established Democracies: A Framework for Comparative Research”, Working Paper presented for the Academy of Migration Studies, Denmark, 2003, p.8.

⁸⁷ The forms of political participation can be categorized as “canvassing or campaigning in elections; active membership of a political party or a pressure group; political demonstrations; various forms of civil disobedience; membership of government advisory committees or consumer’s councils for publicly owned industries; client involvement in the implementation of social policies; and various forms of community actions”. Anthony H. Birch, *Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy*, (New York: Routledge, 1993). p. 105.

displays similar opportunities and constraints in terms of macro-level factors.⁸⁸ However ‘reciprocity rule’ is unique as macro-level factor to Turkish-Greek relations that enhance or deter these minority communities’ political representation. Until now, several researches on the political behavior of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace and on the political participation of non-Muslim minority of Turkey (not specifically Greek minority) had been conducted in reference to a certain period of time (mainly after 1974 for Greece and after 1980 for Turkey, or inter-war period, during the junta years of both states, and influence of European Union on political rights of the minorities). Moreover, in the comparison of these two communities, social, cultural and religious rights have been discussed more intensively rather than the political rights dimension of reciprocity. However, a comparative study, which observes the political representation, political behavior and strategies of these two groups regarding the bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece since the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, and with the light of reciprocity, and deep analysis of macro-level and micro-level factors has not been conducted. This work aims to fulfill this gap in the literature, where there are few studies that compare ethnic minority representation across countries, or that address the under-representation of different groups within countries. Uniqueness of ‘reciprocity rule’ as a macro-level factor also increases the contribution of this thesis to the literature.

1.4.1 Arguments of the Thesis

Defending the thesis that improvement and implementation of the political representation of these communities would break the hegemony of ‘the rule of reciprocity’ and bilateral relations on the protection of their minority rights, this study aims to search the dynamics that influence the political representation of Muslim minority of Western Thrace (in the provinces of Ksanthi/⁸⁹ İskeçe; Komotini / Gümülcine (in Rhodopi/ Rodop electoral district) and Greek-Orthodox minority of Turkey, to understand whether it is the internal political system of the states they are living in, the socio-economical features of these communities, the rule of reciprocity, bilateral or international factors that affect and shape the political participation of these minority groups. For this purpose, the study conducts a comparative work between the political representation of Greek-Orthodox minority and

⁸⁸ Analyzed in detail in following chapters.

⁸⁹ In the general literature its been written both as Ksanthi or Xanthi. Throughout this thesis, I will be using Ksanthi.

Turkish-Muslim minority of Greece since the implementation of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923.

Here three research methods are utilized: to analyze each countries' political system and minorities' demographic and political characteristics (macro-level and micro-level factors) new-institutionalism (historical) approach is used and minority deputies' rhetoric in the Parliament are examined by archive research. In the case where the MPs' speeches are unavailable, their discourses will be found and analyzed by press research. Lastly, to understand why reciprocity rule is not implemented in political sphere, the interviews with notables and MPs from each community and Parliament is conducted.

The asymmetry between current and post- EU membership criteria led Greece and Turkey to diverse experiences of Europeanization (1983 the transition from military rule to democracy for Turkey and 1981 accession of Greece to the EU) in the field of minority rights. This difference between these two countries is crucial in examining whether the level of democracy of one country, the agreements it is obliged to or the concept of 'reciprocity' is the significant determinant for shaping the conditions of respective minorities. On the other hand, role of EU as a multilateral binding organization is discussed with its comparison of leaving the fate of minorities to bilateral reciprocity rule. The comparison of Roum community in Istanbul with Muslim-Turkish minority living in Western Thrace is conducted in order to understand the role of reciprocity rule as a macro-level factor on their political representations and implementation of their minority rights gained by Lausanne Treaty.

1.4.2 New Institutionalism (Historical) as Comparative Method

Before explaining the benefits and opportunities gained by the historical institutionalism method, a brief discussion on the limitations and problems in comparison of the minorities' political representation will be helpful.

Problems in Comparison of Minorities' Political Representation

There are very few studies that compare ethnic minority representation across countries or that addresses the under-representation of different groups within countries. Comparative studies that do exist are largely descriptive and theoretically underdeveloped. A separate problem arises in that the theoretical and political conceptualizations of ethnicity and

ethnic minority representation often remain rooted in nationally specific contexts, and are difficult to translate meaningfully into other national contexts. A quite concrete manifestation of this problem comes in the question: who counts as an “ethnic minority” in a given country, and how can we compare their numbers (and the number of their representatives) to assess how well they are represented?

We also need to distinguish between two different kinds of ethnic minorities – territorially concentrated national minorities and more dispersed poly-ethnic minorities – and consider the nature of their claims to group representation. It is difficult to compare the levels of representation across these groups, because they may demand and achieve representation through very different types of institutions. For example, a national minority may demand representation through federal arrangements and sub-national institutions (e.g., band councils for indigenous groups, or territorial/provincial legislatures for regionally distinct groups) and may actually resist inclusion within the institutions of the nation-state. Finally, we need to keep in mind that the ethnic minority in any country is itself highly heterogeneous. There may be an over-representation of some groups and an under-representation of others, making broad, cross-national comparison of ethnic minority representation less meaningful.

One further explanation for the underdevelopment of comparative research on ethnic minority representation may be chronological. In general, party interest in the votes of ethnic minorities is a newer phenomenon, corresponding with recent changes that have facilitated global migration and the acquisition of citizenship. Of course, movements of peoples across borders have shaped states and societies from time immemorial. What is distinctive in recent years, and important in terms of the increasing political relevance of ethnic minorities, are the global scope of migration and the increased diversity of newcomers, the increasing rate of naturalization of foreigners within many countries, and the political coming-of-age of the second generation (the children of original immigrants, who are automatically citizens).⁹⁰

In John Stuart Mill’s *A System of Logic*, a distinction is made between two strategies for

⁹⁰ Ayhan Kaya and Bahar Şahin, *Köklere ve Yollar*, (İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007).

comparison – ‘method of agreement’ and ‘method of difference’.⁹¹ In the first approach, the strategy is to find cases, which are similar in what is to be explained, while seeking to uncover variation in the explanatory factors. In the ‘method of difference’, the opposite strategy is chosen. Then variation in the dependent variable is the point of departure, while similar explanatory variables are to be eliminated. The methods are thus different with respect to what is made the object of investigation. With reference to Mill, one could ask if comparing specific – and similar – situations in various countries makes sense at all. Mill would probably have responded that the cases are too complex, and that they have too many special characteristics, which in turn are problematic to take into account.⁹²

In the comparison of Turkish-Muslim minority of Western Thrace and Greek-Orthodox minority of Istanbul, some problems that mentioned above for the comparison of minorities are irrelevant. In the comparison of the political representation of the two minority groups, most similar system design is used. Here, it should be noted that these two minority groups display both similar and different characteristics; however their similarities enable us to make this comparison, and indicates that the differences in their representation had emerged due to political institutional constraints or opportunities they experience at their home countries. Although these two communities show socio-economic, religious, magnitude differences; they have more common points such as being recognized as national minority, having a long length of residency, living in countries with similar political system, and being bounded by the ‘reciprocity rule’. However, despite their macro-level and micro-level similarities, their political representation differs within periods. That’s why; the thesis study utilizes ‘Most Similar System Design’ method (MSSD) in the comparison of these two communities to understand the reasons behind their different levels of political representation.

Historical New-Institutionalism

In this thesis, the determinants of political representation of minorities are examined through institutional factors, rather than sociological-approach or rational-choice approach. Moreover, as the political representation of these two minority communities changes within time since Lausanne Treaty of 1923, the thesis adopts ‘historical

⁹¹ John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive*, (University Press of Pacific, 2002).

⁹² Adam Przeworski and Herry Teune, *The logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*, (1970).

institutionalism' approach when comparing political representation of these groups.

In historical institutionalism approach⁹³, the objective is to understand which political institutions matter and how they matter. In this emphasis, the institutionalist scholars are influenced from the group theory. Their general understanding of the polity as an overall system of interacting parts from the structural functionalists, yet their rather than the latter's emphasis on the social, psychological or cultural traits of individuals as the parameters driving much of the system's operation, the historical institutionalists saw the institutional organization of the polity or the political economy as the principal factor structuring collective behavior and its distinctive outcomes. State institutions as well as the other political and social institutions are influential in producing distinctive national trajectories. Much of this work consists of cross-national comparisons of public policy, typically emphasizing the impact of national political institutions structuring relations among legislators, organized interests, the electorate, and the judiciary.

'How do historical institutionalists define institutions? They define them as the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity and political economy. They can range from the rules of a constitutional order or the standard operating procedures of a bureaucracy to the conventions governing trade union behavior or bank-firm relations. In general, historical institutionalists associate institutions with organizations and the rules or conventions promulgated by formal organization.⁹⁴

Four distinctive features of historical institutionalism are:

- They tend to conceptualize the relationship between institutions and individual behavior in relatively broad terms.
- They emphasize the asymmetries of power associated with the operation and development of institutions.
- They tend to have a view of institutional development that emphasizes path dependence and unintended consequences.

⁹³ Peter A. Hall and Rosemary Taylor, Political Science and Three New Institutionalisms, (MPIFG Discussion Paper, 1996).

⁹⁴ Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Constructing European Institutions" in (eds.) Schneider and Aspinwall, *The rules of Integration*, (Manchester University Press, 2001).

- They are especially concerned to integrate institutional analysis with the contribution that other kinds of factors, such as ideas, can make to political outcomes.

Historical institutionalism method provides a qualitative and in-depth study for the comparative analysis. Compared to the rational-choice institutionalists, who deals with preferences at the level of assumptions; historical institutionalism takes the question of how individuals and groups define their self-interest.⁹⁵ As this approach aims to illuminate how political struggles are mediated by the institutional setting in which they take place, here it serves the best to understand the relationship between the operating practices of the minority communities with the formal political rules and procedures of the society they live in. With its functioning, it enables to combine the theory and the thesis inspired from the institutional factors it aims to test. Utilizing historical institutionalism approach will help to generalize the findings of the thesis study and to increase its contribution to the general literature.

Therefore, in order to conceptualize the relationship between institutions (macro-level and micro-level factors) and minority behavior in political representation, the thesis utilizes historical new-institutionalism method in comparison of Turkish-Muslim minority and Greek-Orthodox minority in Chapter 2 “Turkish and Greek Case”, and in Chapter 4 “Political Representation of Greek-Orthodox Minority in Turkey” and Chapter 5 “Political Representation of Turkish Minority in Western Thrace”, when scrutinizing political systems of Greece and Turkey in details. *Text analysis* is adopted to measure the effectiveness of the minority deputies in the National Parliaments in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. In these chapters interviews with notables and deputies from minority groups and major party members are conducted to find an answer to the question ‘why reciprocity rule is not applied in political representation’.

1.4.3 Content Analysis Model (Qualitative Approach)

As the number of Rourm MPs in the Turkish Parliament is insufficient for a quantitative content analysis, and to form a regression model, in this study qualitative approach has been utilized. Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid

⁹⁵ Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, Frank Longstreth (edited by), *Structural Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, (Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.8.

inferences from texts to the contexts of their use. Qualitative approaches to content analysis have their roots in literary theory, the social sciences and critical scholarship (Marxist approaches, feminist theory etc.). Sometimes they are given the label interpretive. With *Discourse analysis* the thesis studies how minorities appear to the societies they live in, how ethnic tensions are described, and how stereotypes permeated. *Rhetorical analysis* focuses on how messages are delivered, and with what (intended or actual) effect. *Narrative Analysis* is not interested in the text as such but in characters as carriers of the story. *Ethnographic content analysis* encourages accounts to emerge from readings of texts by focusing on situations, settings, styles, images, meanings, and nuances presumed to be recognizable by the human actors/speakers involved.⁹⁶ They share the following characteristics⁹⁷:

- They require a close reading of relatively small amounts of textual matter.
- They involve interpretation of given texts into new (analytical or critical) narratives.

In the thesis, discourse and rhetoric analysis will be made by examining the texts in the minority press; parliamentary speeches and interviews. How the two minority communities perceive the ‘principle of reciprocity’; how they define themselves; freedom to mention their ethnic origin, and the differences between the parliamentary speeches and minority press in depicting the problems will be understood by these analyses.

1.4.3.1 Texts Analysis- Discourses

To measure the effectiveness of the minority deputies, their Parliamentary speeches in their national assemblies are analyzed through Text Analysis Method in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Here, for each minority representative, how many times they had spoken in the National Parliaments, how many times they had mentioned the words ‘minority, loyalty, identity, their prefecture and minority’s concerns’ is categorized. The texts are drawn from the Parliamentary Archives of both Greece and Turkey.⁹⁸ These discourses will be compared with the texts in the minority press.

⁹⁶ Kimberly A. Neuendorf, *The Content Analysis Guidebook*, (Sage Publications, 2002), pp.5-8.

⁹⁷ Klaus H. Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology*, (Sage Publications, 2004), p.32-25.

⁹⁸For Parliamentarians’ Speeches Archive, in Turkey:

http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/tutanak_sorgu.html

In Greece: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Vouleftes>.

1.4.3.2 Interview Analysis- Rhetoric

To understand two communities' different characteristics of political representation and 'why reciprocity rule is not applied in political sphere', interviews are conducted with present minority representatives (in Greece) and with notables (both in Greece and Turkey). In addition to them, deputies belonging to majority parties are also asked the same question to scrutinize why minority representatives are preferred or not preferred in candidate nomination and election. In total there are 8 interviews made in Greece, and 4 interviews made in Turkey. The difference in the rhetoric of the Roum minority and Muslim minority on 'reciprocity rule' will be analyzed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 6, to understand why one part says "we were always here", while the other "we are left here".

To sum up, macro-level and micro-level determinants of minorities' political representation are salient for the research of this study to enlighten the arguments given in this chapter. As the literature review showed, these factors have not been analyzed or tested for the respective minority groups, and their political representation has not been compared before. Micro-level factors will be intensively analyzed in Chapter 3 "General Characteristics of Roum and Muslim Minority". As macro-level determinants are related to the political system and political history of the countries, they will be scrutinized separately throughout the thesis. Chapter 2 "Reciprocity and its applications: Turkish and Greek cases" will look at the influence of 'reciprocity rule' on economic, social, cultural and political fields. Chapter 4 "Political Representation of Greek-Orthodox Minority in Turkey" will examine the effects of political institutions on the political representation of the Roum minority and effectiveness of the minority MPs in Turkish Parliament; whereas Chapter 5 makes a similar research for the Muslim-Turkish minority. The findings of the chapters will be discussed in the Conclusion Chapter.

CHAPTER 2. RECIPROCITY and ITS APPLICATIONS: TURKISH AND GREEK CASES

Reciprocity rule concerning Turkish and Roum minorities has been positively and negatively applied to their economic and social rights, but not on their rights in political field. If reciprocity rule is not a major factor for the political representation of the two minorities, the thesis aims to analyze the other factors for their political representation and why they have differences in their representation. Before comparing these two communities' political representation in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 respectively, in Chapter 2 the historical background of Greek-Turkish relations and in Chapter 3 the general characteristics of the minority communities will be given in order to understand whether their relationship has an impact on the political representation of their regarding minorities. The discussions and debates on events related to Turkish-Greek relations in Turkish and Greek Parliaments will be given in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 respectively.

2.1 Reciprocity Rule

As the primary factor that influences the conditions of the Greek-Orthodox and Turkish-Muslim minority, it is necessary to explain first: What is reciprocity and how does it function on Greek-Turkish relations regarding the policies toward their respective minorities? The difference between international minority policy of League of Nations and bilateral approach of Lausanne Treaty will be discussed in this Chapter as an interesting argument that will serve the hypothesis testing for the role of EU in the Conclusion Chapter 6. This discussion will be followed by giving cases on the application of reciprocity rule in economic, social and cultural areas. This chapter aims to show that because the Lausanne Treaty leaves the fate of minority communities in the hand of Turkey and Greece, the economic, social and cultural rights of Greek-Orthodox minority of Turkey and Turkish-Muslim minority of Greece have been affected by Greek-Turkish relations, and not well-protected or monitored by an international organization. However, these minority groups' political representations have not been determined through reciprocity rule, neither depended on Greek-Turkish relations; but realized by the combination of macro and micro factors.

2.1.1 Definition of Reciprocity

Reciprocity is a universal concept in international law and in international relations that encourages the parties to adhere to a contractual agreement. It is also binding, as it allows the possibility of sanctions under the international law. Reciprocity is applied in several areas. For instance in real-estate sector if the law enables foreign citizens to buy property in one country, than the citizens of the enabling country would have the same rights to buy property in the those countries.

Similarly, in international relations ‘reciprocity’ suggests principle that favors, benefits, or penalties that are granted by one state to the citizens or legal entities of another, should be returned in kind. That is to say, reciprocity might encompass both positive and negative responses for the actions of others. It is seen that, in the lack of an international or bilateral agreements, reciprocity regarding the minorities of the two countries, which are the kin-state of the minority groups have been applied concerning the educational, economic, social rights of minorities. The conditions of Hungarian minorities in Romania can be an example for that, where minorities have been treated as hostages to influence the policies of the other country.⁹⁹ On the other hand, reciprocity might avoid one country to violate its minorities’ rights, when its nationalities are inhabitants of the other country.

In the case of Turkish minority of Greece and Roum minority of Turkey, their rights and the policies of the regarding states had been mentioned in Lausanne Treaty (1923), and because of the article 45 states that “Greece has the same obligations towards the Muslim minority in Greece”, even though the word reciprocity had not taken place in the Treaty, and it suggests ‘mutual/parallel responsibility’ rather than reciprocity, in practice reciprocity had been applied in several fields. Moreover, compared to League of Nations’ policy on minorities where the international community was determined as the observer, Lausanne Treaty left the destiny of these two communities at the hand of Greece and Turkey, and their rights became mutually tied to each other.

The conditions of a minority group will be understood better by making comparison to another. That’s why this Chapter consists of similar information about both minority communities, and Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 will portray how the same events such

⁹⁹ Refworld, “Ethnic Hungarian Minority in Central and Eastern Europe”, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,WRITENET,,HUN,,3ae6a6c34,0.html>

independence wars, world wars, treaties, occupations, civil wars, conflicts and military coups affect both sides. Although this thesis focuses on the rights of the minorities, in general their conditions also give us the picture of the majority, their approach to the minority issue, their level of tolerance and democracy.

2.1.2 Reciprocity Rule by Lausanne Treaty (24 July 1923)

While the Ottoman Empire had been defeated in the First World War, Turkish Republic emerged as the winner of the Greek-Turkish War and was able to enter the negotiations from a position of strength. The importance of the Lausanne Treaty for the present work is three fold. First of all it is the agreement that confirmed the emergence of Turkish Republic and ended the existence of Ottoman Empire through which the religious identity of Muslim minority of Thrace and modern Turkish identity of Turkey began to challenge each other. Secondly, it gave the minorities their legal status and is consequently the charter of the Greek-Turkish minority regime. Thirdly, Greeks and Turks have a tendency to refer to the Lausanne treaty on every relevant and irrelevant occasion when Thrace is on the agenda. From the minority perspective the main issues were the population exchange and the protection of the minorities.

2.1.2.1 Population Exchange

The Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek–Turkish Populations was signed by Greece and Turkey at Lausanne on 30 January 1923, six months before the general peace treaty of Lausanne which it was affixed to.¹⁰⁰ The convention specified the exchange of the Greek Orthodox of the Ottoman Empire and the Muslims of Greece, adhering to the traditional religious criterion. The provision of exchange did not apply to Greek speakers in Turkey professing other religions than Greek Orthodoxy, such as Catholicism, Protestantism, or Islam. On the other hand, Turkish-speaking Greek Orthodox of Turkey (in Karaman region) was included to the population exchange. The text of the convention was sufficient in a literal sense to cover any Greek Orthodox Turkish subjects, but such a literal interpretation was considered to be contrary to the spirit of the Convention. It was said, “Greece was not expected to receive emigrant of her own religious faith unless they had Greek national sentiments.” Likewise, the Albanian Muslims in Greek Epiros were

¹⁰⁰ Alexis Alexandris, *Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974* (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1983), p.91.

excluded from the exchange.¹⁰¹ The exchange and subsequent liquidation of property comprised both those who had left their homes between 18 October 1912 (declaration of the First Balkan War) and 30 January 1923, and persons who had been left in situ and were now to be transferred. About 848,000 Greeks had fled from Anatolia with the withdrawing Greek army in September 1922, while 115,000 Muslims had been left Greece in 1914 due to Balkan War with the invitation by the Young Turks to repopulate the regions in western Anatolia where they had deported the local Greeks.¹⁰²

The exchange of those who still remained in the territories of the respective governments was completed under the supervision of the Mixed Commission by the middle of 1925, and included 192,356 Greeks and 354,647 Muslims.¹⁰³ Two cases, for some reasons,¹⁰⁴ were exempted from this condition: The Muslim minority of Western Thrace, and Greek-Orthodox community in Istanbul, Gökçeada (Imros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) were allowed to stay. Initially, the Turkish deputies wanted the Greeks of Istanbul to be included in the compulsory exchange. After pressure put from the British Foreign Minister, Lord Curzon, the Greeks of Istanbul were excluded, as according to him, this population was of vital significance for the city, its commerce and industry, and without it Istanbul would be in danger losing its wealth and trade.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, Venizelos opposed strongly as well regarding the Greeks of Istanbul on the ground that Greece could not absorb more refugees, after the arrival of Greek refugees from Anatolia. Moreover, the Greeks of Istanbul represented a large number of urban population, which the Greek state could not receive, since the urban centers were about to overflow from the mass arrival of refugees. Most important reason was to maintain the Patriarchy and its community in Istanbul. Despite Turkey's initial objections, finally Greeks of Istanbul and the two small islands were exempted. With this concession on behalf of the Turkish side, they achieved also to exclude the Muslim minority of Western Thrace as well. There was an issue raised by the Turkish delegate on the proportionality of the two non-exchangeable groups and thus 110.000 Greeks were allowed to stay in Turkey and a

¹⁰¹ Elisabeth Kontogiorgi, *Population Exchange in Greek Macedonia: The Forced Settlement of Refugees 1922-1930*, (Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 25.

¹⁰² Eric J. Zürcher, *İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete: Türkiye'de Etnik Çatışma [From Empire to Republic: Ethnic Conflict in Turkey]*, (İletişim Publications, 2006), pp.9-17.

¹⁰³ John Petropoulos, "The Obligatory Exchange of Populations: a Greco- Turkish Pacification Arrangement, 1922-1930", *Elefterios Venizelos*, T. Veremis and G. Goulimi (eds.), 1989, pp.442-444.

¹⁰⁴ Alexis Alexandris, *Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974* (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1983).

¹⁰⁵ Thanos M. Veremis, *Greeks and Turks in War and Peace*, (Athens News, 2007), p. 104.

respective number of Muslims to stay in Greece. Those who were entitled to remain in the areas exempted from the population exchange were recognized in the French treaty text as *établis*. As it is noticed, there was a strong interstate bargaining for the number and the status of the two groups. Nevertheless Lausanne Treaty brought guarantees and positive dimensions for the minorities.¹⁰⁶

After the Greek-Turkish agreements in 1930, 73,000 Greek Orthodox in Istanbul were granted certificates as not subject to be exchanged along with 7,000 in Gökçeada (Imbros) and 1,200 in Bozcaada (Tenedos), while 30,000 Greek citizens who had lived in Istanbul for generations were granted residence permit.¹⁰⁷

2.1.2.2 Protection of Minorities

Within the framework of reciprocal treatment of the minorities in Greece and Turkey, the policies have been based on the Lausanne Treaty (24 July 1923). In Lausanne summit, it was launched for the first time a brand new, brutal practice, the compulsory population exchange.¹⁰⁸ After the end of the Greco-Turkish war, Greek Orthodox were forced to leave Turkey, as well as Muslims who had been living in Greece who were required to do the same.

Several treaties and agreements enforce the protection of the non-Muslim and Muslim minority in Turkey and Greece respectively. According to Articles 37-45 of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), the Greek and the Turkish governments are obliged to protect the

¹⁰⁶ The minorities in both sides are determined regarding their religion, not ethnicity. In Turkey only non-Muslims: Greek-Orthodox, Armenians and Jews are considered as minorities, while Alevis and Kurds, and also other non-Muslim groups are exempt from this recognition. In Greece, similarly only Muslims are recognized as minorities and granted the rights from Lausanne Treaty. Macedonians who are Orthodox and Albanians who are Orthodox or Muslims are exempted from this recognition. Greece and Turkey attempted to exercise different policies: Greece was led to consider the minority as religious (except for the early 1930s and the 1950s) over-estimating Pomaks and Gypsies, while Turkey considered the whole minority as one and only nationally Turkish. Meanwhile, Turkey refers to the minority group as Roums instead of Greek, and naming an organization including "Greek" is forbidden. Renée Hirschon, *Crossing the Aegean: An appraisal of the 1923 compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey*, (New York : Berghahn Books, 2004).

¹⁰⁷ Alexis Alexandris, "Imbros and Tenedos: A Study of Turkish Attitudes Towards Two Ethnic Greek Islands Communities Since 1923." *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* (7, Spring, 1990): pp.5-31.

¹⁰⁸ According to its provisions all Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory and all Greek nationals of Muslim religion established on Greek territory, were forced to be exchanged. In addition to the refugees immigrated before the treaty, approximately 1,1 million Orthodox Greeks fled Turkey and became refugees in Greece, and 470.000 Muslims left Greece (since 1922). This was the first time this method was adopted, the compulsory exchange of large ethnic groups as a means to separate nationally intermingled people in order to solve the problem. Dimitris Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Population and its Impact on Greece*, (London: Hurst and Company, 1962) pp. 52.

respective minorities in their territories. They agreed to provide equality before the law, protection of life and liberty, free use of any language, free exercise of religion, the right to establish and control their own institutions and schools, the right to give instruction in their own languages, freedom of movement and all other rights enjoyed by the majority. The Article 45 refers to a mutual responsibility of the states by saying all these guarantees were mentioned (in Articles 37-44)¹⁰⁹ in respect to the Greek minority in Istanbul were recognized by Greece in relation to its Muslim minority.¹¹⁰ In short, the articles give the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey the same civil rights as the Muslims, while their cultural peculiarities as minority must also be respected. This includes the use of any language both in private and public, the right to have interpreters in court, the right to establish, to manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institution, and schools and other establishments for instruction and education. The existence of minority schools should not prevent the Turkish government from making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory.

Adhering to the focus of the thesis, political rights of the minority communities are also determined in the Treaty. However, with the respect to the political rights, apart from the fact that the convention implicates full exercise of political rights of the members of minority, as the Christians (in Turkey) and as Muslims (in Greece), there is no reference that political equality requires territorial autonomy or quotas for the representation of the minority group in the parliaments. Distinct rights did not involve maintenance of the group as a distinct body with its own legislative and executive powers. Hence, it is not declared that if one member from a minority group is elected as deputy in Greek

¹⁰⁹ Section III of the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923) Concerning Protection of Minorities. Given in Appendix A. In these articles it is explicitly mentioned that The Muslims of Western Thrace in order to be treated as equal citizens of the Greek state were granted civil, political and cultural rights. Equality before the law is guaranteed and discrimination on the ground of ethnic characteristics is prohibited. With the respect to the political rights, apart from the fact that the convention implicates full exercise of political rights of the members of minority, as the Christians, there is no reference that political equality requires territorial autonomy or quotas for the representation of the minority group in the parliament. Distinct rights did not involve maintenance of the group as a distinct body with its own legislative and executive powers. As regards the cultural rights, according to the provisions of the convention, Greece was obliged to secure and maintain rights of the Muslim minority linked to their language, education and religion. In particular the Greek state undertakes the responsibility that in areas where a large number of the minority is established the group receives an equitable share of the funds in order to be able to maintain its own religious, social and educational institutions. The non-Muslims (Roums, Armenians, Jews) in Turkey will enjoy the same rights granted to the Muslim minority of Greece.

¹¹⁰ "The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory".

Parliament, a Greek-Orthodox minority has to be preferred as deputy in Turkish Parliament and vice versa. However, because these communities' rights in economic, social and cultural areas have been treated according to the reciprocity rule (although not mentioned in Lausanne Treaty either), the thesis questions why reciprocity have not been applied in political sphere and tries to understand the factors that determine their political representation in the parliament.

Beside the negative and abusive application of reciprocity in the Lausanne Treaty, there were other factors that affected the protection of minorities' rights, which the Mixed Commission failed to foresee. As the research conducted, since the Lausanne Treaty, official Greece has seen the Muslim minority of Western Thrace as an inconvenient remnant of the Ottoman Empire. It has been the unreliable 'other', a likely instrument for Turkey's irredentism. Prior to 1941, Greek strategy had assumed the minority's potential disloyalty.¹¹¹ Again, despite official reports confirming that the minority had not collaborated with the Bulgarian occupation (during the WWII), the Athens government continued to misjudge the minority in the civil war. Contrary to such interpretations, however, the Muslim minority of Western Thrace did not pose any threat to Greece or the Greeks in a period when existing structures were collapsing and contested, despite ample opportunity to do so. Official Greece has continued to misinterpret the minority thereafter. Similar misinterpretation can be suggested for the official Turkey towards its Greek-Orthodox minority since the WWI with Greek occupation, which had reached to its climax with Cyprus issue.

To sum up, the Lausanne Treaty had placed the West Thracian Muslims in the same strategic frame as that of the Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul. The numerical equivalence managed by the Lausanne Treaty had changed over years. Especially new Greco Turkish tensions in the 1950s over Cyprus underscored this equivalence. The demands of the Greek Cypriots for 'enosis' (union) with Greece raised fears amongst Turkish Cypriots as to their own fate and the violent campaign of the former inflamed Turkish nationalism. Popular tensions ran high. The bombing of the Turkish Consulate in Salonika (Selanik/Thessaloniki) – the house in which Kemal Atatürk had been born – led

¹¹¹ Kevin Featherstone; George Niarchos, *The Last Ottomans: The Muslim Minority of Greece, 1940-1949*, (Palgrave Macmillan: Newyork, 2011), p.327.

to large-scale riots in Istanbul directed at the Greek minority there.¹¹² The Istanbul riots weighed on the Greek psyche as the ‘Septemvriana’ (Events of September). An expulsion of Greeks from Istanbul in 1964 – again provoked by the actions of Greek Cypriots vis-à-vis their Turkish counterparts – further reduced a once large community. Since the Lausanne Treaty, the Greeks of Istanbul have declined from 111,000 to 2–3000, a reduction clearly brought about by the repression and pressure of their host government and society.¹¹³

Beside the numerical inequality, another sensitive issue for the Roum community is the position of the Ecumenical Patriarch in the city, which is recognized internationally as the spiritual leader of the world’s second largest Christian Church, but seen by official Turkey as merely a local bishop has been kept bound and vulnerable. At the same time, successive Turkish governments in the post-war period have looked to the ‘outside Turks’ (Dış Türkler) of Western Thrace, stressing their common ‘Turkish’ identity and criticizing their mistreatment by the Greek authorities since the 1950s.¹¹⁴

2.2 Comparison with League of Nations (Role of Supra-national institutions)

With the constitution of the League of Nations (LoN) in 28th April 1919, it was the first time that the protection of minorities was put on an international system and therefore the League of Nations undertook to respond to that commitment, to the principle of self-determination and self-governance and to the international commitment to minority rights. Although there was not a comprehensive convention, which defined the rights of minorities that should be allocated to minority groups, the “minority treaties” which were signed between the allied powers and each new or newly-enlarged nation-states included articles and clauses about the protection of minorities. The main features were the absence of bilateralism and inter-state negotiations about the minorities, the explicit obligation of the kin-state not to involve, but to proceed in a procedure to denounce the state which violated the rights of the minority affiliated, and the centralization of the

¹¹² Later reports indicated that Turkish nationalists had planted the Salonika bombing as an apparent pretext for action in Istanbul. Dilek Güven, *6-7 Eylül Olayları*, (Tarih Vakfı: İstanbul, 2005); Umut Özkırımlı and Sypros Sofos, *Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey*, Columbia Press: Newyork, 2008), p. 171).

¹¹³ Baskın Oran, *Türkiye’de Azınlıklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, İç mevzuat, içtihat, uygulama*, (İletişim Yayınları, 2004), p. 32.

¹¹⁴ The Turkish Edirne MP says “Western Thrace Turks are living in the region that Turkish nation accepts as ‘the case’”, [Azınlıkça](http://www.azinlikca.net/bati-trakya-haber/ipsala-da-toprak-toreni-gerceklestirildi.html), “İpsala’da Toprak Töreni Gerçekleştirildi”, 16 May 2011, <http://www.azinlikca.net/bati-trakya-haber/ipsala-da-toprak-toreni-gerceklestirildi.html>

settlement of the problem, under the aegis of the services, competent departments and Minority Office of the League of Nations.¹¹⁵ Whereas, in the framework of the Lausanne Treaty, which was under the League system, Greece and Turkey undertook significant obligations, that put the rights and protections of the minorities from international to bilateral judgment.

As it is explained above, the Turkish victory in Asia Minor had swept the native Greek Orthodox population away together with the Greek army. In the negotiations between Turkey and Greece on the situation of the immigrants (before the Treaty), the exchangees, their properties, and settlement, it is seen that League of Nations acted as a third party, rather than an obligatory and lawmaker. Therefore, the historical details of the negotiations are interesting to understand the abusive applications of minority rights later.

The League of Nations entrusted Dr. Nansen with the refugee relief. Nansen proposed a separate convention for the exchange of the Greek and Turkish population after visiting Istanbul and Athens. The Greek government assumed that Turkey would not allow the return of any of the Greeks, and gathered that the transfer of the Muslim population in Greece by a compulsory population exchange would help create room for the large influx of refugees. In the negotiations at Lausanne¹¹⁶, Venizelos was ready to consider an obligatory or voluntary exchange of populations, but opposed the exchange of the Greeks from Istanbul. The Great Powers also opposed their departure because of their important position in commerce and industry. 13 December the Turkish delegation accepted that the Greeks of Istanbul should be allowed to stay in exchange for the Muslims in Greek Thrace. As the response, Turkey insisted on the proportionality of the two non-exchangeable minorities to limit the size of the Istanbul Greek community to match the numerically smaller Muslim minority of Thrace. This question of proportionality resulted in the decrease of the Istanbul Greek community from more than 300,000 in 1922 to about 100,000 in 1927.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 51.

¹¹⁶ Veremis, *Greeks and Turks in War and Peace*, p. 142. There is a very large literature on the Lausanne Treaty and the population exchange. The most detailed account of the population exchange is (S.Ladas, *Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, MacMillan Press, Newyork, 1932). For a brief recent interpretation, which includes a selected bibliography, see (Kalliopi, Koufa, and Constantinos, Svoloopoulos, "The Compulsory Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey: the Settlement of Minority Questions at the Conference of Lausanne and Its Impact on Greek-Turkish Relations" (1991).

¹¹⁷ Turkish State announced that the Greek-Orthodox population living in Istanbul city but beyond the province (such as Tuzla, Pendik) would be departed as well. (Alexandris 1983: 83–87).

In fact, Article 44¹¹⁸ stipulated that the articles related to minority protection constituted obligations of international concern and should be placed under the guarantee of the LoN, while the last article stated that the above provisions would be similarly conferred by Greece on its Muslim minority. Additionally, minorities in Greece had also the guarantees provided by the Protocol relating to the treaty concluded at Sèvres between the Principal Allied Powers and Greece on the 10th August 1920, concerning the Protection of Minorities in Greece. This was another post-WWI minority treaty almost identical to the Polish one with some special provisions relating with the particularities of its minorities.¹¹⁹

LoN did not last long, dissolved with the eruption of WII. Moreover it was not perceived as a fair institution, as the Protocols binding the minority rights were not feasible for the minorities of the founders of LoN, namely Britain, France and Italy. After the Second World War, LoN became United Nations; however the fate of the Muslim minorities of Greece and non-Muslim minorities of Turkey was left to the hands of Greece and Turkey respectively.

Moreover, for the settlement problems of the Greek-Orthodox refugees LoN was unprepared, had not considered the economic and social consequences of such a big population exchange. Nansen, in February 1923, presented the situation during a session of the LoN. He presented a Greek request suggesting the League's assistance in order to raise an international loan, as Greece could not cope any longer economically with the refugee crisis. Immediately, a Sub-Committee was formed to examine the issue and the High Commissariat prepared a plan for the settlement of the refugees on a self-supporting

¹¹⁸ Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect non-Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of the majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances. Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of fact arising out of these Articles between the Turkish Government and any one of the other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

¹¹⁹ Carlile A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities*, (Oxford Univ. Press, 1934), pp. 247-249.

basis as the League had not undertaken such a huge task before.¹²⁰

Besides the legal framework we must also take into consideration the social realities. In other words, what did those who formulated the articles for minority protection in the League of Nations intend, and what was the prevailing attitude of the host countries and the minorities themselves? After the First World War the host countries tended to resent the imposition of the minority treaties as a violation of their sovereignty and believed that they should have an entirely free hand in their internal affairs. The Allies did not pay attention to these objections, but took pains to avoid that the protection regime should violate on the sovereignty of the states. In reality the needs of the minorities were subjugated to the needs of the states.

Very far from the traditional function of minorities in the Ottoman Empire, where the legal and social mechanisms had contributed towards keeping the religious groups apart and not integrating them, Republican Turkey made determined efforts to assimilate the minorities in her country. In Greece the Ottoman structures remained more intact and the Muslims and Christians continued to live as parallel communities. The integration of the Muslims into Greek society was hampered not only by traditional attitudes, but also by the environment. The rural minority often lived in pure Muslims villages and had very little contact with society at large.

When the ratification of the Greek-Turkish agreement (of 10.06.1930) was discussed in the Greek Parliament, the opposition leader Panayiotis Tsaldaris claimed that it was necessary to sign a new Greek-Turkish agreement, which would consolidate the minority rights of the Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul. Venizelos replied that he did not consider it to be a wise policy to make the minority rights a part of the bilateral relations with Turkey. He thought that the behavior of Turkey towards the Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul would be similar with the development of friendly and close relations between the two states. Greece desired for their “co-nationals” (*omoyenís*) in Istanbul to live as law-abiding Turkish citizens, yet keeping their distinctive traditions and customs.¹²¹ This gives us an important indication of Greek attitudes towards the minority

¹²⁰ C.B. Eddy, *Greece and the Greek Refugees, 1931*; S.Ladas, *Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, 1932.

¹²¹ Alexandris, 1983, p.187.

questions. Venizelos did not consider it prudent to demand strong formal guaranties, which could be used to challenge Turkey's minority policy directly.

To sum up, the international involvement in the fate of the minority was limited after the first years of friction in the aftermath of the Lausanne Treaty. In the case of Thrace this is natural as it would be difficult for foreign observers to keep in touch with what was happening in such a relatively remote area. Consequently the fate of the minority became dominated by the ups and downs of Greek- Turkish relations, which for years represented the framework of "internationalization". After the Greek Orthodox minority has all but vanished, Turkey's patronage of the "Muslim minority" in Western Thrace has taken on a new character. Since the Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul can no longer be used as leverage, there has been a growing tendency to apply to international organizations. The minority too became aware of the possibility to appeal to international organizations. Sometimes the appeals to international organizations were coordinated with Turkish diplomatic efforts. Finally we have the question of the international organizations' ability to follow up the situation in Western Thrace and in Turkey with consistency and integrity.

Whether legal reciprocity can be applied to states' obligations towards their minorities has to be considered under modern international law,¹²² which is clear on the predominance of human and minority rights over any clauses of reciprocity or bilateral restrictions. In its judgment in the case of *Apostolidi vs Turkey*, where it held the confiscation by Turkish authorities of real estate inherited by Greek nationals from their late aunt, a Turkish national, to be in violation of the right to property,¹²³ the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) "reminds that the Convention, contrary to classical international treaties, transcends the frame of simple reciprocity between the contracting parties".¹²⁴ The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) also criticized "the recurrent invoking" by Greece and Turkey of the principle of reciprocity for being 'anachronistic' and detrimental to national cohesion.¹²⁵

¹²² Treaty of Vienna on the Law of the Treaties, Article 60(5).

¹²³ Dilek Kurban, and Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *A Tale of Reciprocity: Minority Foundations in Greece and Turkey*, TESEV Report, July 2010.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* A Tale of Reciprocity, ECHR, *Apostolidi and Others v. Turkey*, No. 45628/99, 27 March 2007, para. 71.

¹²⁵ Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), *Freedom of Religion and Other Human Rights for Non-Muslim Minorities in Turkey and for the Muslim Minority in Thrace (Eastern Greece)*, Res 1704, 2010, para. 8. (hereafter PACE, Res. 1704).

While noting that the two ‘kin states’ may feel responsible for their brethren in the neighbouring country, the Assembly reminded that “it is actually first and foremost the countries in which the minorities live that are responsible for their own citizens, including the members of the respective religious minorities”.¹²⁶

The initiatives by the minority itself to promote its problems internationally can be roughly divided into three groups: The initiatives by those from the minority who have remained in Greece and Turkey, by those who have emigrated to Turkey and Greece, and by those who live in other countries. The last group comprises those who live more or less permanently abroad as foreign workers or students, mostly in USA, Australia and Germany. Each group has its peculiarities, depending on a number of factors.

2.2.1 Application of Reciprocity in Economic, Social and Cultural Areas: Case for Turkey and Greece

As aforementioned, compared to the constitution of the League of Nations in 28th April 1919, where the main features were the absence of bilateralism and inter-state negotiations about the minorities, the explicit obligation of the kin-state not to involve, but to proceed in a procedure to denounce the state which violated the rights of the minority affiliated, although in theory aimed the equal and just practice and protection of minority rights, Lausanne Treaty positioned these two countries as the monitoring kin-states that would indirectly intervene in the internal affairs of the other country through mobilizing or manipulating their kin-minority groups living in the other state.

As already said, Article 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne creates parallel legal obligations for Greece and Turkey for the protection of their Muslim and non-Muslim minorities. However, restrictive and often distorted interpretations of this provision by both states have often led to them to violate these obligations. In both Greece and Turkey, community properties, assets and real estate have been targeted by official policies aiming to undermine minority communities’ power over their foundations and to strengthen state control over them. On the basis of the ‘reciprocity principle,’ states have exercised tight control over the selection of the boards of foundations and the

¹²⁶ Ibid. para. 5

management of their properties, undermining the autonomy and property rights these foundations were granted under Lausanne.¹²⁷

Championing reciprocal mistreatment by the two states began as soon as the legal protection system was set up. The ups (1930, early 1950's) and downs (1955, 1964, 1974) of inter-state relations, which is analyzed in this section, largely explain the divergence of both states' policies towards Lausanne minorities, particularly community foundations.

Critical in the cycle of foreign relations between Turkey and Greece has been the conflict over Cyprus, which has had serious repercussions for minorities in both countries. The endorsement by Greece and Turkey of the negative reciprocity concept, both in law and practice, mainly affected the Muslims of Greece and the Greek-Orthodox of Turkey. However, in many cases, other non-Muslim communities in Turkey also suffered from this political antagonism, which was external to them.

It was obvious that the articles of the Lausanne Treaty would be challenged or misused by Turkey and Greece within time according to internal, international and bilateral dimensions, as the Treaty of Lausanne ignored five main features of Greek-Turkish relations:

- 1) These two nations established their nation-states through the wars they made against each other: 1821 War of Independence for Greece (Greek Rebellion in Turkish literature) against the Ottoman Empire, and 1919-1922 War of Independence for Turks against the Greek occupation (Asia Minor Catastrophe in Greek literature).
- 2) Bad memories of the War of Independence and the population exchange was very new, there was distrust between the two nations created by their living history. The enforced population exchange was a tool for the process of homogenizing of the nations, and also interpreted as the indication that "these two communities cannot live together".
- 3) Especially in Turkey, minorities were perceived and labeled as the allies of the occupying forces (Roum-Greece; Armenians- Russia and France) and separatist

¹²⁷ On the application of reciprocity by Greece and Turkey, see Emre Öktem, "Yeni Vakıflar Kanununun Cemaat Vakıflarına İlişkin Hükümleri Hakkında Uluslararası Hukuk Açısından Bazı Gözlemler" (Some Observations on Provisions of the New Law on Foundations Concerning Community Foundations on the Basis of International Law), *Essays in Honor of Ergun Özbudun: Vol. II- Constitutional Law*, Ankara, 2008; Samim Akgönül (ed.), *Reciprocity: Greek and Turkish Minorities; Law, Religion and Politics*, Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2008.

activities (Jews and Armenians). Turkish-Muslim minority of Greece has been treated as the heritage of Ottoman rule, and their loyalty always questioned.

- 4) Both Greece and Turkey (but especially Turkey) was at the stage of creating nation-states with more homogeneous citizens under the discourse of “one language-one goal- one culture”.¹²⁸ Hence, minorities became the main target for this nationalizing policy.
- 5) There were unsettled issues such as the conditions of the islands in Aegean, the rule of Cyprus and War compensations.

As a result, just after the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, both states began violate the articles concerning the ‘Protection of Minorities’. For Turkey’s side, which was passing through nationalization and de-Ottomanization process, the articles 37-45, guaranteed the continuity of a similar order of ‘community’ and ‘millet’ that the minorities were granted under the Ottoman Empire rule. Due to these articles, minorities of Turkey also expected that they will continue the ‘millet’ order (also as equal citizens) where they could maintain their cultural identities; however very soon, under the single-party regime of the Early Republican period, they understood that these rights would be abused in practice under Turkey’s “one language- one goal- one culture” motto which aimed to melt the whole ethnic communities under its Turkification policy.¹²⁹ On this issue, the biggest deterrence had been the 42nd article of Lausanne Treaty¹³⁰, which enables the minority communities to exercise their religious rights according to their own religious practices (private laws, such as religious church weddings instead of official municipality marriages). The Civil Law of 1926 displayed that Turkey would not accept such an exercise of private laws. The minorities announced that (in surface by their own will, but in reality due to the warnings of the political institutions) they resign from their rights determined by the article 42.¹³¹ Turkification policy during the early Republican period

¹²⁸ Every nationalism has a perception of ‘other’. According to Ayşe Kadioğlu, Turkish national identity has three types of ‘other’, which has been excluded time to time, or sometimes tried to be assimilated to Turkish identity. These are non-Muslims within the empire; non-Turkish Muslims and lastly its own past. Ayşe Kadioğlu, *Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Üç Ötekisi*, The three “Others” of Turkish National Identity, *Radikal*, 23 October 2005.

¹²⁹ Rıfat N. Bali, “Cumhuriyet Döneminin Azınlıklar Politikası”, *Birikim*, Vol. 115, November 1998, pp.80-90.

¹³⁰ Appendix A: Treaty of Lausanne, Protection of Minorities.

¹³¹ For the Turkification policies, look at Ayhan Aktar “Cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarında uygulanan “Türkleştirme politikaları” *Tarih ve Toplum*, Vol. 156, December 1996,pp.4-18. This policy was implemented especially toward the Jewish minority, they had taken Turkish names and surnames, and their integration to the Turkish culture had been repeated in every occasion.

showed itself in economical field as well, by the implementation of numerical quota for the employment of the minorities. In 1923, all the companies are forced to employ Muslim officers in order to reduce the percentage of the non-Muslim officers, which was about 90% before 1923.¹³² This was an open violation of 37th and 39th articles of the Lausanne Treaty.

Moreover, the concept of reciprocity was misconstrued and, eventually, misused by the respective governments. Very soon the Greek government has put the misusing of the reciprocity rule into practice as “any Turkish measure taken against the *omoyenis* (the minority of Greek descent) in Turkey, after being verified beyond any doubt, has to be faced by counter-measures, excluding any retaliation without having consulted with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs”.¹³³

However, as a positive side, reciprocity also deters the states to apply more severe measures toward their minorities, considering their kin-member on the other side. The concern of Turkey regarding the minority of Thrace is perceived to be more limited compared to the concern of Greece regarding the minority of Istanbul. Hence, the Greek side understood that there were no possibilities to make gains in favor of the Greek minority in Turkey by applying repressive measures in Thrace.¹³⁴

Some examples for the deterrence effect of reciprocity: When just after the Lausanne Treaty, the Greek side broke the principle by confiscating houses of the Muslims in order to facilitate the Greek refugees, the Turkish side has accused Greek government and informed the Mixed Commission on the reason that the implementation of the provisions of the treaty regarding minorities’ property. Again, when Venizelos enacted the Land reform to distribute the lands in Western Thrace, the Turks put a lot of pressure and they finally managed to avoid the law to be applied in the Muslims areas in Western Thrace. It was clear that the Greek government had fear that the Turks might retaliate against the Greek populations in Istanbul. However due to indirect and bureaucratic ways that Greece

¹³² Alexis Alexandridis, *The Greek minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish relations 1918-1974* (Center for Asia Minor Studies Atina 1983), s.109-111.

¹³³ Konstantinos Tsitselikis, “Reciprocity as a regulatory pattern for the treatment of the Turkish/Muslim minority of Greece”, in *Reciprocity: Greek and Turkish Minorities law, religion and politics*, (ed.) by Samim Akgönül., (Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2008).

¹³⁴ Baskın Oran, *Yunanistan’ın Lozan ihlalleri*, (Ankara : Stratejik Araştırma ve Etüdler Milli Komitesi, 1999).

utilized since the Lausanne Treaty the percentage of Muslim minority in Western Thrace has dropped from 84% to 35% today. The re-opening of minority school in Gökçeada/İmvrös and Bozcaada/ Tenedos (early 1950s) and establishment of the minority high schools in Gümülcine/Komotini in 1953 and in İskece/Ksanthi in 1965 may be also considered as positive measures in the framework of applied reciprocity.¹³⁵

As the minorities did not have the strength to assert themselves on their own, their situation was directly related to the development of Greek-Turkish relations. When Greece complained about seized property in Istanbul the Turkish delegation countered the complaints by saying that it was reprisals for the occupation of Turkish properties in Western Thrace. In several instances the Turkish government made restrictions on the Greeks of Istanbul in order to bring pressure on the Greek government.

In this connection the Turkish press played an active part in demanding retaliatory action against Istanbul Greek Orthodox for the illegal behavior of the Greeks in Western Thrace.¹³⁶ Greece was not in a position to absorb more refugees, and Turkey used the threat of exchange as lever in negotiations concerning Muslim property in Greece.¹³⁷ Ultimately it was a question of bargaining practice, and the minorities became pawns within the greater framework of Greek-Turkish relations. This demonstrates that the minorities were not viewed as proper citizens of their host countries, something that ran contrary to efforts directed towards integrating them.

Both periods of Greek–Turkish friendship (1930–1938 and 1947–1954) had been imposed by external considerations, rather than emerging as the result of genuine understanding.¹³⁸ The improvement in Greek-Turkish relations proved to be a blessing for

¹³⁵ Bruce Clark, *İki Kere Yabancı: Kitlemel İnsan İhracı Modern Türkiye'yi ve Yunanistan'ı Nasıl Biçimlendirdi?*, (İstanbul Bilgi Yayınları, 2008).

¹³⁶ Vemund Aarbakke, "The Concept of Reciprocity and its Significance for the Political Organisation of the Muslim Minority in Greece", in *Reciprocity: Greek and Turkish Minorities law, religion and politics*, (ed.) by Samim Akgönül., (İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2008), p. 76

¹³⁷ Alexandris, 1983, p. 131.

¹³⁸ Vemund, Aarbakke, *The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Bergen, 2000, p. 239.

On the other hand, after the two devastating earthquakes that hit Turkey and Greece on August and September 1999 respectively, the support that each side displayed for the adversity of the other opened up a new channel of communication. This rapprochement not only broke the intense criticism that both Foreign Affairs Ministers of that time -İsmail Cem and George Papandreu- received at home from opposition parties and the media, but also gave signals of a potential change in Greek foreign policy declaring that Greece was ready to let Turkey into the 15-nation union of the EU.

the minorities in both Greece and Turkey. It initiated a period, which even today is remembered as a golden age. In 1952 there was a new period of détente in the relationship between the two countries, and because of the détente the known agreement between Papagos-Celâl Bayar was signed, by which the secondary school with the same name was founded in Gümülcine/Komotini which was to constitute a hotbed of anti-hellenism. The children of the minority were taught only Turkish and soaked in the conviction that they were Turks who live, only temporarily, under Greek administration.

During this time the misrecognition of the minority had vanished completely. The Field Marshall Papagos gave orders that all the titles, all the signs, all the epigraphs which refer to “Muslim community”, “Muslim association” etc. should immediately be changed. The terms “Muslim” and “Islamic” become “Turk” and “Turkish”. There was indeed an instruction by the general governor of Thrace at the time, Fessopulos, which imposes sanctions against a township president (*kinotárhis*) who had refused to change the sign on the township store. “If there are occasions of oppression against the minority, this is the most obvious: We have a forced Turkification of the minority by the Greek government. The events of ’55 shocked the Public Opinion. Our reaction—in its totality—provokes shame even today. And then we lost even one more opportunity: Of course not to expel, by force, the minority—for which there were many suggestions and even plans—but to announce the chapter on “Protection of Minorities” in the Lausanne Treaty to be in abeyance, to cut the umbilical cord between Ankara and the minority”.¹³⁹

However, although reciprocity in this framework is morally wrong, legally illegitimate and harmful to minorities’ interests, in practice since the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, it has been applied, and continues to be applied. The most salient point in terms of the integration of these minorities with the majority of group, and their freedom to exercise of their civil, economic, political and social, and religious rights is highly related to the relations between Turkey and Greece. When Greek- Turkish relationships were seriously deteriorated, this has been reflected to the Muslim minority on Western Thrace and Greek-Orthodox community of Turkey, as concerns the policy of the Greek and Turkish governments towards the minority population. Though minority issues also form part of the debate, discussed and criticized publicly, the arguments are often limited to a comparative

¹³⁹ Vemund, PhD Thesis, 2000, p. 241.

narrative of repressive acts, aiming to demonstrate the faults and sins of the ‘other’ side.¹⁴⁰ Depending on the Greek-Turkish relations, there have been elements of continuity and change in the implementation and development of minority policies in Greece and Turkey.

In Greece, Muslim minority is internationally recognized compared to the Macedonian minority and their rights are legally protected.¹⁴¹ On the other hand, as aforementioned reciprocity inextricably linked them with the fate of Greek Orthodox population of Istanbul and its outskirts, and the islands of Imbros (Gökçeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada). As fluctuations of Greek-Turkish relations influence the fate of these minority communities, any wrong move towards these minorities would most likely jeopardize the delicate post-Lausanne relationship between Greece and Turkey.

In 10th June 1930, with the initiative of Venizelos, the first rapprochement between Greece and Turkey occurred, when the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Greek Ambassador in Ankara signed the “Ankara Convention”, the Convention settled all the property issues which were pending after the populations’ exchange. Turkey and Greece accepted not to participate in any economic or political alliance that would be against the interests of the other. Until the signature of the series of agreements of friendship, the Greek government favored the “conservatives” of the minority, stressing on the religious and not the national characteristic of the minority. Unlike after the agreements, the “Reformists” were favored in the expense of the “conservatives” by the Greek government, which interfered in the sphere of autonomy of the minority. The leader of the anti- Kemalist “group of the 150”, Mustafa Sabri left Thrace and he went to Egypt.¹⁴² In

¹⁴⁰ Georgios Niarchos, “Continuity & Change in the minority policies of Greece & Turkey”. London School of Economics; Hellenic Observatory Annual Symposium; Paper presentation. www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/symposiumPapersonline/Niarchos.pdf

¹⁴¹ Muslims who have settled outside Thrace are not covered by the Lausanne minority regime and therefore, lack places of worship or religious ministers for their weddings and funerals. The recently approved bill for the construction of a mosque and an Islamic cultural centre in the wider Athens area, aims to cure some of these problems, but it is unlikely to satisfy the needs of the Muslim community of Athens.

¹⁴² The reforms that Kemal Atatürk introduced in the modern Turkish Republic, which completely changed the Islamic image of the country and formed a clearly secular. State, were not welcomed by the conservative part of the minority society of the Western Thrace, a region where religion played a key role. The religion defined their lifestyle, and based on that they had been organized. The Conservatives or the “Old Muslims” (*Muhafazakâr*) were not determined to adopt the changes which were taking place in their motherland and that led to a conflict with the champions of “Kemalism”, the “Kemalists” or the “Reformists” (*İnkılapçı*), who were trying to transfer the newly established state model in Greek Thrace. The conservatives were strictly opposed to the reforms that were already adapted to Turkey, many of which were related to fields they controlled. They didn’t want to abolish the religious education, as well as they

return, the Greek side requested from Turkey the removal of Papa Eftim from Istanbul.¹⁴³

Moreover, although today the government of Greece justifies its refusal to accept the Turkish identity of the minority on the Treaty of Lausanne, which only mentions a “Muslim minority” by pointing out the fact that “Turkish” refers to state identification, rather than to an ethnicity, during the friendship years until 1950s (before 6-7 September Events of 1955), it should be noted that the chief administrator of Thrace ordered municipalities to change all signs from “Muslim minority” to “Turkish minority”.¹⁴⁴ Which signifies despite the claims that the Treaty of Lausanne only allows reference to a “Muslim minority,” official Greek state policy has fluctuated regarding the identity of the minority and this fluctuation appears largely to be a function of Greco-Turkish relations. It is seen that after the Cold-War, minority is perceived as diverse, Muslim in general (Turks, Pomaks, Gypsies), but definitely not Turkish. Hence, Greece refers the minority as Muslim but treats it as a Turkish one.¹⁴⁵

Among massive examples I would like to give some applications of negative reciprocity between Greece and Turkey considering the Turkish and Greek minorities in their territory. The minority primary schools on Gökçeada/Imvros and Bozcaada/Tenedos (1964), the Greek- Orthodox seminary on Halki/ Heybeliada (1971), schools for the Muslims of Rodos and Kos/Istanköy (1971) are closed down as links in a chain reaction to mutually repressive measures. Similarly, the Cyprus events of 1954 (claim for union with Greece – enosis-raised by the Greek-Cypriots), which caused the related pogrom against Greeks in Istanbul

were against the use of Latin alphabet, or the Swiss Civil code, the new position of the Muslim woman and the abolition of the traditional clothing and the Islamic Law Shariah. These reforms also included state control of the religious foundations, in which they played a dominant role. They also enjoyed the support of the Greek administration, who had obvious interests that the minority not be recognized as national, but religious, thereby strengthening the Conservatives. The Lausanne regime gave them the chance to maintain their traditional character, as there was a stipulation in the Treaty about the protection of religious particularities. Baskın Oran, *Yunan-Türk ilişkilerinde Batı Trakya Sorunu*, (Ankara Bilgi Yayınları, 1991).

¹⁴³ When Turkey asked for the removal of the conservatives, Greece had also requested the removal of the “Turkish Orthodox Patriarch” Papa Eftim, a renegade priest who in the 1920s had turned into some kind of anti-patriarch in the service of the Turkish nationalists. In spite of Turkish assurances, this was never done. Papa Eftim and his descendants have remained as heads of the “Turkish Orthodox church” until today. The curious story of Papa Eftim is treated briefly in (Alexandris, 1983, p. 216.). A fuller treatment falls outside the scope of the present work.

¹⁴⁴ Baskın Oran links this good intention of Greece to its Cyprus policy, to display the international and Turkish community that Turks of Cyprus will live in peace and prosperity under the rule of Greece if it unites with Greece, as the Turkish/Muslim minority of Western Thrace does.

¹⁴⁵ Umut Özkırımlı and Spyros A. Sofos, *Tormented by history: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey*, (New York : Columbia University Press, 2008)

(6-7 September 1955), the unilateral denouncement by President Makarios of the constituent treaty of Cyprus, the military involvement of Turkey, the atrocities committed against Turkish-Cypriots by Greeks in Cyprus (1964) and the Turkish invasion in Cyprus (1974) constitute the milestones which shaped Greek and Turkish policies towards their minorities: the collateral victims of the Cyprus crisis.¹⁴⁶ Although, as a reaction to the massive expulsion and immigration of the Greek minority (1955 and 1964)¹⁴⁷, Greek authorities did not take symmetric direct counter-measures against the minority of Thrace, this was regarded as an attempt to show the international community that Greece was to be relied on keeping control over the Cyprus question (that any non-Greek population would be secure under Greek administration). However, later Greece also enforced the article 19 of the 1955 Citizenship Law, which had been used arbitrarily to deprive ethnic Turks (and other non-ethnic Greeks) of their citizenship.¹⁴⁸ Through the implementation of Article 19 of Civil Law, 60,000 citizens were expelled from Greek citizenship, and 50,000 of them were Muslim.

These events changed the balance between the population of minorities in the Western Thrace and Turkey which was determined by the Lausanne Treaty; such that today approximately 3000 Greek-Orthodox minority members have been left in Turkey compared to 110,000 Turkish-Muslim minority of Greece.¹⁴⁹ Similarly, while in the early 1970s there were 2,622 Greeks on Gökçeada/Imbros, in 1985 there were 496 and today less than 300. Bozcaada/Tenedos had 1,400 Greeks in the early 1970s, 150 in the 1980s and around 50 today. Nevertheless as authorities noticed, considering the 3% birthrate of Western Thrace Turks, around 380,000 member of the minority group have been emigrated from Greece to Turkey.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ Tsitselikis, p. 97

¹⁴⁷ In order to force Greece to take an action about the Cyprus Events, Turkey abandoned the bilateral agreement of 1930 between Greece and Turkey, which permits Greek citizens to work in Turkey. In 1964 Turkey announced that it would not extend the residence permit for the Greek citizens, which led to mass emigration of Greeks (8600 people) and drop in the number of Greek minority of Turkey.

¹⁴⁸ Baskin Oran, *Yunanistan'ın Lozan İhlalleri*, (Ankara: Stratejik Araştırma ve Etüdler Milli Komitesi, 1999).

¹⁴⁹ The overall population of Thrace is 340,000. The precise size of the Turkish Muslim population is a matter of dispute due to their large-scale immigration over the years and the lack of an official census since the 1950s. Estimates range from 90,000 to over 120,000 while official accounts put it between 110,000-135,000 (see *The Muslim Minority in Greece*, Athens: ELIAMEP, 1995). Alexandris estimated the minority in 1981 to be about 120,000, with 45% Turkish-speaking, 36% Pomaks and 18% Roma (Alexandris 1988, p.524).

¹⁵⁰ Georgios Niarchos, *Between Ethnicity, Religion and Politics Foreign Policy and the Treatment of Minorities in Greece and Turkey, 1923-1974*, unpublished PhD Thesis, LSE.

According to Niarchos, socio-economical difference between the Greek-Orthodox minority and Turkish-Muslim minority also plays a significant role on their ability to immigrate, such that “the Greek-Orthodox, a generally urban, bourgeois and wealthy population that was politically and socially mobilized, did not manage to ‘survive’, but departed in a relatively small period of time. On the other hand, the Muslim minority in Greece managed to preserve its numerical strength, despite its low level of urbanization and social mobility. Perhaps, the fact that the latter was an agricultural community, attached to the land, from which it gained its living, largely contributed to its reluctance to abandon its roots.

No matter what its reason, this difference in the number of populations also affected and mainly removed the rule of reciprocity for the Turkish minority of Greece and left the Greek authorities free on their Western Thrace policies. This dramatic reduction in the number of Roum limited and deterred their political participation which is crucial for the protection of their minority rights and left it totally at the hands of Greek and international interests. As a result, the debate on minority rights had shifted from the implementation of property and educational rights of the Greek-Orthodox minority to maintaining the Patriarch at Istanbul.

The minority in Greek Thrace has a very different point of departure from other Muslim minorities in the Balkans because of the explicit and tacit logic of the Lausanne Treaty. The explicit protection of the treaty gave the Muslim minority members special privileges in addition to their rights as Greek citizens. However, the fact that the minority remained in Greece after a population exchange, and that it was seen as a balance to the Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul, has been of much greater significance than the treaty itself. This balance meant that Turkey was able to put significant pressure on Greece, as long as the Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul was considered to be more important than the Muslim minority in Greek Thrace. Turkey’s ability to intervene in the handling of the minority was reinforced by Greece’s greater sensibility about its international image. After 1950 this sensibility was in particular connected to the Cyprus questions.

If we look at the power relations within the triangle Greece-Turkey-minority, the minority was always the weakest part. It did not have a sufficient political, cultural, and economic strength to carry much weight on its own. In the cultural sphere the power relations display themselves clearly in questions related to education. Today, the minority in Western Thrace continues to suffer from disadvantages of public provision and of economic circumstance. Though the path of Muslims into Greek universities has been greatly eased by measures of positive discrimination, the places available in local secondary schools offering tuition in Turkish remains inadequate and the number of local Muslims exiting education at an early age (sometimes as young as 12 years) continues to cause major concern. Deeper than the provision of services, however, are the social attitudes that affect the life of the minority community.¹⁵¹

In short, minorities' rights have been ignored and violated especially at periods when Greek-Turkish relations were jeopardized such as Cyprus issue (reached its peak with 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation), and when those countries have political disturbance like military coup (1936, 1967 for Greece; 1960, 1980 for Turkey); WWII (1941-44 German-Bulgarian occupation in Greece, Wealth Tax in Turkey); and civil wars (1946-49 in Greece). It is not a coincidence that massive wave of migration of these communities coincide with bad terms of Greek-Turkish relations or political turmoil period of Greece and Turkey. Both states deliberately violated minorities' rights on these periods claiming their needs are ignorable compared to the problems of the majority.

In both of these states, reciprocity had been interpreted as a legitimate basis for retaliation against its own citizens for policies of another sovereign state. Reciprocity, when applied to the situation of minorities in Greece and Turkey, cannot be treated by both governments as means of reprisal, but instead should be source of responsibility towards the respective minority that resides in each country and constitutes part of the society. On the other hand, it is observed that the minorities also internalized this concept, demand its stricter and wider implementation from time to time through the discourses¹⁵² such as "they have more than we have" and "we should have the same rights as they have". Also, the same kind of

¹⁵¹ Stephanos Stavros, "The Legal Status of Minorities in Greece Today: The Adequacy of their Protection in the Light of Current Human Rights Perceptions." *Modern Greek Studies* 13(1), 1995, pp. 1-32.

¹⁵² Dimontenis Yağcıoğlu, "The internalization of reciprocity by many members of Greek-Orthodox and Turkish-Muslim minorities: how can it be explained? Some initial reflections", *Reciprocity: Greek and Turkish Minorities law, religion and politics*, (ed.) by Samim Akgönül., (Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2008)

thinking is widespread among the majority in both nations. “Our people are more valuable and deserve more than the others”. As a result, reciprocity is applied on the worst forms as the denial of rights, oppression and human suffering. Meanwhile, the Patriarch himself has joined those complaining about the ‘reciprocity’ principle and said “they’ve used us as a ‘trump card’ in Turkish-Greek affairs, especially after the Lausanne Treaty...if Greece ill-treated Muslims in Western Thrace, why blame a few thousand Greeks here? The same is true for the Turks of Western Thrace”.¹⁵³

There are interesting points when the comparisons of these two communities are studied. The comparisons differ according to the side they are made, and they have opposite depiction of the otherside. Western Thrace Turks usually compare these two communities from an economic perspective. They claim the balance between the communities has changed in contrary to their benefit. After the Lausanne Treaty, while Turkey had adopted Westernization model in every aspect of life and with Civil Code their life-style approached to its minorities’; Turkish minority of Greece became more isolated within time.¹⁵⁴ Moreover, they highlight the richness of Roum of Istanbul, how well their foundations are preserved, in comparison to their poverty and destruction of their institutions. The newspaper “Western Thrace’s Voice” claims with the 1930 Agreement between Greece and Turkey, Greeks were allowed to make trade and live in Turkey (until 1964), while Greek authorities were taking lands from the hands of Turkish community whose only income is agriculture (since 1938). This comparison is also observed in the rhetoric of Turkish official institutions. From Roum point of view; the classical comparisons have been based on ‘numerical difference’ between these two communities.¹⁵⁵ After the population exchange the number of these minority groups was almost equal, around 110,000. While the number of Muslim minority in Greece remains unchanged, the populations of Greek-Orthodox in Turkey fell to a few thousands. To the question “Do you think the economic, social cultural and political rights of Roum in Turkey are similar to the situation of Turks in Greece?” a Greek-Orthodox Professor I made interview with after emphasizing the salience of democratization and citizenship rights, also mentioned the numerical difference between the communities, and claimed they are in a worse situation.

¹⁵³ Tsitselikis, Reciprocity, p. 98.

¹⁵⁴ Abdürrahim Dede, *Hak Verilmez Alınır: Batı Trakya’da yayınlanan Trakya’nın Sesi Gazetesi’nden derlemeler*, (Grafik: İstanbul), 1988

¹⁵⁵ Samim Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları*, 2007.

The rhetoric both Turkish and Greek newspapers use to identify these two communities also differs. Greek national press avoids naming the community as Romios-Roum, and identifies them as ‘Asia Minor Hellenes’, whereas it does not use ‘Turkish/ Turk’ for the Muslims living in Western Thrace. Moreover, although minority members usually insist that the minority is one and Turkish, the Greek authorities divide them into people of Turkish origin and Pomaks; but treated them as Turkish. Similarly Turkish officers and national newspapers identify the minority as Romioi/Roum rather than Greek-Orthodox, and avoid mentioning their nationality, while usually emphasize the connection between them and Greece on nationality (especially their connection to Cypriots as both called Roum in Turkish). That’s why; appeasements given to the minority groups are perceived more threatening compared to Aegean and Cyprus issues where two countries have more strict attitudes. On the contrary, Aegean and Cyprus conflicts are other political factors that negatively affect the conditions of Roum and Turkish minority.

2.2.2 Aegean and Cyprus Disputes

Turkey and Greece, although they have not waged war against each other since the 1920s and they have been involved in the common alliance (NATO) since 1952, are two countries that have not always managed to establish good relations. However, as indicated above, the pending issues in the aftermath of the population exchange proved hard to settle. All through the 1920s Greek-Turkish relations remained tense. The main problems centered on the liquidation of the property left behind by the refugees, the status of the property belonging to those remaining, and the question of who were entitled to be exempted from the exchange.

Beside the problem of unsettled property remaining since the Lausanne Treaty, as the former Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs declared “among the obstacles that prevent not only the solution but even the discussion of the ‘real’ problems is the distrust between the two nations created by their living history”.¹⁵⁶ Moreover, both Turkey and Greece constructed their nation-state identity as a result of their struggle they made against each other and the process of their mutual interaction.¹⁵⁷ Since 1974, Greek-Turkish relations have been frustrated mainly by two sets of issues: Cyprus and Aegean.

¹⁵⁶ Şükrü Sina Gürel, *Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri, 1821-1993* (Ankara: Ümit, 1993), p.10.

¹⁵⁷ Leften S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, (London: Hurst & Company, 2000).

2.2.2.1 Aegean Problem

Although these two issues seem to be linked to each other, it can be said that of the two, the dispute over the Aegean is more challenging because, unlike the Cyprus issue, it touches more directly on essential national interests concerning national security and territorial sovereignty for both countries. The Aegean conflict is composed of a set of four separate issues. These include: 1. delimitation of the maritime boundaries and continental shelf; 2. breadth of territorial waters; 3. control of the air space beyond the territorial waters; 4. Greek militarization of eastern Aegean islands.¹⁵⁸ Operational control of the Aegean can also be added as the fifth issue.¹⁵⁹

The dispute over the breadth of territorial waters emerges on Greece's claim to extend its to 12-mile territorial sea (currently operating 6-miles limit) both for its mainland and for its islands in the Aegean by referring to the international law "the Law of Sea" (1982), which would increase Greek sovereignty and virtually would restrict all passage to high seas from Turkish Aegean and Black Sea ports through areas under Greek sovereignty and jurisdiction if the 12-mile limit be implemented.¹⁶⁰ Greece's insistence on stating her rights to extend its territorial waters is perceived by the Turkish side as an attempt to turn the Aegean into a Greek lake and hence the Turkish governments have repeatedly declared that if Greece goes ahead with the unilateral adoption of 12-mile territorial waters in the Aegean, it would represent a *casus belli*.¹⁶¹

Since the 1924 Lausanne Treaty, Greece and Turkey have never had a delimitation agreement regarding maritime boundaries in the Aegean; therefore, the continental shelf dispute also originates tension in Aegean from time to time. The Greeks argue that most of the Aegean continental shelf belonged to them with an assisting economic zone because of the numerous Greek islands, and reject any Turkish right in areas to the west

¹⁵⁸ Mustafa Aydın, "Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations: Constraints and Opportunities", *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean*, edited by Mustafa Aydın, Kostas Ifantis, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), p.27-32.

¹⁵⁹ Thanos M. Veremis, *Greeks and Turks in War and Peace*, (Athens News, 2007), p.180.

¹⁶⁰ Under the present 6-mile limit, Greece holds approximately 43.5% of the Aegean Sea and Turkey 7.7%, the remaining 49% being high seas. Should the 12-mile limit be applied, Greek territorial waters in the Aegean will increase to 71.5% whereas Turkey's share will increase to 8.7%, and the area of high seas will be drastically reduced to 19.7%, which will also be fragmented due to the existence of Greek islands. See Aydın, "Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations: Constraints and Opportunities", p. 27.

¹⁶¹ Ahmet O. Evin, "Changing Greek Perspectives on Turkey: An Assessment of the post-Earthquake Rapprochement", *Greek-Turkish relations in an era of détente* / editors Ali Çarkoğlu, Barry Rubin, (Routledge: London, 2005).

of the Greek islands since this, according to Greece, would constitute a threat to its sovereignty. The Turks, on the other hand, have argued that much of the Aegean continental shelf is geologically an extension of the Anatolian mainland, or that it should be delimited on an equitable basis.

The conflict over the airspace is also related to the dispute on territorial waters, in which Greece claims that “the width of the territorial waters concerning issues of air force and its policing, at ten miles”, by referring to the 1944 Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation declaring that the width of the territorial seas determines the air-space.¹⁶² Turkey disputes this and frequently exercises ‘its right’ to fly over international airspace of the Aegean up to a distance of 6 miles to the Greek mainland, thus inciting regular protests from Greece on the ground that Turkey, yet again, violated Greek national airspace. Operational control of the Aegean became a dispute since 1974 Cyprus intervention, when Greece insisted on using its Flight Information Region (FIR) to monitor Turkish movements over the Aegean. Again related to Cyprus crisis, Greek militarization of the eastern Aegean islands emerged as a problem for the Greek-Turkish relations after 1974 with the Greek decision to fortify those Aegean islands (Lemnos, Lesbos, Chios, and the Dodecanese/12 islands) that was demilitarized by earlier international treaties.¹⁶³ However, after these islands had been militarized by Greece in practice, Turkey decided to establish its Fourth Army, with headquarters in Izmir.

The settlement of these issues¹⁶⁴ seems to be difficult because Greece suggests solving the issues individually, while Turkey considers all the five issues linked to each other; Greece demands the involvement of the international authorities as a mediator (traditionally International Court of Justice), while Turkey successfully avoids such an involvement where Greece would be advantaged. Moreover, the pressure coming from the public opinion and from the opposition parties composed the biggest obstacle for the settlement as according to Aydın, each of these issues is entangled with the general

¹⁶² Greece claims a 10-mile national airspace over its current 6-mile territorial waters. Incidentally, Greece’s 10-mile airspace is not recognized by other states; including NATO countries which often ‘violate’ Greek airspace during NATO exercises in the Aegean.

¹⁶³ Lausanne Treaty of 24 July 1923, and Treaty of Montreux. Thanos Veremis, *Greek Security: Issues and Politics*, Delphi Paper, no. 179 (London: IISS, 1981).

¹⁶⁴ This thesis only represent overall looking to these issues, for the detail information on them and Cyprus issue see *Greek-Turkish relations in an era of détente* / editors Ali Çarkoğlu, Barry Rubin, (Routledge: London, 2005) which are written by Turkish and Greek scholars and reflect the opinions of the both sides would be very useful.

mistrust between the two nations and with their attempts to gain political advantage in settling outstanding differences.¹⁶⁵

Yet, there have been diplomatic dialogues on lifting of ‘casus belli’. In April 2005, Turkish Foreign Minister of the period Abdullah Gül and his Greek counterpart Moliviatis agreed to deepen their cooperation by introducing three more confidence building measures in the Aegean and pledged to support efforts to develop multidimensional bilateral ties.¹⁶⁶ After a Greek newspaper quoted Gül as saying that he had no objection to canceling a parliamentary statement declaring any Greek attempt to extend Greece’s territorial waters to 12 miles as *casus belli*, Turkey repeated that there was no plan to revise Turkey’s Aegean policy. While Parliament Speaker from AKP Bülent Arınç suggested that the policy should be scrapped in light of the current Greek-Turkish rapprochement, Turkish General Staff, İlker Başbuğ’s declaration saying “casus belli” is a state policy, which is still valid and in force.¹⁶⁷ After Başbuğ’s statement saying “the essential aim of our policy is preventing clashes, not creating clashes”, Arınç uttered that if Greece insists on 12 miles, Turkey should definitely oppose it, and later reportedly said on a visit to Luxembourg that “there is no deviation in foreign policy, we pursue the national interests of our country”. Recently, Alexis Tzipras, the leader of the far left party Syriza demanded to bring the issue of continental-shelf to the International Justice Court at the Hague and asserted that Greece would support Turkey’s EU membership process in exchange of lifting the casus-belli.¹⁶⁸ Some scholars also link the policy of Turkey about Cyprus to its strength in the Aegean, saying Turkish military on the island prevents Greece from increasing its territorial waters to 12 miles.¹⁶⁹

2.2.2.2 Cyprus Problem

Beside the disagreements in the Aegean, the issue over Cyprus also forms another handicap for the Greek-Turkish relations, where such as 6-7 September Events of 1955, it may act as a catalyst for broader conflict. As aforementioned, the period of Greek-

¹⁶⁵ Aydın, “Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations: Constraints and Opportunities”, p. 27.

¹⁶⁶ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 17.4.2005
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=10986>.

¹⁶⁷ Turkish Daily News. Top General says casus belli is state policy. 14.4.2005
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=10771>.

¹⁶⁸ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/planet/20705872.asp> 6 June 2012

¹⁶⁹ Mustafa Kibaroglu, Cyprus: Turkey’s Deterrent to Greece, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 5, No. 2, March/April 1999.

Turkish co-operation in minority affairs came to an abrupt end with the so-called “September events” in Istanbul. These events had a number of both short and long term effects, and have been referred to constantly in Greece up until the present. The September events have often been interpreted as a Turkish attempt to put pressure on Greece to relinquish her initiatives in connection with Cyprus.

The most complete study on the Greek Orthodox minority in the 1950s connects the Turkish minority policy only indirectly to Cyprus, and argues that Cyprus was the cause rather than the reason. The term “Rum”, used in Turkish to define both Cypriot and Istanbul Greeks, made the two groups indistinguishable. Formerly part of the Ottoman Empire, the island became a British colony in 1925. The Greek community in Cyprus gradually began to express its desire for independence, but wanted to remain ethnically separate. The inter-ethnic turmoil started to increase on the island, which created tension in Athens and Istanbul. The organization of Greek Cypriot guerillas, EOKA (Εθνική οργάνωσις κυπριων αγωνιστων), founded by Grivas and Makarios in 1953, showed that Greek nationalistic ideas were intense and effective in the island. The Greeks called for ‘*enosis*’ (the allocation of the island to Greece) while Turkish side started to support the idea of ‘*taksim*’ (the division of the island).¹⁷⁰

In the end of August 1955 the situation was tense because of the Cyprus issue. There were rumors that the Greek Cypriots were preparing an attack on Turkish Cypriots on 28 August 1955. The “Cyprus-is-Turkish Society” (Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti) stirred up public opinion in connection with the Tripartite Cyprus conference in London. In general, the riots were interpreted as events, which took place on the night of 6/7 September as a youth demonstration, which got out of hand, in response to the news about the bombing of Atatürk’s house. After the events, it was stressed that the events created great sadness in Turkish public opinion.¹⁷¹ The contemporary Turkish press centered on three issues: The effects of Greece’s “provocative attitude” in the Cyprus issue on Turkish opinion; the bomb in Atatürk’s house of birth in Salonika; provocation of the left-wingers against a sincere demonstration. As given in Chapter 4, in the Parliamentary Archives, when the 6-7 September events were discussed, most of the Turkish deputies insisted that it was the provocation of communists.

¹⁷⁰ Veremis, *Greeks and Turks in War and Peace*, p. 170.

¹⁷¹ Güven, 2005, p. 45.

More or less, it can be said Turkey gave a direct message to Greece that Greek commitment to enosis would endanger the Istanbul minority. However, the moral and material losses in the “September events” were great. According to Greek and Turkish sources 200 women were raped in the suburbs, where the greatest destruction of churches and other Greek institutions took place. 1,004 houses, 4,348 shops, 27 pharmacies and laboratories, 21 factories, 110 restaurants, cafés, and hotels were destroyed. The mob gutted 73 churches, 26 schools, and 5 athletic clubs, which was a serious blow to Greek Orthodox communal property.¹⁷²

Its effects on the image of Turkey and the position of Muslim minority in Greece needed to be explained. It is claimed that Greek pogrom to Turkish minority of Western Thrace, so-called “İlhanlı events” in 1988, was justified by the Greek state and society through comparing it to the magnitude of September events of 1955.¹⁷³ The Greek MP (and later Foreign Minister) Theodoros Pangalos proposed in the parliament to make 6 September into “commemoration day for the uprooting of the Constantinopolitan Hellenism”¹⁷⁴. This displays the central position of these events in the Greek discourse on the relationship with Turkey. A side effect is the tendency to refer to it every time Turkey or the “Turkish” minorities have any complaints about the situation in Thrace.

Andreadis claims that to put a pressure on Greece through the Greek minority, the false accusations were made to create hatred against the Greeks of Istanbul. Turkish newspapers exaggerated the situation of Turkish minority in Western Thrace. The newspaper *Her Gün* (22.01.1955) wrote in an article titled “The Greek oppression in Western Thrace”: “If we do not retaliate rapidly against the Greek Orthodox in Istanbul for the injustices inflicted on the Turks of W. Thrace, the Turks of Thrace will suffer the harmful consequences of our kindness”.¹⁷⁵ Similarly, Greek newspapers supported enosis and policy of Cypriots and both parties violated the minorities’ golden age of 1950s.

Cyprus conflict had always affected Roum community of Turkey and Turkish minorities of Greece more than the Aegean dispute. The immigrations of the Greek-Orthodox (Roum) of Turkey to Greece coincide with the periods when there was a direct Turkish-

¹⁷² Ibid. p. 64-68.

¹⁷³ Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, 2000, p. 162.

¹⁷⁴ (Eleftherotipia 04.10.1995).

¹⁷⁵ Konstantinos Andreadis, *I musulmanikí mionótis tis Ditikís Thrákis*. (Thessaloniki, 1956).

Greek conflict and when Cyprus conflict occupied the agenda.¹⁷⁶ The condition that the two communities living in the island identify themselves as Greek and Turk also includes Greece and Turkey as parts to the problem. Moreover, as the Greek-Orthodox community on the island is called Roum and their identity had been stressed by the Turkish politicians (especially by Rauf Denktaş), the Roum of Turkey had been associated with the Greek Cypriot community of the island, behaved as they sided with the Greek Cypriots, and they were treated as scapegoats of the violent events.

Moreover, Cyprus Crisis in 1963-64 and in 1973-74, also caused major eruptions in Turkey's Western oriented foreign policy.¹⁷⁷ Before the Turkish intervention and the division of the island in 1974, the issue was based on the representative rights of the Cypriots Turks in the Cyprus state and Turkey's objection on the attempts of the Greek side to unite the island with Greece. After the intervention of 1974, it can be said that Turkey aimed to continue the status quo which favored the total division of the island, whereas the Greek side demanded the unification of the island by rejecting the demands for a federation composed of two communities and equal representative rights as a result of declaring itself the only representative of the whole island. Therefore as Veremis argues, in the Aegean and the Cyprus problem, Turkish and Greek sides follow differing strategies, in which for Aegean issue, Greece tries to pursue the status quo and Turkey aims to change the legal status, however regarding Cyprus, the Greek strategy aimed at overturning the *fait accompli* and, therefore the status quo that emerged as a result of the 1974 intervention.¹⁷⁸

As Tozun Bahçeli predicted, the issue of Cyprus' EU membership yet created lasting difficulties for both Turkish-Greek and Turkish-EU relations as no settlement of the island' dispute proved attainable when Cyprus (in effect, the Greek-Cypriot controlled territory) joined the EU in 2004.¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, Cyprus issue influences Turkey's domestic policy and parties approach to Cyprus problem varies. As an example, before the 3 November 2002 elections it again caused tension for Turkey's Western oriented

¹⁷⁶ Alexis Alexandridis, 1983, p.316. The migration flows happened on the periods 1922-29, 1955-59, 1964-67 and 1972-75.

¹⁷⁷ Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999), pp.48-51.

¹⁷⁸ Veremis, *Greeks and Turks in War and Peace*, p. 212.

¹⁷⁹ Tozun Bahçeli, "Turning a New Page in Turkey's Relations with Greece?: The Challenging of Reconciling Vital Interests", in *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean*, edited by Mustafa Aydın, Kostas Ifantis, (London And New York: Routledge, 2004).

foreign policy as before losing the elections the coalition government led by Bulent Ecevit took a hard line on the Cyprus issue, warning that Turkey might annex the TRNC and close the doors permanently to any hope of re-unifying the island if Greek Cypriot accession is allowed prior to a settlement.¹⁸⁰ On the other hand, after the elections of 3 November 2002, the elected Justice and Development Party have considered the UN plan of 11 November 2002, as acceptable as a basis for negotiations. JDP leader Tayyip Erdoğan and other senior members of the government had welcomed the peace initiative that was made by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for the Cyprus issue and had encouraged Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş to strive to reach a settlement before Cyprus is admitted as an EU member in May 2004.¹⁸¹

As many scholars declare, this represents a vital departure from the hard-line policy of former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit who took a major role in the 1974 Turkish intervention and championed separate Turkish Cypriot statehood and even stated that the Cyprus issue was resolved in 1974 when Turkey's intervention partitioned the island. Unlike its predecessors, the Justice and Development Party appears committed to pursue a reformist agenda and to secure Turkish entry into the EU, and furthermore, to remove the Cyprus issue as an impediment to Turkish accession.

¹⁸⁰ Democratic Left Party ran the 18 April 1999 elections with its slogan "honest governance, just order, national solidarity and secularism respecting religious beliefs". In this electoral manifesto, DSP's foreign policy is defined to be based on "national interests, regional centered and with wide expansion", which encompasses a chapter regarding to "National Foreign Policy at Aegean and Cyprus". Ecevit perceived the division of the island as the solution to the Cyprus issue, from its 1999 electoral manifesto it can be said that DSP demanded the international recognition of Northern Cyprus. MHP's (National Movement Party) electoral campaigns stresses on Cyprus issue that the party evaluates the Cyprus issue in a special subheading, where the party states that the struggle of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus –which is considered as "little/baby motherland" in the eyes of Turkish nation-to exist has a vital and strategic importance for Turkey. Therefore, the Cyprus issue is a national case not only for the Cypriot brothers but also for the Republic of Turkey. MHP asserts that they have the whole responsibility to give all the means of support to the Turkish Cypriots and the party will never let Cyprus turn to be a Greek island. The unpublished master thesis: Burcu Çulhaoğlu Taşkın, *Role of Turkish Political Parties on Greek- Turkish Relations: What Had Changed After the 1999 Helsinki Summit*, National & Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2008 September.

¹⁸¹ With the referendum of 24 April 2004, the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan by a majority of 76%, while the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor by 65%. The accession of Cyprus to the EU on 1 May 2004 offered the Cypriot government a serious advantage, while the Turkish Cypriots continued to be deprived of an internationally recognized state entity. However, the notion that the Greek Cypriots favor seeing the Cyprus problems solved while the Turkish Cypriots are opposed to any proposal for a solution, has since been reversed. Turkish Cypriots leadership started to advocate in US and EU capitals an end to the isolation of Northern Cyprus based on their strong 'yes' in the referendum.

For the conclusion of negotiations with Turkey, beside the three Copenhagen criteria such as the prevalence of democracy, human rights and the protection of minorities; the existence of a ‘functioning market economy’ capable of competing within the EU; and the administrative and institutional capacity to implement EU rules and regulations; three more criteria are given as conditionality for Turkey to be an EU-member. These are Turkey’s ‘unequivocal commitment to good neighborly relations’ an indirect reference to Greece and Armenia; continued support for a comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in line with Union principles, and normalization of relations with Greek Cyprus; and the fulfillment of obligations under the 1963 EU-Turkey Association Agreement, including the Additional Protocol extending the Agreement and Custom Union to the 10 new member states, including Greek Cyprus.

Because Copenhagen criteria imposed good neighboring and the solution to Cyprus problem as preconditions for negotiations, it can be said that Turkey’s own interest in advancing towards EU membership has created a strong incentive to solve the Aegean issue and to help achieve a settlement in Cyprus. On the other hand, Greek-Turkish rapprochement also initiated the improvements in Turkey-EU relations. With the mutual aids during the earthquakes energizing bilateral dialogue, Greece lifted its veto on Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership at the EU’s Helsinki Summit in December 1999. Since 1999, bilateral meetings between Turkish and Greek officials have yielded more than a dozen agreements on largely non-controversial issues related to economic and cultural ties, border security, terrorism and cross-border crime.

In sum, Turkey’s EU candidacy not only created incentives for Turkey to change its foreign policy towards Greece and its approach to Cyprus problem, but as Nicolacopoulos points out the Greek decision to support the offer of EU candidacy to Turkey at the December 1999 Helsinki summit – although emphasizing particular conditions favorable to Greek interests- reflected a new, strategic approach to the future of relations with Ankara, and it represents a major step towards dampening the sources of unintended spirals.¹⁸² However, domestic public opinion and national wings still construct pressure to

¹⁸² Ilias Nicolacopoulos, “Elections and Voters, 1974-2004: Old Cleavages and New Issues”, in Special Issues on *The Challenge of Modernisation: Politics and Policy in Greece*, West European Politics, Vol. 28 No.2, (March 2005).

both governments that the wind of 2004 faded quickly and both Aegean and Cyprus issues remained unresolved until today.

Cyprus issue of 1974 had important effects on Greek politics as well. After the restoration of democracy in 1974, the fear wrought by Turkey's invasion of Cyprus and its claims over the Aegean continued to sustain policies that involved a significant limitation of the basic economic and social rights of the minority. Moreover, located in a poor periphery of Greece, the minority suffered much economic inequality: a periphery of a periphery.¹⁸³ With a rising tension between local Muslims – erupted with İlhanlı Event and the arrestment of Sadık Ahmet – and the Greek Orthodox community, the Mitsotakis Government in 1991 announced a new approach, abolishing discriminatory measures, and applying the principles of 'equality before the law' and 'equal citizenship'. Though not mandated by any external body, the shame that Greece received from the European Court of Human Rights, the Council of Europe, and the EU – quite apart from Turkey – underscored such moves. The policy of designating the mountainous (Pomak) areas as 'restricted zones', requiring the outside traveler to obtain special clearance and permits, for example, lasted until 1996.¹⁸⁴

2.3 Concluding Remarks

In this Chapter reciprocity rule and Greco-Turkish relations are analyzed as macro-level factors, which were expected to influence political representation of Greek-Orthodox minority of Turkey and Turkish-Muslim minority of Greece. The analysis displayed that Greco-Turkish relations directly affects cultural, social and economic areas positively and negatively. On the other hand, as a macro-level factor, it does not affect political representation. As Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 will display, political representation of the regarding minority communities is not mutual, when one community is represented, the other was misrepresented or not represented in the Parliaments.

On the other hand, as Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 will examine if the effectiveness of the minority MPs are affected by Greco-Turkish relations, such as when the relations are good they are more effective, whereas when there is a conflict between Greece and

¹⁸³Dia Anagnostou, and Anna Triandafyllidou , *Regions, minorities and European integration: A case study on Muslims in Western Thrace, Greece*, (ELIAMEP Publications, 2006), p. 32.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. p. 5

Turkey, their loyalty to the state and regime is in question. Moreover, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 will indicate that, political alignment of the minority communities will be shaped by the attitudes of the political parties towards their minorities and mainly their approach to the events influenced by Greek-Turkish relations.

Here, the effectiveness of the minority deputies in the Parliament becomes important; if one minority group can grant a right in the Parliament regarding their cultural, social or economical demands then other minority community is granted a similar right even though they are not represented in the Parliament. This suggests that although reciprocity rule is not implemented in political sphere, political effectiveness of one community is expected to bring positive outcomes for the reciprocal minority community.

Moreover, even though EU guarantees the rights of the minorities in economical and cultural areas, it cannot make a pressure or constructs any implementation for the political field. More than EU effect, the micro-level and institutional factors determine the representation possibility of the minorities. In order to test the influence of micro-level and macro-level factors on political representation of minorities, first the general characteristics of the two minority groups will be compared in Chapter 3; and in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 political history that has affected the daily life of minorities and political systems – electoral and party systems- will be given for every term minorities are represented, mis-represented or non-represented.

CHAPTER 3. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS of GREEK-ORTHODOX and MUSLIM MINORITY

In Chapter 2, Greco-Turkish relations, and its impact on economical, cultural, and social rights of minorities were analyzed. Reciprocity rule emerged from Lausanne Treaty of 1923, was displayed as one of the macro-level factors that might influence the political representation of Greek-Orthodox community of Turkey and Turkish-Muslim population of Greece. From the examples discussed in Chapter 2, one can falsify this argument claiming mutual relations between Turkey and Greece determine political representation. In this Chapter, demographic characteristics of the Roum population, their ability in forming organizations, and their political mobilization will be scrutinized in comparison to Muslim-Turkish minority in Western Thrace to understand the influence of macro-level and micro-level factors on the political representation of the minorities, which will be analyzed in the following chapters.

3.1 The General Perspective: Demographic Characteristics of Roum Community

While macro-level factors are related to political system of the home-countries; features of the relevant minority community determine micro-level factors. Comparative micro-analysis attends to the effects of group size, spatial concentration, participation in ethnic associational life, political cohesiveness and mobilization, educational attainment and language skills, and length of residency in host country among ethnic groups. Before analyzing these macro-level and micro-level factors for the political representation of the Greek-Orthodox community in Turkey, the study will depict the general characteristics of them. Here, the way they identify themselves, their demographic features, their abilities in forming organizations and governing their foundations is given.

3.1.1. Identity: Roum, Greek-Orthodox or Ellinas?

Within the framework of research in both the Greek and Turkish languages, it is necessary to be as precise as possible regarding vocabulary, as categorizations in both languages are extremely important when approaching such a topic. In fact, what the English language defines as “Greek” actually includes three different categories within the Greek language and culture. The term with which the “Greeks of Istanbul” define

themselves in Greek is used most of the time through this thesis. They refer to themselves as “romios” (ρομιος) or “omogenis” (ομογενής). According to the dictionary, romios is the term used to define a Greek in some kind of patriotic context or discourse. In historical terms, it refers to the inhabitants of Rome who were the citizens of the Eastern Roman Empire. The term “rum” became so widespread that it was adopted by the Turkish language as well. Within the Turkish context, the term “rum” is historically tied to the “rum milleti” in the Ottoman Empire, and today it defines both the Istanbul Greeks and the diasporic ones (Greek Cypriots, Australians Greeks, etc.). In the context of Istanbul, “omogenis” defines the Greek minority, even though they are not a diaspora since they have been living in Istanbul for centuries. The term “romiosini” (ρομιοσύνη), which defines their identity, is thus employed with the same meaning.

Apart from these terms, which have geographical and historical references, the Istanbul Greeks also define themselves using the term “ellinas”(ελληνας), or Hellenic (the term used in English to refer to the ancient Greeks). This term defines all the individuals who are culturally integrated to Hellenism. A Greek from Cyprus, a Greek from Australia, and a Greek from Greece are all included. There is also term “elladitis” (ελλαδίτης) which is used to define Greeks living on Greek territory. This allows Greek culture to be spoken of while specifying that the person’s country of residence is Greece. The term “yunan” also refers to the Greeks of Greece. Following the term used in the general literature and how the community identifies itself, in this thesis both terms Greek-Orthodox minority and Roum are unchangeably used.

There is no consensus on the number of Roum population in Istanbul and in Turkey. The total number varies from 2,500 to 5,000 if Arab-Orthodox population is also included. Various majority of the Greek population within Turkey are in Istanbul metropolitan area, Izmir and the Aegean islands of Imbros (Gökçeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada). Except the impressive population decline due to the historical facts of the last 50 years since 2008 there has been a stable - but low increase of the population in terms of Greek newcomers -especially from Greece and abroad for business or permanent residence in the country.

Greeks in Turkey have to live with many prohibitions such as that on the use of Greek in courts, purchase of land by social and cultural institutions and the establishment of any association based on race, language or religion. On the islands of Imbros and Tenedos

land was compulsorily appropriated, schools closed and the islands declared military zones, making normal life virtually impossible for the Greek populations. In 1964 Greek Orthodox priests were forbidden to teach religion or conduct morning prayers in minority schools and Turks have since been appointed as teachers in all minority schools. Students were obliged to enroll in their nearest school rather than in a school of their choice and the teaching of the Greek language have been severely reduced. In 1971 the government closed down the Department of Advanced Religious Studies of Heybeliada (Halki), thus impeding preparation for office within the church. Passports are also being withheld from prominent members of the Greek Orthodox community despite the fact that they are Turkish subjects. Some of these people face restricted movement within Turkey itself.

There has been a continuous decline in the Greek population most of which remains concentrated in Istanbul. From 100,000 in 1934 it has fallen to 4,500-5,000 today in general total around Istanbul, Prince islands, Izmir, Gokceada and Bozcaada (Imbros and Tenedos islands). The Greek population of Imbros and Tenedos is reported to have fallen from 10,500 in the 1940s to 1,600 in 1977. However despite its decline and the restrictions it faces, the Greek minority in Istanbul is reported to be a prosperous one and, along with Armenian and Jewish minorities, to have played an important, although low profile, role in the financial and commercial sector. Majority of the Greek-Orthodox community lives in Istanbul, and this study also focuses on the population living in Istanbul as according to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 they were granted same rights in reciprocity with the Turkish-Muslim minority in Western Thrace. The distribution of the Roum community living in Istanbul is given in the following chart.

Table 1: Greek Population According to Municipalities in Istanbul

| Municipality (İlçe) | Population |
|----------------------------|-------------------|
| Beyoğlu | 1084 |
| Şişli | 1173 |
| Bakırköy | 525 |
| Kadıköy | 410 |
| Beşiktaş | 313 |
| Zeytinburnu | 250 |
| Sarıyer | 230 |

| | |
|--------------|-------------|
| Fatih | 190 |
| Üsküdar | 79 |
| Eminönü | 49 |
| Beykoz | 2 |
| Total | 4305 |

Source: Vyron, Kotzamanis, “A Demographic Profile of the Rums of Istanbul and of the Related Groups”, Conference in Istanbul, June 2006.

Even though the number of Roum minority has been reduced from 100,00 thousands to 4,000 thousands, and they should not be perceived as a threat, unjust practices are still being exercised by the Turkish State against the Greek minority in areas such as religious freedoms, foundations property rights, restrictions of educational institutions and individual’s property rights.¹⁸⁵ Moreover, because of this numerical difference between Roum population and Muslim population in Greece, many times Muslim minority’s discontent on the violation of their rights is deprived of political attention. Furthermore, as it will be seen in the following chapter on the political representation of Turkish-Muslim minority in Greece, due to historical differences, Roum community is better organized in forming and management of their foundations, as they were granted minority rights since the Ottoman rule, while Muslim-Turkish community turned to be a minority in Balkans only after the early 20th century.

3.1.2 Foundations (Vakıflar)

Under the Lausanne Treaty as well as national laws of Greece and Turkey, minority foundations have a fundamental right to possess property and to dispose of it for their benefit. The foundation consists of the ‘main’ foundation building, which in effect lends its name to the foundation (as a legal entity), such as running a church, a mosque, a synagogue, or a school, or, in rare cases, a water source or an orphanage. The foundations acquire property through purchase or donations by members of the community. In effect, in both Greece and Turkey, foundations have suffered from constraints curtailing their right to acquire and enjoy property due to internal factors (mismanagement and excessive sales by foundation boards) and external ones (excessive expropriation, ‘nationalization’ or confiscation by the government, the state’s non-recognition of the acquisition of new

¹⁸⁵ Reports on the Minority Rights of the Greek-Orthodox Community in Istanbul, 2008.
http://www.istanbulrumazinligi.com/_files/pdfs/REPORT_ON_THE_MINORITY_RIGHTS_OF_THE_GREEK-ORTHODOX_COMMUNITY_OF_ISTANBUL.pdf

property, the lack of rule of law and unfair trial).

In Turkey thousands of immovable properties belonging to non-Muslim school, social, hospital, and church foundations have been confiscated by the state in the past half-century. In addition to the seizure of the managements of foundations discussed in the previous chapter, another critical tool of this state policy has been the infamous misuse of the ‘1936 Declarations.’ Following the adoption of the Law on Foundations in 1935, the newly established Republic called on all foundations, Muslim and non-Muslim, to declare the real estates they owned. The foundations adhered to this call and submitted to the state lists of real estate they owned at the time. Decades later, the lists of properties that non-Muslim foundations had declared to the state in 1936 were interpreted by the VGM (Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü/General Directorate of Foundations) to be their ‘founding statutes’ – with dramatic implications for these foundations’ ability to retain properties acquired after that year.

On the basis of no legal rule whatsoever, VGM concluded that community foundations were not entitled to own – through purchase, sale or donations- any property that was not listed in their 1936 Declarations, i.e. ‘founding statutes.’ The distorted interpretation of mere declarations of property as founding statutes of foundations enabled the VGM to confiscate all properties that non-Muslim foundations had acquired after 1936. It was no coincidence that this policy began in the 1960s, at the height of the conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. In 1971, the Second Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation unanimously upheld this unlawful bureaucratic practice, ruling that “legal personalities established by non-Turks are prohibited to own property” under Turkish law.¹⁸⁶ The General upheld the judgment in 1974 Civil Council of the Court of Cassation based on the same reasoning and expressed in nearly identical terms.¹⁸⁷ The use of the term “Turk” in laying out a rule banning non-Turkish nationals, not nationals of different ethnic origin, to own property was certainly more than a slip of the tongue. It displayed a mentality that held the non-Muslim minorities of this country to the same (namely lesser) legal standing as foreigners, rather than as full citizens. Indeed, in 1975, the First Civil

¹⁸⁶Court of Cassation 2nd Civil Chamber, Substance no: 4449, Decision no:4399, 06.07.1991. See Dilek Kurban and Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *A Tale of Reciprocity: Minority Foundations in Greece and Turkey*, (TESEV 2010).

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. Court of Cassation Civil General Council, Substance no: 1971/2-820, Decision no: 1974/505, 08.05.1974.

Chamber of the Court of Cassation went even further and said that “foreigners in Turkey are prohibited from owning property,” clarifying any ambiguity that might have been created by the 1971 and 1974 decisions.¹⁸⁸ These court decisions resulted in mass confiscation of real estate belonging to community foundations and their transfer to the state, and in some cases to third parties, in clear contravention of the non-Muslim communities’ rights to property, association, religion, and self-rule under the Treaty of Lausanne, the Constitution, and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

The EU’s minority protection conditionality for accession as well as the cases that Greek Orthodox and Armenian foundations filed at the ECHR obliged the Turkish government to address the property and self-management problems of community foundations in recent years. The Law on Foundations was amended in August 2002 (Law No. 4771), January 2003 (Law No. 4778), and July 2003 (Law No. 4928), granting for the first time the rights to purchase, sell, or use property in any other way.¹⁸⁹ The executive regulation adopted by the VGM to implement Law No. 4778 listed 160 non-Muslim foundations that were officially recognized as ‘community foundations’ and hence entitled to benefit from the law.¹⁹⁰ However, the regulation not only did not list the properties belonging to these 160 foundations, but also excluded a number of non-Muslim foundations from the list, preventing them from exercising the rights granted to them under the new laws – rights to which they should have been entitled under the Lausanne Treaty.

By the end of February 2010, petitions were filed under Law No. 5737 for the return of more than 1,400 immovable properties. Of these, 774 belonged to the Greek Orthodox community and 452 to the Armenian community. That 347 applications were rejected and 943 were returned for additional documents is seriously disconcerting. Lawyers for community foundations state that they have already submitted all the information they possess and it is virtually impossible for them to present additional supplementary

¹⁸⁸ The discriminatory treatment of the state towards the non-Muslims in these and other high court decisions in Turkey is given in Chapter II. For the details see Baskın Oran, *Türkiye’de Azınlıklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama, (İletişim Yayınları, 2004)*, pp. 83-87.

¹⁸⁹ These amendments were made through ‘package laws’, which contain amendments to various different laws, including the Law on Foundations. These package laws are: Law No. 4771, 03.08.2002, Official Gazette No. 24841, 09.08.2002; Law No. 4778, 02.01.2003, Official Gazette No. 24990, 11.01.2003; and Law No. 4928, 15.07.2003, Official Gazette No. 25173, 19.07.2003. For more on these laws, see Kurban and Hatemi, 2009.

¹⁹⁰ For a list of the 73 foundations that have been officially recognized as Greek-Orthodox community foundations, see Appendix D.

documents. Lakis Vingas, the representative of all minority foundations at the VGM's General Assembly, shares the lawyers' disillusionment. Pointing out that the problem mainly stems from the problematic scope of the new law, which does not foresee the return of all confiscated properties; Vingas criticizes bureaucracies for resisting its implementation by requiring foundations to provide title deeds for properties they had already declared to the state in 1936.¹⁹¹

Turkey's reciprocity rhetoric against Greece also harms those minorities in Turkey that have no affiliation with Greece. On the other hand, both Greece and Turkey recently took a step forward in their decades-old reciprocity policies through new laws governing minority foundations. Unlike its predecessor, Greek Law No. 3647 of 2008 does not make a reference to the principle of reciprocity. In fact, for the first time, Law No. 3554 of 2007 overtly denounced the principle of reciprocity. The law's explanatory report declared, "reciprocity is not aligned with the European values that Greece constantly applies." This statement is a welcome step forward, opening the door to a new approach departing from the reciprocity dogma.

Today among the non-Muslim communities in Turkey, Roum have the highest number of foundations with 75, considering there are 23 more foundations seized by the Turkish state, the number extends to 98. On the other hand, compared to the other non-Muslim communities, there are only 3,000 Greek-Orthodox left in Turkey, which means that management of their foundations forms a crucial problem for this community. As Prof. Dr. Yorgo Stefanopoulos points out in his interview (conducted at Isik University, September 2011 and March 2013), mostly the elder population gives their time to the management of the foundations, and he has to deal with the management of 3 foundations besides his academic and administrative duties. Until the new development on the community properties, community members were not allowed to make donations to their foundations; the properties could not be sold, or the community could not build a new foundation. The new law seems to lighten the burden on their shoulders, as they can sell or rent their properties. Compared to the general criticisms about 1936 Foundations Declaration, Prof. Dr. Stefanopoulos is thankful to Atatürk to bring this law as it enabled the communities to have a legal right on their properties. Although Prof. Dr.

¹⁹¹"Sonuçlar Tatmin Etmedi" (The Results Failed to Meet the Expectations), *Agos*, 19 March 2010.

Stefanopoulos appreciates the democratic approach of the new government Justice and Development party towards the minorities, he stresses that re-gaining of the old foundations which were closed and ruined for long years (as the Greek-Orthodox Orphanage in Heybeliada/Halki) brings new burdens to the community instead of favors, as the community has to finance the costs of the building, and the Turkish state does not give money to the non-Muslim foundations.

The Turkish government's decision to group the heterogeneous Orthodox population together has affected the management of the community. For example, Arabic-speaking Orthodox subjects have the legal right to sit on the vakf management boards, although their participation is often limited to religious duties. Laki Vingas said in his interview (conducted at Fener Rوم Patriarchy on September 2011) that the community tries to solve this problem – management of the foundations- through providing Arab-Orthodox populations' participation to the foundations belonging to Greek-Orthodox community. Beside the foundations, starting from the 19th century there have also been community associations, social charity institutions and culture institutions that have manage the continuity of social and culture life of the Rوم population in Istanbul. The Associations were: Teacher Association; Rوم Schools Charity Association; and Epir phileducation Association. There were six charity institutions, whereas three cultural institutions.¹⁹²

3.1.3 Education

Even though Rوم shools were the ones first established during the Ottoman rule, today the community is suffering in terms of their education rights due to lack of sufficient student number and obtaining education materials. Most of the schools have been closed, or about to be closed. The community is concerned about the education of their pupils, and their possibility of finding spouses. These are important factors that accelerate the migration of the Greek-Orthodox population to Greece and other countries with high number of Greek-Orthodox populations.

Starting from the 19th century, Rوم living in Istanbul had rich education opportunities, which were organized through Central Education Institution determined under Patriach's observation. There were 23 schools that Rوم community could receive education in

¹⁹² Sula Bozis, *Istanbulu Rumlar*, (İstanbul Bilgi Yayınları, 2011), p.76-93.

Greek at primary, secondary and high-school level. Because of the population decline of the last decades, the pupil and student population of Greek Minority of Turkey is considered as “tiny” and “small”. Nowadays there are 7 open primary and senior high schools, 3 high schools with around 250 pupils, and only 120 of them are identified as Greeks (the rest belong to the Syrian Arab Orthodox Minority of Turkey, whose clerical ownership belongs to Patriarchate of Fener and it’s children attend also the Greek schools –however those pupils uses arabic and turkish as primary languages – rather than Greek).¹⁹³ In the interview, Prof. Dr. Stefanopoulos mentioned that because Arab-Orthodox minority students do not speak Greek, the schools are re-organized in order to teach Greek to these students first, and then they can attend to the normal schedule of lessons. However, Arab students who are fluent in Turkish would prefer to attend to schools providing education in Turkish rather than consuming their time by learning Greek.

There are actions for the restoration a big amount of old Greek schools which are still standing across Istanbul and other places with significant Greek population such as Imbros/Gokçeada and Tenedos/Bozcaada. Those actions are still ongoing from Greek donors and public services of the Republic of Turkey. Although the recent years there has been a continuing wave of Greek immigration to Turkey, there is no ability for non-Turkish citizen Greek pupils to attend the Minority Greek Schools because of the limitations since the Agreement of Lausanne in 1923. The Treaty of Lausanne establishes that the minorities will manage their schools. However the authorities by placing restrictions in the enrolment of students into the minority schools, thus violating the relevant article of the mentioned before Treaty and they limit the fundamental right of free access into education, to all parents who wish their children would study in a particular school. Also according to the Treaty of Lausanne article 41, the Turkish State has an obligation to subsidize the schools of minorities, which has never happened any time. Still the State appoints to minority schools a teacher of Turkish origin as a "Deputy Director" who has higher administrative power than the minority member Director. This measure causes serious obstacles in the administration of schools by the minority Communities, as the article of 40 Treaty of Lausanne establishes it.

¹⁹³ Ibid. p.37. For the changing characteristic of the Istanbul Roum community also see Dimostenis Yağcıoğlu, *İstanbul Rum Azınlığı'nın Değişmekte Olan Karakteri*, Conference in Athens, 27/08/2013.

The authorities continue occasionally to deny the nomination of minority teachers seeking to force Greece to dispatch more Greek teachers and equivalents Turkey to have the right to dispatch more Turkish teachers into the Muslim minority schools in Western Thrace. This reciprocity in the exchange of teachers having established between the two countries, creates serious problems in the education of Greek-Orthodox minority and moreover renders them hostage of inter-country relations between Turkey and Greece. The minority wants the issue to be solved by the State with an ongoing agreement for the better usage also of the buildings and the flexi limitations to be replaced by the needs of the nowadays conditions.

In order to have a more efficient management of the foundations and education opportunities, in 2011 the RUMVADER (Rum Cemaat Vakıfları Destekleme Derneği)¹⁹⁴, was founded, in which Laki Vingas serves as the President and Yorgo Istefanopulos as Vice-President. Official representative of the Greek communities around Istanbul has a master plan for the usage of the old Greek schools around the city which are closed and without pupils most of them since '70s. The plan provides restoration, different usages as cultural centers and accommodation needs for the community.

3.1.4 Greek-Orthodox Press

Before 1922 starting from 19th century we witness a rich press life within the Roum community in Istanbul, where more than 50 daily and weekly Greek newspapers and magazines and novels had been published.¹⁹⁵ The press life continued but diminished highly after 1922, where as today it is about to end. Othomanikos Minitor, which had started its press life in 1835, was the first Roum newspaper, which was a translation of the official state newspaper Takvim-i Vekayi. After the 1856 Hatt-ı Hümayun, the freedoms granted to the non-Muslim public reflected on Istanbul's Roimio press and led to its development.

The distribution of the 47 newspapers published with 1876 Constitutional Monarchy were as such: 13 Turkish; 9 Greek; 9 Armenian; 7 French; 3 Bulgarian; 2 Ladino-Jewish; 2 English; 1 Arabic and 1 German. The Roum publishers had published their newspapers in

¹⁹⁴ <http://www.rumvader.org/>

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. Bozis, p. 160-175.

Turkish, Greek, Karamanlis (Turkish with Greek alphabet); and also with double languages (Greek-Turkish). In order to abstain from being trialed, the Roum journalists' whole criticisms targeted the government members, while they declared their loyalty to the Sultan.

The number of newspapers reduced to 18 after 1922, and the population exchange. After the Second World War this number decreased to 6, whereas today, *Apoyevmatini* which was established in 1925, is the only remaining newspaper that is published regularly. Its owner Mihalis Vasiliadis says without *Apoyevmatini*'s knowledge, neither a *Rum* is born nor dies in Istanbul. However, the newspaper is also facing the danger of closing, due to its financial crisis. Within the period (1923-1945), in the 1930 municipality elections, the minorities supported the opponent party, Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Partisi- FRP) and FRP managed to mobilize the minority and immigrant (mostly exchangees) electorates as well.¹⁹⁶

3.2 General Characteristics of Turkish-Muslim Community

Thrace is the name of a larger geographical region, which today is divided between Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. Greek Thrace is often referred to as Western Thrace and covers an area of 8,706 square kilometres. This region is composed of three provinces: Alexandroupoli (Dedeğaç) on the east, Komotini (Gümölcine) in the center and Ksanthi (İskeçe) on the west. Western Thrace had been under Turkish rule from its conquest in 1364 until the 1913 Balkan Wars. Following 1913 Balkan Wars, it remained under Bulgarian rule (1913-1919), under French rule on behalf of Union States (1919-1920) and under Greek control and political rule since 1920.

¹⁹⁶ Rıfat N.Balı "1930 yılı Belediye seçimleri ve Serbest Fırka'nın azınlık adayları", *Tarih ve Toplum*, vol. 167, November 1997, pp. 25-34. Cemil Koçak, *Belgelerle İktidar ve Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2006). Cem Emrence, *99 Günlük Muhalefet: Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2006).

Map 1. Administrative Map of the Western Thrace Region



The Muslim Turkish minority in Greece concerns itself as autochthonous community. Similar to Greek-Orthodox population at Istanbul and Turkey, The Muslim population in the region varies when Greek and Turkish statistics are compared. Turkish Muslim sources from Western Thrace claim a total of 100,000 to 120,000 Turkish-speaking Muslims in Western Thrace and most observers estimate between 100,000 and 120,000 Muslims out of a total population for Western Thrace of some 360,000 recorded in the census of 1971.¹⁹⁷ The minority press used to refer to 120,000. Turkish diplomacy wants to keep the figures high. The Turkish consul in Komotini gave the figure 150,000–170,000.¹⁹⁸ A nationalist academician Hikmet Öksüz who made research on Western Thrace gives the Turkish population number as 120.00-130.000.¹⁹⁹ Turkish-Muslim minorities' political leader of 1990s Sadık Ahmet said that the Turks of Western Thrace would have been 1,500,000 instead of 150,000 if it had not been for the oppression and persecution by the Greek authorities.²⁰⁰ Nevertheless, the Turkish Muslim minority conducts 1/3 of the population habitant in the region. The main reason for the decline in ethnic Turks in this area is their continual emigration to Turkey and Europe²⁰¹, out of some 250,000 Muslims – around 25,000 who lives in Europe- have left Western Thrace

¹⁹⁷ Hugh Poulton, Suha-Taji, Faruka (ed.), “Changing Notions of National Identity Among Muslims in Thrace and Macedonia: Turks, Pomaks and Roma”, *Muslim Identity and the Balkan State*, (C.Hurst&Co: UK, 1997), p. 84.

¹⁹⁸ “Yunanistan’daki Türk Varlığı”, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/bati-trakya-turk-azinligi.tr.mfa>.

¹⁹⁹ Hikmet Öksüz, *Batı Trakya Türkler Makaleler*, Karadeniz Araştırma Merkezi, Çağdaş Sorunlar dizisi No:3, (Karam Yayınları: Çorum, 2006).

²⁰⁰ (*To Vima*, 10.04.1994).

²⁰¹ Cem Şentürk, “Batı Trakya Türklerinin Avrupa’ya Göçleri, Buldukları Ülkelerdeki Yaşam Koşulları ve Kimlik Algılamaları”, (Türkiye Araştırmalar Merkezi, Essen), *The Journal Of International Social Research*, Volume 1/2 Winter 2008,p. 422.

since the 1920s, and the majority of these have been ethnic Turks.²⁰² Greece interprets religious rights for Muslims under the concept of territorial autonomy. There is a Muslim population of 500,000 outside of Western Thrace composed of Albanians, Africans and Southeast Asians. However, they cannot benefit from minority rights. There is no mosque or cemetery outside Western Thrace.

Vemund Aarbakke claims that the exaggeration of the Muslim population is adopted by those who are interested in promoting the minority issue as a problem. This includes Greek nationalists, who warn about the imminent Turkish danger in Thrace. In my interviews with the prominent figures of the Muslim community, the numbers are commonly named as 39,000 at Ksanti and 56,000 at Komotini. Throughout this chapter I will use these numbers as the total number of Turkish-Muslim minority at Western Thrace. Aarbakke's calculations of the Muslim population for 1991 that is based on Greek censuses go along with these numbers as well: 39,115 at Ksanthi; 56,865 at Rodopi; 7,900 at Evros, hence 103,880 in total (see Table 2). According to Aarbakke, in Ksanthi 19% of the Muslims are Turks; 63% are Pomaks and 18% are Roma, while in Rhodopi with 71% Turks compose the majority, followed by 17% Pomaks and 12% Roma.²⁰³ The population at Western Thrace has altered due to Turkish minorities' immigration to Turkey, and Pomak population settled in these lands (e.g in Ksanthi there were 63% Turks, 36% Pomaks and 1% Roma according to the 1928 census). Still compared to Roum population of Turkey, Western Thrace Turks managed to maintain the same population since 1923.

In its 2001 and 2011 population census the state did not collect information on ethnicity. According to Tsitselikis and Mavrommatis study (based on 2001 census) today, less than 85,000 Muslim Turkish speakers live in Thrace, predominantly Turkish, as well as Pomak and Roma. Furthermore, more than 15,000 Thracian Muslim Turkish speakers live elsewhere in Greece (mostly in Athens). After the Dodecanese islands were annexed by Greece in 1947, their Muslim inhabitants, Greek and Turkish speakers, were granted Greek citizenship. Today, about 4,000 Muslims live in the Dodecanese islands of Rhodes and Kos and use Turkish in every day life. Over 20,000 Greek Orthodox descendants of

²⁰² Poulton, *Muslim Identity*, p. 84.

²⁰³ Vemund Aarbakke, *The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace*, (Unpublished PhD Thesis, 2000), p. 31-35. In the statistics given at his thesis, the total Muslim population at 1920 was 93,273 and at 1928- after the population exchange- 102,171.

those who came from Turkey and settled in Greece after the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey are speakers of Turkish; most live in Macedonia and Thrace. According to the 2001 census, Turkish as mother tongue or as a second language, is spoken by 85,000 minority Muslims. Whereas, interestingly, more than one third of the Christian Greek-speaking population of Thrace – mainly people older than 50 years - are able to communicate through Turkish. In all, unofficially, 0.3 % of Greece’s population (some 300,000 people) could be considered to be Turkish speaking (speaking or understanding Turkish at various levels).²⁰⁴

Increase in the regions’ total population ratio is approximately 10% from 1991 to 2001 & 2011 census, suggesting that for 2011 the total population of Muslim in Western Thrace would be around 115,000; and in Ksanthi and Komotini where the Muslim minority can send minority representatives to the Parliament, the total number would be approximately 105,000. As 1991 census is the last report where the religion of the respondents were asked, I will use its statistics when referring to the Muslim minority in Greece.

Table 2: Demographic Distribution of the Muslims in Western Thrace

| Census | Ksanthi | | Rhodopi | | Evros | | Total | |
|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|
| | Mixed | Muslim | Mixed | Muslim | Mixed | Muslim | Mixed | Muslim |
| 1920 | | | | | | | 201404 | 93273 |
| 1928 | 89974 | 39229 | 89488 | 50432 | 124417 | 12510 | 303879 | 102171 |
| 1940 | 98575 | | 106575 | | 150790 | | 355940 | 112535 |
| 1951 | 89891 | 42245 | 105723 | 49660 | 137654 | 6934 | 333268 | 98839 |
| 1961 | 89591 | | 109201 | | 153930 | | 352722 | 105000 |
| 1971 | 82917 | | 107677 | | 135968 | | 326562 | |
| 1981 | 88777 | 42000 | 107957 | 62000 | 145531 | 10000 | 342265 | 114000 |
| 1991 | 90965 | 39115 | 103391 | 56865 | 140312 | 7900 | 334668 | 103880 |
| 2001 | 101,856 | | 110,828 | | 149,354 | | 365,571 | |
| 2011 | 111.222 | | 112.039 | | 147.947 | | 370,208 | |

Source: From 1920-1991, from Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p.31. The data for 2001 and 2011 is added by the author, derived from Hellenic Statistical Authority.

The ex-deputy of New Democracy Party İlhan Ahmet’s statement -in the interview conducted on April 2013- is interesting to mention as he said, “Our poverty saved us”, meaning the population was poor to migrate abroad and start a life from the beginning. It is indicated by the Turkish and Pomak groups that this separation of ethnic groups is a

²⁰⁴ Konstantinos Tsitselikis and Giorgos Mavrommatis, “The Turkish language in Education in Greece”, (Mercator-Education, 2003).

Greek state policy, whereas both of these ethnic groups identify themselves as Turks and in the elections vote for and are represented by Turkish (or Turkish speaking) deputies.

As it is given in Chapter 4, the immigrations of the Greek-Orthodox (Roum) of Turkey to Greece coincide with the periods when there is a direct Turkish-Greek conflict and when Cyprus conflict occupies the agenda.²⁰⁵ A similar condition is valid for the Muslim minority of Greece. In other words, these communities became internal victims of external crisis. Although hostile politics between Turkey and Greece on the Aegean and Cyprus issue is directly reflected to the situation of their minorities, such as 1955 pogrom by Turkish authorities and banning the use of adjective Turkish by Greek government after North Cyprus declared its independence in 1983, the examples also pointed out that 'reciprocity rule' is mostly implemented in economical, cultural and social areas, whereas when political representation of one minority group increases or decreases, this is not reflected to the other minority group.

On the other hand, despite the geographically concentrated power of the community, Greece's integration to EU and its more homogeneous feature (which supposed to decrease security concerns of the state), rights of Western Thrace Turkish minority has been violated by the Greek state due to the enforcement of the 'rule of reciprocity', and fluctuations on the bilateral relation between Greece and Turkey. The main political struggle of the minority has been the recognition of their Turkish identity, rather than being referred as Muslim, which the Greek state prefers by abusing the Lausanne Treaty.²⁰⁶ The second problem is the nationalization of the lands belonging to the Turkish-Muslim minority who earn its living through animal husbandry and agriculture. Third problem can be given as the illegal deportation from Greek citizenship due to the enforcement of Article 19, where around 50,000 minority members lost their citizenship. The fourth one is their demand to control their own education materials, and their foundations. The last one is to earn their right to elect their own religious leader, which

²⁰⁵ Alexis Alexandridis, *Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974* (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1983), p.316 The migration flows happened on the periods 1922-29, 1955-59, 1964-67 and 1972-75.

²⁰⁶ Several associations have been closed due the fact that they used the word 'Turk'. Even money has been offered in exchange for removing the word 'Turk' from the labels. The reflection of Cyprus Events is such that after the establishment of Turkish Republic of South Cyprus in 1983, Greek authorities removed these labels for security concerns such as to avoid a Muslim-Christian conflict. Ibid. Baskın Oran, (Ankara Bilgi Yayınevi, 1991), p. 167.

has been assured by the Lausanne Treaty, but began to be violated with the 1967 junta rule. Elected Turkish minority community boards, established by government decree in 1920, were abolished under the dictatorship and have never been reinstated. 'Muslim-origin Greek citizens' were deprived of citizenship under Article 19 of the Greek Nationality Law. With the military coup by the Colonels in 1967, active discrimination against the Muslim minority became the norm and this has continued since then. Discriminations concerning the minority are building constructions, driving licences, land purchases, education and abolishment of the elections for the Turkish minority community boards and their replacement with government-appointed officials.²⁰⁷ Despite the return to democracy in 1974, the democratic practices vouchsafed to the Muslim minority under former legislation were not resumed.

These problems are all salient for the Western Thrace minorities; however the priority of these problems (identity- education- economy-mufti election-citizenship rights) varies according to the ideology (Kemalist, modernist or nationalist), education level, religiosity and occupation of the minority community.

3.2.1 Identity: Turkish, Muslim or Muslim-Turkish?

Ironically, even before the foundation of the Turkish Republic the word "Turk" was widely used as a synonym to "Muslim" by the Balkan Christians. This is firmly rooted in both the Bulgarian and the Greek language, and a part of everyday usage even today. There are no such words as "Greco-Turk" or "Turco-Greek". While there are some *Bektaşî villages* at the border of Turkey, the Muslim community in Thrace which remained after the transfers consisted mainly of ethnic Turks, Pomaks (Islamicised Slavs) and the Roma (Gypsies), and is predominately Sunni.

The subsequent Lausanne Treaty of 24 July 1923 laid down further guarantees concerning the rights of these minorities. This treaty makes no mention of 'Turks' in Greece, but merely of 'Muslims'. The rights of the Muslim community in Western Thrace continue in theory to be guaranteed by Article 45 of the Lausanne Treaty. Consequently, Turkey considers itself to have a say in the community's affairs.

²⁰⁷ Hugh Poulton. *The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict*, (London: MRG). pp. 182-188.

Around 1.3% of the population is classified as Muslim in Greece today. Most of them live in Western Thrace, the province bordering Turkey.²⁰⁸ Many identify themselves as Turks, although they are of different origins, including Muslim Roma/Gypsies and Pomaks or Muslim Slavs. The Pomaks reside mainly in villages in the Rhodopi Mountains in Thrace. Their dialects are usually classified as dialects of Bulgarian, although most Pomaks identify themselves as Turks, whose welfare is actively promoted by the Turkish government. Under Greek law, the Muslim minority (including the Pomaks) has a right to education in its own language. In practice, however, only Turkish is used. This is due to the Turkish self-identification of the Pomaks, and the fact that this trend was promoted until recently by the Greek authorities (who from 1968 until the 1980s even officially recognized the Pomaks as Turks) in order to distance them from the Bulgarians.

Hence recognition of the Muslim minority with their ethnic identity depends on mainly Turkish-Greek relations, and that period's Greek foreign policy and Greece's arbitrary choice. Mainly Greece denies the ethnic identity of the Muslim minority, in order to prevent them from identifying themselves with Turkey and to avoid Turkey's interference to its minority issues. Muslim minority in Greece is officially defined as "Muslim Helens". Despite the Greek policy, the minority at Western Thrace express themselves as Turkish Muslim or Western Thrace Turks.²⁰⁹ However, it is forbidden to use the word "Turk/Turkish" at the minority institutions such as schools, associations or foundations. Turkish deputies at Greek parliament are not allowed to say "Turkish minority" when they are mentioning their electorates. On the other hand, the language of instruction at the minority schools is Turkish; minority can publish their newspapers, advertisements and election manifestos in Turkish. This conflict between the minority and Greek policy creates a major concern and demand for the minority: recognition of their Turkish ethnic identity.

To sum up, according to Greek officials, from the 1920s until the 1970s, minority members were referred to either as Turks or as Muslims. From the 1970s until the early 1990s, Greece officially recognized the existence of a Muslim minority in Western Thrace. And from 1991 onwards, Greece repeated its reference to a Muslim minority in

²⁰⁸ Minority Right Groups: Turks and Pomaks, <http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=1533>

²⁰⁹ "Western Thrace Turks" is used to differentiate themselves from the other Balkan states' Turkish minorities.

Western Thrace that was composed of those with Turkish descent (no usage of the term Turk), Pomak and Roma. Unlike Greece, Turkey's official reference to the minority has never changed. Since the early 1920s, Turkey has referred to them either as Turks or Muslim Turks. In Turkish literature and at Turkish politicians' rhetoric the words, "Western Thrace Turks", "Muslim-Turkish minority" and "our Western Thrace cognates" are used to refer to Western Thrace minority. Since the reconciliation of Greco-Turkish relations in the 21st century in Turkish parties' election manifestos and at main parties' programs Western Thrace Turks and their problems have not been mentioned,²¹⁰ however in politicians declarations the community is generally referred to as "Western Thrace Turks".

Current Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's speech at the 5th International Western Thrace Turks Assembly saying "Western Thrace Turkish minority who maintain his belief, identity, traditions and custom, and command of both Turkish and Greek languages, would make salient contributions to Turkey's relations with Greece"²¹¹ signifies that all problems of Turkish minorities regarding their identity, education, economic rights and religious rights would concern Turkey and Turkey would be interested in their demands as well. In his research Ali Hüseyinoğlu mentions that the minority living in Western Thrace define themselves as "We are of Turkish ethnic origin, following Islam and we are citizens of Greece as well". Hence they felt more affiliated with their Turkish and Muslim identities than the Greek one.²¹² This definition also coincides with the rhetoric and demands of Turkish politicians in Turkey.

It is known that ethnic identity and demands related to minority rights – and internalization of Western Thrace minority's problems began to be named in 1990s, following the return of the young generation that completed their high education in Turkey in addition to the second wave of immigration of Western Thrace Turks to Europe. For minority rights struggle, European Western Thrace Turks Federation's

²¹⁰ <http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme>; http://www.chp.org.tr/en/?page_id=70; <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/5uluslararasi-bati-trakya-turkleri-kurultayibasbakan-erdogan-sorunlarin-coz/5950>.

²¹¹ "5th International Western Thrace Turks Assembly", 2006

<http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/5uluslararasi-bati-trakya-turkleri-kurultayibasbakan-erdogan-sorunlarin-coz/5950>

²¹² Ali Hüseyinoğlu, The Development of Minority Education at the South-Easternmost Corner of the EU : the Case of Muslim Turks in Western Thrace Greece, Unpublished PhD Thesis,(University of Sussex, 2012)

(ABTTF) which is located in Germany is crucial.²¹³ Cem Şentürk's research on Western Thrace Turks living in Germany displays that for this community religion and ethnicity intermingles. In the survey when the participants were asked "how do they define themselves?" 58% answered as Muslim Turk, while 29% said Turk (in total 87% mentioned Turkish identity), 5% responded as Greek Turk, while 1% defined themselves as Muslim Helen. None of the participants defined themselves as Pomaks.²¹⁴ This statistics indicates that there is a salient conflict between how Greece defines the Muslim minority, and how minority community identifies itself, and identity problem leads to the irresolution of the other problems that the minority faces.

3.2.2 Education

Identifying themselves as rather "Turks" or "Muslim Turks" can be given as the primary reason why the minorities send their children to minority schools. In these schools the values of Turkishness and Islam were transferred to younger generations of the minority. Therefore, the minority interpreted these institutions as if the "guaranteeing" the minority's survival in the region. Official changing of school names, some minority students' arguments with their Greek teacher at the public Greek secondary schools on Turkey and Turkishness of the minority, singing silently the Turkish national anthem during the Greek national day celebrations are only a few examples for the strong link between identification and education of the minority in Western Thrace.²¹⁵

Before mapping the general structure and characteristics of minority education in Western Thrace after 1923, it is essential to analyze the emergence and development of the great schism inside the minority: controversies between traditionalist/anti-Kemalists and modernists/Kemalists, as it had a great impact on the minority's educational, socio-political and educational development until 1970s.

The Traditionalist Muslims based their influence on the conservative character of the minority, while the Modernist Turks identified with the Turkish reforms. The first

²¹³ Cem Şentürk, "Batı Trakya Türklerinin Avrupa'ya Göçleri, Buldukları Ülkelerdeki Yaşam Koşulları ve Kimlik Algılamaları", (Türkiye Araştırmalar Merkezi, Essen), *The Journal Of International Social Research*, Volume 1/2 Winter 2008, p.428.

²¹⁴ Ibid. Avrupalı Batı Trakya Türkleri Anketi Sonuçları, p. 432.

²¹⁵ Ali Hüseyinoğlu, The development of minority education at the south-easternmost corner of the EU : the case of Muslim Turks in Western Thrace Greece, Unpublished PhD Thesis, (University of Sussex, 2012, p.117.

adherents of the Kemalist reforms in Thrace were comparatively few and mainly concentrated in Ksanthi. Several of them had their education in Edirne where they had frequented schools controlled by the CUP. They often worked as teachers and were quite young at the time. The best known among the early activist was the teacher Mehmet Hilmi (1901–1931). He was a graduate from the teacher college in Edirne, and has later been hailed as the one who “kindled the light of Turkish nationalism in Western Thrace”. In his newspaper “*Yeni Adım*” (New Step) he had struggled for the illumination of the Western Thrace Turks and for the transition to the New Turkish Alphabet.²¹⁶ Another important figure was Osman Nuri (1902–1990) who later gained prominence as MP. In his successive newspapers Mehmet Hilmi was the staunch defender of the minority’s rights and the main propagandist for the Kemalist reforms. He criticized in particular the fugitives 150’s (*150’likler*)²¹⁷ led by the last Ottoman *şeyhülislam* Mustafa Sabri, whom he blamed for the bad state of education and for being national traitors. As a result of his fierce criticism of the Greek authorities, he was sent 3 times to internal exile.²¹⁸

The conflict between the two wings extended and intensified towards the end of the 1920s. It took place in politics, education, press etc., and included both legitimate and illegitimate methods. Both wings tried to secure the support of the Greek administration to undermine the opponent. The Muslim conservative religious personnel refused to carry out services such as weddings, burials etc. for those who wore modern hats. They refused the children of their Kemalist opponents to attend school, with the result that they had to study at home or attend Greek schools. Modernist teachers were sacked from their jobs by the Muslim Community. The conservative wing called the modernists heretics and asked them to make their own mosques and schools. They also tried to prevent the introduction of the Latin alphabet with all means. The modernists on their part secured the backing of the consulate and undermined the authority of the *muftis* by threatening or bribing

²¹⁶ Nilüfer Erdem, “Mehmet Hilmi’nin ‘Yeni Adım Gazetesi’nde Batı Trakya Türklerinin Yeni Türk Alfabesine Geçmesi İçin Verdiği Mücadele”, *Trakya Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol. 14, No. 2, December 2012, p. 157-178. His other newspapers are “*Yeni Ziya*” (the first newspaper in Western Thrace that had been published in Turkish language) and “*Yeni Yol*”.

²¹⁷ These were a group of Ottoman religious and political elites who had fled Turkey before its official proclamation of independence and settled in neighboring countries. Prominent, with the nickname *Yüzellilikler* (the hundred and fifties), it was a group of 150 members of the Ottoman Caliphate’s elite. The most prominent figure was Mustafa Sabri, who had served as the last *Şeyhülislam*, the highest religious authority in the Ottoman Empire. Sabri became the leader of the traditionalist. Mustafa Sabri also published a newspaper called “*Yarın*” (Tomorrow).

²¹⁸ Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p. 78.

religious personnel to do the services for them.²¹⁹ The Greek states believed it would make it more secure if it promoted the continuity of an old fashioned Muslim community than if it encouraged a modern ethnic community with ties to Turkey. While supporting the traditionalists, Greece did not completely ignore the demands of the modernists as well. In 1928, Greece first accepted one of the modernists' fundamental demands, by allowing the usage of Turkish Latin alphabet in minority schools.²²⁰ After the signing of the Greek-Turkish friendship agreement Greece favored the Kemalists, but the rivalry inside the minority continued.

This conflict between the traditionalists and modernists reflected on the education system as well. Although the Muslim community in Greece looks to Turkey, which is ostensibly a secular republic, it has always been mainly a religiously conservative community. Along with the minority schools where Turkish is used the community has two *medreses*: one at Echinus in the Pomak zone, and the other in Komotini. In these schools Islamic functionaries like imams and *muezzins* are trained, and some of the pupils continue their studies at the special academy in Thessaloniki. There are two imam muftis -one in Ksanthi and one in Komotini, plus a minor one in Didimotyho; they are paid by the state.²²¹ The academy in Thessaloniki was set up in 1968 to train teachers in the minority schools and thus end the need for teachers from Turkey or the Arab world. Today in Western Thrace there are still primary schools and *medreses*, where traditionalist tend to send their children to *medreses*- religious schools that are continuation of Tanzimat-era Ottoman education, where students are taught in Ottoman and Arabic, beside they receive Islamic and religious practices. There were 267 minority schools in Western Thrace in 1925-1926, among which 16 schools were *medreses*. Along with *medreses* and primary schools, a third type of schooling was also introduced in 1928 called minority private schools – but none of them lasted more than five years.²²² The first bilingual primary school opened in 1954. The first minority secondary school also opened at that period. Today there are two high schools one is located in Komotini, and the other in Ksanthi. Considering that there are around 10,000 students enrolled in minority primary schools

²¹⁹ For more details of the schism between Traditionalists and Kemalists see (Tsiumis, I musulmanikí mionótita tis Ditikís Thrákis ke I ellinoturkikés schésis (1923–1940). Pedagogyiki Scholi Tmima Nipiagogon. Thessaloniki, Aristotelio Panepistimio Thessalonikis, 1994.

²²⁰ Şerafettin Hurşit, *Lozan Anlaşmasından Günümüze Batı Trakya Türkleri Eğitim Tarihi*, (Gümölcine, 2006), p 125.

²²¹ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/bati-trakya-turk-azinligi.tr.mfa>

²²² Hüseyinoğlu, Unpublished thesis, p. 130.

each year, two bilingual minority secondary schools are not sufficient. All minority students who wanted to pursue tertiary education had either to follow the trajectory of Greek students and win a place at Greek universities, or to attend a university in Turkey. The lack of minority secondary schools and the low number of minority students finishing high schools still remain as the primary problem for the minority's education, beside the traditionalist- modernist clash.

The clash was not limited to the usage of the Turkish alphabet. For instance, major disputes also erupted over the weekly official day off work. Traditionalists insisted that Friday was the holy day for all Muslims, thus the weekly holidays for minority students should continue to be Fridays and Saturdays. This group is called as "*pazarcılar*" (ones who support education on Sunday). However, the modernists insisted on changing it to Saturdays and Sundays as it was in Turkey. This group is called as "*cumacılar*" (ones who support education on Friday)". In a short period of time, most minority schools accepted Sunday as the weekly holiday, but until the early 1990s, a small number of schools continued to close on Friday. However in education, among the Western Thrace minority we can still observe the separation of *cumacı* vs. *pazarıcı*.

Beside that the decree implemented on 1984 – one year after the establishment of North Cyprus Turkish Republic- had enormous negative impact on the minority's education, following the beginning of the official denial of Turkish identity by the Greek state. There has been a drastic reduction in the number of pupils at the two Turkish minority secondary schools (in Komotini and in Ksanthi) since the stipulation by the authorities in March 1984 that final examinations there must be conducted in Greek.²²³ For minority high school students, it was difficult to take an exam in Greek on courses that were taught in Turkish. As a result, none of the final-year minority students were able to pass the exam.²²⁴

The 0,5% quota system²²⁵ which the Greek state introduced in 1996 increased the number of minority graduates from Greek universities and was welcomed by the minority as it motivated minority parents to educate their children in Greece from pre-school to

²²³ Decision No.Z.2/396/21.7.1983

²²⁴ Hursit, Batı Trakya Türkleri Eğitim Tarihi, 2006, p. 123.

²²⁵ Decision No.152.11/B3/790, FEK B'129,5.3.1996.

university. Increase in the education level of minority enables them to struggle against the discrimination, since they had the linguistic skills, educational background and self-confidence to fight against violations of their rights by the host country. The ex-president of Ksanthi Turkish Youth Association Ahmet Kara in our interview (21 April, 2013) said when in 1990s the minority members who got their university education at Turkey returned to Western Thrace, the community began to express their demands as well. The low level of literacy of women in both Turkish and Greek is an obstacle for the community. Only after 1990s, female pupils begin to enroll in higher education. Yet the problem regarding education of the minority seems to be originated even at kindergarden-level. The problems considering kindergardens still continue, as it is compulsory for the Greek students to attend to them before the primary school, and the language at these kindergardens is only Greek. Ahmet Kara stated that the community is struggling for bilingual kindergardens. Today, because there is lack of bilingual kindergardens, the community does not send their kids to the state kindergardens. Ahmet Kara is suggesting turning some of the primary schools to kindergardens. The 300 or so Turkish primary schools are apparently crucial to the teaching and learning of Turkish. Beside the education institutions, another factor that contributes to continuation of Turkish language and Turkish-Muslim identity and traditions is the press.

3.2.3 Press

Before the annexation of the New Lands, publishing activity in Turkish was observed in Athens (in 1880, 1895, and 1910) mostly among 'Young Turk' supporters. In Crete, during the period of the Autonomy, Muslims in Hania also published three periodicals (1908-1911). As such, before the 1923 population exchange, the Muslim minority communities in Greece had an important role in the media, mainly in Thessaloniki.²²⁶

Since the Kemalist revolution in Turkey, there have been secular and Turkish nationalist forces, as opposed to more conservative Islamic ones, working within the Turkish Muslim community; both groups have their own associations and publications. The first Turkish language newspapers in Western Thrace appeared in 1923 after the area had passed under Greek sovereignty. Before this time the nearest cities with a Turkish press would be the

²²⁶ Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *Old and New Islam, in Greece: From Historical Minorities to Immigrant Newcomers*, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), p. 275.

larger cities Thessaloniki and Edirne.²²⁷ Since 1920s, it can be said that there has been a vivid press life in Western Thrace, however today, Thrace's sustainable minority newspapers are usually weekly, rather than daily, as the cost of their production cannot be covered through sales and advertising, in most cases they receive financial aid from the local Turkish consular authorities.

Up until the mid 1970s most of the newspapers could be classified according to the important cleavage between the conservatives and the Kemalists. Since there was no indigenous press tradition both groupings were directly or indirectly inspired from outside. In the beginning the conservative newspapers were dominated by the anti-Kemalist fugitives from Turkey. Çapur İsmail Hakkı wrote polemically against the reforms of Atatürk in his newspaper *İtilâ* (1925–1930). He was joined by Mustafa Sabri who took the leading role as opponent of Kemalism with his newspaper *Yarın* (1927–1930).²²⁸ The Kemalist newspapers were dominated by young persons educated according to the spirit of the new Turkey. The most prominent person of this group was the aforementioned Mehmet Hilmi.²²⁹ The teacher Mehmet Hilmi was the most conspicuous figure among the Kemalist adherents. From the first issue of his newspaper *Yeni Ziya* (New Light), which appeared in 1924, he wrote about Greek oppression and attacks on the Muslims, reflecting what was written in Turkey during this period. The motto of “to teach the new alphabet is Turk’s aim” continued with Osman Nuri’s and Hıfzı Abdurrahman’s newspaper *İnkılap* (Revolution) which was published to support the Turkish revolution during 1930-1931. This newspaper was criticized the actions of 150’s, and Greek state’s support to them about the management of the minority foundations.²³⁰

In my archive research at Culture and Education Foundation of Western Thrace Minority (BAKEŞ/PEKEM)²³¹ in Komotini, I realized that there were newspapers published in Ottoman Turkish up until 1975. Hafız Ali Reşat’s *Muhafazakar* (Conservative) Newspaper (1958-1975) and Mustafa Hilmi’s *Müdafaa-i İslam* (Islam’s Protection)

²²⁷ Vemund, Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p. 80.

²²⁸ Adil Özgüç, *Batı Trakya Türkleri* (Western Thrace Turks), (Kutluğ Yayınları:1974), pp.119–123

²²⁹ Nilüfer Erdem, “Mehmet Hilmi’nin ‘Yeni Adım Gazetesi’nde Batı Trakya Türklerinin Yeni Türk Alfabesine Geçmesi İçin Verdiği Mücadele”, *Trakya Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol. 14, No. 2, December 2012, p. 157-178.

²³⁰ Hikmet Öksüz, “Batı Trakya Türk Basımında Atatürkçü bir Gazete, *İnkılap*”, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Vol. 16, No. 50, (July, 2001).

²³¹ <http://www.pekem.org/>

Newspaper (1935-1939) are one of these newspapers published in Ottoman Turkish. The cleavage on *cumacı-pazarıcı* came to an end during 1970s, and there are no conservative newspapers or magazines in the region today. However, Hüseyinoğlu asserts that before this date, these groups were not even buying the publications of the other part.²³² Turks in Western Thrace are able follow Turkish TV channels via satellite; they also follow the Turkish newspapers published in Turkey. On the other hand, Turkish press in Western Thrace only encompasses newspapers and magazines, while there is no press company that publishes novels, except academic works.

Today the newspapers are still being weekly published. Among the Turcophone newspapers the most popular, professional and regular in Komotini is *Gündem* (the Agenda), and *Millet* (Nation) in Ksanthi. These newspapers have been published 1,000 the most, they have one owner and the owner is responsible of the whole process of publishing. There are also online newspapers. *Bati Trakya* (Western Thrace) expresses the voice of diaspora in Europe, while *Trakya'nın Sesi* (Thrace's Voice) also employed Greek writers and has a more alternative voice towards the minority issues. *Azınlıkça* newspaper has a similar approach with *Trakya'nın Sesi*.

On the whole, I have the impression that the Turcophone press in Greek Thrace has been very vocal about the minority's rights. On minority issues, the newspapers have common views, blaming Greek state for ignoring and violating their rights, while viewing Turkish state as the guarantor of their rights and existence in Western Thrace. They highlight the importance of unification among the minority group, while usually Turks are describes as "naive, innocent, emotional, honest", while Greek state is "evil, decisive, dishonest"²³³. The main target and the cause of the problems is the Greek state, and Greek people are excluded from these decriptions, they do not take place in the Turkish press.

As aforementioned, even Muslim minority deputies did not have a command on Greek and have not made any remarks at Greek Parliament until mid-1970s, some of the representatives have their own newspapers and tried to express their opinions though this medium. The conflict between Hasan Hatipoğlu and the leading Kemalist Osman Nuri

²³² Interview conducted with Ali Hüseyinoğlu, who is a member of Turkish Muslim community in Komotini and has Phd in Political Science.

²³³ One of the examples of this rhetoric: Birlik Newspaper (Unity), 11 May 2011.

<http://www.birlikgazetesi.info/ilhan-tahsin/3264-ka-yaparken-goez-cikarmayin-aman-dkkat.html>

Fettahoğlu was reflected in their own newspapers, *Akın* (Attack) and *Trakya* (Thrace) respectively during 1950s, while conservative Hüsnü Yusuf was using his own newspaper *Sebat* (Perseverance) up until 1960s. The prominent leader of Turkish Muslim minority of Western Thrace Sadık Ahmet's newspaper *Balkan* was sharing the opinions of Dr. Sadık Ahmet, his actions in the parliaments and informing the public about the decrees decided in the parliament, while *İleri* (Forward) newspaper was taking an opposition position against him and blaming Sadık Ahmet for dividing the community instead of uniting it during 1990s.²³⁴

Starting from 1970s, the newspapers were considered totally Kemalist Turkish in style and overtly anti-Greek. The newspapers in Istanbul were under strict control and did not dare to write anything, which might offend Turkey. Vemund Aarbakke gives the example of the newspaper *Eleftheri Foni* of Andreas Lambikis for this case. When he demanded security for their children and homes after the September events in 1955, the military authorities banned his newspaper.²³⁵ It was allowed to resume a month later, but Lambikis was detained in a military prison for three months. "On one occasion, he was questioned for three consecutive days as to whether the Patriarchate or the Greek embassy had instructed him to campaign on behalf of the minority."²³⁶ He was expelled from Turkey in September 1965, after he had published an open letter to the minister of education about the restrictions on the minority schools. Later the Grecophone press in Istanbul seems to have avoided any explicit criticism of Turkish authorities. Aarbakke also adds that when he read regularly the minority newspapers (*Apoyevmatini, Iho*) during the autumn of 1993, he found them devoid of anything which could possibly be perceived as criticism. It should be noted that Mehmet Hilmi was also expelled for his criticism against the Greek government. Moreover, the Turkish press in Turkey is also under serious control and censorship. However, this does not change the fact that Turkish press in Greece is more free in expressing their views and criticism of the state compared to Greek press in Turkey.

²³⁴ BAKES Archive at Komotini.

²³⁵ Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p. 203.

²³⁶ Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, (Athens. 1983), p.256, 261, 288.

3.2.4 Foundations

The management of the foundations, the status of *müftü* association, ban of using the label “Turkish” for the associations and non-protections of Muslim cemeteries form the other problem for the Muslim minority in Western Thrace and issued several times by the minority press, community and the representatives as well.

It should be said that the minority community in Western Thrace highly attend to its traditions, even more than the Turks in Turkey. One of the traditions of Western Thracian Turks, Kurban (Sacrifice) Tradition attracts attention as a tradition which reflects acting collectively and union of forces and a tradition based on cooperation.²³⁷ Their traditions and belief are salient for them in protecting their existence and cultural identity. Kurban (Mahya) tradition is still alive in this region, where one Sunday in every August, it is continuously repeated every year. Another tradition that continues – not so valid in Turkey- is the social celebration of *hatim* (to finish a complete reading of the Koran). In my visit to Ksanthi on April, 2013, I had that the Muslims of the city attended to this event, where they celebrated their children’s successfully finishing the Koran course and had a command on Koran and Arabic. The community celebrated this tradition by delivering *pilav* (rice) and *kavurma* (meat) to the community members.

The Pious Foundations (*vakıf/ wakf*)

While, in Turkey, foundation properties were partially registered through the 1936 Declaration process, in Greece, Muslim foundations never registered their properties under the law, as the administration boards have so far refused to implement the law. After the adoption in 1920 of Law No. 2345, which was designed for the pre-Lausanne Muslim communities in Greece, the management of foundation estates was placed under the authority of the Muslim community and the supervision of the local *mufti*.²³⁸ Gradually through political interventions, the community councils had been losing its legal status and by 1949, Law No. 2345 was activated for the Muslim foundations of Western Thrace. Then, elections were held for the designation of foundation management boards, and the boards gained an important political role *vis-à-vis* the Greek state. Due to their political importance, the boards became a field of antagonism, both internally --

²³⁷ Füsün Aşkar, “Batı Trakya (Yunanistan) Türklerinde kurban (mahya) geleneği”. *Uluslararası İnsan Bilimleri Dergisi* Vol.8:No.2, 2011, p. 445.

²³⁸ Dilek Kurban and Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *A Tale of Reciprocity: Minority Foundations in Greece and Turkey*, (TESEV 2010), p.10. Appendix F. List of Muslim foundations in Greece.

between the modernists against the Islamists -- and externally -- between the Greek administration and the Turkish Consulate in Komotini, with the latter's increasing influence within the Muslim community. As a result, elections for management boards have not been held since the 1967 military regime. Instead, members of the boards have been appointed by Greek authorities.²³⁹ Therefore compared to Greek-Orthodox in Turkey, the Turkish Muslim community has neither the right to manage their own foundations, nor to elect the representatives for the managing board.

According to the law, a foundation property is defined as "the foundation itself, and any other real or tangible property, donated for the functioning of the foundation, implying the aims of the institutions or the institution itself."²⁴⁰ Over time, the acquisition and maintaining of property suffered from legal uncertainty and administrative practices, a consequence of the powerlessness of Muslim communities to control their property. This happened during the first years of the implementation of the Lausanne Treaty, when most of the properties belonging to the Muslim community and private individuals were put under the temporary use of Greek (*Rum*) refugees in Western Thrace.

In the context of the legislative reform of 1980, a series of decrees and acts ordered foundation managers to declare and register with the state their foundations' estates. The law was never implemented, although the deadline was extended several times. Recently, Presidential Decree 2/2007 authorized the Secretary General to call on foundation management boards to register their real estate properties within two years, but again this remained unimplemented. At last, by the completion of the first phase of the land registration process in the urban centers of Western Thrace in 2009, minority foundations started to become visible as legal entities owning property.²⁴¹

Like every demand of the Western Thrace Turks, the problems of the minority related to the management of their foundations are also in Turkey's political agenda. In the 5th International Western Thrace Turks Assembly, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan stated "We are taking the necessary steps [about the improving of minority's management of their own foundations], similarly Greece should take this step as well. We need to protect

²³⁹ Ibid. *A tale of reciprocity*, p.10

²⁴⁰ Article 3, Law No. 3647, 27.02.2008. Official Gazette No. A 37, 2008.

²⁴¹ Ibid. *A tale of reciprocity*, p. 12.

the law on Muslim minority's foundations and deliver them to their owners. Like the non-Muslim communities in Turkey, Muslim Turkish minority should be able to elect the administrative councils of their foundations".²⁴² This statement is also important to show the way how Turkey and Western Thrace Turks used to enforce the *reciprocity rule* in demanding minority rights.

Associations (*Dernekler*)

During the Ottoman period the administration on the level of empire had belonged to the Muslims, and when the empire vanished this part of their social organization was lost along with it. What remained were their religious institutions led by the *müftüs*, their pious foundations (*vakıf*), their schools, their political representation, and their newspapers. On the village level, the two pillars of the minority's social organization were the mosque and the school.

Mehmet Hilmi is a prominent figure for the Western Thrace Turks, not only that he had tried to expand Turkish alphabet in the community, but also because in 1927 he founded the "Ksanthi Youth Association" (*İskeçe Türk Gençlik Yurdu*). It was frequented by the "progressive" youth and not looked favorably on by the well to do families. In the following year he organized the youth in Komotini in the "Turkish Youth Union" (*Türk Gençler Birliği*). These associations were modeled on the "Turkish Hearths" (*Türk Ocakları*), which played a leading role in Turkish nationalism.²⁴³ When the terms were good between Greece and Turkey, these associations could put the label "Turkish", however since 1984, it has been forbidden to use "Turkish" in any labels of associations and schools. In my visit to Komotini and Ksanthi, I observed that the label with the sign "Turkish Youth Union" was put inside the building, while the official label was hung outside.

²⁴² "Biz bu adımı atıyoruz, ancak aynı şekilde Yunanistan'ın da bu adımı atması gerekiyor. Müslüman azınlıkların vakıflarının hukukunu korumanız ve onları sahiplerine teslim etmeniz gerekiyor. Türkiye'deki gayrimüslim cemaatler gibi Müslüman Türk azınlığı da vakıflarının idari kurullarını kendileri seçebilmeli" taken from Justice and Development Party's Official website. "5th International Western Thrace Turks Assembly" <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haber/5950/Suluslararasi-bati-trakya-turkleri-kurultayibasbakan-erdogan-sorunlarin-coz>

²⁴³ *Gündem* 43/06.05.1997. Allegedly, Mehmet Hilmi's initiative came after suggestions from Osman Nuri Fettahoğlu.

The executive council of the association elected regularly, and has a democratic structure. Most of gatherings such as publishing release, religious holidays, conferences, seminars; courses take place in the Youth Union at Komotini and Ksanthi. Beside the Youth Unions, Association of West Thracian Minority Scientists (*Bati Trakya Yüksek Tahsilliler Derneği*) has a salient place in the community. As observed in the case of Ahmet Hacıosman, it is common that its general secretary who receives the support of the community elites is likely to have a political seat as well.

Mufti (müftü) Office

The highest religious leaders of the minority are the *muftis*. The three *mufti* offices are situated in Komotini, Ksanthi, and Didimotiho. The *muftis* are public servants and have their salary from the Greek state. Lower religious personnel such as *imams* (prayer leader) and *muezzins* (man who calls people to prayer) are not employed by the state and usually have other sources of income beside their religious services. Like religious personnel of other religions in Greece they are exempted from military service. The religious institutions and pious foundations of the minority received financial support from the Greek Government. In 1929 there were 300 mosques in use, with 378 imams and a total of 667 religious personnel. There were 5 *medrese* with 83 pupils and 7 teachers, and two *tekkes* with 21 novices.²⁴⁴

There are several agreements and regulations related to mufti institution in Western Thrace. The first one is 1913 Athens Agreement. According to this regulation's 11/6 article 3rd protocol the head muftis and the muftis would have the same rights with Greek state officers. The mufti will come to service by election and head mufti is elected by the muftis.²⁴⁵ This article was adapted to Greek law by 2345/1920 decree; along with the part on management and control of the foundations belonging to Muslim community and 1923 Lausanne Treaty did not abolished nor made any changes in the content of 1920 agreement. Similar to religious leaders in Ottoman period, mufti has judicial power as judges within the community, has authority on religious marriage, divorce and inheritance. Although in Turkey the religious leaders lost their judicial power with 1926 Civil Code, *muftis* power as judges has not been affected in Greece.

²⁴⁴ Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p. 84.

²⁴⁵ Baskın Oran, *Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Batı Trakya Sorunu*, (Mülkiyeliler Birliği Vakfı Yayınları:Ankara, 1986), p. 97.

There were no conflict between Greek state and minority on mufti's election until 1980s. The mufti problem emerged when Greece began to appoint the muftis in Komotini and Ksanthi in 1985. Moreover, according to 24 December 1990 decree 2345/1920 was abolished and regulated such that the muftis would be appointed by Greek Foreign Affairs Minister's Minority Administration Office President and in the case the mufti leaves the office, the region mayor would make the appointments. Following this decision, two independent minority deputies sent a petition to Greek Parliament Presidency on 16 January 1991 asserting that they were expecting the recession of the decree.²⁴⁶ On 19 January 1991, the Western Thrace Turkish Minority Higher Institution (1984-2005) announced that the community would not recognize the decree.

Mehmet Emin Ağa's case was the beginning of resistance to Greek states' arbitrary rule and two headedness of the mufti office. When he was elected as mufti on 17 August 1990 at Ksanthi by taking 80% of 52 mosques' community votes– he was in fact appointed as mufti following his father Ksanthi mufti Mustafa Hilmi's death, but arranged an election as he was against appointment of the mufti officer- the Turkish minority representative Ahmet Faikoğlu announced this to the Ksanthi mayor. Following this announcement, Greek state annulled Ağa's service and appointed Mehmet Emin Şinikoğlu in his position. Ksanthi community did not accept this implementation and protested the state on 23 August 1990 with a civil disobedience action by sitting around the Ksanthi mufti building.²⁴⁷

Thus, even though there are elected muftis on one side and assigned muftis on the other side, a double headed cases came forward. Mehmet Emin Ağa had become the symbol name of mufti issue and mufti struggle. Ağa struggled for religious justice of Turkish minority and also took place in forefront of Turkishness and case of continued existence. In this context, he appeared at courts and was sentenced with multifarious reasons. When he was sentenced to prison, Turkish Foreign Minister Karayalçın warned that unless

²⁴⁶ Turgay Cin, *Yunanistan'daki Müslüman Türk Azınlığın Din ve Vicdan Özgürlüğü: Baş Müftü ve Müftülükler Sorunu*, (Seçkin Yay., Ankara 2003), p. 263

²⁴⁷ Ibid. Cin, p. 106;

Mehmet Ağa was immediately released Turkey would 'take steps' over this issue.²⁴⁸ Nevertheless, his struggle helped mufti issue to be known worldwide.²⁴⁹

The decree famously known by the minority community as “240 imam law”²⁵⁰ which was prepared by Nea Demokratia Party (New Party /ND) and accepted in 2007, is another example of tension between the Greek state and the Muslim minority on religious rights. According to this decree, imams and Koran course instructors will be appointed by the council composed of 5 Christian Greek citizens, whose wage will be paid by the state. The decree has not been implemented as the minority community declared that they do not recognize this decree. It came to agenda again January 2013 by adding the statement “imams can give religion lessons in the Greek public schools” to the old decree and altering the structure of the council – composed of two Christians and three Muslims-accepted with the support of Nea Demokratia, PASOK and Golden Dawn Party (Χρυσή Αυγή), while rejected by the 3 Turkish minority deputies, DIMAR and SYRIZA representatives. However despite the opposition from the minority community and the representatives, the decree will be implemented.²⁵¹ Generally Muslim minority rejects any decree concerning their daily life, traditions and minority rights, which is taken without consulting to them. The decree took place also at Turkey’s agenda. Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ after saying that the appointment of the mufti is illegal continued as “if we appointed the church priest by *Diyanet* (Department of Religious Affairs in Turkey), the whole world including Greece would stand up. This is unfair”²⁵².

In conclusion, even though the aforementioned discriminations concerning the repairing of the building, driving licenses, land purchase, education and closing of the elected Turkish minority community boards and their replacement with government-appointed officials continues, after Greece’s membership to EU and internationalization of the minority problem on 1990s, there have been improvements concerning the minority rights

²⁴⁸ *Milliyet*, “Yunanistan’a İskeçe Uyarısı” (Warning to Greece about Ksanthi), 1 January 1995, <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/Arsiv/1995/01/25>

²⁴⁹ Recep Çelik, “Batı Trakya Türklerinin Müftülük Sorunu ve Mehmet Emin Ağa”, *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları*, No. 188, 2010.

²⁵⁰ It refers to 240 religion officers (100 in Komotini, 100 in Ksanthi and 40 in Didimotiho/Dimetoka region).

²⁵¹ *Birlik Gazetesi*, “Yunanistan 240 İmam Yasasını Hayata Geçirecek”, 18 April 2013, <http://www.birlikgazetesi.info/haberler/7125-yunanistan-240-mam-yasasini-hayata-gecrecek-komyonlari-kurdu.html>

²⁵² *Batı Trakya Online*, “Yunanistan’ın bu yaptığı saygısızlıktır”, <http://www.batitrakya.org/bati-trakya/bati-trakya-haber/bozdog-yunanistanin-bu-yaptigi-saygisizliktir.html>

in Greece. However, the problems of the Turkish Muslim minority in Western Thrace concerning recognition of their identity, deficiencies in education, management of foundations, label of the associations and autonomy of institutions have not reached a solution yet.

It should be noted that Lausanne Treaty has been perceived like a constitution within the Western Thrace Turkish minority. This treaty is the protector of their minority rights, while Turkey has been perceived as the guarantor of the treaty and the minority community. Beside the Lausanne Treaty, the community gives reference to 1913 Athens Agreement about the issues concerning the mufti institution, while it refers to 1920 Greek Internal Law and its articles for the agenda related to minority foundations. In opposition to these articles on favor of the minority community, the Greek state and representatives emphasize the laws and decrees that were implemented during 1967 Colonels period, and increased discrimination against the community.

Yet it should not mean the tension between minority and majority is expanded to all regions in Greece. It is known that when a minority member cannot attain a driving licence from the Western Thrace public officers, he would be able to get it from the other regions of Greece. This suggests that there are no or very few cases of discrimination towards the minority outside the region. Moreover, according to Hüseyinoğlu, the population living outside Western Thrace is not aware of minority's problems, of the state discrimination, and of the right violations.²⁵³

3.3 Comparison of the General Characteristics: Their Influence on Political Behavior

The general characteristics of the two communities given in sections 3.1 and 3.2, will be compared here in relation with their effects on the political behavior of the minority.

Micro-level Differences of the Two Communities

During the first decades of the republican period of Turkey, minorities were not included in Turkey's politics, whereas Turkish minority was represented in the Greek Assembly. Turkish minority was not represented in the period 1936-1946, during which Roun

²⁵³ Ali Hüseyinoğlu, "Survival of Islam at the South-eastern most edge of Western Thrace, Greece", Economics and Administrative Sciences Conference, in Işık University, April, 2013.

minority was represented in the Turkish Parliament. These differences reveal that minorities' representation is not based on 'reciprocity rule'. However, in terms of political behavior, we need to emphasize 4 main differences between these communities: 1. urban-rural difference; 2. political cleavages; 3. minority institutions; 4. efficiency in the language of the home country.

Roum community in Istanbul is highly urbanized, and this characteristic of them was reflected in their political behavior as well. Although as a minority population they vote for the party which gives the best service to them, they usually vote for central parties, not for the persona of a deputy member. Whereas, within the Turkish minority of Greece, which is an agricultural community and bound to the land, we observe more traditional way of political behavior. Although they also vote for central left or central right parties, patron-clientalistic relationships are more internalized, and the community votes for the person/community leader rather than the party, or for the ideology. İlhan Ahmet's success in moving 10,000 minority votes from central right party to left-party, even though he had no chance to be elected in 2012 elections, can be given as an example to minorities' political behavior.

Moreover, political cleavages²⁵⁴ are very deep within Turkish minority of Western Thrace, such that the conflict between the traditionalist-modernist/Kemalist groups still exist until today, and beside political preferences, it is also reflected at community press, education, social life and organizations. As the following sections will reveal, this cleavage has been manipulated by both Greek and Turkish authorities as well. During 1989-1990 period, Turkey supported independent candidates. On the other hand, as Vemund Aarbakke asserts, independent candidates were independent of Greek parties but more dependent on Turkey.²⁵⁵ In 22 September 1996 elections, the minority managed to elect three candidates, but from three different Greek parties. It is noted that Turkey pooled the minority vote for their favored candidates to PASOK in Rhodopi and to ND in İskeçe/Ksanthi. A General look at the party preferences of the Turkish-Muslim minority

²⁵⁴ The most important political cleavage within the minority was the rivalry between the Traditionalist Muslims and Modernist Turks. The Traditionalist Muslims based their influence on the conservative character of the minority, while the Modernist Turks identified with the Turkish reforms.

²⁵⁵ Vemund Aarbakke, "Concept of reciprocity and its significance for the political organization of the Muslim minority in Greece", in *Reciprocity: Greek and Turkish Minorities law, religion and politics*, (ed.) by Samim Akgönül, (Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2008), p.136.

in Western Thrace suggests that there is not a strong party-affiliation for any of the Greek parties.

In both Ksanthi and Komotini, in every election, Turkish minority groups lead campaigns as ‘Turk’s vote is for Turk’ in order to give forth to deputies as many as possible, where Greek parties introduce different Turkish-origin candidates in order to divide but also gain the Turkish votes. Therefore, political effectiveness of the minorities has been limited and controlled due to the Greek political system, where minority group cannot be represented neither by their own minority party nor by independent candidates- especially since 1993, and needed to be involved in the Greek parties if they want to be represented in the Parliament. For the Greek-Orthodox deputies in Turkey, as it will be given in Chapter 4 there was no institutional constriction on their possibility to be elected as independent, in opposite until 1946 minority deputies served in the Parliament as independent representatives. Whether it is better for the minorities to serve as independent representatives, from a major party seats or from a minority party seats will be discussed in the Conclusion chapter.

Continuing with the differences between the regarding minorities, their way of managing and organizing their institutions should also be noted. The social organisation of the Muslim minority encountered a new situation when the Muslims ceased to be the ruling element. For the sake of comparison, the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul had become adjusted to minority life, and had well developed minority institutions which survived more or less intact grouped around their spiritual leader, the Patriarch. In the Ottoman Empire they had always been ruled indirectly through their communal leaders. The Muslims in Greek Thrace— like Muslims in other parts of the Balkans—lost much of their social organization together with their political power. Hence, even though Roum minority has not been represented in Turkish parliament since 1961, they still have powerful political say and they manage to rule their community foundations successfully. On the other hand, Western Thrace Muslims found themselves governed by people with a different language, religion and culture. This dramatic change was exacerbated by the nostalgia for the ‘good old days’ under the Ottoman regime. Such factors constituted the main impediments to the integration of this imperial minority with a Greek majority society after 1923.

Another difference, which had not influenced their representation, but effectiveness of representation – is Muslim deputies' lack of command of Greek generally. It is interesting to understand that although this community has been represented in Greek Parliament since 1920 – the accession of Western Thrace to Greece- until 1974, it was not the custom to participate in parliamentary debates for the Turkish-Muslim minorities and they did not leave a mark in the Parliament. On the other hand, it is indicated that since the Ottoman Parliament, Roum deputies had good command of Turkish, as the general of the community. This does not mean Turkish deputies were ineffective in politics. Most of them had their own newspapers, and had chance to express their ideas within the community, however their main target was not Greek authorities or Greek population. Therefore, until the period 1974, the thesis will focus on press and deputies' newspapers in order to comprehend minority's perception of the period. In the sufficiency of using Greek, there is a salient difference between Komitini and Ksanthi. Community at Ksanthi, whose main economy is based on trade rather than agriculture, is more integrated with Greek population and has better knowledge of Greek, compared to the community at Komotini. The fact that there is denser Turkish population in Komotini can be another reason to explain this difference.

The difference between Greece's and Turkey's approach towards their respective minorities can be another question one should keep in mind when comparing their minorities. Greece is noted nowadays as one of the most homogeneous European countries. Compared to Turkey, Greece's deeper incorporation into the process of European integration, the implementation of liberal European norms regarding human rights, have influenced the conduct of minority policy in recent years. Considering the political participation of Muslim minority to Greek politics, it is observed that since 1920s, in every Greek election the Turkish community has given forth at least one deputy as the community is highly concentrated in Western Thrace region, and in order to pull the votes of Turkish minority, Greek parties nominate Turkish deputy candidates in their lists.²⁵⁶ Moreover, political parties or candidates of larger Turkish-Muslim minority have been a relatively stable figure in highly volatile Greek political party systems. Since 1920, there has been 32 national elections in Greece, and in total 43 Turkish-Muslim minorities

²⁵⁶ Given in Appendix E: List of Turkish-Muslim minority deputies at Greek Parliament since 1920.

from Western Thrace served in the Greek Parliament.²⁵⁷ It is even seen that as the case of Müderris Hafız Ali Galip, who was elected to the Greek Parliament from Komotini/Gümülcine (Rhodopi) district for 6 terms between 1920-1936, and Osman Nuri Fettahoğlu (Ksanthi) who was elected to the Greek Parliament for 8 terms (1946-1963), and recently Ahmet Hacıosman who has been elected in the last four elections (2007-2012), this consistency can also be understood as the reflection of the cleavages between the majority and minority.

This cleavage between the minority and majority is deep in both countries, where there is lack of trust between the communities. Chapter 4 will show that Roum representatives also served in Turkish Parliament for several terms. However, their loyalty was questioned all the time- for the Crete problem, and also for the Cyprus issue as well. A similar, discriminative approach has been observed in the Greek deputies' behaviors towards the Turkish-Muslim minority representatives. Even Muslim minority deputies had served in Greek Parliament as Greek citizens since 1920, it did not prevent Golden Dawn Party (Χρυσή Αυγή) members from accusing PASOK Komotini representative Ahmet Hacıosman for being a Turkish agent in the Greek Assembly.²⁵⁸

Another actor that influences the political participation of the Turkish-Muslim minority is the Orthodox Church in Greece, which usually interferes with Greek politics, as much as Turkish army interferes with Turkish politics. Orthodox Church perceives the demands of the minority as a latent jihad. And Muslim minority is still widely perceived as an alien body within Greece and its elected representatives are often regarded with suspicion.²⁵⁹ This is why, when Gülbeyaz Karahasan was nominated by PASOK for the superprefecture of Kavala, Drama and Ksanthi in May 2006, Metropolitan and Archbishop in Greece interfered with politics and opposed this nomination. She was asked to express that she is Greek in public.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁷ This number is higher if Muslims from other cities of Greece is included, such as Salonica, Kavala, Kozani before 1923 population exchange. In 1920 Greek national elections, 20 Muslim deputies were elected in total, among which 4 were from Western Thrace.

²⁵⁸ Greek Parliament Archive, 15 January 2013, discussion on the articles and amendments of the draft law of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport: "Organization and Functioning Foundation Youth and Lifelong Learning and National Qualifications Agency Certification and Career Guidance and other provisions".

²⁵⁹ Umut Özkırmılı and Sypros Sofos, *Tormented by history: nationalism in Greece and Turkey*, (Columbia Press: Newyork, 2008), p.159

²⁶⁰ Minority Right Groups: Turks and Pomaks, <http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=1533>

As discussed in Chapter 2, Greco-Turkish relations and ‘reciprocity rule’ do not have a direct influence on the political representation of the regarding minorities. However, these minority communities suffer from similar policies of their home-states, regarding their minority rights, especially on education, social, religious and economic rights. This Chapter displayed that in addition to Roum minority’s problems on discrimination, Turkish-Muslim minority also struggle for their ‘identity’ rights, as their Turkish identity has been ignored by the Greek state, and to use ‘Turkish’ was forbidden by law in 1987. Turkish-Muslim deputies avoid to using the word ‘Turkish’ in their parliamentary speeches, where they usually use the name of their province or using the word ‘minority’ in order to mention the regarding community. On the other hand, in the Turkish press, newspapers or articles which belong to minority representatives they prefer to say ‘Turkish minority’ or “Western Thrace Muslim Turkish minority”. In the literature, press and interviews, Turkish-Muslim minority names the same problems that the Greek state ignores to improve. It can be said that there is a common rhetoric among the minority; however the ranking of importance of these problems alters according to the ideology or religiosity of the respondents – minority deputies. This issue will be scrutinized along Chapter 5.

As aforementioned, Greek-Turkish relations do not affect the political life of the minorities, however minorities’ perception of the ‘reciprocity rule’ and ‘Greek-Turkish relations’ have salient differentiation, which I believe, constructs the major difference between them. Chapter 4, will note that Roum community of Istanbul do not like to be compared with Muslim minority of Western Thrace, and they refuse the implementation of the ‘reciprocity rule’, claiming their citizen rights should not be dependent on Greek-Turkish relations. They strongly defend the idea that “they were always in Istanbul, and always will be”. In contrast to Roum community, Muslim-Turkish population at Western Thrace prefers to relate its political life dependent on Greek-Turkish relations. In the newspapers, literature, and in interviews I made I realized that there is a common rhetoric among the community saying “we were left here”, which signified that Turkey is and should be responsible for this minority group. Regarding the great tension between the countries, choosing to base its political choices on being part of Greek-Turkish relations seems irrational, considering the minority in Istanbul has almost disappeared. It should be noted that, the demographic characteristics of the minorities, the political institutions,

their constraints and opportunities, and home-states' approach to their minorities constructs the main differences of this common rhetoric. The rationality of this common rhetoric and comparison of minorities' approach to Greek-Turkish relations will be discussed at the Conclusion Chapter along with the other comparisons.

Political representation of Muslim minority in Greece and of Roum community in Turkey is highly salient not only for trying to find a solution to the problems, and forming a bridge between the community and the state, to open ways for mutual dialogue, but also significant to extend these problems to the national agenda and internationalize them. The following chapters (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) will examine the statements and speeches of the minority deputies in Turkey and Greece respectively in order to analyze the effectiveness of the representatives on the issues concerning the minority community.

CHAPTER 4. POLITICAL REPRESENTATION of GREEK-ORTHODOX MINORITY IN TURKEY

Non-Muslim minorities had participated effectively in Turkish political system until 1961, before the number of Greek-Orthodox community had decreased drastically. Since the foundation of the Turkish Assembly in 1920 and declaration of Turkish Republic in 1923, until the 1935 elections there were no non-Muslim candidates nominated, and the whole non-Muslims were deprived of political representation. The minority communities started to send representatives to the Turkish Parliament in 1935, with the declaration of Mustafa Kemal, and from each minority community, one representative was elected. In 1935-1939 National Assembly, there were one Armenian, one Jewish, one Greek-Orthodox and one Turkish-Orthodox deputy. From 1935-1999, 23 minority deputies served in the Turkish Parliament (8 Greek-Orthodox; 1 Turkish Orthodox; 8 Jewish; 6 Armenian).²⁶¹ Before Turkey's transition to democracy (1946) this number was 6, and all were independent deputies. From 1946-1961, the total number of minority deputies in the Assembly was 12. After 1961 military coup, only one minority deputy from each community participated in the Founding Parliament as the representative of state president (6 January – 25 January 1961). An Armenian deputy served as member of the Republican Senate (15 October 1961- 7 June 1964). Lastly, a Jewish deputy was nominated and elected from DYP (True Path Party) in 1996 national elections. Even though Armenian and Jewish community were not affected with 1964 verdict, it was surprising that they haven't been nominated as deputies and nor elected either. These results show, their non-representation cannot be explained only through numerical deficiency.

As the Turkish Republic is drawn from the Ottoman State, it serves no purpose to attempt an analysis of the legal norms and practices of Republican Turkey without knowledge of the Ottoman Constitution and laws. The fact that non-Muslim communities and especially Greek-Orthodox population were highly represented in Ottoman Parliament makes this analysis more crucial for the purpose of this thesis. This analysis would also support

²⁶¹ See Appendix B "List of Greek-Orthodox Minority Deputies in Turkish Parliament since 1935" & Appendix C "List of non-Muslim Minority Deputies in Turkish Parliament since 1935".

Fredrik Barth's (1969) assumption which claims, "political representation of minorities is not based on minorities' ethnic identity but determined through the political institutions of the society they live in". This assumption also constructs the basis of this work. Therefore in the analysis of the role of Greek-Orthodox deputies in Turkey, before every period, the political developments and political system alternations that concern the representation of minorities will be depicted. The main actors in this study are the Greek-Orthodox deputies who were elected in various times to Turkish Parliament between the period of 1935-1961. Greek Ottoman deputies in 1908 Parliament is also given in order to enrich this comparison, to support the hypotheses of the study stressed on Chapter 1.

This dissertation argues that political participation of minorities are essential for stability of democracy; to convey their expectations, demands and concerns probably, to perceive their 'citizen rights' in 'justice and equality' framework rather than 'a treat to national security'. Moreover, political participation and especially their representation in the Parliament are needed to maintain, protect and improve the cultural, economic and political rights of the minority groups. For this reason, the examination of social-political atmosphere of Turkey, characteristics of minority deputies and their discourses is beneficial to understand whether they were effective to provide these goals. Therefore, this Chapter will begin with analyzing examination of Roum representatives in the regarding periods, where the possible reasons for their mis-representation, representation and non-representation will be discussed. The political history and political system parts given before the discussions on 'political representation' aims to test the macro-factors of political representation –given in Chapter 1- which were the effects of electoral rules, candidate nomination and selection processes, and party competition. Although not included in Karen Bird's work, the thesis emphasizes that 'localism' and 'regime type of the host-state' also matter for the effectiveness of the minority MPs in the national parliament. Depicting the different methods Greek-Orthodox community pursues to express their political demands after 1961 will follow these discussions. Interviews with community's prominent figures Prof. Dr. Yorgos Stephanopoulos (Istefanopulos), Pandeli Laki Vingas and Prof. Dr. Evangelia Şarlak on the current demands of the Roum population will help to falsify the assumption that non-muslim deputies were preferred only for "window dressing". One of the main arguments of the dissertation, whether there is any influence of reciprocity in political field will be questioned through the interview conducted with Turkish politician AKP MP Prof. Dr. Burhan Kuzu.

With a series of historical developments that paved the way for the introduction of a parliamentary life and an account of the first real elections in the Ottoman Empire since 1908, this section also briefly informs on what happened inside the parliament. This part will revolve around some other major discussions that directly concerned the Greek Ottoman deputies and Greek-Orthodox Turkish citizens. The format will be the same in the following sections and in Chapter 5. We will take the discussions in the Chamber of Deputies (and Turkish Grand Parliament after 1920) as our central point that will be extended and enriched by following their projections in the relevant pages of the press of the time. The scope of this study does not allow us to deal with every issue debated in the parliament, though they concerned the Roum community. Therefore, an inevitable need to follow a selective approach emerges.

After presenting a series of historical developments paving the way for the changes in the political system, and narrating the electoral process with all its excitements and quarrels, in the following parts we enter the corridors of the parliament, and the speeches and the debates of the period's deputies are analyzed. The parliaments witnessed many significant debates, all of which are hard to be evaluated in a single study. Therefore, the focus is on the main issues of discord between the Turks and Greeks and issues concerning the Roum community. These issues are changing according to the term: Cretan issue (Crete's decision to unite with Greece), the right to serve in state offices, and community privileges in the 1908 Parliament; Wealth Tax, under-representation in state offices, management of foundations in single party regime; Cyprus issue, 6-7 September 1955 Events, education problems in 1946-1960 Parliamentary term.

4.1 Political Representation of Minorities during Late Ottoman Period (1908-1920)

Benefiting from the relatively liberal atmosphere of the time, Greeks and Turks engaged in revealing discussions both in the Chamber of Deputies and the press. There were different views within the Greek community regarding the position of the Ottoman Empire and the Greeks' status in it.²⁶² Despite the common knowledge and perception of the non-Muslims and non-Turks in Turkish society and in the official history, the

²⁶² Vangelis Kechriotis, "Greek-Orthodox, Ottoman Greeks or Just Greeks? Theories of Coexistence in the Aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution," *Etudes Balkaniques*, no.1, 2005, pp.51-71.

Parliamentarian speeches of the Roum representatives are crucial in order to display the non-monolithic character of the Greeks in the special case of the Greek deputies.²⁶³

The early 20th century is significant in order to understand and analyze the representation character of the minorities, as it was the first time Ottoman Empire adopted constitutional monarchy (Kanun-i Esasi and 1908 constitution), witnessed the emergence of a political party (Committee of Progress and Union/CUP), its competition with the opposition parties (Ottoman Liberal Party, People's Party, New Party, Ottoman Socialist Party and later they all united against CUP under the umbrella of Freedom and Understanding Party)²⁶⁴, and later CUP's transformation into a dictatorship.

Here, the analysis of 1908 Parliament is crucial in supporting the argument of this thesis which is 'the representation of minority groups (Greek-Orthodox community of Turkey for this study) is constructed regarding the institutions of the society they are living in'. As the political history and political system of Turkey evolved and changes, so did the representation of its minorities. That is to say while the parliamentary debates of Greek-Ottoman deputies of the 1908 Ottoman Parliament became more pronounced on Cretan issue; the subject that Greek-Orthodox deputies of Turkish Parliament in 1950s debated was the Cyprus problem. That's why in order to support the thesis' main argument and give a more reasonable picture to understand the opportunities and constraints of the Roum deputies of the periods, before analyzing the Parliamentary speeches and actions of the representatives, the political history and the political system of the related periods will be briefly given as the background.

4.1.1 Political History of late Ottoman Period

Starting from the early 19th century, in the face of spreading nationalism (first the Greeks and then the Serbs and Romanians) and the attacks of European powers, the Ottomans had become helpless. Finally, in 1826, the traditional Janissary Corps was abolished and a better-trained corps was created in its place. The navy, too, was restored. Efforts were made to create a new bureaucracy along Western lines; bureaucrats were offered

²⁶³ Uğur Peçe, Greek Ottomans in the 1908 Parliament, Unpublished Master Thesis, Sabancı University, 2007. Vangelis, Kechriotis, "Greek-Orthodox, Ottoman Greeks or Just Greeks? Theories of Coexistence in the Aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution," *Etudes Balkaniques*, no.1, 2005, pp.51-71.

²⁶⁴ Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası (1908), Ahali Fırkası (1909), Hizb-i Cedid (1910), Osmanlı Sosyalist Partisi (1910); Hürriyet ve İtilaf Partisi (1911) respectively.

education in French and other secular subjects. Steps were taken to centralize the system of taxation. The bureaucrats, in particular the “French speakers,” dominated the Tanzimat (Reform) Period, which started with the Imperial Rescript of Gülhane in 1839, continued with the Reform Decree of 1856 (Hatt-ı Hümayun), and lasted until 1876²⁶⁵.

The Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856 was promulgated following the Crimean War. An important motivation behind this decree was to undermine the Russian claims to the right of protector of the Orthodox population in the Ottoman Empire, a claim qualifying as one of the reasons for the Crimean War and other earlier troubles with Russia as well.²⁶⁶ The Rescript and reform measures that followed combined old and new, both in governmental structure and thought patterns. No radical reform was accomplished, but old habits were seriously shaken, paving the way for more comprehensive reforms during the next century.²⁶⁷ During the second half of the 19th century, the Greeks were no longer particularly influential; rather they were more and more economically active. The Hatt-ı Hümayun also ensured the principle of representation for all the religious communities of the empire. Just three months after it was promulgated, the first Christian representatives were appointed to the high judicial council in Constantinople.²⁶⁸ This trend was culminated in the declaration of the Kanun-ı Esasi in 1876, which officially proclaimed every Ottoman subject equal in rights and duties.²⁶⁹ In 1876, Sultan Abdulhamid II ratified the first Ottoman constitution, but the parliament that it gave birth to was short lived. As in 1877, Abdulhamid II abolished the constitution and every trace of political freedom.

Although it did not last long and even implemented, 1876 constitution was a document of primary significance for permitting the establishment of the first Turkish Parliament and enabling the political representation of non-Muslims, which is the primary focus of the this study. The most prominent figure in the old Young Ottomans movement, Namık Kemal, was one of the members of the drafting commission, which also included six non-

²⁶⁵ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004), pp.66-70.

²⁶⁶ For an illuminative account of the challenges that the nineteenth century Ottoman reformer found himself in and accelerating pace of the history, see İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En uzun Yüzyılı*, [The Longest Century of the Empire], (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001).

²⁶⁷ Metin Heper and Nur B. Criss, *Historical Dictionary of Turkey* (Historical Dictionaries of Europe), (2009), p. 68.

²⁶⁸ Thanos M. Veremis, *Greeks and Turks in War and Peace*,

²⁶⁹ Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*, (Syracuse University Press, 2000).

Muslim members while Mithat Pasha was the head of the commission.²⁷⁰ The document declared every subject of the Sultan as Ottoman whatever the creed or nationality he was of. The clause important for the establishment of representational institutions was the Article 42 which stipulated a Parliament (Meclis-i Umumi) divided into two houses: a Chamber of Deputies (Meclis-i Mebusan) and a Chamber of Notables (Meclis-i Ayan). Article 65 specifies the election of each deputy by fifty thousand males²⁷¹, the Article 69 sets the term of the parliament at four years, and the Article 67 says the representatives must speak Turkish and the Article 71 states that each deputy will represent not only his own constituency but the whole country.²⁷² Even though the Parliament was abolished by Abdülhamid II (he has the power to do this without any judicial process according to Article 113)²⁷³, after three decades, it is seen that the 1908 constitution and the structure of the 1908 parliament would encompass similar principles.

In June 1908, the Young Turks made their appearance in Macedonia in the form of a coup by the officers of the third Ottoman army; the nationalistic Young Turks took over power and sent Abdulhamid II an ultimatum, asking him to restore the constitution within 24 hours. Sultan recognized the validity of the constitution in July 1908. The news of this victory (also called as Revolution) by the Young Turks was received enthusiastically by all of Macedonia's ethnic groups (Greeks, Bulgars, Armenians and Turks).²⁷⁴

Both Karpat²⁷⁵ and Ahmad²⁷⁶ argue that Christians' political demands had shaped the context in which the Young Turk leaders eventually began to portray themselves as the

²⁷⁰ Bülent Tanör, *Osmanlı- Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri (1789-1980)*, (Istanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1996), p.119.

²⁷¹ The voters had to be male, who spoke Turkish, Ottoman citizen, who also paid tax to the state. These features of voters are similar to those of Ancient Greece, and in late 19th century were common in the majority of European countries.

²⁷² Şeref Gözübüyük, and Suna Kili, *Türk Anayasa Metinleri, 1839-1980*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1982), pp. 27-42.

²⁷³ *Ibid.* p.33.

²⁷⁴ The proclamation of the constitutional rule was celebrated with great enthusiasm all over the Empire. It was Enver Bey, who emerged as one of the "heroes of liberty" and delivered a speech to the cheering people in Salonica: "Citizens! I am grateful for your affection towards my person. I did not do enough to deserve it. I was only lucky that this duty, which every Ottoman would love to undertake, was given to me. If I could do my job properly this would be the best reward for me. Thanks God, we have restored the constitution. We obtained our liberty. However, we should not think that our task is over. The tougher part begins now. In order to further this first step we taken on the path to progress, we should work harder and be more careful. From now on, all the citizens, Muslim or non-Muslim, work hand in hand and make our fatherland rise. Long live the nation, long lives the fatherland!"

²⁷⁵ Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, New York: Oxford Press, 2001, p.326.

friends of the most oppressed and underdeveloped group- the Turks, the last ethnic group to discover its ethnicity. However, the short comparison of the Ottoman Parliaments at the early 20th century indicates that forming an Ottoman state with Turkish elements was always in the mind of the CUP's high ranks.

4.1.2 Political System of Late Ottoman Period

Before scrutinizing the Parliamentary structure, it is important to briefly mention on CUP that shaped and later dominated the Ottoman political system during late 19th- early 20th centuries. The similarities between the Committee of Progress and Union (CUP) of Ottoman Empire and People's Republican Party (CHP) in terms of organization, and governance are important to understand the political system of Turkey and minorities' political representation. Here a short comparison is made in order to portrey how the minority deputies act in the existence of a single-party regime. A detailed comparison would be beneficial to understand Turkish politics; however such a work is not within the scope of this thesis. On the other hand, this study enables us to compare how Greek-Ottoman deputies acted under CUP's existence and how Greek-Turkish deputies acted under RPP's single-party rule, whether there were similarities or differences. Moreover, in Chapter 5 "Political Representation of Muslim-Turkish Minority in Western Thrace" would help to extend this comparison, which shows minorities had a similar path of political representation under similar political constraints no matter which ethnic identity they belonged to. This support the arguement of this work derived from Fredrik Barth's theory: the political representation of minorities are determined by the internal institutions of the society they live in.

Committee of Progress and Union

Committee of Progress and Union is one of the primary actors of the early 20th century Ottoman political history and political system. The first organized opposition within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire emerged in September 1906 when a group of young bureaucrats and army officers, most of whom had joined the CUP before 1896, formed the Ottoman Freedom Society (*Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti*) in Salonica. Mehmet Talat Bey, a postal officer, who had been exiled from Edirne to Salonica on the grounds of

²⁷⁶ Feroz Ahmad, "Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914", in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, New York: 1982, pp.402-409.

being a CUP member, led this group. This new association organized itself very efficiently in Macedonia. The group in Salonica contacted the émigrés in Paris in 1907. The Ottoman Freedom Society merged with Ahmed Rıza's group under the title of CUP and the center of the Ottoman opposition shifted from Paris to Salonica.

In the meantime, the CUP in just one year increased the number of its supporters with a rapid organization and became a truly revolutionary organization. It established a network with branches in 75 Balkan towns, Istanbul and, albeit less successfully, in Anatolia. Through successful propaganda, they recruited individuals –especially army officers- who were ready to sacrifice themselves for the cause. Assassinations were encouraged if the person in question was deemed dangerous for the Committee.²⁷⁷

Facing the German threat, Russia and Britain were getting closer to each other²⁷⁸ and trying to solve their mutual problems, one of which was related to Macedonia, the CUP decided to increase their influence on this strategic territory. When the rumors that Russia and Britain had agreed on the partition of the Ottoman Empire arrived at Salonica, the CUP decided that it was time for action. Finally, in July 1908 a group of Unionist officers led by Resneli Niyazi Bey and Enver Bey organized their troops and demanded the restoration of the constitutional rule. It was an outright rebellion and Sultan Abdülhamid first tried to suppress it, only to see that the officers and troops were refusing to fight their comrades. There was no way out for the Sultan but to accept the CUP's demands. On the night of July 23, 1908, the constitution - known as the *Kanun-u Esasi-* was restored, thirty years after Abdülhamid had annulled it.

²⁷⁷ Şükrü Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük*, (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 1989).

The CUP also had its rituals; new members were introduced blindfold, with one hand on the holy book of the candidate's religion, and the other on a revolver or an Ottoman flag. The organization also had a coat of arms, which is described by Şükrü Hanioglu as follows: "On top rested the constitution in the form of a book under a shining sun. Pennants reading 'pen' and 'weapon' hung from spears flanking the right and left sides respectively. From beneath each spear jutted a canon. Unlike the canon of the Ottoman imperial coat of arms, this pair of cannons was being fired, symbolizing ideological dynamism. In the centre stood a large upturned crescent reading 'fraternity, freedom, equality'. The word 'justice' hung above the middle of the crescent. Below the crescent snaked a ribbon emblazoned 'Ottoman Committee of Progress and Union', while at the bottom of the coat of arms, below the ribbon, two clasped hands symbolized mutual understanding among the Ottoman peoples."

²⁷⁸ In June 1908, Tsar Nicholas met King Edward VII in the Baltic town of Reval (current-day Tallinn).

First Elections of Ottoman Empire: Comparison of 1877 and 1908 Ottoman Parliaments

The election for the first Ottoman Parliament (19 March 1877) had been held without an electoral law. Instead, the provisional electoral regulations that laid down the election of deputies by administrative councils in the provinces had been observed. The Porte specified the number of delegates from each province and the governors determined the non-Muslim-Muslim ratio (similar to Mustafa Kemal's decision for determining the number of non-Muslim deputies in 1935 elections). The proportion of non-Muslim deputies in the first Ottoman Parliament was more than one third of the total (47/119). The parliament's particular aspect of including many diverse Ottoman elements under its roof is interpreted by Shaw as "a truly Ottoman institution".²⁷⁹ However, the Russian-Turkish War which broke-out the same year caused this institution to live short.

After the restoration of the Kanun-ı Esasi the next step was to hold elections that would start the parliamentary life in the Ottoman Empire after a delay of three decades. Within the 12 years of the second period of the constitutional monarchy 1908 to 1920, four national elections (1908; 1912; 1914; 1919 had been held (five if we include 1911 by-election)²⁸⁰. All these parliaments have common features, such as bi-cameralism; similar number of Muslim and non-Muslim deputies; and each deputy obligated to represent not only his own constituency but also all the country. Although 'Ottomanism' had been the common idea that sustained by the whole ethnic groups, in specific issues that concerns the minority communities (such as Roum in Cretan issue; Armenians for Armenians' interests; and Albanians in Albania events), it was observed that the first reactions had been given by the regarding deputies.²⁸¹

In all the assemblies from 1877-1920, there was significant number of non-Muslim, as Roum deputies in the Ottoman Parliament, whose representation ended with 1920 Turkish National Assembly in which none of the minority communities took a seat.

²⁷⁹ Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. II, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p.182.

²⁸⁰ The by-election was held when Rifat Pasha who is the Minister of Foreign Affairs and deputy of Istanbul was appointed as the Ambassador to London. On the other hand, the by-deputy was elected from the Freedom and Understanding Party against the CUP, which increased the political tension between these two parties, and CUP increased its political oppression.

²⁸¹ Roderic H. Davison, "The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire," in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, eds., *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The nineteenth century*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968, p.101).

Chronologically the ratio of Muslim and non-Muslim minorities and their distribution among the ethnic groups are given below²⁸²:

1. 1877-1878 Ottoman Parliament: Among 119 Representatives, 47 are non-Muslim and 72 are Muslim deputies.

2. 1908-1912 Ottoman Parliament: Out of 288, there were 147 Turks, 60 Arabs, 27 Albanians, 24 Greeks, 14 Armenians, 10 Slavs and 4 Jews.

3. 1912 April-August Ottoman Parliament: Out of 316, 247 were Muslim and 69 were non-Muslim. There were 175 Turks, 51 Arabs, 16 Albanians, 36 Greeks, 19 Armenians, 4 Jews, 5 Kurds, 1 Assyrian, and 9 Slavs.

4. 1914-1918 Ottoman Parliament: Out of 48; 32 were Muslims and 16 were non-Muslims. Circassian Ahmet killed 2 Armenian deputies in 1915.

5. 1920-1923 Turkish National Assembly: In the Parliament where Turkish deputies held the majority, there were no non-Muslim representatives.

Because Parliament of 1912 was under the political oppression of CUP – called as election with stick/ ‘*sopalı seçim*’-and lasted for only 3 months, and because other parliaments were again deprived of an independent atmosphere, in this part the thesis focuses only on the 1908 elections and composition of the Parliament, following the comparison of 1877 and 1908 Ottoman assemblies.

In the two Parliaments of the late Ottoman period (1877 and 1908), we observe a similar parliamentary structure. The Parliamentary life in the Ottoman Empire was composed of two different bodies. One was the Chamber of Notables (Meclis-i Ayan) and the other was the Chamber of Deputies (Meclis-i Mebusan). Because the Chamber of Deputies had more extensive power, and a representative character, as its members were elected not appointed, and witnessed more significant and revealing discussion as compared to the other chamber, here only the representatives in the Chamber of Deputies (and mostly in 1908 Assembly) will be part of this thesis. Moreover, the Greek Ottoman deputies will not be analyzed in detail as the Greek deputies of Republican Period (1935-1961), their occupations, place of birth will not be given here, and only their common actions towards an issue that concerns their own community will be examined.

²⁸² Ibid. pp. 103-105.

1908 Election in the late Ottoman period was more significant compared to the others because the electoral law was applied; the parliament that emerged out of the 1908 elections was different from the first Ottoman Parliament of 1877. The elections for the latter had been held without an electoral law, while the law drafted in the first Ottoman Parliament was taken as the basis for the 1908 elections. In the first parliament there were some provinces that were not represented, whereas all the Ottoman provinces were more or less represented by sending deputies to the assembly in 1908. After 30 years of suppression by the Sultanate, the 1908 election was such a joy in the country that it was celebrated by the Ottoman public in a celebration called the election-festivity (*seçim alayı*).

The total number of deputies in the Chamber of Deputies formed in 1908 was more than double of that first parliament. The number of deputies increased from 119 to 288 in 1908 Ottoman Parliament. However, this numerical change did not materialize with regard to the Muslim and non-Muslim ratio. While in the first Ottoman parliament 40% of the Chamber of Deputies was composed of non-Muslim deputies, this ratio was smaller in the Ottoman parliament of 1908 in which it was reduced to 18 % (53/288).

4.1.3 The Greek Ottoman Deputies in the 1908 Parliament (1908-1912)

Here the structure of the parliament, actions and speeches of the Greek-Ottoman deputies on the issues directly concerning the Roum community will be depicted, which are also enriched by relevant pages of the press of the time.

According to the data provided by Ahmad and Rustow a total of 288 deputies entered the Ottoman parliament in 1908. Out of 288, there were 147 Turks, 60 Arabs, 27 Albanians, 24 Greeks, 14 Armenians, 10 Slavs and 4 Jews.²⁸³ Even if we only take the Turkish deputies, we will see that they formed 51% of the assembly. A much higher percentage that we would get with the inclusion of Arabs and Albanians, the great majority of them were Muslim. The shrinking boundaries of the Ottoman Empire at the expense of the Christian element (Slavs and Vlachs) with the defeat against the Russians in the 1877-78 War is quite decisive though not sufficient by itself to account for this new balance. One

²⁸³ Feroz Ahmad, and Dankwart A. Rustow, "İkinci Meşrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918," *Güneydoğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi*, No. 4-5, 1976, p. 247.

has to take into account also the changing political dynamics with the coming of the CUP, which was certainly favoring the Turkish element. Although in the official history it is said that the Armenian, Greek, Bulgarian Ottoman citizens had formed a front against the CUP by making an alliance against the Muslim majority, it is stated by the Turkish press of the period (Tanin) that some Greek deputies were on the Unionist's side, indicating the non-monolithic characteristic of the Greek community who were accused of desiring a great Hellenic state.²⁸⁴

Generally, issues brought to the Parliamentary agenda by the Greek-Ottoman deputies were relevant to the concerns of the Greek-Orthodox community of Ottoman Empire: the *bedel-i askeri* tax; the electoral system; religion; the length of military service and education. One of the major aspects of the Tanzimat era was that it witnessed important legal developments that introduced the employment of the non-Muslims in the state services. With such notable positions as ambassador, administrator, senator and minister, Greeks, and other non-Muslims, started to be visible in the Ottoman government and bureaucracy.²⁸⁵ For instance after the establishment of an independent Greek state, the Ottoman State did not hesitate to appoint Fotiadi Bey to Athens where he served as ambassador during the Cretan crisis and he departed from Athens in protest against Greece's policy regarding the island. Musurus Pasha's importance, however, emerged from the fact that he represented Istanbul at one of the most critical diplomatic posts in Europe, as ambassador to London for thirty five years (1851-91). Another influential figure was Alexander Karateodoris (1833-1906) who was appointed as ambassador to Rome in 1874 and he was one of the representatives of the Ottoman Empire in the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Following the congress he even occupied the position of Foreign Minister for a brief period.²⁸⁶

However, regarding the Articles of the constitution declaring equality among the Ottoman

²⁸⁴ Uğur Peçe, *Greek Ottomans in the 1908 Parliament*, Unpublished Master Thesis, Sabancı University, 2007, p. 59. "Rum Mebusları" (The Greek Deputies), Tanin, 5 Tesrin-i Sami 1326/18 November 1910. The formation of a Greek party during this time is another proof to the non-monolithic structure of the group of the Greek deputies.

²⁸⁵ Higher representation for the non-Muslims thanks to two principles of the revolution, namely equality and justice. It was reasonable and natural because the July Revolution of 1908 had restored the *Kanun-ı Esasi* which explicitly stipulated that "All the Ottomans are equal in rights and duties before the law" (Article 17) and "Civil servants are assigned to appropriate posts in accordance with merit and capability, irrespective of creed or ethnicity" (Article 19). Gözübüyük & Kili, *ibid.*, p. 29.

²⁸⁶ Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918-1974*, Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies, 1922, pp. 27-30.

citizens, underrepresentation of Greeks at governmental posts was also questioned in the Greek Ottoman press of the time and by the Greek deputies with strong voices. According to Neologos (New Word), it was difficult to say that the relevant articles of the Kanun-ı Esasi were being observed in the employment of civil servants. According to the total figures given by Neologos, among 31 governors (*vali*), 98 district governors (*mutasarrıf*) and 547 provincial district governors (*kaymakam*), there were only 10 Greeks serving as *kaymakams*.²⁸⁷ Tanin answers these claims noting “a different case of the Armenians who are more numerously represented at government posts, due to their good level of Turkish and their familiarity with Turkish customs”. Whereas there was no Armenian who did speak Turkish, “there are many Greeks who regrettably mistake Turkish for Chinese”.²⁸⁸

Although the Tanzimat reforms were successful in introducing the principle of equality in many respects, the most obvious area where it failed was in the introduction of universal military service.²⁸⁹ The major non-Muslim religious groups in the empire were the Greek Orthodox, Gregorian Armenian, and Jews. Non-Muslims did not serve in the army; instead, they paid a special head-tax (*cizye*). Non-Muslim religious communities, or millets, were essentially administered through their lay heads and clergy, who had authority concerning not only church administration, worship, education, and charity but also supervision of the civil status of their coreligionists.²⁹⁰

Cretan question which had both internal and external aspects was also one of the main concerns of the Greek-Ottoman deputies and the Ottoman Parliament at that time. The crisis starting with Crete’s unilateral decision to unite with Greece on 6 October 1908, although not formally approved by the latter, kept the political atmosphere uneasy and tense for four years.²⁹¹ The way the Ottoman Parliament handled the Cretan crisis is significant to compare with the Republican period Turkish Parliament as in the following sections we will see, during 1950s the Turkish Parliament would go through a similar tense political atmosphere when the Cyprus crisis erupted. Similar to the Cyprus issue of

²⁸⁷ Uğur Peçe, Unpublished Master Thesis, Sabancı University, 2007, p.57.

²⁸⁸ Ibid. p.58. The Kanun-ı Esasi makes it very clear that the knowledge of Turkish is compulsory for any government employment (Article 18) though it does not specify anything with respect to the obligation of being familiar with the Turkish customs.

²⁸⁹ Ibid. Uğur Peçe, 2007, p.74-100.

²⁹⁰ Metin Heper and Nur B. Criss, *Historical Dictionary of Turkey*, Third Edition. (Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow, 2009), p.75.

²⁹¹ For an account of the Cretan crisis till 1908, see Ayşe Nühket Adıyeke, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Girit Bunalımı (1896-1908)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2000).

1950s, Crete's unilateral claim to unite with Greece was more traumatic compared to other land losses of the Empire such as Bosnia-Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary at that period, because emotional ties with the island were strong. The Ottoman forces had taken great pains to capture the island from the Venetians, after perhaps the longest siege in the military history that lasted twenty one years from 1648 to 1669. Also similar to Cyprus, Crete had a remarkable strategic importance. The Ottomans had lost Cyprus to the British three decades before and now Crete was the last port in the Eastern Mediterranean where the Ottoman state had some sovereign rights guaranteed by the Great Powers.²⁹²

Upon the developments, the Greek Ottoman press – namely *Proodos*- which chose the title The Cretan question occupied a special place among other issues discussed in the parliament because it, in a sense, carried a potential of testing the Greek Ottoman's allegiance in the presence of this crisis. Unlike the Armenians or Jews, the case of the Greek Ottomans was different as there was an independent neighboring state with which they could theoretically identify themselves with respect to race and religion. For this reason, it was an incident where internal and external spheres intersected.

Uğur Peçe's study points to the different reactions among different towns the Greek Ottoman community of the Empire settled and the Greek Ottoman deputies. For instance a telegram from Balıkesir which was written in the name of the Greeks of the town asserted that "Following the demonstration organized in Balıkesir, the loyal Greek community declares its willingness to die for the country with all the other Ottomans, in case the sovereign rights of the Ottomans in Crete are violated"²⁹³. Peçe highlights Cahid's early writings regarding the question of dominant nation²⁹⁴ and such parts from provocative reporting of the Greek Ottoman press would render the Greek deputies in a difficult position in the Ottoman Parliament. The Greek MPs would feel obliged to make an explanation and convince the others of their Ottomanness (we will see similar expectations from the Greek deputies in the Turkish Grand Parliament in the following sections). However, Greek deputies who were expected to prove their allegiance to the

²⁹² Ibid. p. 55.

²⁹³ Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi (MMZC- Minutes of the Ottoman Parliament), p. 80 (17 Kanun-ı Sami 1324 /30 January 1909); Uğur Peçe, 2007, p. 54.

²⁹⁴ Hüseyin Cahid asks "Let us suppose that the issue of the annexation of Crete by Greece comes to the agenda and the Greeks hold an absolute majority in the Ottoman Parliament. How many Greek deputies who will not disapprove this move and not even offer to forsake some territory around Ioannina could someone expect to find?"

Ottoman State remained silent to the issue, while Muslim deputies from various places were taking their turns to deliver patriotic speeches from the floor of the parliament. As a small minority in the parliament, the Greeks did not propose anything that could disrupt the *status quo* in the island. A deputy from Salonika, Artas Yorgaki, expressed that he shared the views articulated in the telegrams and asked the government to give an ear to the public opinion.²⁹⁵

Although a great deal of show and calls for war was continuing at full speed on the part of the Unionist press, the government was reluctant to undertake a military action. A commercial war was found more feasible. The boycott movement against Greece first started in 1909 when the Ottoman porters refused to unload the Greek goods²⁹⁶. A Greek deputy for Serfidje, Boussios' argued that the government did not grasp the real nature of the problem and with the aim of punishing Greece; it supported the boycott although this caused much damage as far as the Greek Ottoman community was concerned. He added Greece with a population of around 2,5 million people could not pose any threat to the Ottoman Empire, where the population of people belonging to the same race was almost double. İzmir deputy Carolidis made similar comments and asked to develop friendly relations with Greece, as the responsible forces behind the Cretan problem were Crete and the Great Powers.

In conclusion, we saw that the 1908 elections and the parliament that followed radically differed from the constitutional experience of 1877-78. First of all, the 1908 elections signified the real beginning of parliamentary life in Turkey in spite of all its shortcomings. It was with the 1908 elections that for the first time people throughout the country elected, in two stages, those who would represent them at the chamber. Again, it was with the 1908 Ottoman Parliament that non-Muslim and Greek Ottoman deputies were elected and represented their own communities. After a long period of autocracy characterized by a heavy censorship of the press and limitation of political freedoms, people were indeed thirsty for the word liberty and they ascribed an air of festivity and celebration to the electoral process.

²⁹⁵Uğur, Peçe, p. 55.

²⁹⁶“Yunan Aleyhine Türkiye Boykotu” (Turkish Boycott against Greece), *Tanin*, 28 May 1326 /10 June 1910. From Uğur Peçe’s work, p. 55.

The reduction in the number of Muslim/non-Muslim ratio can be interpreted by different perspectives. This numerical change indicates that the CUP saw the elections as a struggle that should never be lost to the non-Turks of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish element was the dominant nation and therefore it could never jeopardize its position by accepting the Greek's demands for proportional representation. The CUP's understanding of equality was based on the acceptance of the non-Muslim's active participation in the political arena on condition that the Turks would never abandon the leads of the state mechanism. The state would always remain as a Turkish state although non-Turks would be given extensive political rights provided that they recognize the Turkish character of the state. However, in their approach to the non-Muslims, the CUP chose to maintain a patronizing attitude, which we would also observe in the approach of PRP to the non-Muslims during the early Republican years. On the other hand, what the Greeks of Istanbul – and later Greek-Orthodox of Turkey- demanded was the preservation and the strengthening of the state only through granting a real political equality to the Greeks, and other non-Turks as well.

The main stance of the Greek deputies was assessed under three headings. In the Cretan question we saw that the Greek Ottomans 'successfully' passed the 'test' they were subject to.²⁹⁷ The question of Crete's union with Greece was potentially very contentious as it involved the Greek Ottoman deputies who had been looked down on with suspicion as to where their true allegiance laid. However, as we have seen, during the parliamentary discussions the Greek deputies tried to emphasize the importance of appreciating the real nature of the problem. The second topic elaborated was on the employment in government. The core of the debate was that the Greeks were heavily under-represented at government posts. This under-representation was a fact impossible to be denied by anyone; however the reasons for this phenomenon were open to discussion. The last concern of the Greek Ottoman society and the deputies was about the community "privileges" as it arose in the area of community education- as we will also see after the adoption of 1926 Turkish Civil Code-. It was the most challenging topic between the Phanar and the CUP. In the New Turkey no privileges were to be tolerated. While bringing equality in terms of representation, they were also strict in abolishing the internal allowances granted to the non-Muslim communities through centuries.

²⁹⁷ Uğur, Peçe, p. 57.

A lively political era followed; however, the CUP dominated the political scene, particularly after the April 1912 elections. Despite the great success of the revolution and the victory in elections, CUP faced two kinds of opposition during 1908 and the first half of 1909. The first one was from the Ottoman Liberal Party, which was supported by the Grand Vizier Kamil Paşa. The CUP managed to oust Kamil Paşa and replace him with a sympathizer, Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa. On April 6, 1909, the chief editor of one of the opposition newspapers was murdered. A year later, the committee turned into a party. In 1914, the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the German side. The eventual defeat of the Ottoman armies destroyed the CUP government. The war, on the other hand, served to further reinforce Turkish national sentiment.

In terms of political representation of non-Muslim minorities, despite the political turmoil and acceleration of Turkishness policy, late Ottoman period has been signified as the golden years, where they were fully represented numerically in the Parliament, and hold important positions in state offices.

4.2 Years of Non-Representation (1920-1935)

The early years of the 20th century brought new and important political developments for Turkish history including the end of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the new Turkish Republic; elimination of the ‘millet system’, Westernization and nationalization policies, foundation of opposition parties and closing of them by the single-party People’s Republican Party (RPP). Among them the most important political event concerning the Greek-Orthodox minority of Turkey were the Independence War of Turkey against Greece and the Lausanne Treaty that was signed after Turkey’s military victory that leads to the population exchange. The good terms between Greece and Turkey constructed latter with the 1930 Friendship Treaty and 1933 Ankara Agreement that put an end to the mistrust poisoning the two countries, and opened the way for Roum community to participate in the political sphere again.

The first decade of the Republic is also significant for the study of this thesis, as for the first time non-Muslim minorities were excluded from the political sphere, where on the contrary it was the first time Muslim-Turkish representatives were elected to the Greek Parliament. In the 1920, there were no non-Muslim minorities in the Turkish National

Assembly. The 1915 events in which a mass population of Armenians was killed or deported, Independence War against the Great Powers and especially against Greece can be given as the reasons to explain this. The first Turkish Parliament consisted of mainly Turkish representatives.²⁹⁸ Serbian, Bulgarian and Macedonians representatives that we witnessed in the Ottoman Parliament again did not participate due to the loss of the lands at the Balkans. Similarly, Arabs and Albanians were left out of the Ottoman territory. Moreover, non-Muslim communities boycotted the 1920 election.

4.2.1 Political History

Independence War (Asia Minor Catastrophe for Greeks)

The landing of Greek forces in Smyrna and the Treaty of Serves is considered the death certificate of the Ottoman Empire and the birth certificate of modern Turkey. The Turks, impoverished and exhausted by successive wars, could not count on assistance from either their defeated allies, or their victorious opponents. In March 1920, the secret contacts between Istanbul and the Ankara nationalists caused the intervention and occupation of the capital by allied troops and led to the complete control of the state services by the Allies. On 23 April 1920, the Grand National Assembly declared that Mustafa Kemal was elected president, thus bringing down the official government of the land. Following Greek's defeats on 1921, the Greeks responded with a desperate attempt to seize Istanbul with the intention of using it as leverage for putting pressure on Mustafa Kemal, an operation that weakened the Greek defence line and brought closer the Turkish victory in August 1922. Within a few weeks, the fate of the Greeks in Asia Minor was sealed.²⁹⁹ On 3 January 1923 Greece and Turkey signed the treaty in Lausanne that recognized Turkish Republic and provided for the compulsory exchange of populations between the two countries.³⁰⁰

While guaranteeing the religious and cultural rights of the non-Muslim community, right after the Lausanne Treaty, in 1923 Turkish State established a state controlled "Turkish Orthodox" church, which continuously exerted violence against the Ecumenical Patriarchate. "Turkish Orthodox Church" has not been recognized by any other Christian Church, does not have believers but also is not administered according to the principles

²⁹⁸ Stanford Shaw and Ezel Shaw, 1997, Vol. II, p. 170.

²⁹⁹ Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 356.

³⁰⁰ For the details of the Lausanne treaty see Chapter 2.

that all the other Orthodox Churches function. Essentially this entity has been managed for 85 years period by a family, members of which in the past have admitted that they collaborate with the secret services of the State.³⁰¹

Republican Reforms: End of Millet System?

The first decade of the Republic was characterized by radical social and cultural change. The principal objective was secularization of polity and society. On 3 March 1924, the Caliphate was abolished; the closing down of religious schools and courts followed this move. The Republican People's Party (RPP) was instrumental in carrying out the reforms, including the adoption of law codes from different European countries and the Latin alphabet. In 1924 and 1930, experiments were made in multiparty political regimes—though both turned out to be short-lived: The Progressive Republican Party established in 1924 and the Republican Free Party formed in 1930 were seen by the regime as obstacles to Westernization and shortly thereafter closed. The regime adopted republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and reformism as its basic aims. In foreign relations, the regime's motto was "peace at home, peace abroad"; by the 1930s, Turkey had friendly relations with all its neighbors.

Ayhan Aktar analyzes some of the "Turkification"³⁰² policies, which were implemented during the early years of the Republic. By "Turkification" policies Aktar means the way in which Turkish ethnic identity has been strictly imposed as a hegemonic identity in every sphere of social life, from the language spoken in public to the teaching of history in public schools; from education to industry; from commercial practices to public employment policies; from the civil code to the re-settlement of certain citizens in particular areas. The preconditions of the implementation of Turkification policies can be summarized as follows: the emergence of Turkish nationalism as a well-structured political ideology, the recognition of this ideology by the great majority of the political elite in power, and the existence of an international political conjuncture favorable to the implementation of these policies domestically.

³⁰¹ Patriarchate Report on Minority Rights of Greek-Orthodox in Istanbul.

³⁰² Ayhan Aktar, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Uygulanan 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları", *Tarih ve Toplum*, No: 156, 1996, pp.4-18.

The non-Muslim minorities who had been living in Anatolia for centuries under the protective umbrella of the Ottoman regime and keeping their own religious and ethnic identities intact were logically included in the category of “others”. According to the Kemalists’ conception of nationalism, in order to extend the scope of the category of “us,” every person living in the country was declared to be a Turk. However, when this could not be implemented for structural reasons in the cases of non-Muslim minorities, the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey were in practice discriminated against and classified as “minorities” or “foreigners.”³⁰³

The “problem of minorities” came to the fore once again in 1923, when the victorious commanders of Ankara were laying the foundation of the new Turkish state in Lausanne. During closed sessions held in the Turkish Parliament, which had assembled on January 1, 1923, the following juridical principles were established: All Turkish citizens, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, were to be placed under the same judicial system. And for non-Muslim citizens, all procedures having to do with private law, like marriage, divorce, legal origin of children, alimony, etc., were to be taken away from the churches and placed under the jurisdiction of the Turkish administrative system, thus making them subject to Turkish courts rather than community courts. By enacting the Civil Code on February 1926, the Ankara government eliminated the most significant problem of the community-based social system of the preceding Ottoman *ancien régime*. In this way, it both broke the traditional resistance of non-Muslim communities by making them subject to a secular system that was under its complete control, thus turning non-Muslim minorities into Turks from a legal point view, while also adopting the role of protector of non-Muslims, consequently annulling the influence of the Great Powers, which had been interfering in Turkey’s affairs.

Just before the Civil Code went into effect, the minority representatives—who thought that, thanks to Article 42³⁰⁴ of the Lausanne Treaty, their rights had been guaranteed—were pressured by the government and, as a result of said pressure³⁰⁵, assembled their

³⁰³ Because discrimination in terms of religion continued in Republican period despite the modern and secular reforms, there are also scholars claiming “millet system” has not been eliminated. See Ayhan Kaya, *Europeanization and Tolerance in Turkey: Myth of Toleration (Identities and Modernities in Europe)*, (Palgrave MacMillan, 2013).

³⁰⁴ Appendix A: Lausanne Treaty- Articles on Protection of Minority.

³⁰⁵ Aktar says “The Greek community resisted for a while, but sub-committees that were supposed to “generate recommendations” were continuously being formed. At times, some members of the sub-

Community Councils and declared that they renounced all the rights bestowed upon them at Lausanne.

Employment in the Public Sector: Turkification of Capital and Labor

As aforementioned in the previous section “Greek-Ottoman Deputies in the Ottoman Parliament”, non-Muslims educated in modern schools established throughout the empire began to find more and more employment opportunities in the Ottoman bureaucracy, both central and provincial. For example, if we look at the numbers provided by Carter Findley on the basis of the employment records for the Ottoman Foreign Ministry for the years 1850–1908, we see that in that period, minorities comprised around one third (29%) of all career officials.³⁰⁶

In the Republican period, we see that the concerns of the non-Muslim citizens on their occupation at the state offices continue. In the Ottoman period, the reason for the few appointment of the Greek as state officers were explained due to their problems in using Turkish. As Ayhan Aktar displays, in the republican period, the discriminative case that non-Muslims were deprived from the state officers became an official state policy. The foreign companies were warned by numerous orders and decisions by the police of municipal authorities, which were never put in writing, to force foreign firms of all kinds, whether shops, banks etc. to employ at least 75 per cent Muslim Turks in their staff. On the other hand, this state policy was contrary to the Turkish Constitution, according to which Article 88 says “in Turkey without differentiating religion or ethnicity, everyone is called Turk in terms of citizenship”. Moreover, Article 92 continues as “every Turk has the right to be a civil servant according their capability and merits.”

As for the single party period (1923–1946), the employment of non-Muslims in public service was first stopped *de-facto* and then *de jure* by means of the enactment of a specific law. In Article 4 of the Law on State Employees, dated March 18, 1926, (Law No. 788), it was stated: “The following requirements are necessary to become a state

committees were removed and replaced with more “moderate” members. Finally, the day before the sub-committee was going to vote, the members most adamantly opposed to renouncing the rights granted by Article 42 were arrested by the police.”

³⁰⁶ Carter Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History*, (Princeton, 1988), p. 323.

employee.” The first requirement in clause “a” was that one “must be a Turk.”³⁰⁷ This law, which spelled out the requirements for becoming a state employee by making direct reference to Turkish ethnic identity, rather than simply stating that one “must be a citizen of the Republic of Turkey,” remained in force until 1965.

This de-facto discrimination on the civil service rights of the non-Muslim Turkish citizens would be criticized by the non-Muslim community especially after 1946, with Turkey’s transition to democracy, when Democrat Party acquired significant support from the non-Muslim communities. However, the interviews I made with the prominent community figures indicate these discriminations still continue today, and still form one of the demands of the non-Muslim citizens in Turkey.

The 1930 Greek-Turkish Treaty of Friendship (Seyr-i Sefain İskan Anlaşması) and 1933 Ankara Agreement

Reconciliation of 1930 and 1933 Agreements between Greece and Turkey were important development for both states and their minority communities, as they put an end to the chronic mistrust between the two countries, while also ending the exchangees’ hopes of returning back to their lands. Eleftherios Venizelos came back to power in 1928, after a four-year absence, and embarked on a project of reconciliation between Greece and Turkey.³⁰⁸ After mentioning there were no territorial claims between the countries, the only concern of the treat was on the assets of some 1,3 million Greeks and 600,000 Turks that had been left behind in their countries of origin. The convention aimed to resolve the problems that remained unsettled in the Lausanne Treaty 1923. According to the convention, the assets of persons to be exchanged became the property of the country in which they were located. The convention also determined that all Greeks (Ottoman subjects) who were in Constantinople on the day the agreement was concluded were to be automatically considered as *etablis* and therefore excluded from the exchange. The Muslims of Western Thrace were also excluded from the exchange. Moreover, Article 2 of the treaty made it obligatory for each of the states to remain neutral in case the other was attacked by a third state (and Turkey obeyed this article during the German and Bulgarian occupation of Greece during WWII).

³⁰⁷ Aktar, 1996.

³⁰⁸ Thanos Veremis, *Greeks and Turks in War and Peace*, (Athens News, 2007), p. 113.

On 14 September 1933, a treaty was signed in Ankara in which the two countries undertook to guarantee their common border, as well as to communicate on any international issues affecting them. Even though the guarantee was diplomatic and not military, the significance of the 1933 agreement was a long term one, as it created possibilities for further strengthening Greek-Turkish relations. As a confirmation of their good will, both Venizelos and İnönü declared that nationalities of their countries (Greeks and Turkish citizens-except the exchangees of the Lausanne Treaty) could have a work and residence permit that they can extend as long as they desire. This permit will be unilaterally recalled again by İsmet İnönü in 1964 using Cyprus conflict as an excuse. This unilateral decision would cause mass migration of the Rourm population to Greece.

4.2.2 Political System

In the early Republican years, parliamentary elections were still held in two rounds as was the case during the Ottoman period, and a second ‘voter’ was to be elected for every 200 people until the Electoral Law changed in 1942. Establishment of Democrat Party (DP) in 1945 would put an end to the long-lasting single-party rule of People’s Republican Period (RPP).

Until Turkey’s the full transition to democracy in 1950, eight national elections were held: These were 1920; 1922; 1927; 1931; 1935; 1939; 1943 and 1946 elections. Therefore, the first five of them formed according to Intihab-ı Mebusan Law (the first Election Law of Turkish Parliament). On 5 December 1934, women were granted their suffrage rights in national elections. Following this, their suffrage rights for local elections in 1930 granted. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was elected the President following the 1927, 1931 and 1935 Parliamentary elections.

1920 elections- the Establishment of the First Turkish National Assembly

In Turkish parliamentarian and political history, the 1920 parliament is referred to as the ‘First Assembly’. It had distinguishing characteristics, both in terms of the composition of its members, as well as its working conditions and the free debates it hosted – so much so that the assertion that this assembly has been the most democratic and participatory assembly until 1950 is, to a large extent, true. A ‘spirit’ that was never to be felt during the single-party period was strongly prevalent in this Parliament, which represented a large part of the society. Every reform proposal was put forward to the Parliament.

Although the members were not directly the ‘people’ themselves, but had only come from among the ‘people’, they nevertheless had a strong ‘representational’ ability.³⁰⁹ On the other hand, the freedom of expression of ideas and the discussions within parliament were at a high level never to be noted again in following years. During this term, elections were held only once, and at the end of three years – a short period of time – MPs announced that they had fulfilled their duty, and dissolved the assembly on 23 April 1922, in order for the new elections to be held.

It may be useful to recall some important characteristics of the first parliament: firstly, unlike the Ottoman parliament, political parties or members of political parties never sat in this parliament. Members were affiliated not to parties, but to political groups. No legal statutes had been designed for these political groups, and group discipline was generally careless. Often, members would shift from one group to another – in fact, this tendency was quite frequent. Generally the balance of power would be re-established according to the issue being debated. On the one hand was the ‘First Group’ with its Jacobin tendencies, generally supporting Mustafa Kemal and his close friends; on the other hand was the ‘Second Group’ movement which made its mark upon the political conflicts in this parliament against the First Group - liberal and liberalistic, but at the same time, extremely conservative. Secondly, further in contrast with the Ottoman parliaments, there were no Christian members in Parliament. Therefore, exclusively Muslim - but not exclusively Turkish - members sat in parliament. This was the first instance where representatives of non-Muslim communities were excluded from the parliament.

Upon the call of Atatürk, the lower house of the last Ottoman parliament (*heyeti mebusan*), which had previously assembled in Istanbul, convened on 23 April 1920 in Ankara. The sole justification for this was necessity, as Istanbul was under foreign occupation. Furthermore, the Parliament had decided to use the example of the French Revolution as a model. The MPs who assembled in Ankara were the same as those in Istanbul. However, this assembly differed from that of the Ottoman parliament. Some members of the Ottoman parliament never came to Ankara. One group of MPs came immediately, while another group took some time to arrive. After some time, the Parliament in Ankara announced that those who did not come to Ankara would no longer

³⁰⁹ Cemil Koçak, “Parliament Membership during the Single-Party System in Turkey (1925-45), *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, Thematic Issue No.3, Being a MP in contemporary Turkey, 2005.

be considered MPs. Since the number of MPs who did arrive in Ankara was small, by-elections were held.

Elections could in theory be held in those regions not under occupation. However, in many regions, elections either took a long time to hold, or did not take place at all. For those regions where elections did not take place, MPs were selected and appointed from those either from Ankara or the region concerned. This meant that ‘elections’ were not so much ‘elections’ in the ordinary sense, but rather an assignment system aimed at legitimising the formation of a Parliament as a representative of the people. Although the precise number of MPs in this parliament is still a matter of debate among historians, it can be deduced that there were approximately 350 MPs within this three-year period.³¹⁰

The elections prior to the establishment of the Republic were held in 1923 and conducted in conformity with the electoral law of 1877, a product of the Ottoman period. Accordingly, in 1923 one MP was to be elected for every 20,000 men. Every male over 18 now had the right to vote; the condition of having to pay an electoral tax had essentially been lifted. In order to be elected, one had to be a male member of the people of the Turkish State and over 30 years of age. However, parliamentary elections were still held in two rounds as was the case during the Ottoman period, and a second ‘voter’ was to be elected for every 200 people.³¹¹

The official legitimization of the single-party regime in Turkey lay with the Parliament, which, as a representative of the people, controlled the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. However, the parliamentary period after 1925 was highlighted by a lack of freedom of speech, with scope for political discussion limited. At the head of the single-party system, the President was free to choose every party member for Parliament. This meant competition was very restricted, be it in the form of short-lived opposition parties or independent candidates. During the selection process, some social classes, for example high-ranking officers and bureaucrats were privileged. These two groups were the most common in the Parliament.³¹²

³¹⁰ Ahmet Demirel, *Birinci Mecliste Muhalefet: İkinci Grup*, (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 1994), pp. 511-531.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, Demirel, p. 516.

³¹² Cemil Koçak, “Parliament Membership during the Single-Party System in Turkey (1925-45), *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, Thematic Issue No.3, Being a MP in contemporary Turkey, 2005.

On the other hand, local ties were sometimes respected by the regime: rural notables with close relations with party headquarters were easily elected, and remained in Parliament. A MPs' chance of re-election was significant if he performed his duty with loyalty to the party.³¹³ The ruling party, Republican People Party [RPP, (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP)] used the two-round election law remaining from Ottoman period until 1942, as it was decided that until the voters gained sufficient political, social and cultural knowledge enabling them to make an informed decision, it would be more appropriate to conform with the idea of democracy to select the secondary voters, whom they knew closely and trusted. Until the citizens were given the necessary education and reached the high standards desired, the ruling party would continue to use the two-round election system stemming from the Ottoman period. An important aspect of the program was its aim to give women the vote, as well as the possibility to become MPs.

Attempts to Establish Opposition

Prior to the 1923 elections, Mustafa Kemal had announced that he would form a new political party based on the 'First Group', which had been formed within the First Parliament. The candidates of this group, whose leadership Mustafa Kemal took up after a brief political declaration, eliminated the candidates of the Second Group – their rivals – and entered the new parliament. Only one member of the Second Group had succeeded in being re-elected; thus, there was no further opposition in Parliament against the Kemalist rule. In fact, many of the Second Group MPs did not become candidates in these elections; 16 of them attempted to become independent MPs from Istanbul, though with no success. The Halk Fırkası (People's Party) was formed after the elections and except for one; all MPs were members of this party.

As a consequence of the differences of opinion within the single party, one group of opponents formed a new political party, the 'Progressive Republican Party' (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası) in 1925. However, the first opposition party was closed very quickly and never had the opportunity to stand in any elections. The second one, the liberal and liberalistic Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Partisi), established in 1930 as an opposition party upon the request of the government, was not

³¹³ Frederich Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, (MIT Press: Cambridge, 1965).

able to find the opportunity to participate in any parliamentary election due to its short life span either.³¹⁴ However, it had the chance to take part in municipal elections. In these elections, the opposition party achieved a fairly important success and thus was able to demonstrate to everyone the power of the political opposition in the country, including the government.³¹⁵ It became clear, therefore, that the success enjoyed by the ruling party in the elections of the past two terms, with no present opposition, was not real. The opposition movements in the early republican period were always accused of having a 'reactionist' aim against the modern and progressive character of the Republic.³¹⁶

Voter Turnout

The liberal political competition in the country had come to a total end in 1925, and the participation rate in the elections in 1927 was only 23 %, the election with the lowest participation rate among almost all of the elections of this country until present. As party leader, Atatürk had personally selected the MP candidates. He had thus made it clear that he preferred the MPs to be persons of his own choice, and furthermore that he expected everyone's compliance in this matter. Although a few people did stand as 'independent' candidates, outside of this official list of candidates, these people did not succeed in being elected.³¹⁷ There was a turnover of over 60% of parliamentarians as a result of the 1923 elections. This turnover rate dropped significantly to under 40% at the next elections.³¹⁸

As for the following elections, only less than one third of the Parliament was 'renewed'. In the 1935 elections, the 'renewal' rate was close to one fifth. Under normal conditions, if parliament had had the chance to witness a complete turnover, the number of parliamentarians for all six terms would have been close to 2,500. However, there were barely over 1,000 parliamentarians in these six years.³¹⁹

³¹⁴ Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923-1931)*, (İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999).

³¹⁵ See Cem Emrence, *99 Günlük Muhalefet: Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 2006); Cemil Koçak, *Belgelerle İktidar ve Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 2006).

³¹⁶ Burcu, Çulhaoğlu, "Bir Garip Demokratikleşme: Orhan Veli'nin Yaprak Dergisi ve Demokrasiye Geçiş sürecinde 'İleri' ve 'Geri' Kavramlarının Kurgulanması", SİTD Conference Article, Okan University Publication, 2014.

³¹⁷ Ibid. Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, p. 127.

³¹⁸ Ibid. Frey, p. 164.

³¹⁹ Tunçay 1999; Demirel 2003; Koçak 2006.

4.2.3 Greek-Orthodox Community

Considering the political developments of the period and official discriminations towards the non-Muslim groups, in such a climate it was clear the Greek Orthodox minority members had little opportunity to criticize the treatment of them. They were deprived of any political representation, which they had been granted during the late Ottoman period. Not only the Roum community, but also other non-Muslims were blamed for the consequences of the WWI, Sevres Treaty and the losses during the Independence War. All non-Muslim communities, but especially Roum, was the target of the discriminative and exclusionary state policy, which certainly declared that they can continue to inhabitants in Turkey and benefit from the citizenship rights only if they were loyal to the state and to the party.

There are two important points to point out in analysis of the term where Roum community was non-represented. The first one considers the reciprocity principle, which was not implemented in the political field, as the Muslim community in Greece was represented in Greek Parliament with 4 deputies. There were equal number of minorities in Turkey and Greece at that period –around 100,000-. This leads to the second point saying representation of minorities is determined by geographical concentration and numerical size. There was no change in the number of Jewish community living in Turkey before and after the Independent War; however they were deprived of political representation compared to the Ottoman Parliament. Moreover, although the numerical size of the Greek-Orthodox community in Istanbul did not change from 1923 to 1935, they were granted political representation after 1935. This relation supports Fredrik Barth's argument that the political institutions of the society determine political representation of minorities they are in, rather than their ethnic identity.

4.3 Years of Misrepresentation (1935-1946)

The years between 1935 to 1946 is significant for Turkish political history, as after the attempts for democracy ended with disappointments, and opposition voices were silenced in 1930, again fundamentals for the transition to democracy began to be launched by the government through granting women their suffrage rights and opening the way for non-Muslim deputies to be elected.

Considering that this was a period of a political turmoil for Europe where we witnessed rise of fascism and eruption of World War II, some scholars interpret these developments and political rights granted as symbols targeting the democratic European countries.³²⁰ Suffrage right of women had been discussed in the Turkish Parliaments, rejected many times before. Opening minority's way to political representation with Atatürk's order shows us that single-party government aims to control all the political activity. That's why the government allowed only one deputy from each minority community. The representatives in common had occupations with big networks such as doctors, lawyers and teachers that would create popular support for the party. The representatives were listed by RPP; only one minority representative was nominated by the party and then elected (in fact nominated due to two-round electoral system). RPP nominated minority representatives who were known to be loyal to the state and to the party.

1930-1950 can be called the golden years of Turkish-Greek relation, which was interrupted by the Cyprus conflict. That positive relation between the countries is expected to reflect on the political representation of their minorities as well. Although this was the case for the Roum community as they entered the Turkish Parliament for the first time, an opposite situation was valid for the Turkish-Muslim minority of Greece, who were represented from 1920 to 1936; however excluded from the political system from 1936-1946 due to political turmoil in Greece at that time.³²¹

Their contrary situation on the political representation supports the assumption of this thesis that their political representation was not tied to the rule of reciprocity, and compared to their economical, social and cultural rights, Turkish-Greek relations does not have an effect in the political sphere. This lack of causality creates the main focus of the study that minorities' political representation is mostly influenced by the institutional factors (macro-level and micro-level), and the political situation of the countries they live in. That's why before scrutinizing minority representatives' actions and speeches, this section (1935-1946) and following section (1946-1961) will first portray the political atmosphere and changes in political system that concerns the Greek-Orthodox community.

³²⁰ Şirin Tekeli, *Kadınlar ve siyasal-toplumsal hayat*, (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1982), p. 216 & Arat, "From Emancipation to Liberation: The Changing Role of Women in Turkey's Public Realm", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2000. p. 110.

³²¹ See Chapter 5 "Political Representation of Turkish-Muslim Minority in Greece" for the details.

Although Greek-Orthodox minority and other minority groups were for the first time granted entry to Turkish Parliament, this period is classified as “mis-representation” of them; because without merit or ability, their representation was symbolic as only one deputy from each community was allowed. Even though they were elected as representatives and had the same rights and duties with the Muslim MPs, they were not allowed to be involved in serious discussion in the Parliament. Their loyalty to the state and party was questioned all the time, and they could not mention important issues concerning their communities such as the Wealth Tax that affected the minorities in large the (first time Wealth Tax was discussed in the Parliament was after the 1946 elections). In other words, the Greek-Orthodox community was mis-represented at this period numerically and also in terms of effectiveness.

4.3.1 Political History

During the period of 1935-1946 in which we witnessed the continuity of the single-party regime of RPP, the political events that influenced Roum community in special and the other minority groups in general were the rise of fascism in Europe that lead to increasing pressure on minorities along with the “Citizen, Speak Turkish” Campaign; World War II; and the Wealth Tax of 1942.

1937- Citizen Speak Turkish Campaign (Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş Kampanyası)

Following the discrimination against the minorities that started in 1930s, lastly “Citizen, speak Turkish!” campaigns began in 1937, which comprised the most important aspect of the Turkification policies. Following the “prohibition of speaking in languages other than Turkish within city limits” implemented by certain municipalities in 1937, the Chief Editor of *Tan* newspaper, Ahmet Emin Yalman, wrote an article supporting this campaign. The campaign targeted mainly Jewish community, and began right after the *1934 Trakya Events*. These campaigns began during the single party period, and were repeated on various occasions up through the mid-1960s.

As a result of government pressure, minorities strove to adapt and formulated a theoretical framework for the campaigns that they carried out to this end. For example, in his work titled *Türkleştirme* (Turkification), originally published in 1928, Moiz Kohen Tekinalp, a Jewish intellectual who had worked closely with Ziya Gökalp, summarized in

“ten commandments” what the Jews had to do to ensure that the Jews of Turkey should be included in the “collective conscience” that was the basis of Turkish national union: “1. Use Turkish names; 2. Speak Turkish; 3. Say at least some of their prayers in the synagogues in Turkish; 4. Turkify their schools; 5. Send their children to national schools; 6. Get involved in the affairs of Turkey; 7. Establish close contacts with Turks; 8. Eradicate community spirit; 9. Do their duty in the field of national economy; 10. Know their rights.”³²²

1942 Wealth Tax

In the summer of 1942, Faik Ökte, the head of Financial Revenue Office in Istanbul, received a secret order from Ankara, recommending him to begin preparations for the collection of a once-for-all tax. Mr. Ökte decided to put together names of the businessmen accumulating extraordinary profits due to war conditions by classifying them according to ethnic and religious background.³²³ The bill for the one-off tax was proposed by the Şükrü Saracoğlu government, and the act was adopted by the Turkish parliament on 11 November 1942. It was imposed on the fixed assets, such as landed estates, building owners, real estate brokers, businesses, and industrial enterprises of all citizens, including the minorities. However, those who suffered most severely were non-Muslims like the Jews, Greeks, Armenians, and Levantines, who controlled a large portion of the economy.

As its name implies, the Wealth Tax (*Varlık Vergisi*), was originally conceived as a tool for taxing the extreme wealth being made through wartime profiteering and black market operations in Turkey during the Second World War. In practice, however, it was imposed in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion, in essence representing a sort of “economic warfare” carried out by the Turkish regime against the country’s non-Muslim population, appropriating much of their wealth and shattering all the hopes and aspirations for eventual religious and ethnic equality that had been held out by the Turkish Constitution some twenty years before.

³²²Jacob Landau, *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, (Westview Press, 1984), p. 289.

³²³ In his memoirs, Faik Ökte explains the process as follows: “Lists were first divided into M and G. The group M represented Muslim tax payers and G represented non-Muslim minorities. Later the D added to these for Crypto-Jews [migrated from Salonica] and E added for foreigners.” Faik Ökte, *Varlık Vergisi Faciası*, (Nebioğlu Yayınları: İstanbul, 1951).

The tax was paid by all citizens of Turkey, but higher tariffs were generally imposed on the country's non-Muslim inhabitants, often in an arbitrary and unrealistic way. Around two thousand non-Muslims, who could not pay the enormous amount demanded for this sudden tax within the time-limit of thirty days, were arrested and sent to a forced labor camp in Aşkale in Erzurum Province of eastern Turkey. Twenty-one of these unfortunates died there.³²⁴

Although Wealth Tax was not named (or not allowed to be discussed) in the Parliament in 1942, its implementation left an unforgettable mark on the minorities, and every time it comes to agenda RPP was criticized especially by the Jewish community. The first example of this behavior was the speech made by Salamon Adato – who was elected as DP Istanbul representative on 1946 with the transition to multiparty system- on 1948 at DP's Kuledibi Town Organization's annual congress where he criticized Wealth Tax implementation and treatment to non-Muslim during their military services³²⁵:

“When we faced with cruelty and pressure in Spain, the noble Turkish nation opened its door to us. The incumbent party of that time unfortunately started to create discriminations among the citizens. The party ruined us with the Wealth Tax, abused our good feelings when it called us to country services. Because instead of weapons, it gave us oars...From now on, not pickax but weapons will be given, we will not dig the land but will be given the education and training necessary for the military service.”

Adato was heavily criticized in an article published at Edirne Post:

“Salamon Adato speaking as if he is a Zionist missionary but not like a member of TGNA. He is speaking as pursuing minority case but not as he is a member of Turkish party DP”.³²⁶

In short, many well-known families in Turkey were among the victims of this discriminatory tax and the punishments that ensued if they failed to pay it. RPP's Wealth Tax implementation of 1942 is still being criticized among the minority communities, and shown as the reason to explain mistrust and unpopular electoral support of RPP among the minority groups.

³²⁴ Rıfat N. Bali, *Varlık Vergisi Tartışmaları: Britanya Milli Arşivlerinden Belgeler*, (Libra Publications:Istanbul, 2012), p. 127.

³²⁵ “İspanya’da zulüm ve baskıya uğradığımız sıralarda asil ve necib Türk milleti bize kapılarını açmıştı. Bugünkü iktidar partisi ise bir zamanlar maalesef vatandaşlar arasında farklar yaratmağa başlamıştı.(...) meşhur Varlık Vergisi ile ocaklarımızı yıktı, bizi vatan hizmetine çağırdığı zaman temiz duygularımızı ihlâl etti. Çünkü bize silâh yerine kazma kürek verdi, askerî talim yerine toprak kazdırdı. Salamon ve Jak şirketine ait evraklar aylarca çekmecelerde bekletildi. Fakat asil Türk milleti bunlara tenezzül etmedi. Artık kazma değil silâh verilecek, artık toprak kazdırılmıyacak, vatan vazifesi için lâzım gelen talim ve terbiye yapılacaktır.”Rıfat N. Bali, *Varlık Vergisi Tartışmaları*,

³²⁶ “Salamon Adato, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin bir üyesi gibi değil, bir Siyonist misyoneri gibi konuşmaktadır. Salamon Adato, bir Türk partisi olan DP.’li gibi değil, azınlık davâsı ihdas etmek ister gibi söz söylemektedir. Necip K., “Salamon Adato ne demek istiyor ?...”, *Edirne Postası*, 2 Ekim 1948, sayı 1586, s. 1.

4.3.2 Political System

The period between 1935 and 1946 is categorized as the last decade of the single-party rule of Republican People's Party and witnessed the establishment of a new Democrat Party among RPP's cadres. Between 1 March 1935-5 August 1946 (TGNA's 5th, 6th and 7th terms) seven governments served in the office. These were; 7th İnönü Government (1 March 1935-1 November 1937); 1st Bayar Government (1 November 1937-11 November 1938); 2nd Bayar Government (11 November 1938-25 January 1939); 1st Saydam Government (25 January 1939- 3 April 1939); 2nd Saydam Government (3 April 1939-8 July 1942); 1st Saraçoğlu Government (9 July 1942- 9 March 1943) and 2nd Saraçoğlu Government (15 March 1943- 5 August 1944).

The 1935 election was the first to be held after women were given the right to vote and be elected as MPs. This process also gave women the chance to join the ruling party as members and to be elected as 'second round voters'. For the first time, 18 women were elected as MPs – they were 14 in the next elections, in 1939. Besides, the legal age for voting was raised from 18 to 22.

There was yet another aspect in these elections. For the first time in Republican history – including the period of the national resistance movement (*milli mücadele*) - members of minority groups were put forward as candidates, in order for the communities of the non-Muslim minority to be represented too, as had been the tradition of the Ottoman parliament. The party in power selected these candidates. Thus, Greek-Orthodox, Jewish and Armenian Gregorian candidates were given the opportunity to be elected as MPs. The system of calculating one MP per 40,000 citizens was put into force. One 'second round voter' was to be elected for 400 'primary' voters. A few weeks later, at the CHP Congress of 1935, a new party program was accepted. It included a provision to change the electoral law, itself a product of the Ottoman period, which, save for a few exceptions, was still being implemented. However, the idea that two-round elections were more in compliance with democracy prevailed.

At the end of 1942, the electoral law of the Ottoman period was finally changed. According to new law, one MP per 40,000 persons was to be elected. In order to vote, one had to be a Turkish citizen over the age of 22. For the right to be elected, one had to be over 30 years of age. Again, the elections were held in two rounds. According to the

changes made to the CHP statutes in 1943, the need to preserve two-round elections was emphasized. The 1943 elections were the first elections held in accordance with the first election law enacted after the establishment of the Republic. Representatives from non-Muslim communities were again elected – a total of four members. A remarkable point about the minority representatives is that from 1935 to 1946 the transition to the multi-party system, minority MPs were elected as independent deputies, not within RPP cadres. However, although they were independent MPs, they were approved by RPP.

According to Bülent Taner the legislature was in a working order committed to the government and leaders, rather than government was responsible to the legislature as expected.³²⁷ 1935 independent deputy elections is an example for leader-committed working patterns, as according to the resource Rıfat Bali found, this election was held with Atatürk's private command. On 2 February 1935, RPP General Presidency Council (Umumi Riyaset Divanı), Public Administration Committee (Umumi İdare Heyeti), RPP Assembly Group Administration Committee (Meclis Grubu İdare Heyeti) and Cabinet (İcra Vekilleri) gathered at Dolmabahçe under Atatürk's Presidency, and discussed the new elections. For the general election, they decided to include minorities among the independent candidates.³²⁸ The decision given by Mustafa Kemal on determining the number of non-Muslim MPs in the Turkish Parliament reminds us the Porte's attitude for the 1887 Ottoman Parliament, in which he specified the number of delegated from each province and the governors determined the non-Muslim-Muslim ratio. (see 4.1.2 Political System of late Ottoman Period). This decision from the top caused low level of localism within the 1935 session in general, and among the minority MPs as well. (see Table 3 at section 4.5. Comparison of Political Representation of Roum Deputies in 1935-46 and 1946-61: From Misrepresentation to Representation).

Including 1935 elections, the Turkish elections until 1943 was held under a two-round system. In this system, public first elects the 'secondary voters', and "secondary voters" elect the deputies. According to Hakkı Uyar, the two-round election was more like a double-approval rather than elections, because secondary voters were RPP members and regarding the Party Regulation of RPP, they were obliged to vote for party members. One

³²⁷ Bülent Tanör, *Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri (1789-1980)*, (Yapı Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2002), p. 316.

³²⁸ Rıfat N.Bali, *Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923-1945)*, (İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005), p. 265.

didnot have a chance to be an independent “secondary voter” or representative.³²⁹ However, in the election of MPs, secondary voters played a key role. According to Uyar, the permission given to independent representatives in the 1935 election (there were 13 seats given to independent MPs, 4 of them reserved for minorities), uneased the RPP center. Due to RPP’s worries, RPP pressured on the secondary voters –who they controled- to elect the ones RPP approved among the independent candidates.

4.3.3 Greek- Orthodox (Roum) Deputies in the Turkish Parliament

The first point to emphasize about the first time minority MPs is that, all of them had Turkish surnames, which was an attempt to prove their “Turkish belonging” saying in a way “we are all Turkish citizens”.³³⁰ Considering that most of the minority communities had not made such a choice- taking Turkish surnames- at that time, it is interesting that ones who had more close relationships with the state than others had preferred this option.

Among these candidates, Dr. Nikola Taptaş, Dr. Samuel Abreyava (Marmaralı), accountant Berç Keresteciyan Türker, and Lawyer İstamati Zihni Özdamar were non-Muslims, and they were granted the title Representative for the 5th Term. According to Rıdvan Akın, this situation- nominating a symbolic number of non-Muslim minorities as representatives and putting them in the assembly- created an established practice later and it continued to be applied in Democrat Party rule. Here, to test Fredrik Barth’s argument on ethnic boundaries, link between the social and political condition of society and discourses of minorities demands a scrutiny. Political history and political system given in the previous sections enables this evaluation. Nikola Taptaş, Samuel Abreyava Marmaralı, Berç Keresteciyan Türker and İstimati Zihni Özdamar were elected also in the 1939 session.

In the archive research, speeches of Roum minority deputies and other minority deputies made in Turkish Assembly are examined³³¹. As aforementioned, 9 Greek-Orthodox deputies served in Turkish Parliament since 1935. From 1935 to 1946, including the Turkish-Orthodox MP Stamati Zihni Özdemir, 3 of the Orthodox MPs were elected as

³²⁹ Hakkı Uyar, "Tek Parti İktidarının Toplumsal Kökenleri", *Toplumsal Tarih*, Ekim 2002, No. 106, pp. 54- 58.

³³⁰ Rita Ender, “Vitrindeki GayriMüslimler”, *Toplumsal Tarih*, 2001, No. 214.

³³¹ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi Sorgu Formu; TBMM Albümü Cilt I (1923-1950); TBMM Albümü Cilt II (1950-1980)

independent deputies. Among the Roum MPs elected for the first time to the Turkish Grand National Assembly since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, Stamati Zihni Özdamar (1 March 1935-5 August 1946) was the only Turkish-Orthodox and one of the most active ones who took the floor in the Assembly 17 times. He was an independent representative from Eskişehir, although he was born in Bodrum. He served three terms (V-VI-VII) in the Parliament. However, he was also the founder of the ‘Secular Turkish Christian Unity’, which aimed Turkification of Greeks and Armenians. Stamati Zihni Özdemir defined himself as a Turk although both of his parents were Greek-Orthodox. In one of his speeches where he rejected to use the word ‘minority’ (*ekalliyet*) for the non-Muslim communities, such that he uttered in the Parliament as “look, I am saying Turkish citizens, and I do not want to name ugly words such as ‘minority’”; because these ‘minority’ words wound our national loyalty, citizenship thoughts and feelings. I get seriously angry. What does this mean? Every Turkish citizen who takes shelter under the Turkish flag, apprehends Turkish culture, whose soul and heart takes inspiration and life from Turkish fatherland, no matter his/her sect, is an integral part of the state. ‘Minority’, and minority law, and its political borders and meaning, never and never can exist”.³³² In the speech he made on Atatürk’s funeral he calls “Long live Turkishness, Long live Kemalism idea”³³³, where he repeated his loyalty to the Turkish state and Kemalism.

Dr. Nikola Taptaş was a well-known doctor and an active member within the Greek-Orthodox community of Istanbul. He was the first Greek-Orthodox deputy that represented the Roum community in the Turkish Parliament. He was elected as an independent representative from Ankara and he was born in Istanbul (Tatavla /Kurtuluş) in 1871. He had attended Galatasaray High School, continued his education in Istanbul Medicine Faculty (1896). After completing his proficiency in medicine at Paris, Berlin and Viyana, he also served as Sultan Mehmed V. and Vahdettin’s private doctor. Taptaş served two terms in the Assembly between 1935-1943 (V and VI terms). In an interview made with him in 1935, he said “I want to be a deputy of the Turkish nation, not a

³³² 1937 Maarif Maarif Vekaleti Bütçesi ile ilgili söz alır: “Bakınımız Turk vatandaşları diyorum ve azlık, ekalliyet gibi kulağımıza sakil düşen kelimeleri ağzıma almak istemiyorum. çünkü bu ekalliyet, azlık sözleri, milli taassubumuza,vatandaş düşünce ve duygularımıza fenadokunuyor. (Bravo sesleri). Çok sinirleniyorum. Bu ne demek, Turk bayrağına sığman, Turk kulturunu kavrayan, ruhu, kalbi, Turk yurdundan ilham, hayat alan, her Turk vatandař, mezhebi ne olursa olsun, Devletin bunyesi içindekul halinde, ayrılmaz bir Turk uzvudur (Bravosesleri). Ekalliyet ve bunun etrafındaki ekalliyet hukukunun, ve siyasi uhudun, manası, yeri, asla ve asla olamaz”.

³³³ Atatürk’ün cenaze merasimi için yapılacak sarfiyat hakkında kanun münasebeti ile sözleri (14 Kasım 1939): “Yaşasın Türklük, Yaşasın Kemalizm ideali”.

minority representative, and I will always remain loyal, I'll work in Assembly"³³⁴. He was not an active deputy, did not speak about 1942 "Tax on Wealth", but the only time he took the floor in the Parliament was about Atatürk's funeral, where he said "...Roum citizens will work to prove that they are loyal descent of Atatürk"³³⁵.

Beside the Jewish academician-journalist Avram Galanti (Bodrumlu), Berç Keresteciyan Türker, and İstimati Zihni Özdamar, the Greek-Orthodox lawyer Mihal Kayaoğlu who was born in Skopje and elected as independent representative from Ankara, served in term VII (1943-1946). He was again elected with Mustafa Kemal's order, fulfil the one seat quota – in fact there was no official quota- reserved for Greek-Orthodox community. He took the floor in the Parliament two times, but none of them were on "Tax on Wealth" or other issues that concerned his community.

The Possible reasons for Roum Mis-representation and MPs' Ineffectiveness

As indicated at Chapter 1, in order to have political representation micro-level factors of the minority communities such as effects of group size, spatial concentration, participation in ethnic associational life, political cohesiveness and mobilization, educational attainment and language skills, and length of residency in host country among ethnic groups, are necessary features. If we compare two different periods of Republic under the single-party regimes 1920-1935 and 1935-1946, it is seen that although there is no significant difference in micro-level factors and macro-level institutional arrangement of Turkey, minority's political representation becomes possible and visible in the latter period.

Group size, spatial concentration had drastically decreased from 1920 to 1927 Parliament, but Roum deputies were not accepted to the Turkish Parliament. The number of Roum community did not change from 1924 to 1935. During this period there was the single-party rule of RPP, party competition was limited and eliminated after 1930 the closure of Free Party. The candidate nomination and selection process was same, based on the list of RPP, and two-round electoral system was implemented until 1942.

³³⁴ Ibid. Rita Ender, "Vitrindeki GayriMüslimler".

³³⁵ Atatürk'ün cenaze merasimi için yapılacak sarfiyat hakkında kanun münasebeti ile sözleri (14 Kasım 1939): "Bugün matem içinde bulunan Rum vatandaşlar büyük küçük kaffedi aynı şekilde ağlamaktadır. Bunlar Atatürk'ün ismini daima, edebiyen şükran ve hürmetle kalplerinde muhafaza edeceklerdir. Sadık evladı olduğunu ispata çalışacaklardır. Atatürk ölmedi, hepimizin kalbinde edebiyen yaşayacaktır".

Good terms between Turkey and Greece with 1930 Friendship and 1933 Ankara Agreements, as macro-level factor of this thesis, might be given as the reason for political representation of Roum community. This process might have increased trust between the states and ethnic groups, as minorities were perceived as less threatening compared to the first decade of the Republic. Nevertheless, again they were the target of discriminative policies of Turkish state by Citizen Speak Turkish Campaign, 1934 Thrace Events, and 1942 Wealth Tax. Moreover, good relations between Turkey and Greece did not find its reflection in the political representation of Muslim-Turkish minority of Greece, where between 1936 and 1946, it was the first time for them not being represented in the Greek Parliament. In this period, they were more comfortable in expressing their Turkish identity, although they were also being seen as Turkish element, Metaxas avoided their political representation but did not touch their economic and cultural rights in order to keep peaceful relations with Turkey. During German-Bulgarian Occupation (1941-44) and the Greek Civil War (1946-49) Turkish-Muslim minority were still observed as threats supporting communist groups rather than the center –which is the opposite case as will be examined in Chapter 5. Hence, more than the relationship between Turkey and Greece, for the political rights and political representation, institutional arrangements of the country they lived and political conditions played an important role.

Emergence of Free Party in 1930 might have created a political cohesiveness and mobilization among the minority communities, which RPP would desire to attract as well. The occupations of the nominated candidates were doctor, lawyer and teacher that could bring popular support to RPP. Moreover, sustaining minorities' representation in the Parliament would show the democratic Western states the democratic face and policy of Turkey as well. However, because RPP wanted political representation of the minority community to be under its control, the party nominated only one candidate from each minority group and did not want them to have a group on their own. Hence, they were mis-represented, and their representation was symbolic rather than desired. Non-Muslim deputies of the single-party regime expressed their loyalty to the Republican regime and 6 principles of RPP in their Parliamentary speeches and public declarations.

On the other hand, minority MPs served in the Parliament in this period (1935-1936) as independent candidates, meaning although their loyalty was in question and they

expressed their loyalty in their Parliamentary speeches, they were not part of RPP. The secondary voters that would elect them were chosen by the minority communities – as majority voters would not vote for them. Therefore the independent representatives were indirectly responsible only to the electorates that voted for them. However, one independent representative cannot do much in the Parliament on his/her own, especially when his/her loyalty is in question. This can be the reason why none of the minority deputies mentioned the Wealth Tax in the Parliament. Moreover, minority deputies served as independent because due to the discriminative and excluding policy of RPP towards the minorities, they could not become RPP members. They were in the Parliament as independent MPs, however did not participate in decision-making organs. Considering that minority MPs began to take the floor more and criticize the discriminative policies towards their community after 1946, authoritarian character of the political regime in Turkey during the 1930s should be regarded as an important factor that prevents the non-Muslim MPs to be effective in the parliament.

From the Parliamentary Archives, we see that the first time Wealth Tax was mentioned in the TGNA was in 1946, right after the transition to multi-party system, yet it was not about compensation but a suggestion by Hasan Ali Yücel- Minister of Education- to impose a similar tax for state's education expenses.³³⁶ The implementation of the Wealth Tax ended in 1943, the minority deputies might have been afraid of mentioning this discriminative policy, especially considering they were granted political representation under the will of Republican People's Party. However, they did not mention about the other concerns of their community, such as public representation at state offices, problems in their education life and management of their foundations. As aforementioned, one cannot expect an independent candidate to be effective in giving questions and suggestions without a party support, especially under a single-party regime. For the term before transition to democracy in Turkey, these factors explains even though both Dr. Nikolas Taptas and lawyer Mihal Kayaoğlu were active members and respected representatives in the Roum community, why they did not (or could not) mention the demands and concerns of their own community in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

³³⁶ Rıfat N. Bali, Varlık Vergisi Tartışmaları, *Cumhuriyet*, 7 Temmuz 1946.

Nevertheless their representation in the Turkish Parliament was crucial in order to increase minorities visibility, creating awareness in Turkish society, establishing trust between Muslim and non-Muslim community. Even though minority MPs were not effective in their representation and they were mis-represented, they opened a way for “minority representation” after the transition to the multi-party system, where Democrat Party also listed minority deputies as candidates. Minority MPs under multi-party regime would be more effective compared to the ones under single-party regime that they began to mention issues concerning their own communities.

4.4 Years of Representation (1946-1961)

The years between 1946 and 1959 may be regarded as the period in which the new groups emerged fully and acquired political supremacy, while the period between 1959 and 1965 may be regarded as the period of internal change in the leadership of the political parties and the acquisition of a new welfare philosophy by the same. From 1946-1950 RPP ruled for the last time until 1961 elections. 1950s were written in Turkish history as the period of dominant rule of the Democrat Party, which won the elections three times in 1950, 1954 and 1957. As a result of its oppressive rule during the single-party system, RPP became a party, which could not find support from the minorities and other fractions of the society. The period’s political competition opened the way for the political representation of the minorities who were politically mobilized and effective especially in Istanbul.

4.4.1 Political History

Rule of Democrat Party

The election of May 14, 1950 – the first free and fair elections-, which brought the Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*) of Celâl Bayar and Adnan Menderes, President and Premier in 1950–60 respectively, to power and sent the Republican Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) of İsmet İnönü into opposition was a turning point in Turkish political and social life. It set into motion a new process of leadership selection, social mobilization and broader popular participation. One may rightly ask whether the Turkish efforts to adopt first the classical mechanism of European parliamentarianism and then the ideas of social democracy were successful at all. The answer is positive, despite the brief interlude of a military takeover in 1960–61. Instead of restoring a strong régime under one party government, as demanded by some intellectual and bureaucratic groups, the military

ended their rule formally in 1961, by adopting a broadly based social and political order and a new constitution.³³⁷

The success of the Turkish experiment in parliament democracy stands in sharp contrast not only to the political regimes in the neighbouring countries such as Greece, but also to most of the Third World. The real meaningful issues debated during the Democrats' rule stemmed from their economic policy. The military aid from the United States, which began in 1947, was coupled with economic assistance after Turkey was admitted to the Marshall Plan in 1948.³³⁸ The identification of Turkey with the Western political and economic philosophy and policies was further enhanced after the country joined NATO in 1952, and was thus formally insured against outside aggression. The same year Greece also joined the NATO as well. The economic development and political success created a measure of welfare which was reflected in the national elections of 1954. The Democrats won 504 seats, the Republicans a bare 31 places and the small Nation Party just 5 seats.³³⁹ By 1950 the initial allocation of 100 million dollars to Turkey was increased to 233 million dollars, especially after Turkey joined the United Nations forces in Korea with a brigade of about 5,000 men, who, notwithstanding heavy casualties, achieved a brilliant record on the battlefield.³⁴⁰

On the other hand, economic policy became subject to political controversy. The Democratic Party government, criticized for its unplanned economic policy, reacted by imposing restrictions on the press and the opposition. The election law was amended several times in order to limit the election chances of the opposition. The province of Kırşehir was 'punished' by being reduced to a district seat, for it supported the Nation Party. The press restrictions were so heavy that by 1954 the International Press Institute in Vienna cited Turkey as country infringing upon the freedom of communication. Later the government passed a law to retire judges at an early age.³⁴¹ The conflicts among politicians were in fact the symptoms of much deeper social unrest, as indicated by the riots of September 1955, in Istanbul.

³³⁷ Kemal Karpat, *Studies on Turkish Politics and Society*, (Brill: Leiden, 2004), p. 33.

³³⁸ Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic*, (Cambridge: Mass, 1963), p. 138.

³³⁹ Kemal Karpat, *The Turkish Elections of 1957*, *Western Political Quarterly*, June 1961, p. 459.

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.* Karpat, p. 39.

³⁴¹ Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: the Transition to a Multi-Party System*, (Princeton University Press, 1959).

6-7 September Events and Cyprus Issue

In the end of August 1955 the situation was tense because of the Cyprus issue. There were rumors that the Greek Cypriots were preparing an attack on Turkish Cypriots on 28 August 1955. The “Cyprus-is-Turkish Society” (Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti) stirred up public opinion in connection with the Tripartite Cyprus conference in London. In general, the riots were interpreted as events, which took place on the night of 6/7 September as a youth demonstration, which got out of hand, in response to the news about the bombing of Atatürk’s house. After the events, it was stressed that the events created great sadness in Turkish opinion³⁴².

More or less, it can be said Turkey gave a direct message to Greece that Greek commitment to enosis would endanger the Istanbul minority. However, the moral and material losses in the “September events” were great. According to Greek and Turkish sources 200 women were raped in the suburbs, where the greatest destruction of churches and other Greek institutions took place. 1,004 houses, 4,348 shops, 27 pharmacies and laboratories, 21 factories, 110 restaurants, cafés, and hotels were destroyed. The mob gutted 73 churches, 26 schools, and 5 athletic clubs, which was a serious blow to Greek Orthodox communal property.³⁴³ The government apparently had planned the demonstration for political reasons but without realizing that it could serve as an outlet for releasing the accumulated social tension. The opposition asked unsuccessfully for an investigation. However, later in 1961, at the Yassıada trials the Democrats had to account for these destructive riots.

27 May 1960 Military Coup

Following the tension between Republican and Democrat Party regarding the political restrictions on opposition, it was seen that Democrat Party oppression was leading to dictatorship, which resulted with the military coup on 27 May 1960. The military in communiqué explained the takeover as an action aimed not at any special group but at preventing internal dissension. They promised to hold elections soon to choose a new government and pledged to respect Turkey’s foreign policy commitments. A group of professors were summoned to Ankara to provide advice on the future policy and on the drafting of a new Constitution, issued a declaration justifying the revolution. The military

³⁴² Güven, 2005, p. 45.

³⁴³ Ibid. pp. 64-68.

administration went rapidly into action. The Committee for National Unity, composed of 38 officers, abolished the Constitution of 1924, and assumed 'legal' powers under a self-drafted Provisional Law of 12 June 1960.³⁴⁴ The military arrested the Democratic Party ministers and deputies and banned all political activity.

The return to a civilian order began with the convening of a Founding Assembly on 6 January 1961, to draft a constitution. The 292 members of the Assembly, the majority of whom belonged to the Republican Party or was its sympathizers, was chosen by political parties (DP was left out), universities, bar associations, trade unions, etc. The final constitutional text which was approved in the referendum on 9 July 1961, began with a preamble expressing faith in national independence and progress as inspired by Turkish nationalism, in the rule of law and social justice, and ended by entrusting the constitution to the citizens' custody. The trials in Yassıada ended on 15 September 1961, fifteen people were condemned to death and the remaining to various jail sentences ranging from a few months to life terms. Of those sentenced to death only Adnan Menderes, Hasan Polatkan, the former Minister of Finance, and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the former Foreign Minister, were hanged, despite insistent internal and external pleas for clemency.

4.4.2 Political System

In the multiparty period, DP, by advocating liberalism, equality, freedom of speech and the rule of the people, began to represent the periphery against the representatives of the center (CHP). In the general elections from 1950 to 1960, the plurality electoral system – Block Vote- was used, and in three national elections namely 1950, 1954, and 1957 DP came in power as the 'predominant party'³⁴⁵ with 55,2%, 58,4% and 48,6% share of the votes respectively.

The tension between the ruling Democrats and the Republicans increased after the elections of 1957. The Republicans had elected 178 deputies as against 31 in 1954, while the Democrats lost seats and votes; their total popular vote was in fact below the combined vote of opposition. Although the Democrats won the elections largely because of the majority system, they lost considerable popular support. Actually considerable

³⁴⁴ Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Anayasalar* (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 2002), p. 92.

³⁴⁵ Sabri Sayarı, "The Changing Party System", in S.Sayarı and Y. Esmer (eds.), *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*, (Boulder, CO : Lynne Rienner Pub, 2002).

support for the opposition came from those Democrats who opposed the growing dictatorial tendencies of their party leaders. These were the new middle-class groups who regarded the maintenance of a free and democratic system as the guarantee of their own power and safety. As the government sought to recapture its popularity, it accepted foreign loans and increased constraints on opposition parties. The confrontations reached a climax when the Democrats tried to use the military to stop İnönü from entering Kayseri to give a speech. İnönü, protesting against these measures, declared that “when conditions are complete, revolution becomes a legitimate right for the nation; for the citizen begins to think that no other institutions or way exists to defend his rights”.³⁴⁶

If we approach 1957 elections from minority perspective, it can be said that they faced a very provocative situation. Minority Turkish citizens’ short-term discontent to the incumbent party due to 6-7 September Events had not been reflected on their attitude towards DP, and they sided with DP. The reason that they continued to support DP can be explained due to RPP’s discriminative and excluding behavior during the single-party regime. RPP’s nationalist policy towards the minorities shifted a more unionist and inclusive policy understanding with the transition to multi-party system, as they began to give priority to minorities as electorates. RPP’s change in its policy found its positive reflection in the elections as well; some Greek-Orthodox representatives were elected from RPP list.

During the multi-party regime, Democrat Party initiated an election campaign towards the minorities. While until 1950, we observe only one representative from each minority community, with the transition to democracy the political parties started to nominate two minority candidates. Especially the Governor of Istanbul pursued an intensive campaign among the minority communities, such that the Turkish press published governor’s pictures with minorities’ religious leaders. As a result, DP gained 39 representatives from Istanbul’s non-Muslim electoral regions, and reached the vote share it aimed.³⁴⁷ 1946 election was the last elected that a minority MP was elected from RPP (Dr. Nikola Fakaçelli, and Dr. Vasil Konos).

³⁴⁶ Kemal H. Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*, (Timaş Yayınları: İstanbul, 2010), p. 505.

³⁴⁷ Akgönül, p. 199.

DP's attempt to mobilize non-Muslim's votes during 1957 elections can be analyzed as an effort to minimize the effects of 6-7 September Events. The fact that non-Muslim communities supported DP in 1957 elections is an important issue to be stressed. As aforementioned, this support is originated due to more negative feelings the non-Muslim communities had towards RPP. During Democrat Party rule, we see three Roum deputies in the DP seats: Ahilya Moshos; Hristaki Ioannidis, and Alexandros Hacopoulos.³⁴⁸ According to Dilek Güven, in the beginning the minority communities were strict to boycott the 1957 elections. However this boycott could lead to more dangerous situation for the minorities, if DP was elected again with a smaller vote share it would blame its loss in Istanbul from the minorities. If the electorate list was controlled, DP could easily find the ones who did not vote in the elections.³⁴⁹ Akkaya refuses Güven's claim by saying Greek-Orthodox's vote went to DP as a block and they sincerely supported Democrat Party.³⁵⁰

In sum, minority communities' support to Democrat Party during the multi-party regime can be analyzed through several explanations. They believed Wealth Tax issue would be discussed and maybe they could get their compensation (analyzed in detail in the following section). They were highly represented in the Parliament with two MPs, which enabled them to bring the cases that concerned them into the agenda. Democrat Party tried to find a solution to the issues such as election of religious leaders, regulations of minority schools and foundations. Moreover, Adnan Menderes was the first Turkish Prime Minister that visited Fener Greek-Orthodox Patriarch. Even though 6-7 September Events damaged the confidence between the minority communities and DP, the fact that some of their losses were compensated made them continue to support DP in the 1957 elections.

Political Changes with 1961 Constitution

1961 Constitution which was constructed by the military that seized the power in 1960: defined the Turkish Republic as being a democratic, secular, social state based on the recognition of human rights. TGNA became bicameral with 1961 Constitution, as it defined the legislature, that is the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, as consisting of a

³⁴⁸ Akgönül, p. 212.

³⁴⁹ Güven, p. 150.

³⁵⁰ Ahmet Yaşar Akkaya, *Menderes ve Azınlıklar*, (Müdür Kitaplığı, 2011), p 123.

Senate with 150 members elected for six years and 15 appointed by the President, and a National Assembly composed of 450 members elected for four years. The joint houses choose the President for a seven-year term. The Executive, which could include ministers outside the Parliament, was made subject to legislative controls. Because on the dominant power of Democrat Party plurality electoral system was also effective, after 1961 military coup, the electoral system changed from plurality electoral system to Proportional Representation. There was again one representative from each minority community in the Founding Assembly. The parliamentary elections held on 15 October 1961 in complete freedom reflected all these influences. Despite the military's moral support and the fact it was opposed by newly- formed parties, the Republican Party could not win the necessary electoral majority to form an independent government. It had a plurality in the Assembly while in the Senate the Justice Party had a majority. Proportional representation system was adopted for the Assembly elections, while majority electoral system was used to elect the senators. Consequently three successive coalition governments were formed in 1961-64, all under the premiership of İnönü.

4.4.3 Greek-Orthodox Deputies in the Turkish Parliament

Within the ten years of Democrat Party rule –excluding 6-7 September Events- minorities lived their most comfortable and peaceful years. They declared their confidence to DP in allowing making Wealth Tax discussions and in paying their compensations. With DP's election victory in 1950 spring, the minorities hoped that the new incumbent's liberal policy would also bring a democratic attitude towards the minorities.

After 1946, with the transition to two-party system more active policy of the deputies is observed. After 1946, all of the deputies were party members. However, in contrast to expectations they were freer in their discourses compared to independent minority representatives of the single-party regime. This can be explained through more liberal atmosphere created with the transition to democracy and through the difference of being an independent member or a party member. Therefore, it would be mis-leading to conclude and generalize that party member minority deputies are more effective compared to independent minority representatives; because we should also keep in mind transition to democracy and DP's minority-friendly approach could be influential on that.

Discussions on Wealth Tax

When the discussions on wealth tax are analyzed, it is seen that Jewish representatives are more effective compared to Roum and Armenian deputies. In 14 May 1950 elections that brought DP to power Salamon Adato was re-elected from Istanbul, and he put Wealth Tax issue to the agenda. During the elections held on 1950s, Wealth Tax was mentioned as an issue used against RPP. Ahmet Hamdi Başar –DP Istanbul deputy- said in his speech at Turkish Parliament, RPP rule brought tension between Turkish citizens, embarrassed Turkey in world public by saying “I want to declare that from now on policies of medieval age systems will not be repeated again”.³⁵¹ RPP cadre refused to take the blame only on themselves by stressing that during the Wealth Tax voting in the Parliament, DP deputies –who were RPP members that time- voted for Wealth Tax as well. On the other hand Minister of Finance Halil Ayan declared that “due to the economical conditions Turkey has, Wealth Tax losses cannot be compensated”.³⁵²

When DP came to power, minority communities were excited about and expecting new liberal policies. In the minority press announced that DP is working on a law that would permit non-Muslims to work in state offices.³⁵³ People’s Republican Party was again criticized for its discriminative policies towards the minority in terms of restricting their occupation in state offices. Avrom Leyon from the Jewish newspaper stated:

“If this news is realized, there is no doubt that Adnan Menderes Government would make the biggest benefaction it could make to this country. Until now non-Muslim citizens were perceived worthless, although Constitution states equal treatment among the citizens, non-Muslims were not allowed to work in official state service. However in old times there were even Ministers within non-Muslim citizens. RPP Government has always perceived non-Muslim citizens as step-children, the biggest example is the famous Wealth Tax. Many citizens had suffered because of this tax. It is Democrat Party’s burden to fix these unfair regulations. We expect and hope from liberal Prime Minister Adnan Menderes to implement the Constitution fully”.³⁵⁴

Upon the developments, Kemal Levent- lawyer from Jewish community- gave a petition to the TGNA asking the fixation of the unfairness occurred by Wealth Tax and compensation of the tax. Turkish representatives also supported the minority communities’ demands. On March 1951, Sinan Tekelioğlu – independent representative from Seyhan, who served among RPP seats during 1938-1950, and among DP seats during 1950-1957) announced that there was a law draft prepared to compensate the

³⁵¹ “Meclis hükümet programının müzakeresine dün başladı”, *Hürriyet*, 1 Haziran 1950.

³⁵² Rıfat Bali, *Varlık Vergisi Tartışmaları*, p. 5.

³⁵³ Ibid. “Ekalliyetler ve Devlet hizmeti”, *Hergün*, 22 Haziran 1950.

³⁵⁴ Ibid. Avram Leyon, “DP den beklediklerimiz”, *Şalom*, 29 Haziran 1950.

Wealth Tax, and non-Muslim deputies – Salamon Adato, Ahilya Moshos and Vahram Andre- would also support this draft. However, non-Muslim representatives disclaimed this news.³⁵⁵ When Faik Ökte published his book *Wealth Tax Dissaster*, the PM of the period Şükrü Şaraçoğlu said to the journalists “the work is mine, it such belongs to me that today if I were in the same position and faced with the same financial conditions, I would not hesitate to do a new one”.

In 1951, during the Istanbul municipality electoral campaigns, Wealth Tax was put in the agenda again. Dr. Lüfti Kırdar, who was RPP Istanbul candidate, said in his electoral speech “I proved my loyalty to the revolution during the elections and Wealth Tax implementation as well, as I worked in favor of the citizens. Due to electoral campaign, our rivals are trying to abuse the Wealth Tax. This is a way of propaganda and it is a very dangerous way. For the mistakes and the good deeds of Wealth Tax, we are in common with Democrat Party; because this law was implemented in 1942. The parties parted in 1945. I wonder whether the deputies that serve in the incumbent party of today, contested that law that time?”³⁵⁶

In 1957 general elections Yusuf Salman, a Jewish candidate of DP after stressing the discriminative attitudes of RPP towards the minorities, said that thanks to DP they were granted the all citizenship and human rights, and they would not give RPP vote even if they died.³⁵⁷ Rıfat Bali utters that when the Jewish deputies or community members mention their discontent with RPP or asked for compensation for the Wealth Tax, they were asked to go to Israel, which was founded in 1948.

As aforementioned, Jewish representatives, press and community were in general more active in the Wealth Tax issue compared to Greek-Orthodox community. Only once DP’s Istanbul representative Alexandros Hacıopoulos mentioned in a newspaper about Wealth Tax during 1957 electoral campaign and criticized RPP by these words “RPP did not give any money to the ones harmed by Wealth Tax. Moreover in 1941, we did not forget that RPP banished non-Muslims between 25-45 ages. Do not vote to RPP remembering these

³⁵⁵ “Varlık Vergisi geri isteniyor”, *Vatan*, 28 Mart 1951 / “Varlık Vergisi iade edilecek mi?”, *Hergün*, 23 Mayıs 1951. Rıfat Bali, “Varlık Vergisi Tartışmaları”, p. 6.

³⁵⁶ Ibid. “Partilerin şehrimizdeki seçim toplantıları”, *Cumhuriyet*, 6 Eylül 1951.

³⁵⁷ Ibid. “Ekalliyetler İçin Muhalefet ve İktidar Birbirini İtham Ediyor”, *Hürriyet*, 12 Ekim 1957.

events”³⁵⁸. In 1957 general elections Democrat Party would get an electoral victory again, and Alexandros Hacıopoulos, Yusuf Salman and İsak Altıbeş would be elected as DP Istanbul representatives.

From 1957 general elections to present day, in Turkey there have been two military coups (27 May 1960, and 12 September 1980) and two military notes (12 March 1971, and 27 April 2007). In those turmoil years, Wealth Tax was not been mentioned neither by non-Muslim citizens nor by politicians. The minority communities who were in a big expectation for the compensation of Wealth Tax during the 10 years of DP rule, realized that this hope would never be realized and that it was politically abused by DP in order to criticize RPP. Only in 1992 due to celebrations of the 500th anniversary of Immigration of Spain Jews to Ottoman, Wealth Tax issue would come to the agenda again.

Traumatic experiences stemming from the Wealth Tax, passed on Nov. 11, 1942, still continue, even though the law only remained in effect for a year and a half (and was repealed on March 14, 1944). Today the communities declare that they are only expecting an apology from RPP. İshak Alaton, Alarko Holding’s executive board chairman, is the son of one such victim Hayim Alaton. Hayim Alaton was sent to Aşkale in Erzurum in order to perform manual labor after he failed to pay two separate taxes imposed on him. After he stayed there for a year, his business went bankrupt and he spent the rest of his life greatly depressed, silent and full of resentment. Now, 69 years later, İshak Alaton tells us the tragic story of the hardships endured by his father.³⁵⁹

“İsmet İnönü took office after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1938 and began to implement a policy of repression against non-Muslim minorities. These years mark the start of the ‘black years’” as İshak Alaton puts it. The law gave taxpayers 15 days to pay their allotted taxes. Those who could pay the taxes during the allocated time were saved and those who failed to do so saw their homes and workplaces sequestered. Hayim Alaton was taken from his home and sent to a tent camp established in İstanbul’s Gülhane Park. They put people into cattle cars and sent them to Aşkale in Erzurum.”

It is seen that minority communities make a distinction between Atatürk and İnönü. While they loved and admired Mustafa Kemal due to his reforms on secularism and modernization, they do not like RPP because of İnönü, who was the politician behind the discriminative policies towards minorities. With the transition to democracy, minorities hoped the unfair regulations would be corrected by Democrat Party, however, 6-7

³⁵⁸ “Varlık Vergisi Faciasından Sadece CHP İdaresi Mesuldür”, *Son Havadis*, 13 Ekim 1957.

³⁵⁹ <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-262468-ishak-alaton-wealth-tax-biggest-blow-to-non-muslim-minorities.html>.

September Events would create disappointment, Wealth Tax compensations would not be paid and the discrimination in state office employment would not be healed.

Discussion on 6-7 September Events

Roum community was the main target of 6-7 September Pogroms, which occurred following the tension in Cyprus between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Therefore, in contrast to Wealth Tax discussion, Roum deputies pursued a more active role when 6-7 September Events were put into the agenda. Analysis of the leaders of Roum community and how the Roum press evaluated the events reveals that they behaved in a connective, realistic and constructive attitude, just after 6-7 September Events that weakened the ties between Greek-Orthodox and Muslim public. After 6-7 September Events, especially Roum community living in Istanbul felt threatened. The reason that prevents such a social trauma to extend further was the charity campaigns that Muslim citizens also participated in and hopeful declarations made by the community leaders.

Among the Roum community, security forces were criticized more than Democrat Party. DP Istanbul MP Alexandros Hacıopoulos's speech in the Parliament is important from this perspective. He said:

“The sad events happened are clear to us and the whole world. Religious and cultural places were destroyed and burned totally, our national assets worth millions perished, and domestic privacy of many innocents were violated and ruined under terrible conditions. The press also has a role in this. Do you want an example? Last day, in the 8th of the month Ulus Newspaper has an article such ‘Priests burned the churches’ how is this possible my friends? The thing that upsets us most, I must confess, is the security organization”³⁶⁰.

On the other hand, right after the events for the compensation and remediation of the damages, the government, Roum and Muslim communities held necessary operations.³⁶¹ DP government's declarations on the newspapers aimed to sustain security in the city. Dilek Güven asserts that Roum community was not satisfied with the compensation paid, however they accepted it and did not make a negative speeches about it.³⁶²

Roum community expressed their reactions clearly through press. In *Embros* newspaper – which was vandalized during the events- on article says “We will stay here where we

³⁶⁰TGNA Archives, “The discussions about the compensation to be given to those who got damaged from the events occurred in İstanbul and İzmir during 6-7 September Events”- 1 Ekim 1955.

³⁶¹ (Akşam 7 September 1955; Vatan 10 September 1955, Milliyet 7 September 1955, Vakıf 10 September 1955). From Orhan Türker's study.

³⁶² Dilek Güven, 2009, p. 61.

belong. Roum will rise again from where we fall to build our churches, to bury our dead, to revise our schools, work places and houses. We will remain in this country, where we were born, grew up and even ruined where our fathers and grandfathers' graves exists"³⁶³. Again in *Apoyevmatini* newspaper's 21 September publication it was stated, "The leaders of Turkish Republic immediately castigated the events and promised that it will not be repeated again. Moreover, they expressed that the damages would be compensated. After the first shock of the events and people's suffering lightened a little, the comforts and safeguard came from the official positions put us at ease."³⁶⁴ Patriarch's permanent representative at World Churches Council Melitis Gakovos's article "Pain" published in *Apostolos Andreas* magazine highlights a significant point about how suffering is perceived and glorified by Orthodox members. "As good Christians, we have to live the pain of this new catastrophe. We should approach it as a new test"³⁶⁵.

Hence, as we see, after 1946 minority deputies becomes more active on issues related their communities; however whenever they did this, a common attitude in Turkish representatives takes our notice. They whether try to generalize the problem, as they suffered as well. They sometimes tried to link Roum minorities with Greece. They mentioned the problems of Turks living in other lands. They blamed outside forces, and usually communists for the problems. Even there was no evidence that communist groups were behind these events, they were blamed because religious places such as churches were attacked. Some people perceived the attacks as a counter-attack for Greece's attitudes towards the communist groups. Even Prime Minister of the term Adnan Menderes's speech on 12 September 1955 DP group meeting "the communist who abused the available conditions with such a cool-headed and professional manner, made such a heavy situation that we can call it a national catastrophe" supports how communist groups were seen as the forces behind these events. As a result of the accusations around 45 intellectuals were arrested, among whom were Aziz Nesin, Kemal Tahir, Aslan Yanardağ, Hasan İzzettin Dinamo, Asım Bezirci ve Hulusi Dosdoğru. The charges could not be proved and the cases failed.³⁶⁶

³⁶³ Orhan, Türker, "6/7 Eylül Olaylarının İstanbul Rum Basınındaki Yankıları", *Tarih ve Toplum Dergisi*, No. 177, 1998, p. 16.

³⁶⁴ Ibid. Turker, p. 144.

³⁶⁵ Konstantina Andrianopoulo, "İstanbul Rum Basınının Tepkisi ve 6/7 Eylül Olayları", *Tarih ve Toplum Dergisi*, Eylül 2003, No. 237, p.27.

³⁶⁶ Samim Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları: Küreselleşme Çağında Bir Grubun Yok Oluşu*, (İletişim Yayınları, 2007), p. 403.

In 12 September 1955, when Greek-Orthodox deputy Alexandros Hacopoulos who was merchant and also the manager of Zappion School -Istanbul DP deputy and born in Istanbul, served two terms (1954-1960)-, took the floor for the topic ‘Martial Law in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara’³⁶⁷ and “Compensation for the damaged properties”³⁶⁸ after 6-7 September Events, same attitudes of Turkish representatives could be observed. Again immediately, Manisa representative Hikmet Bayur after uttering the events were painful for all, said “all Muslims, Armenians, Jews have suffered”. Burhanetti Onat from Antalya and State Minister Fuad Köprülü blamed the communists for the provocations of the events. Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver links the problem to Turkish-Greek relations, suggested deportation of Turks living outside of Turkish borders to Anatolia. When Armenian deputy Dr. Zakar Tarver said “the ones who discriminate against minorities are stupid. Those who think they still live in the age of the caliphate and sultanate have not understood that we live in a secular state”; Osman Alişanoğlu from Kırşehir asserted that “there is no minority (ekalliyet) in Turkish fatherland.

In sum, martial law was accepted for 6 months and compensation was given to the ones who suffered during the 6-7 events. Here, we can say that minority deputies were effective in protecting their rights. Similar to Greek-Ottoman deputies in 1908 Parliament, Greek-Orthodox representatives who served in Turkish Parliament expressed reasonable argument and tried to differentiate Roum community from the Greeks living outside Turkey’s territory. Compared to the representatives who served during the single-party regime, under multi-party rule they managed to represent their own communities much better besides participating in the issues concerning the whole country. Moreover, they increased the visibility of the minorities in the public, created peaceful bonds between Muslims and non-Muslims through their peaceful explanations even right after

³⁶⁷ TGNA Archives, “The discussions on the Martial Law to be announced in İstanbul, İzmir ve Ankara provinces”, 12 September 1955.

“Tüylər ürpertici olaylar karşısında insan haklarına tapan ve medeniyete aşık olan Türk milletine ait olması hasebiyle elbette bu anda bu kürsü susamazdı...Celâl Bayar ve Adnan Menderes ve vekilleri muazzam gayret ve gösterdikleri hakiki ve kardeşçe alakadan dolayı ne kadar teşekkür etsem azdır”. “Dinimin Hristiyan olması hasebiyle değil, bir Türk vatandaşı ve bu milletin mümessili olarak medeniyetimize ve tarihimize vurulmuş bu darbe beni son derece üzmüştür”. “Anı fevran değil, planlıdır”. “Milletimizin milli davalarında ne kadar hassas olduğunu elbette takdir ediyoruz, fakat bu öfke ve hiddet kimlerin aleyhinde kullanılmıştır? Anayasanın 88. Maddesi Türkiye’de din ve ırk ayrımı gözetmeksizin vatandaşlık bakımından herkes Türktür” Hiçbir vatandaş ne rehlin ne de esirdir. Bizi en çok üzen memleketin emniyet teşkilatının bazı hadiselere göz yummasıdır.

³⁶⁸TGNA Archives, “The discussions about the compensation to be given to those who got harmed by the events which occurred in İstanbul and İzmir during 6-7 September Events”- 1 October 1955.

the 6-7 Events that directly targeted Roum community. However, Greek-Orthodox deputies did not name discriminations they lived as citizens and de-facto restrictions they had in serving in state offices. This issue still forms one of main problems Roum and other non-Muslim minorities suffer in present time.

Another issue concerning the Roum community was the management of the foundations. The Greek-Orthodox minority representative Dr. Nikola Fakaçelli, was the first minority deputy that mentioned the concerns of his community in the Parliament on that issue. He was RPP Istanbul deputy and was born in Istanbul. He served in the term VIII (1946-1950). He took the floor 11 times, and one time gave a question that was about the community foundations. He demanded the abolishment of 5% control right on these foundations, which was accepted in 1936 by law but has not been implemented yet. About the foundation managements, Dr. Fakaçelli complained about the problems caused by a single administrator.³⁶⁹ With the abolishment of the 24th article of the Foundations Law in 1949, the 5% control right has not been applied.³⁷⁰ This shows that minority MPs were efficient to express the problems of the minority community and with the political will of their party (more effective when that party is in power), they manage to get sufficient results.

As aforementioned, Greek-Orthodox MPs' speeches in the Parliament are very crucial as they also inform us on the reactions and attitudes of the Turkish-Muslim MPs of the time. In the Parliament Archives, it is seen that after Dr. Fakaçelli mentioned his concerns on the management and tax policy of the minority foundations, immediately Ordu deputy Hamdi Şarlan took the floor and said "as the reason and function of minority foundations had changed since Ottoman, their functions should be determined". He also diverted the topic and managed to turn the problem of minority community to a general problem of Turkish society by asking "what would happen to the foundations remaining from Ottoman and Seljuk Empire?"³⁷¹. Other Greek-Orthodox minorities the lawyer Ahilya

³⁶⁹ His speech on "PM Office's question about the management of the community foundations" (12.04.1948).

³⁷⁰ Elçin Macar, "The Problems of Minority Foundations during the Single-Party Era", (ed.) Lorans Tanatan Baruh and Vangelis Kechriotis, *Economy and Society on Both Shores of the Aegean*, (Alpha Bank Historical Archives, 2010).

³⁷¹ Hamdi Şarlan (Ordu) "Modern devlet teşkilatında vakıflar amme hizmeti görmesi mevzu bahis değildir. Vakıflar hangi vazifeyi görecek belirlensin. Bizim ecdadımızdan kalan Selçuklu ve Osmanlı eserleri ne olacak? İbadethanelerimiz ve din adamlarımız modernleşmeli".

(Ahilleas) Moshos (DP Istanbul deputy); tobacco merchant Hristaki Ioannadis (DP Istanbul deputy); and lawyer Kaludi Laskari (representative of Founding Parliament) didn't take the floor on issues concerning minorities. Hristaki Ioannadis is the last Greek-Orthodox deputy who served in the TGNA, after 1960 unfortunately no member of Roun community represented in the assembly.

4.5 Comparison of Political Representation of Roun Deputies in 1935-46 and 1946-61: From Misrepresentation to Representation

In general it is observed that political representation and effectiveness of the minority MPs and Roun MPs increased in Turkey with the transition from single-party regime to multi-party system. In order to deepen the comparison party-alliance of the MPs, and their backgrounds (place of birth and occupation) is necessary to analyze.

Party-Alliance

There was also a link between party preference of minorities and party-policies towards them. As aforementioned, until 1946 the transition to the multiparty system, minorities had been represented in the Turkish Parliament as independent candidates. It is observed that the minority community preferred the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti- DP) rather than the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- RPP). It is seen that only Greek-Orthodox minority group were elected from RPP between 1946 and 1950. The reason of preference for the minority group favoring DP can be due to the repressive measures of RPP. For example, as a result of the repressive measures of the RPP during the Early Republican period (1923-1945), in the 1930 municipality elections, the minorities supported the opponent party, Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Partisi- FRP) and FRP managed to mobilize the minority and immigrant (mostly exchangees) electorates as well.³⁷²

Similarly, in the 14 May 1950 national elections, they voted for DP in majority, and played an important role for DP to come to the power, and each of the minority groups

³⁷² Rıfat N.Balı "1930 yılı Belediye seçimleri ve Serbest Fırka'nın azınlık adayları", *Tarih ve Toplum*, Vol. 167, November 1997, pp. 25-34

Cemil Koçak, *Belgelerle İktidar ve Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, The Incumbent Party and Free Republican Party with documents*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2006). Cem Emrence, *99 Günlük Muhalefet: Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, Opposition of 99 Days: Free Republican Party*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2006).

was represented in the Parliament.³⁷³ The 6-7 September Events of 1955 damaged the good relation and trust between the minorities in Turkey and the political parties. During the 6-7 September Events of 1955, as a deputy from the incumbent party-DP- Aleksandros Hacopulos can be noted as the most effective Greek-Orthodox politician who expressed the concerns of his community.³⁷⁴

Localism

In his work *Turkish Political Elite*, Frey defines localism as the proportion of deputies born in the constituency, which they represent.³⁷⁵ Frey's study shows that during the single-party regime (1923-1946) localism ratio for the MPs in the Turkish parliament was very low (34%), whereas after 1950 with the transition to democracy and an involvement of competition in to the political system this ratio increased to 60%. When we check these ratios for the minority MPs, it is seen that none of the minority MPs were elected from the district they were born or live in during the authoritarian regime (for the place of birth and occupation of the minority deputies, see Appendix C). Nikola Fakaçelli (Greek-Orthodox) is the first minority MP who was elected from the constituency he was born. After 1946, all of the minority MPs were elected from Istanbul, where the majority of the minority population in Turkey had lived. Similar to the general of the Turkish Parliament, localism increased within the minority representatives, however in a lower ratio. The main reason for this lower ratio is that, some of the minority MPs (Vasil Konos, Ahilya Moshos, Henri Soryano, and Yusuf Salman) were born outside of Turkey's borders in late 19th century, when these provinces were within Ottoman territory. Chapter 5 will demonstrate that in Greece, localism is higher for the Greek and Muslim MPs as well.

Table 3. Localism in the Turkish Parliament and within the Minority MPs

| <i>Parliament</i> | <i>Mixed-Locally born (percent)</i> | <i>Minority-Locally born (in numbers)</i> | <i>Roum MPs- Locally born (in numbers)</i> |
|-------------------|-------------------------------------|---|--|
| 1920* | 62 | -- | -- |
| 1935 | 34 | 0/4 | 0/2 |
| 1939** | n/a | 0/4 | 0/2 |

³⁷³ Istanbul deputies (Resourse: TBMM Albümü 1920-1991), Rifat Bali, Cumhuriyet Döneminde Azınlık Milletvekilleri, *Toplumsal Tarih*, No. 186, June 2009.

³⁷⁴ Alexis, *Greek Minority of Istanbul*, p. 289.

³⁷⁵ Frederick W. Frey, *Turkish Political Elite*, (M.I.T Press, 1965).

| | | | |
|------|-----|--------------|-----|
| 1943 | n/a | 0/4 | 0/2 |
| 1946 | n/a | 1/3 | 1/2 |
| 1950 | 60 | 2/4 | 1/2 |
| 1954 | 62 | 1/3 | 1/1 |
| 1957 | 66 | 3/6 | 2/2 |
| 1961 | 69 | 1/1 (senate) | -- |

Source: for 1920-1957: Frey, *the Turkish Political Elite*, pp.187-189. For 1961: Tachau, *Parliamentary Elites in Turkey*, p.221. *There was no minority MP in the 1920 Turkish Parliament. **In the 1939 session, same non-Muslim minorities served in the Turkish parliament.

Occupation

According to the results of Frey³⁷⁶, three professional groups are over-represented within the Turkish Parliament: bureaucrats and lawyers in the early Republic and engineers since the 1970's. As we have seen, the number of civil servants is important during the one-party period before decreasing regularly, whereas liberal professions experience a parallel rise, notably just before the multi-party system. Within this group, lawyers are the most numerous, except in 1957. During the single-party period, professional profiles like high rank army members and bureaucrats who had reached the higher echelons in state administration could be rewarded after their retirement by being made MPs. These civil servants formed the most crowded group in Parliament. According to Frey's study, the rate of this group in the Parliaments of the single-party period ranged from 23% to 57%. The number of parliamentarians who were self-employed, as well as tradesmen and industrialists from the 'private enterprise', were much lower. According to Tachau³⁷⁷, the Democrat Party (DP) represents the interests of provincial middle-classes in the 1950's, and 'localism is increasing.

As the minority members were de facto deprived of being state officers, majority of them were professionals (doctors, lawyers, academicians) rather than civil servants. With the transition to democracy and rise of DP, we observe a change in the occupation of the minority MPs (see Appendix C). In 1950 session, except Alexandros Hacopoulos, the other 3 MPs are again professionals. On the other hand, in the 1957 Parliament, except Dr. Zakar Taver, the other 5 minority MPs are merchants. Chapter 5 will show that until 1977 Greek Parliament, the Muslim-Turkish MPs were not professionals and less

³⁷⁶ Ibid. pp.114-122.

³⁷⁷ Frank Tachau, 'Parliamentary Elites: Turkey', in Landau Jacob. M.; Özbudun Ergun; Tachau, Frank (eds.), *Electoral Politics in the Middle East: Issues, Voters and Elites*, (London, Cromm Helm; Stanford, Hoover, 1980) pp. 205-242.

educated compared to the Roum MPs, and majority of them were land-owners, merchants and clergyman (see Appendix E).

From this research some points can be generalized:

1. The political history and system depicted before every term, common attitude of the minority deputies and their discourses supports Fredrik Barth's argument that political participation of minorities was influenced by the social and political conditions of the society, they are part of.
2. Before transition to multi-party democracy, minority deputies declared they were representatives of the whole Turkish nation, not the minority communities. They felt the need to declare they are loyal citizens of the republic. Especially, as seen in İstamati Zihni Özdamar's and Berç Türker (Armenian deputy)'s speeches, they denied the minority-majority separation. Therefore, even though they were independent deputies; they were loyal to RPP policy. Their presence in the Turkish Parliament was symbolic; they were not effective. However, their initial presence in the Parliament led to a more effective and fair representation of the following MPs served after the transition to multi-party system.
3. Minority deputies who were party members were more effective in the Parliament in terms of issues related to minority communities. They did not hesitate to use the word 'minority' word. The minority deputies' surname under single-party regimes was Turkish, showing that RPP listed the minority candidates who were loyal to the regime and to the party. Hence, regime type in the country they live in matters for the effectiveness of the minority MPs in the parliament.
4. While independent deputies were not natives of the provinces they represented, party members were elected from the cities they were born and their communities who would bring electoral support knew them. As Table 3 indicated, for both Muslim and non-Muslim MPs, localism increased after the transition to democracy and to a competitive politics.
5. Minority representatives did not mention the events against the minority communities, and did not make intensive opposition to the incumbent parties. Their passiveness was

mainly due to the restricted political freedom during the early republican period. Moreover, as observed in all of the minority MPs, if a minority deputy desires for re-election, he/she should not make so much opposition in the parliament.

6. None of the minority deputies and Roum community preferred RPP (Republican People's Party) after 1950 due to its policies excluding and suppressing minorities. Their negative attitude was mainly against İsmet İnönü rather than the party. There was a sharp distinction between Atatürk and İnönü. Especially Roum community while they remember Atatürk with respect, they dislike İnönü for his policy on population exchange, for Wealth Tax implementation and for his unilateral denouncement of 1933 Ankara Agreement in 1964 that leads to massive migration of Roum community.
7. Compared to Greek-Orthodox deputies, Armenian and Jewish representatives were politically active in the Assembly. Tension between Greece and Turkey during 1950s and 1960s were main reasons to this difference, which also supports Barth's thesis on the role of ethnic boundaries.
8. Among the 23 minority representatives (including member of the senate, and founding parliament), there is only one female MP, Armenian Hermine Agavni Kalustyan, who served in the founding parliament as deputy representative of State President. However, she was not elected but appointed for the position.

4.6 Years of Non-Representation (1961-Present)

In 1935-1939 National Assembly, there were one Armenian, one Jewish, one Greek-Orthodox and one Turkish-Orthodox deputy. Even though Armenian and Jewish communities were not affected with the 1964 verdict, it was surprising that they weren't nominated as deputies or elected either. This result shows that, their non-representation cannot be explained only through numerical deficiency. After 1923, the first reduction in the number of the minorities in Turkey began with the establishment of the Israel state in 1948, as there was a massive migration of Jewish citizens to this country. It is also known

that with Soviet Union's invitation in 1946, a number of Armenians in Turkey immigrated to Armenia.³⁷⁸

The serious reduction in the number of the Roum in Turkey is not a result of 6-7 September Events of 1955; however is a result of psychological trauma they suffered in the long term. As aforementioned, the Patriarch, representatives and minority newspapers tried to make the community stay where they were born through various terms. The main migration started in August 1957, when Greek and Roum journalists were deported. Prominent Roum businessmen including the previous DP Greek-Orthodox deputy Dr. Nikola Fakaçelli left Istanbul.

In 1964 Turkey took a number of strong measures—often referred to as the “dissolution programme” (*eritme programı*)—towards Imros and Tenedos, which were presented as a direct response to repression inflicted upon the Turks in Western Thrace and Cyprus. The teaching of Greek language was suspended and the Greek community schools along with other buildings became sequestered. As a result many of the islanders went to Istanbul or Greece to secure Greek education for their children. After 1964 Turkey took away first the Turkish citizenship from those who studied abroad, and afterwards from all the young people who consequently had to leave. They even took away the citizenship of people who had died, but whose deaths had not been recorded. A mosque was built in the main village and a program for settling 3,000 was initiated. On top of this set up an “Open Farm Prison” was established on Gökçeada and the heavy convicts spread a climate of terror among the native population.

Another aspect is the indignation often expressed in Greece when Turkey cried up about the situation in Thrace, since the memories of the Turkish handling of minorities were fresh. While the “September events” in 1955 is the incident most often referred to in the Greek press, it was the 1964 expulsions which marked the beginning of the end for the Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul. Most of the minority members were Turkish citizens, but some 10,000 *établis* held Greek passports. This arrangement hailed back to the transition from Ottoman Empire to modern Turkey. The Greek nationals were an integral part of the minority and had as a rule lived in Istanbul for generations. In order to

³⁷⁸ Sarkis Çerkezyan, *Dünya Hepimize Yeter*, (Belge Yayınları: İstanbul), 2009, p. 27.

put pressure on Greece in the Cyprus dispute, Turkey denounced unilaterally the 1930 Conventions of Establishment, Commerce, and Navigation on 16 March 1964, and announced the intention of expelling all the Greek nationals who resided in Istanbul. This measure affected a much larger group than those with Greek passports, since the Greek Orthodox of Turkey formed one single ethnic group. The expulsion of one person could consequently lead to the departure of a whole family.

Fiscal authorities took a series of arbitrary measures intended to ensure that Greek nationals were deprived of all possibility of liquidating their assets. The expulsions were carried out with extreme harshness and with the intention of humiliating the victims. They were not allowed to take out with them more than \$20 and one suitcase containing only clothing; and they were forced to sign a declaration of the contents of which they were not allowed to take cognisance. It was revealed, through a friendly police officer, that by this declaration the signatory admitted: (a) having committed currency offences; (b) having been a member of the dissolved Hellenic Union of Istanbul which had been accused of political activities inimical to Turkey; (c) having sent money to the Greek “terrorists” in Cyprus; (d) finally, that he was leaving Turkey of his own free will (Greece’s Information Services 1965).

In the aftermath of the Cyprus invasion in 1974 (known as the “peace operation” in Turkish), the situation became very tense. Today the Greek Orthodox population has all but vanished. For Gökçeada this decline is presented as follows: In 1950 there were 6,100 Greeks and 200 Turks. According to the 1960 census there were 5,487 Greeks and 289 Turks. In 1970 there were 2,571 Greeks and 4,020 Turks. In 1985 there were 496 Greeks and 7,114 Turks. In 1990 there were 7,200 Turks and 300 Greeks, most of them older than 60 years old. Only some 40 Greeks remained on Bozcaada. Another islander complains bitterly about what Greek diplomats would say: “We cannot spoil the relationship with Turkey for ten fishermen”.³⁷⁹ The dramatic reduction of the minority as a result of the expulsions and the pressures on the remaining minority members has brought the minority to the verge of extinction.

4.6.1 Political History

³⁷⁹ Samim Akgönül, *Rum Azınlık*, p. 256.

In 27 May 1960, Turkish democracy was interrupted by a military coup which accused DP and its politicians as being un-democratic, and claimed the military coup was done in the name of freedom of speech and democracy. DP was outlawed, its leadership banned from politics and its founder (also the former Prime Minister) Adnan Menderes executed with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and the Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan by a military edict for violating the constitution. After DP was closed, it was re-established with the name of Adalet Partisi [*Justice Party-AP*].

The plurality electoral system –Block Vote- which required the “winner takes all” system was seen as the reason for the repressive power of DP in the parliament and on society. Therefore, as a caution against the probability of undemocratic governance, the 1961 Constitutional Law replaced the plurality electoral system with the proportional representative (PR) electoral system which created a multiparty system in the National Assembly, and increased the level of fragmentation in the party system during the early 1960s. According to the general assumptions of the literature review given above, voter turnout is expected to be higher in countries with a PR electoral system than in the countries with a plurality electoral system. Here, the alternation in the electoral system from plurality to PR electoral system in Turkey with the 1961 Constitution did not increase the rate of electoral participation in Turkish national elections. In contrast a reduction in voter turnout is observed if the average participation in 1950s, 1960s and 1970s is compared.

4.6.2. Political System

Towards the ends of 1960s, ideological polarization between leftist and rightist political views became dominant in the voting decision of the electorates, especially those living in the urban cities, whereas the patron-client relationship continued in the rural areas. In 12 March 1971, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) declared a statement asserting that if the political parties could not prevent the anarchic conditions and struggle between the Turkish leftist and rightist youth, the military would handle the administration directly. This statement is accepted as the second military coup in the history of Republic of Turkey. After this military coup, not the major parties but only the small Marxists

Türkiye İşçi Partisi [*Turkish Labor Party-TİP*] and Islamist Milli Nizam Partisi [*National Order Party- MNP*] were banned by the Constitutional Court.³⁸⁰

However in the 1973 national election, it is seen that AP lost significant share of votes: the Pro-Islamist party Milli Selamet Partisi [*National Party-MSP*] received the 11,8% of the votes in this election, a percentage which signifies that people began vote for extremist parties rather than the parties closer to the center. Whereas, competition between CHP (leftist) and AP (rightist) increased again in 1977 national election, where they obtained 41,4% and 36,9% share of the votes respectively. In 12 September 1980, Turkish Armed Forces interrupted the Turkish democracy for the third time, and seized the political governance in Turkey. All of the former political parties were closed, and politicians were banned from politics.

The 1982 Constitutional Law made two changes in the electoral system, which altered the voting behavior of electorates and rule of politics for political parties and politicians. First by considering the low electoral participation rate of the 1977 general elections in 1982 Turkey adopted a new constitution and new election law, which defined the act of voting as “mandatory”. Those who failed vote could be subject to punishment, if the eligible voter in question failed to declare a credible excuse, such as serving in the army, as soldiers had been exempt from voting since 1983.³⁸¹ Second, by considering the uprising political demands of ethnic minorities (especially Kurds), in order to prevent their entrance to the Parliament, the electoral threshold was increased to a 10% level. This high national threshold requires that any party that takes less than 10% of the general votes cannot enter to the National Assembly and the votes given to them be distributed among the other parties that manage to pass the threshold.

4.6.3. Political Representation after 1961: Role of Patriarchate and Greek Consulate

For the political representation of minorities, it is indicated in the literature that Proportional Representation electoral system is in favor of minorities compared to the plurality system. In Turkey, the analysis of the political representation of the non-Muslim citizens indicate a contrary situation, as their representation was higher during the

³⁸⁰ Sabri Sayarı, “The Changing Party System”, p.15.

³⁸¹ Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society*, (I.B.Taurus: New York, 2007), p. 16.

plurality electoral system and finished totally with the alternation to the PR system in 1961. They were easily elected in the terms where there were democratic elections, but a dominant party rules in the Parliament, as it is observed during Democrat Party's ten years of rule during the 1950s. The liberal atmosphere, political mobilization and party competition made minority votes more important and DP and RPP competed for minority votes especially in Istanbul. With the implementation of the PR system, until 2002 with the electoral victory of Justice and Development Party, Turkish politics witnessed a high level of fragmentation, electoral volatility, failure of coalition governments, and except ANAP, there had never been a party as Democrat Party that dominated the Parliament with a high vote ratio. Beside the numerical disadvantage, political instability also played a role in non-representation of minority communities. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that minority premier leaders have been asked to be JDP members since 2001, and asked to participate in Constitution Commissions.

Since 1961 elections, the Greek-Orthodox community has been absent from the political arena of Turkey, similar to the other non-Muslim citizens. Turkish Greeks have started to migrate from Turkey to other western countries, particularly Greece since the outbreak of events 1955; although the actual migrations were in tense in 1964. Because of Turkey's termination of the Treaty of Trade and Residence signed with Greece, tens thousands of people from Greek abandoned Turkey. Their number reduced drastically with 1964 denunciation of 1930 Agreement, moreover with 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, there was another massive immigration observed within Rourm community. Today there are approximately 3,000 Rourm living in Istanbul (excluding the Arab- Orthodox population).

Hence since 1961, non-Muslim minority groups, and especially Greek-Orthodox community have been deprived of political representation in the Turkish Parliament. Whether this is a deliberate choice of the minority groups or the major effective political parties are an issue, which must be questioned. Examining political participation from the point of view of democratic stability, one can note that minorities run the risk of being excluded from the political system without special protective measures. Especially in countries with mobilized ethnic nationalism, majorities have been unlikely to vote for parties or candidates of other nations or ethnic groups. Conventional institutions of democracies without minorities are insufficient to allow for a stable democracy system in diverse societies. It is in the interest of state and stability to provide for political inclusion

of minorities to avoid the consequences of exclusion. Generally it is seen that, political participation of minorities has been largely channeled through minority parties. On the other hand, parliamentary representation, though symbolically important, has often not been the most significant form of minority inclusion, as the impact of minority members in the Parliament has been marginal. In a situation where the number of minorities diminished in extensive ratios, it is obvious that minority candidates cannot mobilize non-muslim electorates, nor can they guarantee vote share attracting the parties. According to Rifat Bali, the only feature political parties would require from a minority candidate is to contribute to Turkish Republic's promotion. My interviews with the Roum community's premiers Yorgos Stefanopoulos and Laki Vingas, contradicts Rifat Bali's assumption that the minority representatives were only for "window dressing".

Since 1961 founding parliament, there is no Roum MP in the Turkish Parliament. Therefore, in order to understand political mobilization and participation strategy of the Roum community whose number reduced around 4,000 today, I conducted interviews with the community's prominent figures. The interview with a Turkish MP helps to compare how reciprocity rule is perceived by the Roum community and by the Turkish state. For this reason, I conducted four interviews, two interviews with Prof. Dr. Yorgo Stefanopoulos in 2011, when he was the dean of Isik University and in March 2013 when he was the Rector Consultant. In September 2011, I made an interview with Laki Vingas who was the representative of community foundations. In January 2014 I conducted my last interview with Prof. Dr. Evangelia Şarlak (Faculty of Fine Art, Isik University). For the view of the incumbent party, I made an interview with JDP Istanbul MP Prof. Dr. Burhan Kuzu (1 April 2013).

In general, interviews display that Roum minority does not have a monolithic political view. For the question "how does the community organize/or even organize in the elections? Do they come to a consensus on a candidate or a party?" Stefanopoulos and Vingas did not give a common answer. Prof. Dr. Stefanopoulos said the Greek-Orthodox community was offended by RPP due to "Tax on Wealth" and "1964 deportation of Greek citizens" which led to the numerical disappearance of the community. Laki Vingas' demands and problems are oriented mostly on future expectations and rather than the past. He believes the community needs to integrate to the Turkish society and should be more visible in politics, economy and media. Evangelia Şarlak stressed that the

community usually votes for center-right parties such as Democrat Party, Justice Party and ANAP (Motherland Party); now they are more likely for vote to AKP (Justice and Development Party-JDP); however the intelligentsia gives its vote for RPP. According to Şarlak, for the new generation who have not witnessed, nor heard discriminative policy of the single-party regime, RPP has a salient vote potential. JDP MP Burhan Kuzu mentioned the positive steps his party made regarding the minority rights, and said the reason for not opening the Halkidiki Theology School is tied to policy of the minority, rather than the political will of JDP. In terms of minority rights, Burhan Kuzu made comparison with the situation of Muslim-Turks in Western Thrace. According to Kuzu, Rour minority has been granted more rights than the minority in Greece, such that they can elect their religious leaders, manage their own foundations, elect the administrative officers for the community foundations, get their properties back, and their churches has been restored at JDP's rule.

In analyzing the years of non-representation and violations of minority rights, although RPP was disliked by the community and punished in elections after 1950s, Prof. Dr. Stefanopoulos points out that while loving, respecting and appreciating Atatürk especially for his reforms in modernization and secularism, which coincide with community's life style, the community is not in favor of İsmet İnönü, who is seen as the architect of population exchange, implemented Wealth Tax in 1942, and denounced that Ankara Agreement in 1964. Therefore, the community's main distrust was not towards RPP but to İnönü himself. When Bülent Ecevit was the leader of the RPP during 1970s, they voted for Ecevit. Stefanopoulos also shared his memory regarding this discontent towards İsmet İnönü. He said later, while both Stefanopoulos and İsmet İnönü's son Erdal İnönü were professors at Bosphorus University, he expressed that Rour community was not in favor of his father, and Erdal İnönü replied: "you are not unfair".

Prof. Dr. Stefanopoulos said there is not a common party preference among the Rour community, but they vote for the party, which has a better message to the community, and for this period this party is Justice and Development Party. An interesting point which falsifies the arguments that numerical size matters for the political representation of minorities also occurred during this interview. Stefanopoulos also mentioned that he got an offer from JDP in 2001. Even though he believed their sincerity, he didn't accepted that offer because 'secularism' is very salient for the community, and he might find

himself in difficulty when a law opposed ‘secularism’ is voted or discussed. When I asked the question “why he would be preferred by JDP?” in our second interview on March 2013, his answer also falsified Rifat Bali’s argument that minority candidates would be preferred only for symbolic terms, when they can contribute to Turkey’s image. Stefanopoulos said, his colleague from Bosphorus University, İbrahim Özat, who participated in JDP branches, named him. Respecting freedom of belief, Stefanopoulos backed İbrahim Özat who could not find a position in the university due to his conservative religious practices. Knowing that Stefanopoulos was one of the faculty members who were against the ban on headscarf, İbrahim Özat brought this offer to him, as he also shares the party’s approach in terms of freedom of belief. Hence the offer was due to his merit, rather than his ethnic identity. Laki Vingas also appreciated the friendly approach of JDP towards the minority community, its policy on democratization, and freedom of belief. Even though he said the community in general supports JDP today; he didn’t say they were offended by RPP and vote for rightist parties since then. According to him, community is not organized before the elections to support and make consensus on candidates or parties. Both said, they would like to be elected as deputies in the Parliament.

I asked the political representation of minority question to JDP MP Burhan Kuzu. He said his electorate basis will not show a reaction to that, as it is a center party. At local level, there are minority members who are in JDP cadres. On the other hand, Burhan Kuzu emphasized that he is against an implementation of quota system for the minorities, as it will highlight the fragmentation in the society. A minority member can be a JDP MP, if he/she does not work only for the minority issue, but mentions minority problems in terms of human rights, and also tries to find solutions to the whole country’s problems. According to Burhan Kuzu, as a result of minority psychology, the community is close to integration and mis-representation can also be a choice of them. Samim Akgönül’s survey on Greek-Orthodox minority falsifies the belief that the community supports only rightist parties. According to this survey, 62% of community is interested in politics. 32% of the respondents take place in center of the spectrum; 37% in left; and 13% on right of the spectrum. None of them are located in radical left or radical right. However, people’s ideological preferences are not directly reflected in their party preferences either.

On the issue of ‘reciprocity’, both participants stated their discontent on its

implementation, by asserting, “human rights should not be based on reciprocity”. “Greece, as a member of EU, has to do the best for its citizens, and Turkey should do the same as well”, says Prof. Dr. Stefanopoulos. Prof. Dr. Evangelia Şarlak included that she does not perceive Greece as the guarantor state, and the word ‘reciprocity’ evokes negative feelings in community members. According to Burhan Kuzu, even if Turkey becomes an EU member, the problems regarding the minorities would not be solved immediately, mostly because of Greece’s policy of mis-recognition of its minority’s identity. Greece is denying the ethnic identity of its minority to deter Turkey’s interference in its politics. Two states make the minority rights a bargaining topic, and again for Burhan Kuzu Greece is the party to blame for, as it does not respected the rights given by the Lausanne Treaty, and bargaining becomes the only option.

Roum community who are experienced in forming organizations and management of their foundations since Ottoman period, developed different ways of political representation outside Parliament corridors in expressing their problems in education, foundation managements, office employment, religious rights. These are mainly the Patriarchate, the Greek Consulate and the Greek state.

The issue of political representation does not concern only the management of the foundation. Duties and responsibilities are shared between the two most important institutions of the community: the Patriarchate and the Greek Consulate. Despite the secularism imposed by the Turkish Republic and the secularization of religious institutions in the community, the Patriarchate continues to be a point of reference for the community. The community expects a lot from the Patriarchate, although it does not have the legal capacity to fulfill the expectations. In practical terms, it often plays the role of a counselor with regards the domain of education. Many times Patriarch meets Turkish politicians, Greek politicians and representatives from the European Union and expresses the problems of his community regarding the Halkidiki Theology School, on management of the foundations and requests for education materials.

Recently in 2012, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew made a landmark presentation at Parliament’s constitution-making commission, demanding equal treatment for non-Muslim minorities, including an equal share of public funds for religious services and education. “It is the first official invitation to non-Muslim minorities in Republican

history. We don't want to be second-class citizens. Unfortunately there have been injustices in the past. These are all slowly being rectified. A new Turkey is being born. We are leaving the meeting with hope and are extremely grateful," the patriarch told reporters after the meeting.³⁸² He renewed demands for the re-opening of the Greek Orthodox seminary on Heybeliada (Halki) island off Istanbul, stressing that they accepted vocational school status for the seminary under the supervision of the Education Ministry. "We want equality in all realms, including education and the bureaucracy. Minorities are virtually non-existent in the higher posts of the bureaucracy," he was quoted as saying. "The state has never extended financial assistance to any church or minority school," he said.

Although consulates are generally in charge of managing issues related to the legal and administrative problems of its citizens, the Greek consulate of Istanbul has a sort of moral duty towards the Greek minority of Istanbul. The role the Greek Consulate occupies is both official and semi-official. As a diplomatic institution, its function is to manage all issues regarding the citizens with Greek-Orthodox nationality, but community members consult it for various reasons. The Roum and the Greeks of Greece gather in the reception hall of Sismanogelion, the consular building at Istiklal Avenue, to celebrate national festivals. The cultural activities supported by the consulate bring together all the Greek-speaking inhabitants of the city. Also the community is financially tied to the consulate. Moreover, Greek state has played an important role as the guardian of Istanbul Greek-Orthodox that it brings their demands and problems into international agenda. Greece pays the retired Greeks of Istanbul about 600 euros every three months. At the same time, it is well known that the Greek state financially supports, through the consulate, the minority schools and other institutions.³⁸³ As will be seen in Chapter 5 "Political Representation of Turkish- Muslim minority of Greece", a similar case and duty is valid for the Turkish Consulate in Komotini.

To sum up, as smaller minorities more frequently articulate their concerns when it comes to minority-specific interests through institutions for cultural autonomy, minority

³⁸² Greek Patriarchate made history in Turkish Parliament, (Hurriyet, February 2012), <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/greek-patriarch-makes-history-in-parliament.aspx?pageID=238&nid=14205>

³⁸³ Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Community of Istanbul and the Greek- Turkish relations, 1918-1974*, (Athens, 1983).

associations, or local-level political activism, the same political participation strategy is feasible for the Greek-Orthodox minorities of Turkey. They do not have the sufficient number to form their own minority party, not even to elect an independent candidate, and the candidates from Greek-Orthodox ethnic origin are not preferred or nominated by the major effective Turkish parties. Therefore, the rule of reciprocity, effective policy of Greece and the intervention of the international actors such as European Union play a significant role in protecting and monitoring their minority rights. The community is gathered around the Patriarch who is a powerful religious and political actor in expressing the conditions of the community to the internal and foreign public. Greek-Orthodox foundations and associations also enable the community to act collectively. As every community needs to represent their political interests, the political participation strategy of Greek-Orthodox community has been shaped by the legal, social and economical conditions of Turkey. For instance, when the law for foundations on 1936 was implemented by the Turkish government in 1971 (to prove the legacy of the foundations by showing the deeds), the community sought help from Greece to enforce the 'rule of reciprocity'.

As mentioned, another key feature of the development of minority parties has been the European Union. Although the EU lacks a coherent minority right policy, it has strengthened the European legal framework, above all the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, by insisting on its ratification by accession states. However, in regard to the representation of minority parties in the political system, the EU has not taken a clear position.³⁸⁴ Hence, the Greek-Orthodox minority still faces difficulties: the title-deeds of its foundations are not recognized, the communities and the Patriarchate lack a legal status, new teaching materials are hard to acquire and teachers trained abroad encounter problems in obtaining approval and most students have few prospects to remain in Turkey to study and work. The Halki/Heybeliada Theological Seminary has also attracted the interest of the EU, as an outstanding human rights violation that Turkey is required to cure. On the other hand, as given in the previous example, Turkey requires the improvement in the conditions of the Muslim minority in Greece, in return for opening the Theological Seminary in Halki/Heybeliada. As a result, both Muslim and Greek-Orthodox communities have been worse-off because of the

³⁸⁴Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/default_en.asp

negative application of the reciprocity rule. The creativity of internet and usage of new technologies helped the Greek Minority to re-birth from its ashes. Creativity of new websites, and cultural events and music facts with the new generation of the Greek communities especially in Istanbul gave the message; minority must revive. The 1999 earthquakes in Turkey and Greece broke the ice in political relations with the quake diplomacy, which became very useful for the publication of issues of the Greek Minority in Turkey.

The congress of 2006, which created a new basis for emphasizing the demographic issue, and the actions, could be done for positive reactions to the continuity of the Greek existence in Turkey. The actions of Greek donors for continuing restoration of old Greek schools, churches and cemeteries of the Greek Minority of Turkey are some of the initiatives. The held elections of Greek communities around Istanbul became the necessity for changing with positive reactions and results for the public feeling of equality. The Creation of the RumVader, Union for the support of the Greek Institutions (in Istanbul) is the very first official representation of the Greek communities of Istanbul today.

4.7. Concluding Remarks

This Chapter by analyzing and comparing the political representation of Rourm community since late Ottoman period, aimed to prove that political representation of minority communities is not shaped by their intrinsic identity, but by the political institutions of the society they live in. With the establishment of Turkish Republic with Lausanne Treaty 1923, which also enforced population exchange between Greece and Turkey, Greek-Orthodox community and other non-Muslim populations, were deprived of political representation for the first time since first the Ottoman Parliament of 1887. This difference can be explained due to their numerical decline; however as a micro-level factor group size is not sufficient to explain their political representation, as non-Muslim communities were elected to Turkish Parliament in 1935.

Considering the good terms between Greece and Turkey in early 1930s, their election to the assembly can be explained, however in Greece we observe that Turkish-Muslim minority who were represented in Greek Parliament since 1920, for the first time were deprived of political representation in Greek Parliament from 1936-1946. Hence, Turkish-

Greek relations as macro-level factors fail to explain possibility of political representation, as there is no consistency between the periods that two reciprocal communities are represented. On the other hand, this Chapter is important to show us that Greco-Turkish relations influence effectiveness of the Roum MPs in the Parliament, as since the late Ottoman period, their loyalty to the state has been questioned. Greek-Orthodox MPs often needed to declare their loyalty to the state and especially in the early Republican period, they avoided mentioning the demands and problems of their own community.

It is seen that compared to the single-party regime, minorities found themselves more comfortable in periods when there was a multi-party system with a dominant party. The period of 1912 when CUP was the dominant party, the period between 1950-1960 when DP was the dominant party were the terms when Greek-Orthodox community was represented fairly, and their MPs were more active in the Parliament. The interviews conducted with Roum prominent figures of today supports a similar situation, where Justice and Development party claimed to give the best messages to the community and their demands to be represented in the Parliament is more likely to be realized. On the other hand, secularism is important and seen as the guarantee of their cultural and social rights. They would not support any policy, which would affect or limit their life-style. Moreover, it is clear that minority candidates cannot compete in the race of politics when political polarization and competition is high.

In terms of political system, the literature in political science assumes that possibility for political representation of minorities is expected to be higher in proportional representation system compared to plurality system. The case of political representation of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey displays the opposite, as political representation of them totally diminished –except Jewish MP Jefi Kamfi in 1995 elections- with the transition to PR system in 1961. Generally, Turkey's relations with its neighbors affected the position of its minorities. Candidacy of Kamhi who is a well-known businessman can be read also as 'window dressing', where as a non-Muslim politician who would not express the difficulties the minorities experienced in the past, he would contribute to the positive presentation of Turkey abroad and would attract votes from a specific electorate group.

It is indicated that Roum community of Istanbul was highly organized since the early 19th century in terms of having a vivid press life and management of their foundations. Considering organizational skill as micro-level factor, their political mobilization and political representation were expected to be high, especially compared to Muslim minority of Greece, who just became a minority in early 20th century, lack of press-life and had a low level of literacy. However, with the radical decline in Roum population after 1964, Greek language started to vanish from public life. Here, numerical size alternation for the Greek-Orthodox minority makes the outcome understandable; however the same situation- lack of political mobilization and representation- is observed in Armenian and Jewish communities whose numbers have not changed obviously since 1960s.

From 1920 to present, the numerical size of the Roum deputies, and their representation and effectiveness of this representation has changed. However, their main problems of job security; good level of education; guarantee of finding a spouse; and property security remain the same. Their demands are not fully met. Until now, this chapter tried to depict the issue of political representation from historical and political developments, and the demands of the Greek-Orthodox community are analyzed. The interviews conducted with Turkish politician- JDP MP Prof. Dr. Burhan Kuzu- helped to understand the approach of the Turkish politicians and parties towards the minorities, the reasons they prefer or not prefer minority candidates, and the way they perceive the ‘rule of reciprocity’.

The chapter’s finding for party alignment is important for general literature as well. It is seen that Roum community’s party preference is not determined by ideological differences, but through party attitudes towards the minority community or towards Greco-Turkish relations. They have not forgotten the population exchange proposal made by İsmet İnönü, the Wealth Tax enforced by RPP and the denouncement of 1930 Agreement again by İnönü. They voted for the candidate who was competing against İnönü, or the party, which they believed, gave the best message to them. Their dislike is not mainly towards RPP but to İnönü, as they love and respect Mustafa Kemal who implemented modern and secular reforms. Moreover, besides his Cyprus Peace Operation, they supported the electoral campaign of Bülent Ecevit called “Our hope is Ecevit”. In terms of representation, the community foundations (*cemaat vakıfları*) and Patriarchate institution currently fulfills the loop of the parliamentary representation.

CHAPTER 5. POLITICAL REPRESENTATION of TURKISH-MUSLIM MINORITY IN WESTERN THRACE

In this Chapter, political representation of the Muslim-Turkish minority will be scrutinized in accordance with the major political and historical events that took place in Greece. With this regard, five different periods will be specified: 1) representation after accession to Greece (1920-1936); 2) non-representation 1936-1946 (during Metaxas Dictatorship; WWII German Occupation and Greek Civil War); 3) representation after Greek Civil War until Junta period (1946-1967); 4) non-representation during the Junta period (1967-1974); and 5) representation after the transition to democracy (1974-2013).

5.1 Political Representation without Parliamentary Work (1920-1936)

Compared to Turkish political history, the parliamentary life in Greece had begun earlier, around the first half of the 19th century, when in 1844, some fifteen years after Greece declared its independence from the Ottoman Empire, King Otto was forced, as a result of the army uprising of 3 September 1843, to concede a constitution.³⁸⁵ For Western Thrace, the first decades of 20th century were more salient than independence of Greece³⁸⁶, as the demography of the region and its political power has been altered due to flux of immigrations. The primary events that shaped politics in Western Thrace politics can be enumerated as the Balkan Wars, establishment of Western Thrace Turkish Republic in 1913, accession of the region with Greece in 1920, Asia Minor Catastrophe, and Metaxas rule in 1936.

5.1.1 Political History

At the beginning of the 19th century, the independence of Greece came to a breaking point. The Ottomans suddenly realized how powerful and effective the nationalist ideas spreading through the European capitals were. The links between Roum milleti and Greece were strong. Several sources showed that critical support had been provided for

³⁸⁵ Richard Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search for Legitimacy*, (Duke Univ. Press: 1987).

³⁸⁶ See Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, (Cambridge Pub.:1992), p. 15; Thanos Veremis and John Koliopoulos, *Modern Greece: A History since 1821*. (Wiley Blackwell, 2009), p. 15-20.

the organization of the upheavals of the 1820s in the Greek peninsula (1821-1829).³⁸⁷ The Greek war of independence had repercussions for Istanbul itself. In response to the massacre of Turks in the Peloponnese, Sultan Mahmud II accused the Orthodox Patriarchate, and ordered hanging Grigorious V and other clergymen in 1826. Greek independence from Ottoman Empire, opened the way for the national uprisings and independence of the other Balkan states (Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro) during the first decade of the 19th century, which led to first Balkan Wars, where Ottoman Empire lost its rule in the region, and later on Balkan states' struggle to rule in the regions: Macedonia and Western Thrace. Within this struggle, Western Thrace Turks who composed a large population (85%) in the region tried to form their own way for self-determination.

Independent Western Thrace Turkish Republic and Accession of the Region to Greece

Western Thrace was occupied by Bulgaria in 1912 at the beginning of Balkan Wars, and by Greece during the Balkan War II. With the Bucharest Agreement, some parts of Western Thrace was given to Bulgaria, while Greece was supporting Turkish rule in the region rather than Bulgarians, considering the security of the Greek population in the region. Meanwhile, Ottoman state managed to take Edirne back from Bulgarians in 23rd July, 1913 and secured its lands until the Evros river. Following this event, Turks in Gümülcine (Komotini) and İskeçe (Ksanthi) managed to gain these territories on 31st August and 1st September, 1913 respectively. Hence the first Turkish State was founded and named as Western Thrace Turkish Republic, and its capital was determined as Komotini. Except Dedeğaç (Alexandroupoli), which was in Greek control, all the Western Thrace occupied by Bulgarians was secured. This newly formed state was recognized by Venizelos, however it was not recognized neither by the Ottomans –Union and Progress Party cadres- nor by Bulgarians or Big Powers. On 2nd October 1913, Greeks receded from Dedeğaç, and left the city to the Turkish state.

Lack of external recognition and efforts of Cemal and Talat Pasha brought the end of this state. On 29th September, Ottoman state signed the Istanbul Agreement with Bulgaria and approved Bulgarian rule at Western Thrace. Western Thrace government was forced to accept Istanbul Agreement, and asked to leave the region to Bulgarians until the date 25th

³⁸⁷ Georges K.Byzantiou, *Ta Ellinika Tativla, Mia Mikri Xameni Politeia Pou Perase Stin Istoría (1535-1929)*, (Athina, 1981).

October 1913. Consequently, while the Western Thrace Government had terminated itself, and ended the 57 days of its independence, the Bulgarian forces under General Cemal Bey's control completed the occupation of the region until 30th September.³⁸⁸

Western Thrace remained under Bulgarian rule until 1918. With the Neuilly Agreement, its rule passed to Ally Forces' hands in 29 November 1919. Another national struggle occurred in 1919, when on 17th October Western Thrace State was established. Upon this event, Greece asks for referendum, and Western Thrace joined Greece with the referendum. In 22 May 1920, it was fully occupied by Greece. Uniquely, within 12 years (1908-1920) Western Thrace was under control of 5 different states' administration (Ottoman State; Bulgaria; Independent Government of Western Thrace; France and Greece). Consequently, Western Thrace Muslims voted in the elections of 3 different countries and were represented in their national assembly: 1908 and 1912 Ottoman Parliament; 1914 and 1919 Bulgarian Parliament; and 1920 Greek Parliament.

Even though it had existed for less than two months, the establishment of Western Thrace Turkish state and the policy of the other parties against its formation shaped the political behavior of Western Thrace Muslims during 1920s and 1930s within the Greek politics. Some of its high officers such as Hafız Salih Efendi and Hafız Ali Galip continued their political life in Greek Parliament as representatives. Moreover, as a reaction to Bulgarian occupation and resentment to the Union and Progress Party for their lack of support to the new Turkish state, Muslims tended to support the Venizelist-wing in Greek political life. While there was a deep polarization in Greek politics between republicans and royalist, there was another schism emerging among the Western Thrace Muslims between reformists and conservatives.

Asia Minor Catastrophe

Asia Minor Catastrophe in Greek history which is called Turkish Independence War in Turkish literature, is another significant event for the political life of Western Thrace, as it has not only changed the demographic structure of the region, but also changed political spectrum in Greek politics by increasing the polarization between Venizelist and anti-

³⁸⁸ Kemal Ş. BatıBey, *Bati Trakya Türk Devleti*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1979).

Venizelist wings, and it also introduced socialist elements to the Greek politics.

The role of the 1922 refugees was catalytic to all subsequent developments in Greece. They posed a social challenge that strained the tolerance of the natives, introduced new perceptions in the closed society of the urban and rural centers, changed the face of party politics beyond recognition, gave the economy a vital transfusion of skills and labor, and affected the views of the intelligentsia as no other single source of influence had ever done before.

The influx of refugees in such numbers and their resettlement principally in the recently acquired lands of New Greece significantly altered the country's ethnic balance. Greeks who had been in a minority in Greek Macedonia in the immediate aftermath of the Balkan wars now became a clear majority. The census of 1928 recorded that almost half the inhabitants of Macedonia were of refugee origin. At the end of the First World War, Greeks had constituted fewer than 20 percent of the population of Western Thrace, with its large Muslim element. On the completion of the exchange they made up over 60 percent. Greece thus became one of the most ethnically homogeneous countries in the Balkans.

When Venizelos won the elections in August 1928 he attempted immediately to improve relations with Turkey, and negotiations were resumed in December 1928. The implementation of the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek-Turkish Populations was completed by the Ankara Convention of 10 June 1930, which paved the way for a Convention of Commerce and Navigation and a Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, both signed at Ankara on the 30th October 1930. The series of treaties signed between Greece and Turkey at this time are usually referred to collectively as the Greek-Turkish Friendship Agreement of 1930. The Ankara Convention dealt almost exclusively with the liquidation of questions arising from the applications of the Lausanne treaty and of the agreement on the exchange of populations.

Mostly the refugees were to remain intensely loyal to Venizelos, whom they persisted in regarding as their liberator rather than as the architect of their misfortunes. In the elections of January 1936, for instance, the Venizelist vote in the refugee quarters of

Athens was uniformly high, in Nea Ionia and Kaisariani 83% and in Nea Symirni 79%.³⁸⁹ By the time of refugee influx, another element had entered to Greek politics: the communists. In 1918, Socialist Workers Party of Greece was founded. This became affiliated with the Communist International in 1919, and was renamed the Communist Party of Greece (Kommounistiko Komma Elladas - KKE) in 1922. The Communists were first represented in the parliament in 1926, with 4.4%, and as a result of straight proportional representation system introduced for the first time; they got 10 seats in a 279-seats parliament.

5.1.2 Political System

The political life in Greece for the period between the years 1920-1936 can be labeled as political instability, where several changes in electoral system, alternations in power, polarization between Venizelos' Liberal Party and Tsaldaris' People Party, emergence of communist element, abolition of monarchy, military coup attempts, regime changes (restoration of monarchy) and transition from democracy to dictatorship were witnessed.

Electoral System

Between the years 1920-36, from the accession of Western Thrace to Greece until Metaxas regime 8 national elections were conducted: 1920, 1923, 1926, 1928, 1932, 1933, 1935 and 1936. Searching for political stability and to decrease political polarization electoral system was changed several times. Such that 1920 and 1923 elections were held in majority system, it had altered to proportional representation in 1926, again changed back to majority system in 1928 elections; there was a return to proportional representation in 1932 national elections, and majority system was implemented in the elections in 1933, 1935 and 1936. In all of these elections Western Thrace Turkish-Muslims were represented at least with four deputies (except with two deputies in the 1936 elections).³⁹⁰ The electorate elects MPs at a general election by direct, universal and secret ballot (article 51 par. 3 of the Constitution). The Constitution does not determine the total number of parliamentarians (article 51 par. 1), but does stipulate that there shall be no less than two hundred (200) or more than three hundred (300). Since 1952 the overall number of Hellenic Parliament MPs has been 300.³⁹¹

³⁸⁹ Ibid. Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece*, p. 8.

³⁹⁰ See Appendix E: List of Muslim MPs in the Greek Parliament.

³⁹¹ <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Vouleftes>

According to the electoral law in Greece, in some elections Western Thrace was accounted as a single electoral district, and sometimes divided into two districts as Rhodopi and Evros. For the period between the years 1920-1936, Rhodopi district encompassed Komotini and Ksanthi provinces. When it is mentioned that the representative is elected from Thrace, it refers to the periods that Rhodopi, Evros and Ksanthi were merged as single electoral district. Today, in the Western Thrace region, there are three electoral districts: Ksanthi, Rhodopi (Komotini) and Evros. As the number of minorities reduced to insignificant numbers in the Evros districts (mainly Alexandroupoli), Muslim minority members have not been elected from this district.

Another important institutional structure regarding the minorities is reinforcement of electoral colleges for the Muslims in the Thrace and the Jews in Salonika in October 1923 (just before the 16 December 1923 elections).³⁹² According to Vemund, this electoral college was introduced after the massive support of these groups to Anti-venizelist in the 1920 elections.³⁹³ The implementation of the electoral college enabled to control their votes by separating the minority votes, and granting them a fixed number of mandates. The electoral colleges were in force in most of the inter-war elections (1923, 1928, 1932 and 1933 for the chamber, 1929 and 1934 for the Senate). Only in the 1926, 1935 and 1936 elections for the chamber did the Christians and Muslims of the area constitute a united election district. This institutional planning helps to understand why during the political turmoil years of Greece, Western Thrace Turks managed to maintain 4 seats in every election. The separate electoral college of the Muslims in Thrace was abolished in 1934 when it was found unconstitutional by the State Council, also following Venizelos' fall from power in 1932, the new anti-Venizelist administration scrapped the system.³⁹⁴ Aarbakke asserts that contrary to the Jews, the Muslims in Thrace resisted the abolition of their separate electoral college, as it reflected traditional attitudes tied to the separation of the groups in the Ottoman Empire. In other words, they were more

³⁹² Mavrogordatos, "The Emerging Party System", in *Greece in 1980s*, R. Clogg (ed.), (London: 1983), pp.238-246.

³⁹³ Esther Benbassa and Aron Rodrigue, *Sephardi Jewry: A History of the Judeo-Spanish Community, 14th-20th Centuries*, (University of California Press: London, 2000), pp.98-100.

³⁹⁴ For the views of the Jewish Community on the separate electoral college see. <http://www.jta.org/1929/02/13/archive/senate-elections-in-greece-raise-issue-of-separate-jewish-electoral-college> ; <http://www.jta.org/1932/09/08/archive/separate-electoral-college-in-greece-abolished-for-all-but-salonica-jews>

concerned about keeping the minority's status as a separate group, than influencing the overall development of Greek politics.³⁹⁵ Considering the fact that Muslim deputies did not take the floor in the Greek parliament and did not have the intention to learn a good level of Greek language, electoral college would ease their political participation.

Political Parties

After two years following the 1920 national elections which was held in the majority system, brought the victory of People's Party led by Dimitriou Rallis, however 1922 military coup interrupted the constitutional monarchy in Greece. The military revolt justified itself based on the Asia Minor Catastrophe and political uncertainty following it. Greece returned back to civil politics in 1923, in which majority electoral system was used again. The 1923 elections were for an assembly empowered to revise the constitution. Since they were boycotted by the anti-Venizelist camp, the assembly was dominated by supporters of Venizelos. Following the population exchange of 1923, the refugees who were sided with the Venizelist-wing, voted heavily for the abolition of monarchy in the 1924 referendum, which resulted in a 70% vote for the republic.³⁹⁶ Asia Minor refugees composed a significant ratio of this 70% vote share.³⁹⁷ This referendum brought the end of the second kingdom of Greece, while it started the era for the second Hellenic Republic (1924-1935)³⁹⁸. Venizelos³⁹⁹ became Prime Minister again between 11 January and 6 February, 1924. Admiral Koundouritis, a hero of the Balkan Wars, was elected President; however a republican constitution, providing for a two-chamber parliament was not instituted until 1927 due to military intervention by General Theodoros Pangalos (ruled between 26 June 1925-19 July 1926), who was going to be overthrown in 1926 again by a military coup.

In the 1920s and 1930s Greek politics witnessed polarization between republicans on the Venizelist-wing, and royalists supporting People's Party, which was against the

³⁹⁵ Ibid. Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p.75

³⁹⁶ Ibid. Clogg, *Concise History of Greece*, p. 108.

³⁹⁷ Ibid. Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece*, p. 10.

³⁹⁸ First Hellenic Republic (1822-1832) was followed by House of Wittelsbach Dynasty (1832–1862) and Glücksburg Dynasty (1863–1924).

³⁹⁹ Eleftherios Venizelos dominated political life during much of the first third of the 20th century. He was projected on to the stage of the national politics by the military coup of 1909, becoming prime minister between 1910 and 1915. His feud with King Constantine I during the First World War precipitated the National Schism which split the country into two rival camps. Venizelos became prime minister once again between 1917 and 1920.

annihilation of the dynasty. These two parties supplemented by the smaller Agrarian Party and Communist Party on the left. The Communist Party displayed some tendencies towards Christian-Muslim integration, and it was the only party where a significant number of Christians voted for a Muslim candidate. Alexandros Zaimis became Prime Minister in 1926 after the overthrow of Pangalos dictatorship, who ruled candidate heading "ecumenical government" after no party won parliamentary majority during the November 1926 elections, in which PR system was implemented. The Communists were first represented in the parliament in 1926, with 4.4%, and as a result of the straight proportional representation system introduced for the first time; they got 10 seats in a 279-seats parliament. Yaprak Gürsoy asserts that because Asia Minor refugees began to work as workers in Greece and put their support to the radical politics and communist ideas, this caused the conservative groups in Greece to support the authoritarian regime formed by Metaxas in 1936.⁴⁰⁰

Following the 1928 national elections, due to majority system Venizelos' Liberal Party (Komma Phileleftheron) won victory⁴⁰¹ against the rival People's Party (Laikon Komma), and Venizelos was once more elected as Prime Minister between 1928 and 1932. He served out its full four-year parliamentary term. The elections of 1932, which was in proportional representation system, however, were held in a period of political instability and growing polarization that was to culminate, four years later, in the imposition of outright dictatorship. PR electoral system had resulted in a parliamentary deadlock. The Liberal Party performed badly in comparison with 1928 and Venizelos maintained its votes slightly above the People's Party. 1929 Great Depression and its effect on Greece whose economy was based on luxury goods was the primary reason for the reaction. In the 1932 elections, Alexandros Papanastasiou's Agriculture and Labor Party (Komma Agroton kai Ergazomenon) served for a short term (26 May-5 June, 1932). In the 1933 elections, held under a majority system, the People's Party headed by Panayatis Tsaldaris, and its allies secured the majority over the Venizelists. Diehard Venizelist Colonel Plastiras attempted the coup of 5/6 March 1933. This was a failure and Plastiras was forced to exile. Meanwhile, in June 1933, Venizelos miraculously escaped an assassination attempt.

⁴⁰⁰ Yaprak Gürsoy, "The Impact of Population Exchange to Greek and Turkish Political Regimes on 1930s", Conference Dissertation, Lozan'a Yeniden Bakmak (Reviwing of Lausanne), 27-28 September, 2013, Istanbul Bilgi University.

⁴⁰¹With 47% of votes, Liberal Party gained 71% of the seats.

Alarmed by the possibility of the declaration of monarchy, a group of Venizelist officers launched a further coup in March 1935, with the involvement of Venizelos. Venizelos joined Plastiras in exile in France, where he was to die the following year. The Senate which was still under Venizelist control was abolished, and elections were held in June 1935 with the country still under martial law. In 1935 elections, People's Party won a significant majority in the parliament (65% votes and 96% of the seats), in which the Communist Party won 10% of the votes (the highest vote share in the inter-war period), however, did not gain any seats. After successful suppression of Venizelist revolt in March 1935, gradual reorientation towards restoration of monarchy was witnessed. Tsaldaris resigned and was replaced by Georgios Kondylis⁴⁰², who declared the abolition of the republic confirmed by a plebiscite (1,491,992 votes for, 32,454 against)⁴⁰³ and King George II ascended the throne for the second time on 3 November, 1935. The 1936 national elections again led to a political deadlock, as in a 300-seat parliament, the People's Party and its royalists allies controlled 143 seats, the Liberal Party (now led by Sophoulis) and its allies 141.⁴⁰⁴ Due to the concerns about communist power and political deadlock, on 4 August 1936, Metaxas suspended the parliament and established dictatorship.

5.1.3. Political Representation of the Muslim-Turkish Minority

After the accession of Western Thrace to Greece in 22 May 1920, the first election in which Western Thrace Muslims cast a vote and were represented in the Greek National Assembly was on the 1 November 1920 elections. Between the years 1920-1936, there were 8 national elections in Greece. 29 seats were taken by Muslim deputies in total by 17 different representatives. Even these numbers are sufficient reveal the political instability in Greek politics, and the consistency for the Muslim representative to be elected for several terms.

⁴⁰² Georgios Kondylis, Lt. General and head of the small National Radical Party. Assumed government with the support of the Armed Forces chiefs, abolished the Republic on 10 October. Regent until the return of King George II on 3 November 1935.

⁴⁰³ Clogg, Concise History of Greece, p. 45.

⁴⁰⁴ This left the communists holding the balance of power as their 6% share of vote gave them control of a critical 15 seats. The deadlock and negotiations with the communists by the both sides created unrest in the army. When the caretaker minister of war, General Papagos, voiced the army's concerns to the king, he was replaced by General Ioannis Metaxas the leader of the Freethinkers' Party, an ultra-right-wing party, pending a solution of the political statement.

While from 1920 to 1935 Greek-Orthodox Ottomans and Turkish citizens were not appointed as representatives in the Turkish Parliament, since the unification of Western Thrace to Greece, Turkish-Muslim deputies were present in the Greek Parliament until the dissolution of the Parliament by Metaxas in 1936. Tsiumis mentions that the Muslim politicians occupied themselves with the full range of minority issues, of both general and particular interest, such as education, military service, property rights, solution of local problems, but they did not make their presence felt in the parliamentary discussions. Their loose integration in the Greek political parties and their insufficient knowledge of Greek must have ruled out any such participation.⁴⁰⁵ This shows that in general political representation of the minorities have not been effected by reciprocity rule, as political rights were taken as individual rights rather than granted as collective rights. Moreover, although good command in Turkish was crucial for Roum citizens and political representatives, such a requirement did not create an obstacle for the Muslim minorities in Greece.

As aforementioned, within one decade before 1920, Western Thrace remained under the administration of 5 different countries, and represented in 3 different states' parliaments. In the Ottoman Parliament in 1908 and 1912, Muslims from Western Thrace were represented along with Greek-Orthodox Ottoman citizens. In 1908 three Turks were elected from the Gümülcine (Komotini) district. Mehmet Arif Bey (CUP), Hasan Fehmi Bey (independent), and İsmail Hakkı Bey (left CUP and founded Fırka-ı Ahrar in 1910).⁴⁰⁶ In the Bulgarian elections of 24 February 1914 the Muslim vote became very important because Liberal coalition used it in a scheme of electoral engineering in order to remain in government. The one sided vote secured the election of 12 Muslims who formed a compact group in parliament and supported the Liberal coalition according to directions from Istanbul, mainly by the CUP. In the Bulgarian parliamentary elections 17 August 1919, as Greek occupation was imminent, the Muslim notables decided not to participate.⁴⁰⁷ Hafız Salih Efendi and Hafız Ali Galip (both representing conservative camp) were prominent figures that made such political mobilization possible. They were exiled to Philibe and Sofia for this political action.⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰⁵ Kostis Tsiumis, *I musulmanikí mionótita tis Ditikís Thrákis ke I ellinoturkikés schésis (1923–1940)*. Pedagogiki Scholi Tmima Nipiagogon. Thessaloniki, Aristotelio Panepistimio Thessalonikis, 1994).

⁴⁰⁶ Aykut Kansu, *1908 Devrimi*, (İletişim Yayınları, 1995).

⁴⁰⁷ Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p. 70.

⁴⁰⁸ http://www.kircaalihaber.com/?pid=8&id_aktualno=48

1 November 1920 Parliamentary Elections

In the Greek elections of 1 November 1920, 20 Muslims were elected from Thrace (both Eastern and Western), which had recently come under Greek occupation, all of them on the Venizelist ticket. On the other hand, the winner of the election was Dimitrios Gounaris' People's Party in whole Greece. This election is significant for being the last elections before the Lausanne Treaty and population election, hence Muslims from both Macedonia and Thrace regions voted in the Greek elections. It should be noted that Muslims of Macedonia had voted massively for the Antivenizelists,⁴⁰⁹ which led the way for People's Party's electoral victory. Among these 20 Muslim representatives, 4 of them were elected from Western Thrace. These were Müderris Hafız Ali Galip (Osmanoğlu) from Rhodopi (Komotini); Arifzade Arif Bey from Rhodopi (Komotini); Hasan Abdürrahimoğlu from Rhodopi (Ksanthi) and Müderris Hafız Salih Efendi from Komotini. All of them were elected from Venizelist Liberal Party. Hafız Salih Efendi who was one of the Presidents of Western Thrace Republic in 1913, served in the Greek Senate up until his death in 1934.

A special focus should be given to Müderris Hafız Ali Galip, who was a farm-owner, and served in the Greek Parliament for 6 terms.⁴¹⁰ He was speaking Bulgarian, Greek and Arabic in addition to Turkish. In total he served almost 18 years as a MP. He was at the anti-Abdülhamid camp in 1908. He had an active political role in the Western Thrace Republic of 1913, whose President was Hafız Salih Efendi, and made the conversations with Enver and Talat Pashas of the period. In these 6 electoral terms, he managed to be elected from 4 different parties. In 1920 elections he supported the Venizelist-wing and was elected from Liberal Party (KF). In 1923 elections, he was not elected as he was exiled to Patras and could not run for the elections. He was released in exchange of the Roum at Beykoz Prison. However in the following 1926 elections he got the ticket from Democratic Union Party (Komma Demokratiki Enosis/KDE). In the 1928 national elections, he was re-elected from Liberal Party, while in the 1932 elections he got the seat from Alexandros Papanastasiou's Agriculture and Labor Party (Komma Agroton kai Ergazomenon/AEK) which he served for a short-time. In the 1933 elections, again he was representative of AEK. In the 21 January 1936 elections he became a deputy from George Papandreu's Democratic Socialist Party of Greece (Dimokratikon Sosialistikon

⁴⁰⁹ Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p. 73.

⁴¹⁰ http://www.kircaalihaber.com/?pid=8&id_aktualno=48

Komma/DSK)- which was split from Liberal Party- and served in the parliament until the Metaxas dictatorship of 4th August 1936. The reason that Hafız Ali Galip has been elected for 6 terms can be explained by the traditional clientelist relations and the creation of political parties around a person. He was active in politics since 1908, and had learned the game of politics. Moreover, as middlemen, he fulfilled the role of a mediator between minority members and Greek authorities successfully. In the inter-war period where Greek politics were inconsistent and changeable, his inconsistent political preferences should be considered rational.

There were also other representatives who served in the same party such as Ksanthi representative Hasan Abdürrahimoğlu- who was also farm-owner- had served in the Greek Parliament for 3 terms, all with Liberal Party ticket (in 1920, 1932 and 1933 national elections). In the first Greek parliament after the accession of the region the Muslims from Western Thrace could not complete their term of service. Social, political and economic chaos emerged after the population exchange and caused a military intervention in 1922 led by Colonels Nikolaos Plastiras and Stylianos Gonatas, as they viewed the government responsible for the national catastrophe. Gounaris was executed.

16 December 1923 and 7 November 1926 Parliamentary Elections

In the 16 December 1923 elections, Mustafa Ağa- landowner-, Eminbeyzade Hasan Bey and Müderris Hoca Mestan Efendi managed to get a seat in the Greek Parliament. Venizelos' Liberal Party won the elections and he became the Prime Minister. After the plebiscite on the termination of dynasty in Greece, the Greek Parliament was again overthrown by a military coup in 1925 before it ended its 4 years of service. In the 1926 national elections, Müderris Hafız Ali Galip (from Democratic Union Party), Mustafa Ağa (Liberal Party), Şükrü Mahmutoğlu (Democratic Union Party) and Haşımzade Fehmi Bey (Liberal Party) were elected. After no party won parliamentary majority during the November 1926 elections, Alexandros Zaimis served as a compromise candidate heading "ecumenical government". Mustafa Ağa and Hafız Ali Galip were the candidates mobilizing the traditionalist Muslims' vote in the period. Mustafa Ağa who served in the Greek Parliament for 4 terms, would be elected again in the 1932 and 1933 elections, both with the Liberal Party ticket. Meanwhile, Ksanthi Turkish Youth Association was founded in 1927. It was pioneered by the Kemalist camp leaders: journalist Mehmet Hilmi, and MPs Mestan Efendi and Hasan Abdürrahimoğlu.

19 August 1928 Parliamentary Elections

In the 19 August 1928 national elections, Liberal Party won the elections and Venizelos became Prime Minister again. All the Muslim representatives (Hafız Ali Galip, Cezayirli Muhtar Ali Rıza- land owner-, Niyazi Mumcu Hafız Haliloğlu -merchant- and Halil Karaçanlı -tobacco merchant-) were elected with the Liberal Party ticket. Venizelos' success in gaining majority of the seats in the parliament would enable him to manage Turkish-Greek rapprochement in 1930 with a Friendship Treaty. As aforementioned in the previous chapters, in terms of the factors that influence minorities' political representation, it was claimed in this thesis that Turkish-Greek relations were not much of a determinant as expected. Even the rapprochement between Venizelos and Mustafa Kemal did not bring a direct positive influence on the minorities' political rights. Yet, it should be mentioned that this friendship strengthened the Kemalist camp's position over the traditionalists. Moreover, Aarbakke asserts that after this rapprochement, the minority MPs made an application to Venizelos, and he worked out a draft law dated 13 June 1930.⁴¹¹ However, the law was never ratified. In 1930s, Kemalists vs. traditionalist schism began to be reflected more strongly in Muslim minority's politics in Greece. According to Aarbakke, each of the personalist centered political minority groupings identified with a Greek party, but without any clear ideological relation. The analysis of the affiliation of the minority MPs and their party preferences (given in Appendix E) supports Aarbakke's argument that there is no direct relationship between these determinants.

25 September 1932 and 5 March 1933 Parliamentary Elections

In the 25 September 1932 elections, Alexandros Papanastasiou's Agrarian and Labor Party (AEK) won the elections and Hatip Salih Yusuf (from Liberal Party), Hafız Ali Galip (From AEK), Mustafa Ağa (Liberal Party) and Hasan Abdürrahimoğlu (Liberal Party) were elected as minority representatives. Following the 5 March 1933 national elections, in Komotini the three central persons were Hafız Ali Galip, Hatip Yusuf and Mustafa Ağa. According to Aarbakke, they were elected from different parties and they were representing 3 ideological blocks within the minority.⁴¹²

⁴¹¹ Tunda-Fergadi, 1994. pp. 192-202, in Vemund Aarbakke. It would have given the Muslims greater freedom to regulate internal minority affairs such as their schools, pious foundations, religious institutions and anticipated the election of muftis by general male suffrage.

⁴¹² Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p. 75.

- a) The modernist Turks headed by Hatip Yusuf (the People's Party)⁴¹³
- b) The moderate traditionalist Muslims headed by Hafız Ali Galip (the Republican Coalition) and Mustafa Ağa (Liberal Party). Traditional in their personal behavior but not hostile to the Kemalist reforms.
- c) The fanatical anti-Kemalist traditionalist Muslims headed by Ali Rıza Ahmetoğlu.

Meanwhile, in Ksanthi, where there were more merchants than landowners, the political formations followed the cleavage between Turks and Pomaks. According to Aarbakke, in the 1932 elections, Pomak tickets obtained 72,2% of the vote in the rural Pomak areas and only 20,7% in the Ksanthi town. Moreover, as seen in Hafız Ali Galip (uncle of Osman Nuri) and Hatip Yusuf (father of Hasan Hatipoğlu) case, in Komotini some of the politicians were able to establish family dynasties, similar to Greek politicians in Greek politics. The rivalry between Galip family and Hatip family will continue during 1950s and 1960s.

Generally during the inter-war years, Muslims in Western Thrace voted for the Venizelist party. As Aarbakke argues, there was certainly no ideological reasons why the conservative traditionalist Muslims should vote massively for Venizelism in the 1920s, which was the party with the clearest formulated policy of integration and assimilation. While the Christian population in Thrace voted consistently for Venizelism, a considerable portion of the minority vote displayed a sharp turn towards anti-Venizelism after 1933. Nikolakopoulos's study shows that Muslim vote to Venizelists which was 86,6% in 1926 elections dropped to 43,3% in 1936 national election.⁴¹⁴ It is mostly related to anti-Venizelist exploitation of the cleavages within the minority. It appealed to people of the modernist Turks' camp in its bid for power since the most prominent traditionalist Muslims were already associated with Venizelism. The first independent ticket in Thrace appeared in 1933 when the 'Independent Muslims' won 25.19 percent of the votes.

⁴¹³ He is the father of Hasan Hatipoğlu, who was one of the prominent figures in 1950s and 1960s Greek politics. Hatip Yusuf, together with Arifzade Arif had initiated education in modern Turkish alphabet in Komotini. Hasan Hatipoğlu was among the first 7 students that got an education with the Latin alphabet.

⁴¹⁴ Ilias, Nikolakopoulos, 'Politikes Dynameis kai Eklogike Symperifora tes Mousoulmanikes Meionotetas ste Dytike Thrake: 1922–1955', *Deltio Kendrou Mikrasiatikon Spoudon*, Vol. 8 (1990), pp. 177.

9 June 1935 and 26 January 1936 Parliamentary Elections

In 9 June 1935 elections, People's Party was in the rule and led the way to the abolishment of republic. The Muslim representatives were Hatip Yusuf (People's Party), Mehmet Mustafaoğlu (People's Party), Niyazi Mumcu (People's Party) and Hamdi Hüseyin Fehmi (People's Party). The 1936 elections-with PR electoral system- were inconclusive. The Liberal Party and its allies won 141 seats but the Populists and the Royalists secured 143. The Communist Party became the balancing factor with its 15 seats.⁴¹⁵ From Muslim-Turkish community two representatives were elected. These were conservative Hafız Ali Galip (Democratic Sosyalist Party), and modernist Hamdi Hüseyin Fehmi (People's Party).

Looking at the distribution of seats in the Parliament, Muslim deputies' role and their preferences could be crucial. It was interesting that while Hamdi Hüseyin Fehmi who was a supporter of Kemalist reforms was elected from traditionalist People's Party, the traditionalist Mustafa Ağa was elected from Liberal party for 4 terms. Hamdi Hüseyin Fehmi was also the owner of the anti-traditionalist newspaper *Milliyet* (1931-1968).⁴¹⁶ Moreover, in the 1936 elections the fanatic conservative Niyazi Mumcu was not elected but he chose to collaborate with the Kemalist Hamdi Hüseyin Efendi. In the period when the dynasty was re-established and political polarization increased signaling for military intervention, this was a rational political strategy for securing seats rather than dividing the votes between the camps.

In conclusion, the party preferences of the Muslim representatives were important to show that their ideological position could be in contrast with the ideology of the party they were elected from. Muslim minority's political behavior was shaped on ideological positions but they vote the persons and through clientelist relationships. Hafız Ali Galip's case, in which he had been elected from 4 different parties in 6 elections, shows vote shares and control over minority was more salient than political loyalty for the Greek parties as well.

Compared to Greek-Orthodox minority of Turkey, after the Lausanne Treaty, Muslim-

⁴¹⁵ Veremis, *Modern Greek History since 1821*, p. 103.

⁴¹⁶ Hikmet Öksüz, "Batı Trakya Türk Basınında Atatürkçü Bir Gazete: İnkılap (1930-1931)", (Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2000).

Turkish minority in Western Thrace exercised their political representation until 1936 Metaxas regime. Despite the satisfactory number of representatives in Greek Parliament, there were institutional and social restrictions over full-political representation of the Muslim minority. Until 1932, with Jews in Macedonia district, Muslim-Turks were electing their representatives through electoral college, which means they were voting for certain candidates –who were under Greek state control- not for the party candidates. Regarding that none of the Muslim MPs had taken the floor in the Greek Parliament – even during the population exchange discussions and Greco-Turkish War of 1922- make us understand that neither Greek authorities nor Muslim minorities in Greece trusted each other. The reason that Muslims rejected the abolishment of electoral college also signifies a rejection of integration of the group to the Greek society. Their lack of incentive to learn Greek- both at electorates and representatives level- indicate that Turks in Western Thrace did not expect to be ruled by the Greek state that long. Greek-Orthodox deputies in Turkey in the first term of their representation in 1935 were also elected as independents. That period in Turkey 1935-1946, there were two-round elections that enabled RPP to control the candidates, however two-round elections were applied to all Turkish citizens regardless of their ethnic or religious origin.

In general, between the period 1920-1936, while there was a national schism between Venizelists (republicans) and anti-Venizelists (royalists/traditionalists), among the Western Thrace Muslim minority another cleavage became important: Kemalists (modernists/reformists) and anti-Kemalists (conservatives). The analysis of the political representation of that period indicated that there was not a clear overlapping of these two camps. Minority politics was dominated by the notables- ağa in villages, bey in the towns- in Komotini and Ksanthi. Most of the Muslim minorities were whether landowners, local agents of the large tobacco companies or tobacco merchants. Compared to the Roum minority MPs, there was no professional (doctor and lawyer) among the Muslim notables. Even though there was a schism within the minority between traditionalists and Kemalists – which was stronger especially in late 1920s and 1930s- as Aarbakke asserts, the Kemalist camp did not develop into a force threatening the class structure of the minority, but evolved by attracting certain notables to its side.⁴¹⁷ Moreover, some of the Muslim deputies in 1920-1936, were active in politics since the

⁴¹⁷ Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p. 74. Aarbakke mentions that Mehmet Hilmi was the only one among the Kemalists who is known to have challenged the beys.

early 20th century. Hafiz Salih Efendi was the President of Western Thrace Republic which was founded in 1913, and Hafiz Ali Galip was one of the founders of the same state. They had also managed to politically mobilize the community when Thrace was under Bulgarian rule.

Recent research reveals the established viewpoint that the Antivenizelists were unable to field candidates to be groundless. The Muslim vote for Venizelos in this area is primarily ascribed to anti-Bulgarian sentiments. The other factor was the conservatives' opposition to the Young Turks. In parliament the Muslim MPs of Ksanthi and Rodopi supported the Antivenizelist People's Party government especially during 1930s. The party preference of the minority suggests that Muslims were never really integrated in the parties, but tended to support the one in power. During 1920s, the fact that Venizelos government gave autonomy on the issues of religion to the minority, led the conservative camp to support Venizelos' Liberal Party, although Venizelos also implemented assimilation policy for the minorities in Greece. The friendship treaty between Greece and Turkey, which was initiated by Venizelos brought the Kemalists camp in a stronger position over the conservatives, however.

Interestingly while the single-party regime of Turkey until 1946 and majority electoral system which led one-party domination in Turkish politics created more opportunistic situation for the minorities to be preferred and elected, as they could not survive in the system of high competition especially after 1960s, Muslim-Turkish deputies secured at least two seats in every election regardless of the party in power, political regime and electoral system. High competition in Greek politics and political turmoil created opportunities of political strategies for the Muslim community and Muslim notables. The case of Hafiz Ali Galip, who was elected in 6 elections and from 4 different parties, signifies that Greek parties also mobilized Muslim votes around persons, and votes share from Muslims was more salient to them than party loyalty.

Nikolakopoulos' work focusing on minority's political behavior from 1923 to 1955 argues that during the interwar period the Muslims of Western Thrace were represented politically through existing Greek political parties and that situation continued after the

WWII and throughout most of the Cold War years.⁴¹⁸ As it will be given in the following sections, this attitude will change towards 1980s with the establishment of ethnic Turkish party and elections of independent representatives by the Muslim community.

5.2 No Elections, No Representation (1936-46)

The period between 1936 and 1946 is important for the comparison of the political representation of the two minority groups. Although it was the first time for the Greek-Orthodox minority in Turkey to be represented in the Turkish parliament, and they increased their representation efficiency towards late 1940s, and became a salient factor in party competition; it was one of the periods for the Turkish-Muslim minority that they were not in the parliament – as the parliament was not operating –, and their rights were violated due to Metaxas dictatorship, external occupation of the region, and Greek Civil War. Hence, this period is important to demonstrate that political representation of the minorities is not depended on Turkish-Greek relations nor reciprocity rule, but to the internal dynamics of the societies they live in. On the other hand, Wealth Tax, which was applied to the minority citizens of Turkey in 1942, can be linked to Muslim's deprivation of rights during this period. To a better analysis of this statement, the political history and situation of Muslim minority in Greece will be scrutinized in this section.

The year 1936 proved a threshold in Greek politics. Most of Greece's interwar personalities in politics died (Venizelos, Tsaldaris, Kondylis, Koundouriotis, Zaimis, and Papanastasiou) leaving a void difficult to fill and a king in full control of the armed forces. George plunged Greece into dictatorship on August 4 by taking Metaxas's advice to suspend a number of articles of the constitution. Metaxas, a retired royalist general, believed that an authoritarian government was necessary to prevent social conflict and, especially, suppress the rising power of the Communists.

5.2.1 Political History

The major political events that affected the daily life of the minority and the majority of the society were 1936-41 Metaxas regime, Second World War, Italian Occupation in 1940 and 1941 German invasion, tripartite German, Italian and Bulgarian occupation, 1944-49 Greek Civil War. These events in general would alter the struggle between

⁴¹⁸ Ilias Nikolakopoulos, 'Politikes Dynameis kai Eklogike Symperifora tes Mousoulmanikes Meionotetas ste Dytike Thrake: 1922-1955', *Deltio Kendrou Mikrasiatikon Spoudon*, Vol. 8 (1990), pp. 171-204.

Kemalists and traditionalists among the minority, and between royalists and liberals in the Greek society. At the end of civil war, the political actors would change and the winning party would be determined.

Metaxas Regime: 1936-1941

On 4 August 1936, with the King's support, he suspended parliament and established the 4th of August Regime. The Communists were suppressed and the Liberal leaders went into internal exile. Despite these efforts the regime lacked a broad popular base or a mass movement supporting it. Metaxas also improved the country's defenses in preparation for the forthcoming European war, constructing, among other defensive measures, the "Metaxas Line"⁴¹⁹. Ioannis Metaxas will be remembered for his authoritarian rule of the Greek state and his decision to reject the Fascist ultimatum of October 28, 1940⁴²⁰, thus bringing Greece into the Second World War.

Regarding minority rights and their conditions, which were relaxed after the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey in 1930, the political situation changed again on 4 August 1936 with the Metaxas dictatorship. From his advent to power to his death in January 1941, the human rights violations increased not only for the minority but also for all the Greeks. The Bulgarian threat from the north enabled the Metaxas dictatorship to take more severe measures and regulations especially in the mountainous region of Western Thrace and other bordering regions in Southern Greece. He increased the military buildup in Western Thrace. More Greek authority implied more restrictions for the Muslim Turks of the region.

⁴¹⁹ The Metaxas Line was a chain of fortifications constructed along the line of the Greco-Bulgarian border, designed to protect Greece in case of a Bulgarian invasion after the rearmament of Bulgaria. Despite his aping of Fascism, and the strong economic ties with resurgent Nazi Germany, Metaxas followed a policy of neutrality, given Greece's traditionally strong ties to Britain, reinforced by King George II's personal anglophile. In April 1939, the Italian threat suddenly loomed closer, as Italy annexed Albania whereupon Britain publicly guaranteed Greece's borders. Thus, when World War II broke out in September 1939, Greece remained neutral.

⁴²⁰ Veremis, *History of Modern Greece since 1821*, p. 107. On August 15, 1940, the cruiser *Elli* of the Hellenic Royal Navy was torpedoed in the harbor and sunk by an unidentified (Italian) submarine. A few months later, on October 28, the Italian Ambassador delivered to Metaxas an ultimatum demanding the right of passage for Italian troops through Greek soil within three hours. Upon refusal of this crass demand (known as and celebrated as Ohi/No Day), the streets of Athens were filled with jubilant crowds celebrating the declaration of a just war.⁴²⁰ By Mussolini's ultimatum to cross the Albanian border on 28 October 1940 Greece was included in the Second World War. The Italian attack on Greece in October 1940- which from the start had been unwelcome to the German military- placed the country in a strange position. The attack made Greece a belligerent, but only against Italy. Greece was not at war with Germany, yet nor was she an ally of Britain.

In his foreign policy Metaxas kept friendly relations with Turkey⁴²¹, but the repressive features of his regime extended to the minority too. This put limits on both the political and educational activities of the minority. The relationship with Turkey also saved the minority from such heavy-handed treatment as the Slav speakers of northern Greece became exposed to during this period. Concerning Muslim minority's daily life, Metaxas made the teaching of Greek language compulsory in minority schools. The textbooks of the minority schools were coming from Turkey. However, in 1938, new textbooks started to be printed in Greek. The whole zones in the north of Greece bordering Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania were declared as 'supervised zones'⁴²².

Second World War, Italian and German Occupations and Bulgarian Control of Western Thrace (1941-1944)

After Greece's involvement in the WWII in 1940, by the end of this year, the Greek forces won victory against Italian forces. In this war, 16.600 Muslim Turks of Western Thrace fought against the Italian army. After the war, 2.600 of them were killed and 1.850 of them were wounded.⁴²³ In January 1941, Metaxas died and King George II appointed Alexandros Koryzis as the Prime Minister. In 6 April 1941, Nazi Germany decided to invade Greece.⁴²⁴ Koryzis committed suicide upon the entrance of the German troops in Athens. As the king and his government were being evacuated to Crete, Emmanuel Tsouderos, a Cretan banker of Venizelist affiliations, was appointed prime minister.⁴²⁵ Ioannis Rallis, a former minister in a Panagis Tsaldaris government, assumed the office of prime minister in April 1943 when the fortunes of war no longer favored the

⁴²¹ Under the Metaxas dictatorship, Turkey and Greece signed a treaty that enabled the cooperation between two countries in case of an attack by a third party. Also, Metaxas visited Turkey and in 1937 he made the gesture of giving the house of Atatürk in Salonika, where he was born, to the Turkish state in order to be used as the Turkish Consulate.

⁴²² The road between Ksanthi and Ehinós which is, today, the main road that combines the city of Ksanthi prefecture with the biggest village of the mountainous segment of this prefecture, Ehinós, was established not to help for the villager's circulation but in order to help the Greek soldiers to move easier from the city to the mountainous area.

⁴²³ Ahmet Aydın, *Batı Trakya Faciasının İçyüzü*, (İstanbul: Akın Yayınları, 1971) pp.149-169.

⁴²⁴ The purpose of Hitler's attack on Greece under the code name "Maritsa" was to secure his Balkan flank from British diversions before the invasion of the Soviet Union. The island of Crete, which was expected to become a fortress of resistance, fell to the Germans following an airborne attack on May 20. The king and Tsouderos escaped to Egypt and from there were taken to London. Greece's long winter under German, Italian, and Bulgarian occupations began.

⁴²⁵ Veremis, *Modern History of Greece since 1821*, p. 111.

Axis. Furthermore EAM-ELAS enjoyed superiority in the field of resistance and promised to play a leading role in post-liberation Greece.

The period of foreign occupation (1941–4) caused great suffering to the Greek population (especially the Jewish community)⁴²⁶. On the other hand, the new force in domestic affairs was the Greek Communist Party (KKE) which had never exceeded 9 percent in pre-war elections. During the Italian attack, the imprisoned secretary-general of the party, Nikos Zachariadis, urged his comrades to rally round the government and resist the invasion. The Communist-dominated National Liberation Front (EAM) was founded in September 1941 and exhibited extraordinary initiative during the winter of 1941–2.

Hitler negotiated with the Bulgarian government for assistance in the attack on Greece. Bulgarian government under Filov accepted the proposal of Hitler. In return, Filov wanted to regain the control of the Western Thrace, a region which had always been the dream of Bulgarians for its access to the Aegean Sea. On 6 April 1941, the whole of Western Thrace was occupied by German forces and after 17 days, the Bulgarian Army got the control of Western Thrace. Worse days were waiting for the Muslim-Turkish minority of Western Thrace. Not only were they suffering under Bulgarian rule, but also they were left between two crushing camps of Greek civil war. Bulgaria got the control of each administrative, educational and religious activity in the region. Bulgarian forces cooperated with the German forces by which the Bulgarian control of the region became more effective. Muslim Turks were forced to learn and use the Bulgarian language. At schools, the old Turkish language with Arabic letters started to be used against the usage of new Turkish language. Muslim Turks of Western Thrace were permitted to work only in farms not anywhere else. They were living in very harsh conditions under the Bulgarian control.⁴²⁷

⁴²⁶ Mark Mazower, *Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews 1430-1950*, (HarperCollins, 2004), pp.392-411.

⁴²⁷ There are reasons to believe that Bulgaria was somewhat more cautious towards the Muslim population, both because they were not “ideological competitors” like the Greeks, and they had a strong patron in Turkey. However, there are descriptions of extreme hardship and oppression towards the Muslims as well. Regarding the hate and negative attitude of the Bulgarians towards the Western Thracian Minority two main reasons is noted: The first one is the 1913 Provisionary Government of Western Thrace that was established against the Bulgarian control of Western Thrace. The second one is the refusal of Bulgarian control by the Western Thracian Minority in the plebiscite conducted in 1919. Şevket K. Batıbey, *Ve Bulgarlar Geldi. Batı Trakya'da Tenekle İle Alarm* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1976) p.7. Bulgarians got the chance to take the revenge of the disloyalties of Western Thracians.

Bulgarian forces forcibly got foods, clothes and any kinds of equipment from the minority houses. A refusal against the Bulgarian orders was likely to result in death. The Germans did not conflict with the Bulgarians on these attacks.⁴²⁸ They rather ignored the Bulgarian attitudes towards the Minority. But Germans did not attack to Muslims either. Germans would not like to provoke Turkey which was neutral in WWII. As a result of the Bulgarian pressures and harsh conditions in Western Thrace, some families of Muslim Turks started to migrate to Turkey which was seen as a 'safe haven'. When the number of the immigrants to Turkey started to increase, upto 10.000 people, then the Turkish government declared that it would not accept any other families from Western Thrace.⁴²⁹

Turkey remained neutral during Second World War, however, the discriminative measures against the Greek Orthodox in Istanbul during the war, have sometimes been interpreted as Turkey taking advantage of the suspension of the reciprocity and balance with the minority in Thrace. The best known among these measures was the infamous Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi), which was applied unfairly and ruined the economy of the Greek Orthodox community.⁴³⁰

Early in 1944 the end of the German war effort appeared imminent. Defeat in Stalingrad and North Africa and the advance of the Red Army in central Europe and the Balkans enhanced the influence of EAM and made the British more determined not to allow Greece to fall into the hands of the Communists. On the other hand, the skirmishes between ELAS and other resistance organizations were an overture of a civil war that would erupt in December 1944. When the Bulgarians retreated in September 1944, Thrace passed under the control of EAM. In April 1945 power was transferred to the regular Greek authorities. Thrace became one of the main theatres of the civil war.

Greek Civil War 1944-1949

There is a debate among the Greek historians on whether the Greek Civil War was limited to 1944-1946 period, or whether it extended 1946-1949.⁴³¹ Beside the German and

⁴²⁸ Ibid. p.10, it is claimed that Germans were trying to prevent Bulgarian violence towards the Muslims.

⁴²⁹ Republic of Turkey State Archive, BCA/77D80/301000/7348113, 'Ministry of Interior to the Prime Minister', 6 May 1941.

⁴³⁰ Given in details in Chapter 4.

⁴³¹ Left-wingers usually reject the rightist theory of three cycles, one during the occupation, the second in December 1944, and the third between 1946 and 1949. According to Thanos Veremis, the civil war encompasses a period between 1944-1949; while Richard Clogg asserts, although the country was in a

Bulgarian occupation of the region, Greek civil war also influenced the lives of Western Thrace Muslims, as much as Greek-Orthodox, as it mainly took place in North Greece. In 1943, Greek gangs mainly composed of the Greek communists under EAM (National Liberation Front) became organized against the Bulgarian and German forces in big cities. The defeat of the German forces in Stalingrad encouraged the Greek gangs against the German and Bulgarian forces. One of the most significant reasons for the success of the EAM was the support from the Greek citizens. Actually, EAM promised to provide welfare and a better future for the poor Greek citizens. Also, EAM achieved to use the nationalistic feelings of the Greeks against the invasions of Germany and Bulgaria. In the end, the Bulgarian forces left the control of Western Thrace to EAM forces on 14 September 1944. Until 12 February 1945, EAM controlled the region.

It is noted that during the EAM regime, 25.000 Turks had migrated to Turkey.⁴³² Actually, both during the Bulgarian domination and Civil War period, the Muslim Turks in Western Thrace remained in between the two forces, or as Aarbakke states, between ‘the devil’ and ‘the deep blue sea’.⁴³³ On the one hand they were oppressed by the Greek gangs in order to provide more food and equipments while on the other hand they were suppressed for the same needs by the Bulgarian forces. For example, in the newspaper *Trakya*, it was stated: “Today’s conditions of Greece should not provide the necessary basis for the elimination of the Western Thracian Turks. We are neither fascists nor communists. We don’t have a problem with the government and we don’t expect for a benefit from a regime change”.⁴³⁴

The December 1944 attempt of EAM-ELAS to usurp power marked the future of the Communist Party in public affairs. Its chance to become an important element in parliamentary politics through the influence it had gained during the years of occupation and resistance was forfeited in the party’s all out attempt to establish a monopoly of power in December 1944. The war erupted in 1946 when forces of former ELAS

political turmoil and there was foreign occupation, the civil war began on 1946. Veremis, *Modern History of Greece since 1821*, p.116; Clogg, *Concise History of Greece*, p. 140. As the civil war between the National Greek Army- backed by the UK and the US- and the Democratic Army of Greece –the military branch of the Greek Communist Party (KKE), backed by Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania, emerged due to a highly polarized struggle between leftists and rightists which started in 1943, I will follow Thanos’ categorization. Hence the Greek civil war will be the political period between 1944-1949.

⁴³² Bülent Demirbaş, *Batı Trakya Sorunu*, (Arba Yayınları, 1996), p.127.

⁴³³ Aarbakke, *UnPublihed PhD Thesis*, p. 91.

⁴³⁴ Hüseyinoğlu, *Unpublished Master Thesis*, p. 65.

partisans that found shelter in their hideouts and were controlled by the KKE organized the DSE (Democratic Army of Greece)⁴³⁵ and its High Command headquarters. KKE backed up the endeavor, deciding that there were no more political means to use against the internationally recognized government that had been formed after the 1946 elections which the KKE had boycotted. King George returned to Greece on September 27, 1946, and died in April 1947. His younger brother Paul succeeded him.

During the civil war period, while some of the Greeks became members of the EAM and clashed against the Greek forces, most of the Muslim Turks cooperated with the Greek forces despite a number of attempts of the EAM gangs to make the Muslim Turks not to migrate and to take side with the EAM forces. In general Muslim Turkish minority were loyal to the Greek government and despite the political turmoil they did not try to take advantage of it. One of the reasons for loyalty can be that during the years of Civil War all the region was full of Greek gangs. Leaving the region and going to Turkey was very dangerous and most of those who attempted to do so were killed by the gangs. In case of such a situation, the Muslim Turks had to stay in the region and assist either the gangs or to the Greek forces. Most of the minority members preferred the second option. The second reason for the loyalty of Muslim Turks can be the stance of Turkey against the communists. Turkey was not in favor of the communist control of Greece. Therefore, Turkey either directly or indirectly assisted the Greek national forces in their fight against the communist gangs. The third and, for me, the most important reason was the effect of religion. The religion of the minority was Islam. In Western Thrace, the Communist ideology has been interpreted as an ideology without a religion. In his master thesis Hüseyinoğlu highlights the statement of Ibrahim Serif -the President of the Consultation Council and the elected Mufti of Komotini at 2005- the rejection towards the Communist ideology based on Islam. "Communism is an ideology that rejects the notion of religion. It is mainly for this reason that we sided with Athens against the Communist EAM during the Civil War Period".⁴³⁶

The newcomers from Turkey, who dreaded yet another migration should their new homeland secede from Greece, became the most ardent of patriots and therefore sworn

⁴³⁵The Communists formed a provisional government and used DSE as the military branch of this government.

⁴³⁶Hüseyinoğlu, Unpublished Master Thesis, p. 70.

enemies of the Communist insurgency.⁴³⁷ Civil War came to an end with more than 100.000 deaths and more than 500.000 refugees who were forced to abandon their homes. Between 1948 and 1949 it is alleged that up to 15,000 soldiers of the National Army lost their lives, while 20,000 of DSE were also killed. Furthermore 4,000 civilians were killed by the rebels and 5,000 guerrillas were executed after they were captured.⁴³⁸ The political and economic situation in Greece was severely damaged during this period. However, it seems that the most dramatic hit was within the Greek society. The Civil War was not between the Greeks and other states but it was within the Greek community. Greek nationals fought against each other. The ‘National Schism’ of the Interwar period between the Modernists and Traditionalists was transformed into a strife between the communists and anti-communists. As Clogg notes, such a division in the Greek society was likely to cast a long shadow on the developments in the Cold War era.⁴³⁹ Greece’s postwar history begins on August 30, 1949, with the conclusion of the last government operation against the Communist forces in the northwest. According to Veremis, it took almost four decades for the chasm between victors and vanquished to be bridged and it was only after people finally ceased to address the issue, not out of fear but oblivion that the civil war was really over.⁴⁴⁰ The climate of political instability is evident from the fact that, during the five years between the arrival of Georgios Papandreou in Athens as Prime Minister in October 1944 and the end of the civil war in late 1949, a total of 17 different governments were formed under ten different prime ministers.⁴⁴¹

5.2.2. Muslim-Turkish Minority During The Period

Even though the immigration of the Muslim minority to Turkey increased during the political dictatorship and at the Bulgarian rule, in general including the Greek civil war, it

⁴³⁷ Veremis, *Modern History of Greece since 1821*, p. 121.

⁴³⁸ Ibid. p. 125.

⁴³⁹ Clogg, *Concise History of Greece*, p. 53.

⁴⁴⁰ Veremis, *Modern History of Greece since 1821*, p. 127.

⁴⁴¹ Tsoumis, (Thessaloniki, 1994), p. 101. The sequence was: Georgios Papandreou (18 October 1944 to 3 January 1945), Nikolaos Plastiras (3 January to 8 April 1945), Petros Voulgaris (8 April to 11 August 1945 and 11 August to 17 October 1945), Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos (17 October to 1 November 1945), Panagiotis Kanellopoulos (1 November to 22 November 1945), Themistocles Sofoulis (22 November 1945 to 4 April 1946), Panagiotis Poulitsas (4 April to 18 April 1946), Konstantinos Tsaldaris (18 April to 2 October 1946 and 2 October 1946 to 24 January 1947), Demetrios Maximos (24 January to 29 August 1947), Konstantinos Tsaldaris (29 August to 7 September 1947), Themistocles Sofoulis (7 September 1947 to 18 November 1948; 18 November 1948 to 20 January 1949; 20 January to 14 April 1949 and 14 April to 30 November 1949), Alexandros Diomedes (30 June 1949 to January 1950).

can be stated that the Muslim community stayed loyal to the capital, and supported its camp. Even though they were a minority group, which spoke different language, religion and customs from that of majority, during the German occupation they did not side with the occupier.

During the civil war, the communist forces in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace included a “Turkish section”, but its ability to attract the Turkish speaking Muslims of Thrace is questionable. Osman Nuri claims that the communists fooled many, and that the damage to the minority could have been much larger if he had not intervened so that people did not assist the armed bands which seemed strong at the time (*Trakya* 888/08.08.1964). The later minority MP Hasan Hatipoğlu was an officer in the Greek army at the time and toured the villages making anti-communist propaganda.⁴⁴² It seems that the schism between Kemalists and traditionalists ceased during the politically dangerous years. Survival of the community was more critical.

On the other hand, Greece and Turkey for not loosing the community of the prominent leader’s clientele, could “forgive” some of the leaders’ past mistakes. Sometimes this turns into absolute opportunism by the minority leaders. In the early period, the best example of this is probably Hamdi Hüseyin Fehmi (Hamdi bey) (1897–1965). His father had participated in the brief autonomous government in the Pomak villages of Bulgaria after the annexation of Eastern Rumelia in 1885. Afterwards he settled in Ksanthi where he was granted large land areas in the plain. Hamdi bey studied in Istanbul and advocated the Kemalist reforms. When he first ran for MP in 1932 he drew his support mainly from the Pomak areas. During World War II he collaborated openly with the Bulgarian occupation authorities, while after the war he supported Greek claims against Bulgaria. His son Şevket Hamdi was appointed chairman of the pious foundation (*vakıf*) committee in Ksanthi in 1967 and has remained there since, drawing his support from the Greek authorities.⁴⁴³

Compared to the pressures of the Metaxas regime, Muslim immigration to Turkey during the civil war accelerated. The tremendous pressure exerted upon the Muslim community during the course of the civil war resulted in a renewed exodus. Those fleeing the area

⁴⁴² Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p. 74.

⁴⁴³ Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p. 75.

were divided into two main groups. The first involved the rural inhabitants of the Rhodopi Mountains who, either through their own initiative or on orders of the EES, evacuated their villages, seeking refuge in the lowland areas and the larger towns of Western Thrace. A second, numerically significant, group tried to escape the dangers of the Greek civil war through immigration to Turkey.

The recruitment and propaganda strategy of the two warring parties of the Greek civil war towards the Muslim community of Western Thrace was shaped by a mixture of military imperatives and deeply entrenched stereotypes as to whether the minority could ever become a 'reliable ally'. This strategy received, in the persona of Mihri Belli⁴⁴⁴, a major and unlikely boost. Yet even 'Captain Kemal's charisma was not enough to galvanize sufficient (or consistent) support on the ground. During the Civil War in Thrace, there was no minority newspaper except in areas under communist administration. *Savaş* (War) was edited by Kaptan Kemal (Mihri Belli) in Latin script and promoted communist ideals together with a nationalist Turkish discourse addressed to the minority.⁴⁴⁵

The government in Athens found, in the Muslim community of Western Thrace, a useful ally in its anti-Communist campaign. But their help was instrumental. The Muslims never really regarded the conflict between the government and the DSE forces as 'their war', as they did not regard the war between the Axis powers and Greece their war. Fear and respect for state authority might have brought Muslim conscripts into the ranks of the EES (until mid-1948), but there are few stories of anti-Communist heroism to report. This front, however, was built largely on mutual convenience rather than a commitment, on either side, to the virtues of multi-cultural co-existence. In subsequent years, it would be shattered by the increasing bilateral tensions between Greece and Turkey, mainly by the Cyprus Issue and 6-7 September Events of 1955.

Featherstone argues that, in ideological terms, the DSE's message towards the local Muslim community also suffered from (inevitable) contradictions. It contained a strong secular and modernist message, but in contrast to the Kemalists approach it also targeted

⁴⁴⁴ Mihri Belli, was a prominent leader of the socialist movement in Turkey. He was legendary for having fought on the partisan side in the Greek Civil war, and took the name 'Captain Kemal'.

⁴⁴⁵ Tsitselikis, *Old and New Islam in Greece*, p. 277. G. Niarhos & K. Featherstone, *Last Ottomans: The Muslim Minority of Greece 1940-1949*, (Palgrave,2007), p.6.

the Ottoman power structures within the Muslim community, yet the Turkish government in Ankara and the Consulate in Komotini were dismissed as American allies. This strategy was a mistake for a local community which valued its traditional way of life more than the promised rewards of the socialist revolution. The low representation of the minority among the ranks of the communist guerrillas did not prevent the local guerrilla administration for putting forward the minority issue in political terms: a year before the end of the Civil War, a minority body called 'Greece's National Democratic Union of Turks' was formed in Organi (Rhodopi). The short-lived Union was the product of a convention organized by the Provisional Democratic Government aimed at 'administrating all issues concerning the Turkish minority to defend its rights and mobilize it in favor of the Democratic Army'.⁴⁴⁶

In the recent work *The Last Ottomans*, it was questioned why a minority – having lost so much by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, suffering much adversity thereafter, living in an unstable, powder-keg region, remained overwhelmingly passive and disengaged when confronted with an exceptionally horrific Bulgarian occupation? It was stated that beside the influence of Turkey and Greek resistance movement during the civil war, the local conditions that deterred resistance and insurgency were the minority's lack of groupness and leadership capacity, as well as its geographic fragmentation.

Although lack of groupness can be an important factor for the loyalty of the minority community, I believe the main reason for the passive action of the Muslim minority during this political turmoil years-occupation and civil war- should be interpreted in term of their legal rights. Beside their weakness in organization, it should be noted that they saw "Lausanne Treaty" as a constitution. Even though the Greek state had violated its articles, they were still benefiting from collective rights given by this Treaty. German and Bulgarian occupation, or a deep social change under communist rule would suggest an end to this treaty. Beside Turkey, a strong Greek state was also a guarantee for the Lausanne Treaty. They would not risk losing their privileges.

The voting behavior of the minority illustrates this point: although both before and after the 1940s the Muslim vote was overwhelmingly given to 'minority' candidates, their political expression never led to the creation of a separate 'minority' party (as was to be

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid. *Last Ottomans*, p. 70.

the case later in post-Communist Bulgaria). Arguably, the integration of minority candidates within the mainstream ‘Greek’ political parties has served as a counter-weight to a political expression built on the premise of a separate nationhood or a distinct nationalist discourse shared across the ‘Muslim minority’.

In conclusion, the experience of the occupation and the civil war formed one of the strongest episodes in overcoming the conservatives/Kemalist cleavage of identity in favor of the latter. This was evident in the growing strength of Kemalist candidates in the 1946 elections, by contrast to those of 1936. That said, the process of growing closer to Turkey remained partial within the minority. According to Featherstone, this was a process that was far weaker in the case of the mountainous Pomaks: having rejected identification with Bulgaria, most retained a sense of distinction from Turkey. The minority thus finished the 1940s still with major points of internal differentiation: it would remain more meaningful to refer to the ‘minorities’. Kemalist ideology, policies and mores were the main stimulus to their social change and adaptation and one that gradually pressed a singular identity of their kinship as ‘Turks’. In so doing, this nationalist ideology encouraged ‘groupness’.⁴⁴⁷ Towards late 1970s, this cleavage would entirely diminish, and Dr. Sadık Ahmet would rise as the leader of the community during late 1980s until his death in 1995.

The post-war reality in Greek Thrace, where developments had slowed because of the Civil War, had the following characteristics: The leaders, the minority, a significant proportion of whom had collaborated with the actors that the Turkish diplomacy endeavored to defend and spread by any means Turkish identity and Kemalist ideology. It is indicative that, the leaders of the minority, regardless of their differences did not express opposition to the ethnic character of the minority. The only voices questioning the Turkish identity of the minority expressed during this time was from the perspective of Hafız Ali Reşat Circassians and other fugitives, who had a different ethnic origin anyway.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid. Last Ottomans, p.130.

⁴⁴⁸ Kostis, Tsioumis, Η διαχείριση της μειονοτικής ταυτότητας στον ελληνικό χώρο και η διαμόρφωση της εκπαιδευτικής πολιτικής: Η περίπτωση των μουσουλμάνων της Θράκης 1923-1974. (The management of minority identity in the Greek area and in educational policy: The case of the Muslims of Thrace from 1923 to 1974.)

5.3 Political Representation without Parliamentary Work (1946-1967)

As aforementioned the period between the years 1936-1949 was a catastrophe for Greece. To the 550,000 people (8 percent of Greece's population) who died during 1940-44 were added another 158,000 dead in the years 1946-49.⁴⁴⁹ During these years, Jews, Muslims, Slavs paid the highest price of the political turmoil and external occupation. Hence despite 10 years of disfunctioning, the elections were held in 1946 and the Muslim minority continuously represented in the parliament, the political stability was not achieved in Greece until 1950.

Although 1930s ended with the victory of Kemalists against traditionalist among the Muslim minority, with the emergence of Democrat Party in Turkey in 1946, it is observed that the political dynamics within the minority group altered as well. While the schism between royalists and republicanists in Greece, transformed into a rivalry between leftist and rightist, we see the continuation of the traditionalists and modernists cleavage in the minority community.

The only thing which did not changed in terms of political representation of the minority is that, despite the political changes in Greece, the stability of Muslim MPs regarding their political influence over the minority was still the same. Between 1946 and 1967 (colonel junta), 9 elections were held in this period. Muslim minority gained 27 seats in the Greek Parliament, and interestingly only 7 different deputies shared these seats. These numbers show that the dynamics between the Greek parties and the Muslim notables, and the relation between Muslim notable and Muslim community did not change during and after the civil-war years. Kemalist Osman Nuri Fettahoğlu (from Galip family) managed to be elected for 8 terms, while conservative Molla Yusuf and Kemalist Yusuf Hasan Hatipoğlu (ex-MP Hatip Yusuf's son) followed him with 6 terms of service in the Greek Parliament.

This period is very important in terms of the political representation of the two minorities (Roum and Muslim-Turkish), as for the first time both groups' representatives were in the Parliament. Unfortunately, the best years of the minorities were shattered by the Cyprus Problem, in which they paid the highest price. The major political events that directly or

⁴⁴⁹ Veremis, *Modern history of Greece since 1821*, p. 127.

indirectly affected the minority's lives can be given as: Turkish-Greek rapprochement during 1950s; Greece's and Turkey's NATO membership in 1952; Cyprus issue; 6-7 September Events; 19th Article of 1955 citizenship law; Cold-War as an international factor; and 1967 Colonel Regime.

5.3.1 Political History

After Panagis Tsaldaris' death in 1936, Konstantinos Tsaldaris led the People's Party and in the legislative elections of 1946, the party achieved a huge victory. The party supported the restoration of George II in the plebiscite of 1946, during a period of fierce civil conflict. Nevertheless, Konstantinos Tsaldaris resigned, in order that a government of national unity (centre-liberals and conservatives) could be formed under the leadership of the Liberal politician Sophoulis. This government with the participation of both the People's Party and the Liberal Party led the country during the civil war. The civil war ended with nationalist victory against the communist forces, and Greece's post-war history begins on August 30, 1949.

Cold War, NATO membership and Turkish-Greek Rapprochement

Both Turkey and Greece applied for the NATO membership and became NATO members together on 15 February 1952. In this way, they protected themselves from the threat of the USSR. Consequently, in 1954 the Greek government relaxed its traditional antipathy towards the use of ethnic labels to refer to ethnic minorities in Western Thrace and upheld the entire Pomak/Turk/Muslim minority as 'Turkish'.⁴⁵⁰

From the beginning of 1950s until mid 1955, there were significant developments that strengthened the relations between Turkey and Greece. One of them was the signing of Cultural Agreement on 20 April 1951. According to this agreement, there would be exchange of academicians and students. The misinformation in the school textbooks regarding the history of the other state would be corrected. Also, the establishment of cultural institutes in the other state and the free circulation of books and magazines in the other state were provided. However, the Cultural Agreement of 1951 had not specially focused on the minority education. The provisions of this agreement were quite general

⁴⁵⁰ Hugh Poulton, Suha-Taji Faruka (ed.), "Changing Notions of National Identity Among Muslims in Thrace and Macedonia: Turks, Pomaks and Roma", *Muslim Identity and the Balkan State*, (C.Hurst&Co: UK, 1997), p. 84.

and vague and they were not legally binding for the two parties of this agreement. Rather, it seems that it aimed to develop the cooperation between Greece and Turkey by means of culture.⁴⁵¹ Another development was the official visits between Turkey and Greece. The Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuad Köprülü made an official visit to Athens in June 1952, and as a response, Prime Minister Sophocles Venizelos visited Ankara in February 1953. Furthermore, the President of Turkey, Celâl Bayar, visited Athens in August 1952 and in this year, on 3 December 1952; the only Minority High School in the Rhodopi prefecture was founded and took his name. However, this policy was not to last, and Greece soon reverted to its traditional distrust of Turkey and the Turkish minority in Western Thrace, especially with the eruption of Cyprus issue.

The Cyprus Issue and the Events of 6/7 September of 1955

By the involvement of the Cyprus issue in the Turco-Greek relations, the fate of the two minorities in Western Thrace and Istanbul started to be negatively affected. The attempts of Greece for 'Enosis', to unite the island with the mainland Greece, were clearly rejected by the Turkish side.

The reaction of the Muslim minority towards 6-7 September events is important. One of the deputies of the time Osman Nuri Fettahoğlu was very sensitive to what influence the "September events" in 1955 could have on the minority regime. He represented a somewhat mature Turkish nationalist who had grasped that it was difficult to demand something for the "Turkish minority" which Turkey was not willing to give to the "Greek minority".⁴⁵² However, even after the breakdown of the Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul many Muslim minority members living in Greek Thrace considered themselves primarily within the framework of the Greek-Turkish "balance". While referring for the attitude of the Western Thracian Minority regarding the 6/7 September events, it was expressed that the events occurred in Istanbul was a shame for Turkey and Turkishness and they shared the pains of the Istanbul Greek Minority.⁴⁵³

After the 6/7 September events, a great number of the Greek Orthodox population have

⁴⁵¹ Clogg, Concise History of Greece, p. 165.

⁴⁵² Hüseyinoğlu, Unpublished Msater Thesis, p.68.

⁴⁵³ (*Trakya Gazetesi*, 12 September 1955)

gradually left Istanbul and migrated to Greece. In this way, the reciprocity in the protection of the demographics of the minorities in Western Thrace and Istanbul between Greece and Turkey came to an end. From 1955 until today, one can notice that Greece has usually condemned Turkey as being the first party spoiling the reciprocity character of the Lausanne system. As a response to the Greek condemnations on the reciprocity issue, Turkey argues that the rights of the Muslim Turks of Western Thrace are not protected only with the Lausanne Treaty. Both the 1913 Athens Treaty and 1920 Sevres Treaty puts Greece under the responsibility to protect minority rights on her own territories.

Article 19 in 1955 Greek Law & 1964 Ban on Purchase of Land

In 1947 the legal act L-2 was issued in Greece. This meant that all people who had fought against the Greek government during the Greek Civil War and had left Greece would have their citizenship confiscated and were banned from returning to the country. On January 20, 1948 the legal act M was issued which allowed the Greek government to confiscate the property of those who were stripped of their citizenship. This effectively exiled the defeated KKE and its supporters who had left Greece.⁴⁵⁴ This policy also affected the Muslim community. It is not certain that Greece implemented article 19 in its citizenship law to target the Muslim minority, however, it can be said that Muslim-Turkish minority was the group that was affected most from this law.

Greece arbitrarily expelled thousands of Minority members from citizenship, through application of the repealed Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Law.⁴⁵⁵ Article 19 was abrogated by the Greek Parliament in June 1998. Yet, as the abrogation is not retroactive in nature, thousands of stateless minority members are still unable to regain their Greek citizenship unlawfully taken away by Greek authorities.

The Greek authorities, making use of the article expelled thousands of Greek citizens of Turkish origin. The administrative decision taken by the Greek authorities was published

⁴⁵⁴ Veremis, *Modern History of Greece since 1821*, p. 135.

⁴⁵⁵ Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Code (No:3370/1955) provides that; "A person of non-Greek ethnic origin leaving Greece without intention of returning may be declared as having lost Greek nationality. This also applies to a person of non-Greek ethnic origin born and domiciled abroad. His children living abroad may be declared as having lost Greek nationality if both their parents and the surviving parent have lost the same. The Minister of the Interior decides in these matters with the concurring opinion of the National Council." Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Law which was in effect between the years 1959-1998, reads as follows: "A person of non-Greek ethnic origin leaving Greece without the intention of returning may be declared as having lost Greek nationality".

in the Official Gazette while the person concerned was not officially notified of the action taken against him or her. Thus the Turkish Minority members lost their citizenships while studying abroad, working abroad (in an EU or non-EU country), even during their compulsory military service in the Greek Army. They usually learned that they lost their citizenship when there was a need of contact with the official Greek authorities.⁴⁵⁶

In 1964, Turkish Parliament passed a law stipulating that the residence and working permits of 10.000 to 11.000 Greek citizens living in Turkey would not be renewed.⁴⁵⁷ In addition to the deteriorating situation in Cyprus, this law once more caused the Muslim Turks to think that Greece would continue to increase the pressures in Western Thrace as a retaliation to the latest applications in Turkey. In 1964 the Greek government implemented a secret decision to hinder the purchase of land by Turks in retaliation for the forcing out of ethnic Greeks living in Istanbul. This policy of reciprocation became open during the Colonels' regime of 1967-74. Moreover, in an attempt to sever links between the minority and Turkey, in 1968 a special teacher-training centre for Turks was set up in Thessaloniki to replace the teachers who had come from Turkey.

5.3.2. Political System

In post-war years, similar to the period before Metaxas regime, it is seen that electoral systems were altered from one election to another in order to achieve stability in politics. Moreover, the number of deputies in the parliament had also reduced from 354 in 1946 elections to 250 seats in 1950 elections, and increased to 258 seats in the 1951 national elections. The 300 members of Parliament (since 1952) depended entirely on the interchange of electoral systems – from proportional representation (PR) between 1946 and 1950, to reinforced proportional representation in 1951, to simple majority in 1952, to a mixed system in 1956. From 1958 onward, some form of reinforced PR turned up giving a majority of seats to the leading party.

In terms of party systems, post-war political system in Greece seems to find stability with the alliance of centrist forces against the leftist threat after the civil-war, then a long period of right rule followed by leftist parties' victory. Unfortunately, the polarization between left-right, schism between republicans and royalists, and treating Cyprus issue as

⁴⁵⁶ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/deprivation-of-citizenship.en.mfa>

⁴⁵⁷ Given in details in Chapter 4.

an internal affair more than a foreign problem led the way for the 1967 Colonel regime to take the power. Veremis categorizes the post-civil-war period into five subperiods⁴⁵⁸: a) 1950-53, the centrist intermission with three elections (1950, 1951, 1953) producing a “polarized multiparty” state of affairs; b) 1952-56, the creation of a rightist state under the Greek Rally of Field Marshal Alexander Papagos; c) the eight years of Constantine Karamanlis’ National Radical Union, a period of stability and rapid reconstruction; d) the elections of 1963-64 regenerating the centrist coalitions of the early 1950s as a major challenge to the Right; e) 1965-67, the break-up of the improbable coalition and the royal attempt to act as the regulator of the politics.

Between 1946 and 1952, 25 Greek governments were formed, all of them short-lived. The situation changed in 1951 when two new parties appeared on the scene, one representing the unified right, the other the united (but never to be unified) left. In this way, the Greek party system entered the stage of structural consolidation, although the centre was to remain fragmented for another decade.⁴⁵⁹ Between 1946 and 1967, in Greek politics we witness the competition between major right-wing and major center parties. Left-wing element became valid and legitimized, however, it did not get the high vote shares to acquire the power. Two-years after the communist defeat in 1949, and despite the restrictions imposed by the post-civil-war regime, a vibrant leftist –though communist controlled- party, called United Democratic Left (Eniania Dimokratiki Aristera-EDA) emerged within Greece, which took its strength from history, especially its role during the resistance and civil war in the 1940s, rather than the thin industrial basis of the country and the weak labor movement.⁴⁶⁰

Between the years 1946 and 1956, the main rivalry was between Papagos’s Greek Rally, and National Progressive Centre Union-EPEK. Karamanlis’ National Radical Union-ERE succeeded Papagos’ Greek Rally. Right-wing parties dominated the political field until 1963, when George Papandreou’s center-wing party Centre Union-EK won the power. Hence, there was a transformation from fragmentation between 6 political camps

⁴⁵⁸ Veremis, *Modern History of Greece*, p. 140.

⁴⁵⁹ Seraphim Seferiades, “Polarization and Non-proportionality: The Greek Party System in the Post-War Era”, *Comparative Politics*, Vol.19, No.1, 1986, p. 74.

⁴⁶⁰ Stathus N. Kalyvas, Niko Marantzidis, “Greek Communism, 1968-2001”, *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 16, No.3, pp.665-690.

to concentration of political forces in 3-4 camps.⁴⁶¹ Between 1952 and 1963, the party system can be named as pre-dominant party system, which after 1963 until 1981 converted to polarized pluralism in Sartori's categorization. In general for the period 1951-1981, right-wing parties able to contest each and all of the period's elections single-handedly, and able to win strong majorities. In order to understand the changes in the political system, it would be beneficial to analyze the elections and party politics in Greece from 1946 to 1967 Colonel Junta.

Following the Varkiza Agreement – which was signed on 12 February 1945, a day after the publication of the Yalta Declaration), it was agreed to have parliamentary elections on 31st March, 1946 under the observation of the allied mission (French, British and American), and Greece also agreed to hold a plebiscite to determine whether it was to be a monarchy or a republic on 1 September, 1946. According to the observations, the population of Greece in July, 1946 was 7,49 million. The number of men validly registered was shown to be 1,70 million.⁴⁶²

The 1946 election in which Leftist parties boycott the elections, was held under the system of proportional representation, and the center was losing power, hence as expected the right, grouped together in an electoral alliance called the United Camp of the Nationally Minded (Inomeni Parataxis Ethnikophronon). This alliance emerged as the largest party, with a 55% share of the popular vote and within a 354-seated parliament, got 58% share of the seats (206 seats in total). A short-lived coalition government⁴⁶³ was created while the People's Party resolved its leadership crisis for a power struggle between Tsaldaris, Mavromikhalis and Stephanopoulos take place.⁴⁶⁴ Konstantinos Tsaldaris, nephew of the pre-war leader of the People's Party formed the People's Party government on 18 April 1946. As a royalist, Tsaldaris secured British and American consent to a plebiscite on 1 September 1946, which produced a 68% vote for the return of

⁴⁶¹ Takis Pappas. "The transformation of the Greek Party System since 1951", *West European Politics*, Vol.26, No.2, 2003, pp.90-114.

⁴⁶² "Observations on the 1946 Elections in Greece", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 14, No.1, February 1949. In Greece, women got their suffrage right in 1956. Hence 1,70 million is significant to display that due to wars there were severe losses in male population. On the other hand, 1946 elections were psychologically crucial, as people would have an opportunity to express their political options by ballot after ten years of dictatorship, war, and military occupation.

⁴⁶³ Within this alliance, People's Party (Laikon Komma) secured 156 seats. The conservative Venizelists Liberal Party secured 34 seats.

⁴⁶⁴ Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece*, p.21.

the King, against 32 for the republic, and King George II became the king. Meanwhile, the KKE was formally banned in December 1947. In February 1950, the martial law, which had been in force since 1948, was lifted.⁴⁶⁵

The election of March 1950 was the first to be held after the conclusion of the civil war. Likewise, the spectrum contesting the elections differed significantly from that of 1946. To the centrist People's Party and Liberal Party, two new groups were added. On the left General Nikolaos Plastiras had founded the Progressive Liberal Center Party (Komma Proodeftikon Phileftheron Kentrou). On the left the Democratic Camp (Dimokratiki Parataxis), aimed to fill the gap left by the KKE- which was banned in 1947 and remained an illegal party until 1974-. Similar to 1946 national elections, the 1950 elections were held under the relatively straightforward system of proportional representation, and contested by some 44 parties, 25 of them grouped in nine alliances.⁴⁶⁶ On the other hand, the number of deputies reduced from 354 to 250. No party achieved more than a 19% share of the vote. People's Party under Tsaldaris got 62 seats with 18,8%, Liberal Party under Sophocles Venizelos leadership won 56 seats with 17,2%, the New National Progressive Union (EPEK) under Nikolaos Plastiras won 45 seats with 16,4% vote share, and George Papandreou's party got 35 seats with 10,7 vote share. The KKE won 18 seats in a parliament of 250 deputies.⁴⁶⁷ Despite the high polarization, the electorate had voted for moderation and a degree of reconciliation. The three parties of the center Liberal Party, EPEK and George Papandreou Party secured 136 seats and a 44,3% share of the popular vote. Following a threat by the US ambassador that continued instability and talk of elections might jeopardize American aid⁴⁶⁸, a coalition government was established, and headed by Plastiras.⁴⁶⁹ When the supporting parties withdrew, a new election decided to be held on 9 September 1951. Meanwhile, Marshal Papagos announced the formation of a new political party to contest the elections to resolve the political impasse and to produce a stable government.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 22.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 23.

⁴⁶⁷ The vote shares are taken from Clogg's work and the number of seats is derived from Veremis' work.

⁴⁶⁸ Greece's total share of the Marshall Plan, which was proclaimed in June 1947, was \$1.7 billion in economic aid (loans and grants) and \$1.3 billion in military aid between 1947 and the 1960s.

⁴⁶⁹ In the 18 months of its duration the new Parliament produced five coalition governments, four under Plastiras. In August, Plastiras resigned, to be replaced by Sophoklis Venizelos head of Liberal Party.

The elections of 1951, although conducted with a system of modified proportionality-designed to favor the larger parties by excluding the smaller parties from the second and third distribution of seats unless they had achieved at least 17% of the popular vote-ended in deadlock.⁴⁷⁰ Two significant political formations, Greek Rally (the Ellinikos Synagermos) on the right, and United Democratic left (Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera-EDA) on the left, emerged with 1951 elections. The right was the true winner since Papagos won 36,5% of the vote and 114 seats out of 258 in Parliament. Tsaldaris all but disappeared, as his People's Party got only 2 seats⁴⁷¹ with 6,8% vote share.

Later Papagos' refused to form a coalition government, urged by King Paul- who had succeeded to the throne on the death of his elder brother, George II, in 1947- to hold new under the simple majority system. Instead, Plastiras was given a mandate to form a coalition with Venizelos. It enjoyed a small overall majority of 131 in a 258-seat parliament. The new government's major tasks were passing the 1949 constitutional draft through the parliament and to bring Greece into NATO. It managed both. NATO not only provided an additional guarantee against Balkan Communism, it also constituted a door to a community of democratic European states and a partial emancipation from exclusive American influence.

As Clogg asserts, when the electoral law was introduced in October 1952 it provided that the next elections should be held under the narrow-wide plurality system that had been used in 1928 and 1933, as the US embassy had wished.⁴⁷² The 28 May 1952 law declared women to be eligible to vote and stand as candidates in legislative and municipal elections for the first time, although they had been prevented from exercising this right before.⁴⁷³ On the other hand, women did not vote in November's elections because the electoral catalogs had not been updated. In 16 November 1952 election which was held under plurality system, the Greek Rally Party under Papagos secured 247 seats in the 300

⁴⁷⁰Richard Clogg signifies that military personnel voted separately in the elections. The number of registered voters increased to 2,224,246. Turnout was 77,1%.

⁴⁷¹Interestingly one of the seats was taken by a Turkish representative Hamdi Hüseyin Fehmi, who was a deputy from People's Party in 1936 parliament. Rally of Farmers and Workers also disappeared with 1 seat in the parliament. Plastiras' National Progressive Centre Union-EPEK got 74 seats with 23,5%, Sophoklis Venizelos' Liberal Party got 57 seats with 19%, and EDA got 10 seats with 10,6% share of the votes.

⁴⁷²Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece*, p. 29.

⁴⁷³Women's Suffrage, <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm>. On 5 February 1930, Greek women, and only the educated who had completed 30 years of age, were given the right to vote in the municipal and local elections only.

seat parliament with 49% of the vote; the coalition of center parties polled 34% and won 51 seats, while EDA and the populists were left out of Parliament. While, Plastiras had discouraged the Greek Cypriots from demanding unification (enosis) with Greece in 1950, Papagos adopted the Archbishop of Cyprus Makarios' demand for recourse to the UN that had been overruled by the British authorities.⁴⁷⁴ Meanwhile, following the bloody conflict between Cypriot Turks and Greeks, and 6-7 September events of 1955, the Cyprus issue became a problem between Turkey and Greece under Menderes and Papagos' governments. Papagos died on October 1955, and King Paul gave Constantine Karamanlis- the minister of transport and public works- the mandate to form a government.

The February 19, 1956 elections under mixed electoral system⁴⁷⁵ witnessed the appearance of Karamanlis' new party, the major- right wing party National Radical Union (Ethnikē Rizopastikē Enosis- ERE) and the first of future coalitions of the center, under the name of Democratic Union (Demokratikē Enosis), which was the major center-left coalition of People's Party, EPEK, KF, KP, and EDA. Although the Democratic Union won 48,2% vote and Karamanlis' National Radical Union 47,3%, the latter secured 165 out of 300 seats in Parliament.⁴⁷⁶

Since each government with its majority in Parliament determined the electoral system of the forthcoming elections, the issue always caused much excitement among party leaders. Despite its electoral victory and securing the majority of the seats, Karamanlis also announced the elections to be held in May 1958, which was under reinforced proportional representation that favors larger parties. The elections of May 11, 1958, were conducted under an electoral law, which was the product of an agreement between Karamanlis and George Papandreous. ERE won 171 seats, although its percentage of vote fell from 47,4% to 41,2%. The Liberal Party separated from the Democratic Union and got 36 seats with 20,7% vote share, while left-wing EDA, with 24,4% got 79 seats in the parliament and became the official opposition. As Veremis claims, the fear of polarization that would destroy the center in Greek politics led the center politicians and conservative opponents

⁴⁷⁴ Veremis, *Modern History of Greece since 1821*, p. 131.

⁴⁷⁵ Simple majority was maintained in smaller constituencies, whereas larger constituencies with over three seats at stake, some were determined by proportional representation-

⁴⁷⁶ Pappas, "The Transformation of the Greek Party System since 1951", p. 95.

of Karamanlis to join forces under the aegis of the Center Union, one month before the elections of October 1961.⁴⁷⁷

In 1959 Karamanlis and Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Members drafted an agreement in Zurich for the creation of an independent republic of Cyprus.⁴⁷⁸ With Cyprus out of the way, at least until 1963, Greek public attention once more focused on domestic questions. The turning point in parliamentary politics was the elections of 1961. Papagos' successor Constantine Karamanlis with his ERE won the third consecutive elections (1956, 58, 61), thus institutionally confirmed the renewed unity, and continuity of the political right since Papagos' Greek Rally initiated in early 1950s. ERE got 50,8% vote share and 176 seats in the parliament, followed by major central parties (Center Union) under the centre alliance of EK and KP with 100 seats and 33,7%, that managed to increase its votes. The third wing in the parliament was left-wing coalition of Greek Pan-democratic. Following the opposition's demand for new and fair elections, and his depute with the King, despite his electoral victory, Karamanlis resigned on June 11, 1963, and the government had served only two years. A caretaker government under a supremecourt judge supervised the elections of November, 1963.

The post-war conservative supremacy came to an end with the victory of center party in the 1 November 1963 national elections, after which Karamanlis decided to abandon politics and to go into exile abroad. ERE's vote share reduced from 50,8% in 1961 elections to 39,4% in 1963 elections and got 132 seats. George Papandreou's major-center, Center Union (Enosis Kentrou-EK) won the 42% of votes and 138 seats. EDA maintained its vote share with 14,3% and participated in the parliament with 28 seats. Papandreou formed a government that lasted 55 days.

On 16 February, 1964, Papandreou's Center Union –EK won a clear victory with 52,7% vote share and 173 seats. ERE under Kanellopoulos, in coalition with Markezinis' Progressive Party got 105 seats and EDA continued its decline with 22 seats. Political prisoners still serving sentences were released. Beside the clash between king and prime

⁴⁷⁷ Veremis, *Modern History of Greece since 1821*, p. 135.

⁴⁷⁸ It provided for two British sovereign bases in the island and Britain, Turkey, and Greece became the guarantors of the new state's integrity. A Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president were given veto power over important legislation and the Turkish Cypriots were represented in the government and the civil service in a proportion over and above their numbers on the island. The two communities, that had played no part in drafting the Zurich agreement, signed the document in London.

minister, there was a problem about the control of the army. From the beginning of 1960s, the relations between the Greek monarchy, parliament and army started to deteriorate. In February 1964, George Papandreou came to the power and stayed there until July 1965. During this term, the Center Union (CU) government of Papandreou followed an anti-royalist, anti-military and anti-American attitude. It is mainly due to this attitude that Papandreou's government did not last long. After the end of the CU government, a stable government could not be achieved. The domestic politics of Greece was in a turmoil that resulted in the beginning of a seven-year Junta regime. On March 30 1967 Paraskevopoulos resigned and the King called Papandreou to form a government. Following his refusal the King gave ERE's leader Kanellopoulos the mandate. During the early hours of April 21 the Colonels moved their tanks into central Athens. The Greeks woke up in a dictatorship.

5.3.3 Political Representation of the Muslim-Turkish Minority

During the years from 1946-1967, Komotini and Ksanthi were not divided as separate electoral districts, but united under Rhodopi district. At all events, the High Court declared in 1933 that the measure violated the constitutionally protected principle of equal voting rights.⁴⁷⁹ The idea of imposing a divided electoral college – which was imposed on 1920s- was unsuccessfully put forward again in 1952 by the Ministry of the Interior. The professed purpose of the proposal was "to hamper any political intervention by political parties for winning over the Muslims through nationally harmful activities". In 1968, during the military junta, the CCT proposed a constitutional amendment imposing a two-deputy limit on the election of Muslim by the minority in Thrace in order "to eliminate the risk that Muslims win all deputy seats in Thrace as well as to control their political influence".⁴⁸⁰

The period which ends on 21 April 1967 with the military dictatorship, is characterized by an impressive stability in the minority's parliamentary representation. Between the years 1946 to 1967, eight national elections were held, which gave 27 seats to Muslim representatives in total, but these seats were occupied by only 7 different politicians.

⁴⁷⁹ Tsitselikis, *Old and New Islam in Greece*, 2012., p. 215.

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.* p.216.

31 March 1946, 5 March 1950 and 9 September 1951 Parliamentary Elections

The elections of 1946, marked the beginning of the Civil War at a juncture in which the modernists strengthened their position among the minority. Thus, of the four elected minority deputies (Osman Üstüner, Hafız Faik Engin, Hüseyin Zeybek and Osman Nuri Fettahoğlu), (Hüseyin Zeybek and Faik Engin) clearly belonged to the conservative camp of the Agrarian Party, the rest were elected among Venizelist Liberal Party members. It should be noted that Liberal Party's total number of seats in the parliament was 34. The anticommunist feelings of Kemalists eased the political rapprochement with the Greek authorities, which promoted Kemalist reforms in the early 1950s. In 1950 elections, among the three Muslim representatives two of them (Osman Üstüner and Osman Nuri) were from Liberal Party, and one (Hüsamettin Fehmi Otmanlı) was from the conservative People's Party. Osman Nuri and Osman Üstüner got the Liberal Party ticket again in the 1951 national elections, while very interestingly Hamdi Hüseyin Fehmi shared the second seat of the Tsaldaris Party along with its leader in the parliament. Within the years when People's Party and Liberal Party were losing power against the right-wing Greek Rally and center positioned EPEK, it was interesting that Muslim-Turkish minority continued to favor these parties. This shows that the old habits in voting for Liberal Party and People's Party before 1936 continued in the minority. Moreover, a guaranteed vote from the community suggested a guaranteed seat in the parliament.

During the period after the Second World War until 1967, when the military junta took over power, modernist candidates consistently dominated the political representation of the minority.⁴⁸¹ Still, the modernist vs. conservative cleavage continued in the minority. Main political figures were Osman Nuri Fettahoğlu, Osman Üstüner and Hasan Hatipoğlu from the Kemalist wing, and Molla Yusuf Hasanoğlu from the conservative part. In Ksanthi, for example, Osman Nuri was elected successively from 1946 to 1963, for eight terms. In the elections of 1946, 50,51 and 52, he got the ticket from minor-center Venizelist Liberal Party; between 1956-1963 elections he was elected as a representative from Karamanlis' major right-wing National Radical Union (ERE), and in 1963 elections from George Papandreou's major-center positioned Centre Union (EK). Apparently, there

⁴⁸¹Ilias Nikolakopoulos, "Πολιτικές δυνάμεις και εκλογική συμπεριφορά της μουσουλμανικής μειονότητας στη Δυτική Θράκη, 1923-1955", ("Politics of power and election behaviour of the Muslim minority of Western Thrace 1923-1955") Δελτίο Κέντρου Μικρασιατικών Σπουδών 8, 1990- 1991, p.175.

was a consistency in his political positioning, and his influence on the minority community.

16 November 1952 Parliamentary Elections

In Rhodopi, Molla Yusuf Hasanoglu represented the conservatives from 1952 onwards, while Osman Üstüner and Hasan Hatipoğlu alternated as representatives of the modernist wing. In the 1952 national election. Hatipoğlu initiated his long time co-operation with Molla Yusuf. According to Aarbakke, the journalist Hâki characterises Yusuf as the conservative of the conservatives, and Hatipoğlu as the conservative of the modernists (İleri, 53/23.10.1976). Both of them ran on the Greek Rally ticket and both were elected. Osman Nuri Fettahoğlu was elected from the Liberal Party. Hatipoğlu benefited from Yusuf's influence on the voters, while Yusuf benefited from Hatipoğlu's closer relations with the Turkish consulate. The very fact that they represented the two opposing ideological poles—the conservatives and the modernists— meant that they appealed to different groups of voters for the same party.⁴⁸² Aarbakke indicates in his PhD work that after Papagos' death, Hatipoğlu was expelled from the Greek Rally party in 1955.

The main rivals of Hatipoğlu were Osman Nuri and the Galip family, who competed against him for the hegemony of the modernist wing. Galip Family would continue its success in the politics after 1974 with the election of Sebahattin Galip (1974 session) and Galip Galip (1996 and 2000 sessions) as deputies. Also Zeybek Family would raise politicians for 3 generations: Hüseyin Zeybek (1946 session); his son Celâl Zeybek (1977 session) and his grandson (Celâl Zeybek's nephew) Hüseyin Zeybek (2012 sessions). Osman Üstüner's grandson İlhan Ahmet would be elected as a MP in 2000 elections as well (see Appendix E).

Parliamentary Elections (19 February 1956, 11 May 1958, 29 October 1961, 1 November 1963 and 16 February 1964)

In the 1956 elections, all of the three representatives (Osman Üstüner, Yusuf Hasanoğlu, and Osman Nuri) would take the ticket from the same party, Karamanlis' right-wing ERE. Molla Yusuf Hasanoğlu managed to maintain a seat for this right-wing party for a

⁴⁸² Aarbakke, p.110.

long time until the 1967 military intervention, such that he was elected from National Radical Union- ERE in the elections of 1956, 58, 61, 63 and 64.

Osman Üstüner was never a serious rival for Hatipoğlu, but when Sebahaddin Galip ran as candidate in 1963, the contest became a question of the leadership of the minority. Hatipoğlu achieved both to be elected and to obtain more votes than Galip.⁴⁸³ During the political crisis in July 1965 Hatipoğlu and the other minority MP Molla Yusuf held the balance in parliament and agreed to support the Stefanopoulos government in exchange for certain privileges. These included change of prefects who were not to the liking of the minority and appointment of teachers educated in Turkey.

In general, the minority candidates were elected via right wing political parties such as Ellinikos Synagermos (Greek Rally) of Marshal Papagos and ERE (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis, National Radical Union) of Konstantinos Karamanlis. The consistency of the Muslims' electoral choice reflects the fact that contrary to the situation in the interwar years and the first years after the war, the politicians of the minority were no longer bound to local political 'protectors'.⁴⁸⁴ They generally had a more long-term relationship with a political party, while enjoying freedom of ideological and political orientation in relation to the internal minority opposition. As a result, the religious wing under the leadership of Molla Yusuf Hasanoglu recovered its strength, obtaining a seat in the Greek Parliament through Synagermos (Greek Rally), and then through ERE. Broadly, the mountainous villages voted in favor of the Islamists (or in some cases in favor of Christian candidates), whereas the rest of the minority showed a clear preference for the Kemalists. The economic structure of the mountainous areas, the dependency of tobacco cultivators on Christian politicians, the antagonisms between Islamists and Kemalists, and the politically favorable measures enacted by the Greek authorities caused the Pomaks of the Ksanthi area to vote overwhelmingly for Christian candidates in the 1960s. In my interview with Ayhan Karayusuf (SYRIZA Komotini MP, 2012 elections), he said this difference in political behavior between the mountainous villages and prefect center still continues.

⁴⁸³ In 1963 the ratio was 6,263 to 4,700 and in 1964 it was 7,862 to 5,685. This was the highest amount of votes obtained by any modernist after the war, but well behind Molla Yusuf who received 10,297 votes in the 1964 election. The situation was slightly different in Ksanthi, where Osman Nuri had his best result in the 1963 election with 6,143 votes, while in 1951 he succeeded to be elected with as little as 1,858 votes. In this connection it should be kept in mind that women did not vote before the 1956 elections.

⁴⁸⁴ Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p. 111.

Among the Islamists two trends emerged - those who were somewhat more pro-Kemalists and the ardent anti-Kemalists, though the latter lost their political strength until the coup of 1967. It is worth noting that both trends were represented for a decade (1951-1961) by the then-ruling party. The period of Greco-Turkish tension, beginning in 1955, redefined political alliances within both the modernist and Islamist camps, as Turkey favored certain minority politicians over others. The first time that the minority vote differed notably from the overall electorate in Thrace was in 1961 when the Muslims voted in favour of the Progress Party (Komma Proodeutikon). The party took 39 percent of the Muslims vote but only 44 percent of the Christian vote due to a strong calls for autonomous minority representation embodied in the figures of Hasan Hatipoglu (modernist) and Molla Yusuf (conservative).⁴⁸⁵

Despite the modernist wing's domination from 1950 onwards, conservative wing also increased its strength. For Nikolakopoulos, two external reasons facilitated the organization and political participation of the Conservatives: The encouragement of the General Administration of Thrace and the Democratic Party's ascendance to the power in 1950 in Turkey by which the monopoly of the hard core Kemalists came to an end.⁴⁸⁶ In 1950, Molla Yusuf and Hafız Yaşar formed the 'Islamic Revival' (İntibah-i İslam) and the conservatives gathered around this group. However, this resulted in an internal division within this group. 'Islamic Union' (İttihat-i İslam) was formed by Hafız Ali Reşat and Hüsni Yusuf who adopted a more conservative attitude against the ideologies of the Reformist group while Molla Yusuf adopted a more moderate stance towards the Reformists and the Greek state.⁴⁸⁷

As Greek-Turkish antagonism over the minority intensified in the ensuing years, the media gained crucial importance. One example of how Greece and Turkey predicated their policies on minority media on a reciprocal basis is evident in Greek support for the Islamist newspapers *Sebat* (Perseverance) of Komotini, published by deputy of 1974 and 1981 elections Hafız Yaşar (1957-1977), the short lived *Muhafazakar* (Conservative, 1958-1966) published by the elder Circassian Muslim leader Ali Reşat, and *Milliyet*

⁴⁸⁵ Tsitselikis, *Old and New Islam in Greece*, p. 219.

⁴⁸⁶ Nikolakopoulos, *Muslim Minority of Western Thrace*, pp.196-197.

⁴⁸⁷ Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p. 103.

(Nation). In the post-war period, *Hak Yol* (Right Road, 1947-1952) expressed religious conservatism (the editor Hüsni Yusuf was exiled from Thrace in 1954 for harming Greco-Turkish friendship) and was in line with the circle of İntibah-i İslam (Islamic Revival) that attempted to implement ideas about Islam exported by then Turkish Prime Minister Menderes.⁴⁸⁸ The authorities' support for Islamist papers enabled Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis to gain influence among elements within the minority in the mid-1950s given the pro-Islamist policies of his government. The Greek authorities in the 1960s-1980s also sponsored local Greek papers to refute pro-Turkish positions promoted by the minority press. The first magazine was *Peygamber Binası* (The Prophet's Edifice) in Arabic, published from 1957 to 2002 and used as a textbook in primary schools. At the same time, the Turkish consulate sponsored the Kemalist press such as *Azınlık Postası* (Minority Post), in circulation from 1965 to 1981 and published by Selahattin Galip – brother of Sebahaddin Galip, deputy of 1974 election; *Akın* (Attack) by Hasan Hatipoğlu, future deputy and strong supporter of the modernist wing, and published from 1957 to 1986; and *Gerçek* (Reality), which was in print from 1977 to 1993 and published by İsmail Molla Rodoplu, also a deputy of 1989 elections. Another form of publication was newspapers that were printed in election periods to express the electoral programs of candidate deputies. Notable items in this genre include the paper *Zaman* (Time), which was edited by a Greek and a Turk/Muslim in 1928, and for a while edited by Hamdi Bey (*Zaman* appeared in Ksanthi also in 1923). Others, like *Akın* (Attack), by Hatipoğlu, or *Öğüt* (Advice) appeared during pre-electoral periods.⁴⁸⁹

It should be noted that despite their different positioning at modernist and conservative camps, the minority deputies pursued the protection and improvement of the minority rights in solidarity. What they had in common was their anti-communist policy. In post-war years, electoral college for the minority was abandoned, however it is seen that Greek parties continued to prefer the MPs who were trustable, anti-communist and had an impact on the community. In 1950s, the number of candidates for the parliament varies from 15 to 20, and in each (except 1964 assembly) at least three of them managed to be elected. On the other hand, similar to the minority representatives of pre-1936, the minority deputies between 1946 and 1967, did not take the floor in the Greek Parliament, and did not discuss the problems in the assembly. However, this was not merely due to

⁴⁸⁸ Tsitselikis, *Old and New Islam in Greece*, p. 220.

⁴⁸⁹ Tsitselikis, *Old and New Islam in Greece*, p. 222.

their lack of command in Greek, as Hasan Hatipoğlu had finished a Greek secondary school and spoke Greek well, and Osman Nuri could read Greek well -but did not have such good command of oral Greek-, but it was not the custom to participate in parliamentary debates. Moreover, the minority MPs would rather try to solve the minority questions in the wings on an individual basis. On the other hand, they were whether founders or writers of a newspaper, and in the analysis of their thoughts regarding minority problems, study on their newspapers shed lights on more points than their work in the parliament. Moreover, these newspapers are beneficial to see the conflict of interest between these MPs. They were prominent leaders of the community, and despite their work in the parliament were insufficient as representatives. They were honored by the Greek state by giving their names to some streets in Komotini on 6 October, 2012.⁴⁹⁰ MPs of 1960s, Molla Yusuf, Osman Üstüner and Hasan Hatipoğlu are some of those MPs, who were remembered and honored.

In order to ensure greater penetration into the Muslim populations of the lowlands a number of 'trusted' members of the minority were employed to supplement the activities of the Committees for the Enlightenment of the Rural Population. One such member was Hasan Hatipoğlu, son of the pro- Kemalist former MP (1932 and 1935 elections) and senator Hatip Yusuf from Komotini, who at that time served as an officer in the Greek Army and was later elected as a Member of Parliament (1952–1967). As an officer in the Greek Army who had fought against the communists during the civil war, one of the 'few stable features in Hatipoğlu's career is his disdain for the Left'.⁴⁹¹ The mobilization of local Greek and Turkish-language newspapers in Ksanthi and Komotini became a key instrument of anti-Communist propaganda in the area. A typical example was Osman Nuri, the editor of Trakya newspaper and a local MP for the centrist National Political Union, who adopted a strong anti-Communist stance and later claimed that, without him, a much larger number of Muslims would have joined the Communist forces.⁴⁹²

Nuri's anti-communism provided the Greek government with a temporarily valuable, if a highly volatile, ally. The Greek security services were highly suspicious of Nuri's

⁴⁹⁰ "Gümülcine sokaklarına 5 azınlık mensubunun ismi verildi", 6 October, 2012, <http://www.azinlikca.net/bati-trakya-haber/gumulcine-sokaklarina-5-azinlik-mensubunun-ismi-verildi-10062012.html>

⁴⁹¹ Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p. 114.

⁴⁹² Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p.91.

frequent criticisms against the government's minority policy and his close links with the Turkish Consulate in Komotini.⁴⁹³ Yet, there is no evidence to suggest that the Greek authorities suspected Turkish officials of defaulting on their commitment to support the Greek government during the civil war. İlhan Ahmet (ND Komotini MP, 2004 elections) mentioned an interesting point in our interview. The Greek state would like to know whose man the minority politician is, no matter Greek or Turkish state side, they would like to eliminate uncertainty about the politicians. For Nuri's case, he would not be a threat unless he clearly showed his side.

It is interesting to look at the role of the leading minority politicians in the Greek- Turkish polemics concerning discrimination. Mainly they did not voice the discriminations in the parliament, nor when they had a chance for re-election. Andreadis points out that when Hamdi Hüseyin Fehmi (MPs at 1936 and 1951 parliament, both from People's Party) failed to be re-elected to the Greek parliament in 1952, he wrote a series of articles in his newspaper *Milliyet* where he described life in Thrace as unbearable. He targeted mainly his voters and presented it as a result of his absence from parliament. He also fed continuously the Turkish newspaper *Hürriyet* with his articles, which picked up on this and exploited them for its own purposes.⁴⁹⁴ According to Aarbakke, Hamdi Fehmi was known for his opportunism and changed positions and alliances continuously throughout his political career. Osman Nuri criticised his lack of principle in his newspaper *Trakya*, and blamed him for undermining his own struggle.⁴⁹⁵ In 1952 Hamdi Fehmi wrote in his newspaper that the minority had never been unjustly treated. This happened when he was MP for the opposition (from People's Party) and under no particular obligation to support the government policy. In the middle of 1953 he made a U-turn and changed his position completely. The aforementioned incidents give us a lot of information about the options and choices of the minority. It points to a high level of press freedom, even to the degree that the minority was not afraid to even insult Greece. It cannot be excluded that Hamdi Fehmi possibly used his articles as usurpation towards the Greek authorities, knowing their sensitivities. His behavior exemplifies the very short term and opportunistic behavior, which has been part of minority politics. In the final instance, it also reinforces the minority's marginal position in Greece's political life.

⁴⁹³ Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p. 93.

⁴⁹⁴ K., Andreadis, *I Musulmanikí Mionótis tis Ditikís Thrákis*. (The Muslim Minority in Western Thrace), (Thessaloniki, 1956), pp. 45–46.

⁴⁹⁵ (Trakya 888/08.08.1964).

Osman Nuri ran on the ERE ticket in 1961 in spite of his differences, since the party would win the election. He attempted to make the minority protest against ERE's education policy in the 1963 election by voting for the Centre Union. Centre Union party was a mixed success. People tended to agree with Osman Nuri in Ksanthi, while in Komotini many were pleased with the minority policy of ERE leader Karamanlis.⁴⁹⁶ In this connection it is necessary to have in mind the stable relationship of the conservative Molla Yusuf to ERE.

Osman Nuri said in his newspaper that in the course of the minority's history, despite difficult times with dictatorship, war etc., there had never been such a systematic psychological oppression of the minority, and never had the central authorities ignored the complaints of the minority to that degree.⁴⁹⁷ A central point for Osman Nuri was that the minority is national, and he wanted to protect the integrity of it. When arguing for the Turkish identity of the minority, Osman Nuri took recourse to formal arguments related to the Lausanne Treaty. He stated that the 103,989 persons with *établissements* certificates are officially recognized as Muslims and Turks.⁴⁹⁸ This makes the minority first of all a part of Greek-Turkish relations. The minority is viewed as some kind of branch of Turkey, and should have the same development as the Turks of Turkey. He wrote specifically that Turkey had to be consulted about the minority issues and the minority's cultural questions.⁴⁹⁹ Osman Nuri also complained about some Christian fanatics who worked systematically, particularly in Ksanthi, to obtain votes from the minority and to secure that no "Turks" were elected. They wanted to spoil the relations between "Turks and Greek Orthodox", and attempted to split the minority vote as much as possible. For instance, The ERE party tried to keep the "Mountain Turks" [Pomaks] away from the Turkish language, and exceedingly supported the schools which employed the old alphabet. They responded to Osman Nuri's protests by saying that the administration was democratic and gave people what they wanted. Osman Nuri would claim that many forms of spiritual oppression masked itself behind the formula: "People want it that way".⁵⁰⁰

⁴⁹⁶ (Trakya 877/18.03.1964; 878/30.03.1964).

⁴⁹⁷ (Trakya 837/29.03.1962)

⁴⁹⁸ (Trakya 839/19.04.1962).

⁴⁹⁹ (Trakya 844/27.06.1962).

⁵⁰⁰ (Trakya 878/30.03.1964).

The military take-over in Turkey 27 May 1960 and the fall of Menderes made Osman Nuri again the favored candidate of the modernist wing. He consequently reclaimed the area challenged by *Akın*. This left room for his local rival Hamdi Bey to return to the Greek “protection” and oppose him in the 1963 and 1964 elections.⁵⁰¹ Osman Nuri represents the clearest statement of the Kemalist position in the 1960s. It should be recalled that during this period the conflict between modernists and conservatives was very prominent. Aarbakke asserts that, from reading Osman Nuri one can easily get the impression that there were only a few conservatives in the minority, and he is not willing to admit that they had a popular basis. Some people adopted the conservative position because the Greek authorities favored it. It is clear that there was not much mutual tolerance between the groups, and each group wanted to impose its views on the other. We see that Osman Nuri applauds the situation in the early 1950s, when the Greek authorities suppressed the conservative element in the name of Greek-Turkish friendship, while he protested intensely against the reversal of fortune in the 1960s.⁵⁰²

The newspaper *Akın*, which Hatipoğlu founded in 1957 together with Asım Haliloğlu, became an important vehicle for extending his political influence. The newspaper *Akın* in which Asım Haliloğlu was the founder and the head-writer, where the Muslim deputy Hasan Hatipoğlu was the manager, was written in Turkish, however the dates, its volume was in Greek. In Turkish it was introduced as “Haftalık Siyasi ve Edebi Türk Gazetesi” (Turkish Weekly newspaper on Politics and Literature), while in Greek title it only says “Evdomadiaia Tourkiki Efimeris” (Turkish weekly newspaper) but did not mention the political side. Hasan Hatipoğlu was a leading minority politician for decades, and left his personal stamp on much of the political life during this period. He had been born in Komotini into a well to do family with a past in politics. His father was the former MP and senator Hatip Yusuf who belonged to the Kemalist wing. After primary education in a minority school Hasan Hatipoğlu attended a Greek secondary school. Even his limited knowledge in Greek brought the advantages to Hatipoğlu as the prominent political and social figure of his generation. We have to bear in mind that until 1974 you could count on your fingers the minority members who could read Greek newspapers.

In the 1958 elections Asım Haliloğlu ran for the Progressive Agrarian Democratic Union

⁵⁰¹ Nikolakopoulos, pp. 51–52.

⁵⁰² Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p. 97.

(Proodeftikí Agrotikí Demokratikí Enosis) in Ksanthi, while Hatipoğlu ran for the Liberal Party (Kómma Fileléftheron) in Komotini. This gave them a dilemma, since they could not both promote their party as the best choice for the minority. They solved this problem by printing separate editions of *Akın* in Komotini and Ksanthi. In the 1958 elections Hatipoğlu surpassed Osman Üstüner in votes, although the latter was elected because of the overall vote distribution between the parties. Asım Haliloğlu was not elected either. There was a strong rivalry between Osman Nuri and Asım Haliloğlu for the hegemony of the Kemalist wing in Ksanthi. This became particularly apparent after the 1964 elections, when Osman Nuri was not elected for the first time after the war.

The newspaper owner Halil Asımoğlu was investigated for his article on 12 February, 1966 in *Akın*. Regarding the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tsirimokosoun's statement took place in Greek press "Greek government would apply reciprocity policy on Western Thrace minority regarding sending away of Roum minority from Turkey", *Akın* wrote that "the minority should be ready for this political bargaining, and if necessary they would accept a new population exchange instead of creating a tension between Turkey and Greece". The charges against the newspaper were for creating fear and discontent in the minority, and that article was written by an order from the Turkish Consulate in Komotini. The interesting point is *Akın* mentions the witnesses were from the conservative wing and a Circassian anti-Kemalist. On 20 July, 1966 *Akın* newspaper, a problem on a school outdoor sign is issued, as the school sign in Yassiören had been changed to "Muslim School" instead of the existing "Turkish School" sign. Asım Haliloğlu wrote a letter to the city governor about this issue. Meanwhile, we learn that Ksanthi Turkish Association was being tried by the Greek court.⁵⁰³ It is seen that the decisions of Greek state regarding the Cyprus issue was analyzed by the newspaper. It is said "Makarios refused to be a patriarch of Alexandria, when Cyprus was in such a depression". Another news informed that after a restoration of a minority school at Kösele village, the Greek officers prepared a outdoor sign saying "Muslim School" instead of the existing "Turkish School". The Turkish villagers rejected to put the new sign on the door. We also learn that an investigation started against *Akın* by the Greek authorities.⁵⁰⁴ Later the newspaper announced that it was acquitted from the charges. Hatipoğlu on the other hand, compared the 20 secondary schools of the Christians, with the two of the minority.

⁵⁰³ (*Akın*, 401/20 July, 1966).

⁵⁰⁴ (*Akın*, 10th year, 405/ 24.09.1966) Makaryos Hakkında; Kösele Köyünde; *Akın* hakkında yeni tahkikat.

There were 1,200 minority primary school graduates and only 60 places in the Komotini secondary school and 30 in Ksanthi. He asked why the authorities had not helped in opening new secondary schools instead of saying that there was no room, and why the minority was not allowed to open schools and to appoint teachers. He found it worrying that the Greek teacher staff in the mountain villages would be increased. “Because our kinsmen [referring to Pomaks] who live there need to learn Turkish and not Greek” he wrote in his newspaper *Akın*.⁵⁰⁵

In general, in the post-war period, it is seen that both minority community and MPs enjoyed their rights and liberties better compared to 1936-1946. The 1946 elections in Greece and Turkey were interesting, as both minority communities were represented in the parliament after a transition from dictatorship to democracy. The conflict between modernists and conservatives continued during 1950s and 1960s. Its reflection was not observable in their party preferences, as majority of the community supported right-wing and centrist parties. In terms of numbers, considering the total population of Greece was around 7 million and Muslim minority were around 100,000, the seats they achieved in the parliament suggests satisfaction of representation. Since 1920, it should be noted that the number of Muslim representatives until 1964, have not been affected by the electoral system. They managed to get at least 3 seats in every election. In Greece suffrage was granted to women in 1952 and Greek women began to be elected as representatives in Greek Parliament in the 1956 national elections. On the other hand, there has been no Muslim Turkish woman minority member – although there has been a candidate- that managed to be elected a minority representative to the Parliament.

The MPs were elected from the main parties. Although People’s Party and Liberal Party were losing power, both the community and MPs supported these old parties. Suggesting a shift in the political behavior of the minority compared to pre-1936, as minority was voting according to the person, not to the party who is likely to win. Between 1952 and 1963, the party system can be named as pre-dominant party system, which was after 1963 until 1981 converted to polarized pluralism. Although Greek Rally dominated the party

⁵⁰⁵ (Akın 1082/13.03.1993; 1093/23.06.1993).

system in the early 1950s, the minority MPs managed to be elected from the minor parties. The community's political preferences were shaped more on the mobilization of persons, rather than the ideology of the parties. Later in 1960s, despite their different political positions, the MPs followed the tradition of being elected from the same party – in 1962 elections, from ERE-. Hence the link between the electoral systems-party systems- political representation cannot be connected for the Muslim minority in Greece in the post-war years.

Moreover, in terms of political representation, even though there were Muslim MPs in the parliament; efficiency of their representation is questionable. Despite the fact that some of the MPs like Hatipoğlu, had a good command of Greek, they did not take the floor, nor did they say or do anything against the parties' policies. Usually the MPs used their own newspapers to express their views, and the criticism against each other was made through these newspapers. Greek parties tried to use this conflict between the Muslim political leaders and cleavage in the community. This way of participation suggests that the mistrust between the communities did not end. The strategy of running as an independent candidate, naming the problems of minority in the parliament, stressing on the Turkish identity of the community and founding their own minority party would be feasible only in late 1980s following a mass protest by the community.

5.4. Junta Period: Non- Representation (1967-1974)

In general, the military coup in Turkey in 1960 and in Greece in 1967 signified difficult times for both minority groups.

5.4.1 Political History

The 1963 national elections had signaled the rising success of George Papandreou, and the military takeover⁵⁰⁶ succeeded in preventing George Papandreou from winning the upcoming elections. On the other hand, the military intervention could not find its legitimacy among the public and politicians. Such terms as “growth” and “development” began to feature in their discourse, as part of an effort to modernize the image of the

⁵⁰⁶ According to Veremis the 1967 coup occurred as the military refused to accept the end of the civil-war polarization and give up their role as guardians of a repressive state ideology. The officers invented a threat to internal order – a possible Communist uprising – to justify their armed intervention. Veremis, *Modern History of Greece since 1821*, p.141.

military.⁵⁰⁷ The initial aim for a rapid return to parliamentary politics was postponed indefinitely.

Moreover, the Colonels failed to find any political allies among the old politicians. Thousands of left-wing sympathizers were sent into internal exile, and a number of politicians and other protestors were imprisoned, exiled or placed under house arrest. King Constantine also failed to make a stand against the Colonels in April 1967. Georgios Papandreou⁵⁰⁸ spent much of the time until his death in November 1968 under house arrest, and his funeral, attended by as many as half a million Athenians, a fifth of the entire population of the city, was an indication of the unpopularity of the regime.⁵⁰⁹ Although the military constitution received a 92 percent approval in 1968, the unpopularity of the Colonel regime would bring its overthrow by the people in 1974. By 1970, Papadopoulos had emerged as the undisputed leader of the junta. In 1973, he was elected as the president of the republic with a 78 percent 'yes' vote. However, not only had the regime lost contact with its original ideals, but also it was becoming increasingly divorced from its military constituency, which was also its only political base.⁵¹⁰

The brutal suppression of the Athens Polytechnic uprising in November 1973 popularized the cause of the students across the nation. On November 25 a bloodless coup led by Ioannides overthrew Papadopoulos. General Gizikis was installed as president, and a civilian puppet government was set up. The attempted assassination of President Makarios of Cyprus by Ioannides on July 28, 1974 had aimed to improve the prestige of the regime; however, it also precipitated Turkey's military operation to the island. The Turkish reaction meant that the junta had either to declare war and risk consequences, or back down and face public humiliation. As Ioannides was unable to choose the former, this led the collapse of the military regime in Greece, and it transferred its authority to the political leaders against whom it had been raised in 1967.

⁵⁰⁷ Thanos Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy*, (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1997), pp. 9-10. Yaprak Gürsoy, "Civil-Military Relations as a Component of Democratic Consolidation in Turkey: A Comparison with Greece," *Turkey-European Relations: Dilemmas, Opportunities, and Constraints*, edited by Meltem Müftüler-Baç and Yiannis A. Stivachtis (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008). pp. 304-307.

⁵⁰⁸ His son Andreas Papandreou was released from prison and allowed to leave the country following intense American pressure.

⁵⁰⁹ Veremis, *Modern History of Greece since 1821*, p.148.

⁵¹⁰ Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece*, p. 56.

5.4.2 Non-representation of the Minority during the Colonel Regime

Regarding Turco-Greek relations, and the situation of the Western Thrace minority, the bilateral relations continued to be relatively good in the following years,⁵¹¹ but gradually dissatisfaction arose over the handling of respective minorities. By May 1973, the two governments exchanged notes complaining about their maltreatment.⁵¹² A further worsening of the situation took place after the Papadopoulos regime was overthrown on 25 November 1973. The new strong man, Dimitrios Ioannidis, had a much more negative attitude towards Turkey than his predecessor. The restrictive measures increased for all Greek citizens. However, the Western Thracian minority was again the one who suffered a lot from the results of Colonels regime. Most of the problems Western Thrace minority faces today originated during the 7 years of Colonel Regime.

With its complete domination of the state services, the junta enjoyed unprecedented opportunities to control and repress the minority. Before the dictatorship such measures had mainly been applied against the communists, while now they were extended to everybody the regime perceived as its opponents. From a minority's point of view, it was an innovation to be classified as a dangerous enemy of the nation.

One of these problems is 'identity' issue. In 1972, for the first time, Greece officially started to identify the Minority as 'Muslims' instead of 'Turks'. From that time on, Greece has officially referred to the Minority as 'Muslims' of Western Thrace. It could also be mentioned that the programme in Turkish for the minority on Greek state radio was reduced and renamed "News bulletin for the Muslims of Thrace". This was only reversed as late as August 1996, when the name was changed again to: "Local news bulletin in Turkish". Besides, the minority started to be identified as composed of three groups: Turks, Pomaks and Gypsies. Also, the supervised zone continued during the Colonels regime but with an addition, the Evros prefecture. In this way, the relation between the Muslim Turks living within the supervised zone and those living outside this zone started to be under the control of the military. Moreover, damages to mosques, cemeteries and historical places belonging to the minority and some reallocations of the

⁵¹¹ Aarbakke asserts that previously, in an attempt to charm Turkey Colonel Papadopoulos had even declared to the Turkish newspaper *Milliyet* (30.05.1971) that he believed in a Greco-Turkish federation (Xydis 1972: 203).

⁵¹² George Niarchos, "Continuity and Change in the Minority Policies of Greece and Turkey", *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2006, p.42.

lands from the Muslim Turks to the Orthodox Greeks were some of the discriminations during the Colonels regime.⁵¹³

In the field of education, as aforementioned, the Greek-Turkish Educational Protocol was signed between Greece and Turkey on 23 December 1968. Compared to the 1951 Cultural Agreement, the 1968 Protocol exclusively dealt with the educational problems of the minorities. However, it was never effectively implemented.⁵¹⁴The Special Pedagogical Academy of Thessaloniki (EPATH) was founded in 1968. This was a counter measure to Turkish authorities' removal of the marble slate of a renowned Greek Orthodox secondary school in Istanbul.

Besides the problems related to buying land, the grievances most frequently mentioned concerned the great difficulties with obtaining permits to build or repair houses, driving license for automobile and tractor, loans and credits in banks etc. On the whole it was stressed that the minority members began to be treated differently from their Christian neighbors. Minority's control of the administration of their foundations was restricted. Naturally, the dictatorship abolished the elected boards of the Muslim minority's pious foundations. The abolishment of elected bodies was a general measure, which did not only affect the minority. Later, Greek authorities would point out that Turkey—where there was no change of regime—reacted promptly by abolishing elections in the Greek Orthodox institutions by administrative action.

Here the newspapers of the minority deputies and other minority and national press materials are important to understand how the minority community viewed the Colonel Regime and the discriminations against them. Baskın Oran mentions that after the establishment of the dictatorship, Hatipoğlu's *Akın* had a hesitant behavior, and immediately the complaints about the minority's situation vanished from its columns.⁵¹⁵ His political rivals criticized Hatipoğlu, as he was MP and supported Stephanopoulos government (17.09.1965–22.12.1966), which first ordered that any kind of land transaction had to be approved by a commission. After this the sale of the property to Muslims began to be restricted and came almost to a stop.⁵¹⁶ Hasan Hatipoğlu would

⁵¹³ Hüseyinoğlu, Unpublished Master Thesis, p 74.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid. Halit Eren, *Batı Trakya Türkleri*, pp.135-141

⁵¹⁵ Ibid. Baskın, Oran, p. 125.

⁵¹⁶ Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p. 177. (Gerçek 13/29.07.1978).

usually claim that the restrictions started with the junta, or that there was no important discrimination in the years 1965–66 when he was MP. Many minority members remember bitterly the junta slogan “Greece of Christian Greeks” (Ellás Ellínon Hristianón). In his article after the end of junta, Hatipoğlu mentions that at this time it became common to write slogans on walls such as “Greece belongs to the Christian Greeks”, “Death to the Turks”, etc.⁵¹⁷

According to minority sources the discrimination had started tentatively before the junta, in connection with the tension between Greece and Turkey. One of the main complaints of the minority has been the application of the Metaxas law 1366/1938, which made property transactions subject to the approval of a commission. According to the minority politician Sebahaddin Galip (MP by 1974 elections) there was no discrimination against the minority by this law until 1963.⁵¹⁸

At this point, Selahattin Galip’s trial is a striking example to show how the minority issue of one state, becomes an internal affair of the other one and influences Turkish-Greek relations. Although the censorship imposed by the junta restricted the possibility to protest against the discriminatory policy, Aarbakke stresses that there were still examples of criticism in the minority press. Selahaddin Galip’s article in his newspaper *Azınlık Postası* (1967-1981) can be given as an example. He wrote an open letter to Colonel Papadopoulos in November 1969, where he complained about the various discriminatory measures against the minority.⁵¹⁹ In January 1971 he wrote another article where he levelled a substantial criticism against the Greek authorities’ treatment of the minority under 4 subheadings: a) The most extensive complaints concerned education, where he basically asked for a standardized modern Turkish education for all the schools, b) He criticized the appointment instead of election of the *Cemaat* committees, c) He mentioned the problems in buying and selling property, d) Particular attention was given to the name of the minority. Galip mentioned that the “Turks of Western Thrace” were referred to by various names such as “Turks”, “Muslims”, “Ottomans” etc., and asked for the uniform characterization of the minority as “Turkish”.⁵²⁰ Among other measures it could be mentioned that the minority members could only obtain passports valid for one single

⁵¹⁷ (Akın 917/28.08.1987).

⁵¹⁸ Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p. 178.

⁵¹⁹ Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p. 180.

⁵²⁰ (Azınlık Postası/ 23.01.1971).

journey within one year from the date of issue. The police had also begun to show less tolerance towards manifestations of Turkish culture such as music, posters, etc.

As a result of this article, Galip was shortly after sentenced to 3.5 years of prison. In the trial of appeal he was sentenced to 20 months of prison and a fine for “disseminating false information” and “insulting” civil servants. This trial was covered extensively in the Turkish press. Galip was able to gather many minority members as witnesses. Among the most prominent was the Ksanthi mufti, who stated that Galip had written the truth. The trial against Galip led to questions in the Turkish parliament and requests for retaliation against the Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul. In the Turkish Parliament the issue was brought up by Antalya deputy Hamdi Özer, who stressed that Selahattin Galip defended his right for reciprocity, and this agreement is under Turkey’s guarantee. He says “with an independent country’s sensitivity, we have to claim our kin-brothers (soydaş)”.⁵²¹ Interesting point is that, Özer blames the Greek Court for making comparison of the Roum and Muslim minority, while he does the same with his words “Roum society is eating the cream (kaymak) of our national wealth, and they are carrying the rest to Greece. In contrast, Anatolian Turks cannot have even the *ayran* of this wealth...that’s why reciprocity rule should be applied to Roum in the fiercest way”. The Foreign Minister Haluk Bayülken responded to Özer in the parliament that they knew about the trial and Turkish officials would evaluate Özer’s suggestions.⁵²²

Later, Haluk Bayülken made a statement to the newspapers where he informed that “various and vigorous initiatives” had been taken to save Selahaddin Galip.⁵²³ Moreover, other minority members did not dare to oppose Galip because they feared the force behind him (i.e. Turkey). Eventually, Selahaddin Galip spent some months in prison until he was released by the general amnesty in the summer of 1973. He secured benefits from Turkey because of his involvement and settled in the Bakırköy suburb of Istanbul.⁵²⁴ Later Galip lost his Greek citizenship according to Article 19 of the citizenship code by the decision 4636/16.10.1984.

⁵²¹ TGNA Archive, (10 April, 1973). In Republic Senato, “Malatya representative Hamdi Özer’s response to the illegal and oppressive behavior of Greek state towards the Western Thrace Turks”.

⁵²² TGNA Archive, (10 April, 1973). In Republic Senato, “Foreing Affiars Minister Ümit Haluk Bayülken’s response to the illegal and oppressive behavior of Greek state towards the Western Thrace Turks”.

⁵²³ (İleri, 358/19.10.1984).

⁵²⁴ (İleri, 358/19.10.1984).

It is clear from the minority press as well, that at this time Galip enjoyed the support of Turkey. This did not only determine his behavior towards Greek authorities, but also gave him a dominant position within the minority. He was able to take his initiative because of Turkey's backing, and acted in all probability in understanding with Turkish diplomacy. This displays the basic dilemma of the minority. It does not have the power by itself to act as a pressure group within the Greek system, and when it uses the support of Turkey it becomes trapped in the net of problems connected to Greek-Turkish relations. As a consequence the minority front figures—in this case Galip—relate themselves first of all to the two dominant powers in the game, Greece and Turkey, while the minority becomes a vehicle rather than a participant.

In conclusion, with the military coup in 1967, active discrimination against the Muslim minority became the norm and it has continued since their fall. Discriminations concerning building, driving licenses, land purchase education and closing of the elected Turkish minority community boards and their replacement with government-appointed officials continue.⁵²⁵ Despite the return to democracy in 1974, the democratic practices deigned to the Muslim minority under former legislation were not resumed. Thus, while legislation provides for the election of the minority community boards and regional muftis, government appointees continue to occupy these crucial posts. After the junta's fall in 1974, which also meant the end of seven years of political inactivity, Muslim MPs were elected as candidates of the main political parties of Greece, such as PASOK (socialist party) and Nea Dimokratia [New Democracy] (right wing). A Two-party system emerged with the consolidation of democracy.

5.5 Few Representatives, More Effectiveness (1974- 2013)

End of Colonel Regime and transition to democracy had a positive effect on the Western Thrace minority in terms of their economic and social rights; however, the changes of Greek policy towards its Muslim minority occurred mostly due to struggle within the minority and internationalization of their situations. Especially towards the end of 1980s, it is seen that identity politics improved among the minority, as early immigrants to Europe initiated the internationalization of the problems. Moreover, compared to the early

⁵²⁵ Hugh Poulton. *The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict*, (London: Minority Rights Publications, 1991). pp. 182-188.

periods, minority representatives' profile also altered and they began to name their problems and demands in the Parliament. This period was the first time minority representatives were elected as independent deputies and established a minority party, meaning they began to participate in politics outside of the main Greek parties with whom they have issues of trust. Meanwhile, Greek authorities adjusted the political institutions – electoral systems and electoral districts- as a reaction to independent functioning of the minorities. It is seen that after 1974, although the number of Muslim minority deputies in the Parliament decreased, their effectiveness increased.

Politics after the end of Colonel Regime, also signified the end of old schisms: republicanist vs. monarchists in major politics, and modernists vs. traditionalist cleavage in the minority community. Struggle for democracy became the priority for both majority of the public and for the suppressed minority. In this struggle the role of the Greek parties, and minority members cannot be denied. The major historical/political developments which were the cause and consequences of these struggles were: Greece's Membership to EU in 1981; 29 January 1988 Protests; 30 January 1988 Davos Summit; 1990 Trial of Sadık Ahmet and İbrahim Şerif; and 1990 Pogrom towards the Muslim minority.

5.5.1 Political History

Starting from the 1974 intervention, the fears and anxieties of Greeks for a possible Turkish intervention of Greece via the Western Thracian Minority increased. Thus, the restrictive measures against the Muslim Turks were intensified. In 1974, Turkey's intervention increased the fear of a possible retaliation from the Greece to the Western Thracian minority, which resulted in a wave of migration of Muslim Turks to Turkey.⁵²⁶ Another development that threatened the Muslim Turks emerged in 1976, when the Turkish government sent the Sismik I, a survey ship, for oil exploration in the disputed waters. Greece clearly rejected such an endeavor and wanted to solve this problem in the International Court of Justice in The Hague. This crisis and other crisis situations in the Cold War era like this one did not turn into a hot war between Greece and Turkey, but it directly or indirectly played a significant role in the formation of Greek minority policy

⁵²⁶ It was noted that the number of the Muslim Turks migrated from Western Thrace to Turkey after the 1974 Turkish intervention of Cyprus was more than 20.000. Hüseyinoğlu, *Unpublished Master Thesis*, p. 76.

towards the Western Thracian minority.

Greece's EU Membership- 1981

Towards the end of 1970s, Greece started to spend its effort for her plausible EU membership while Turkey was struggling with her internal conflicts that caused the military coup on 12 September 1980. The Prime Minister Karamanlis decided that Greece should apply directly for membership of the EEC as a democratic European country and not as an associate member since 1962. After careful preparation of the various documents, Greece submitted her application for full membership of the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and EURATOM on June 12, 1975.⁵²⁷ Formal negotiations started on July 27, 1976. PASOK – the main opposition party- leader Andreas Papandreou threatened that a PASOK government would withdraw from the EEC.⁵²⁸ Papandreou's attacks against Greece's accession became even more provocative when PASOK doubled its share of the vote in the November 20, 1977, elections.

Karamanlis following his visits to the EU member states, on December 21, 1978, announced that the EEC had finally agreed to accept Greece as the tenth member of the community.⁵²⁹ The Treaty of Accession was signed in Athens on May 28, 1979, in the presence of the heads of state, prime ministers, and other dignitaries. Legislation to ratify it was passed in the Greek Parliament on June 28, 1979. Then, followed ratification by all the EEC parliaments and Greece became the tenth member of the community on January 1, 1981. The EC membership of Greece has been very important with its reflections on both Turkey and the Western Thracian minority. Since the beginning of 1980s by the advent of Papandreou to the Greek leadership, Greece has usually used her EC membership in order to prevent closer relations between Turkey and EC. However, it was the EC and later EU that forced Greece to change its minority policy of Western Thrace,

⁵²⁷ Veremis, *Greeks and Turks in War and Peace*, (Athens New Publications, 2007), p. 120.

⁵²⁸ In his fiery speeches during the pre-electoral period in November 1977 he kept repeating that Greece's membership of the EEC "will consolidate the marginal role of the country as a satellite of the capitalist system; will render national planning impossible; will seriously threaten Greek industry; and will lead to the extinction of Greek farmers." "What should be done," he insisted, was "to restructure relations with the EEC on the basis of a special agreement (of the Norwegian type) which would allow for Greece's full control over its national economy and especially the movement of capital and goods." "In any event," he said time and time again, "PASOK believes that the crucial matter of our accession to the EEC cannot be decided without a referendum."

⁵²⁹ Veremis, *Modern Greece: A History since 1821*, p. 160.

which was finally adopted in 1991 under the Mitsotakis leadership.

29 January 1988 Protests

The banning of civic organizations bearing the adjective ‘Turkish’ was one of the principal cases in the issue of denial of the ethnic identification of the Western Thracian minority. Towards the end of 1980s, the most significant development and possibly a turning point in the history of Western Thracian minority was the protest of 10.000 Muslim Turks on 29 January 1988. As a result of the Greek High Court’s decision, the Union of Turkish Teachers of Western Thrace and the Union of Turkish Youth of Komotini were dissolved because of the term ‘Turk’ in their titles that endangered the public order in Western Thrace. The main reason of the rally of 29 January was to protest the decision of the High Court and to make a national and international argument that a community was living in Western Thrace who were of Turkish origin, Muslim religion and Greek citizens. This decision was started to be highly criticized by the minority of Western Thrace which resulted in the protest on 29 January 1988.

This was an organized protest, and the decision for the protest was taken on 26 January with the elected Council of Minority, led by Council President Mehmet Emin Ağa. It was also decided that minority students would not go to school on the first three days of February. The demonstration was announced to the Greek authorities, they tried to prevent it by not allowing the Friday Prayer, and closing the roads to Komotini. Moreover it was claimed by *Akın* that Turks were not taken to public transportation and private vehicles.⁵³⁰ Before the 29 January protest, in the local minority newspapers it was manifested as follows: “Bugün Milletimizi Yarın Dinimizi İnkâr Eden Zihniyete Hayır.”(No to those who Reject Our Ethnicity Today and Our Religion in the Future) and “İrkımız Türk Dinimiz İslam, Şehirli Köylü Artık Uyan”, (Our Ethnicity is Turk and Our Religion is Islam, Both Those who Live in the Villages and Cities Do Wake Up), “Bu Vatanda Türk ve Müslüman Olarak Yaşamak Ne Suç Ne de Günah,” (It is Neither a Sin Nor a Crime to Live in this Fatherland as a Turk and Muslim).⁵³¹ *Akın* newspaper was announcing that as “Beklenen Gün Geldi” (the expected day had arrived), saying 120,000 people would say “We are Turks, Muslims” to the ones who claim “There are no Turks in

⁵³⁰ (*Akın*, 4 February 1988).

⁵³¹ (*Gerçek*, 28 Ocak 1988).

Western Thrace”.⁵³² Minority members were asked to join the protest, which would begin following the Friday Prayer at Komotini Eski Camii with the attendance of the mufti, current and ex-deputies, farmers, workers and journalists.⁵³³ The reason for the choice of this day as the day for protest was to attract the attention of the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, who would meet in Davos on 29 January 1988, for the first time after 40 years. The deputies and former deputies send a telegraph to President Özal before the Davos Summit⁵³⁴, saying they expected him to emphasize the problems of the minority.⁵³⁵

Moreover, it seems that the past experiences regarding the assimilation policies of the Bulgarian state towards the Turkish minority of Bulgaria was taken into consideration by the Muslim Turkish leaders. For example, Hasan Hatipoğlu, the owner of Akin newspaper and one of the ex-MPs, stressed that they are against the Hellenization policy of the Greek state against the Muslim minority⁵³⁶, and stated: “We believe that if our government today tries to apply the Bulgarian type of assimilation for Western Thracian Turks it is in a wrong way”.⁵³⁷ In the newspaper regarding the appointment of mufti instead of election, Turkish Ambassador Kamuran Güren’s article on Sabah newspaper (21 March 1987) about the comparison of Mufti and Patriarchate is mentioned, and it is declared that they are demanding retaliation.⁵³⁸

⁵³² (Akin, 27 January, 1988).

⁵³³ Those who had attended to the Council Meeting were: Ksanti mufti Mustafa Hilmi; deputy Mehmet Müftüoğlu; deputy Ahmet Faikoğlu; ex-deputy Hasan Hatipoğlu; ex-deputy Hasan İmamoğlu; ex-deputy Orhan Hacııbram; ex-deputy Ahmet Mehmet; ex-deputy Hafız Yaşar; politician Hafız Ağa Emin; politician Hasan Kaşıkçıoğlu; politician Hikmet Cemiloğlu; Politician Adnan Yusuföğlü; owner of Gerçek newspaper İsmail Rodoplu; owner of İleri newspaper Halil Haki; Yakın newspaper Enver Kasapoğlu; Hakka Daver newspaper Hasan Paçaman; Yuvamız newspaper Mustafa Mustafa; Çocuk Dergisi İlyas Halil Arkadaş; journalist of AA Mehmet Hatip; lawyer Sebahattin Emin; lawyer Orhan Mehmetoğlu; doctor Sadık Ahmet, and various education and association councils. (Akin, 27 January 1988).

⁵³⁴ On 30 January 1988, the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal met in Davos. They aimed to increase the cooperation between Turkey and Greece, which might lead to a spill-over effect on Cyprus and Aegean issues. Defense expenses for both countries were high enough to threaten their economies.

⁵³⁵ The ones who have names on the telegraph are: deputies Ahmet Faikoğlu; Mehmet Müftüoğlu; Osman Nuri; Hasan Hatipoğlu; Mehmet Yaşar; Celâl Zeybek; Hasan İmamoğlu; Ahmet Mehmet; and Orhan Hacııbram. (Akin, 30 January 1988). However, despite the recent protest of the Muslim Turkish minority, and aforementioned request by the minority prominent politicians, Turkey had not put to the forefront the issue of the Western Thracian Minority. It is argued that even the name of Western Thrace was not pronounced during the negotiation between Özal and Papandreou. Also, both Prime Ministers were reported to agree that the events in Komotini were provocations aiming to spoil their meeting and the ‘spirit of Davos’. Turkish Minority was not only protesting the decision of Athens against themselves but also protested Ankara for not being necessarily interested in what was happening in the Western Thrace.

⁵³⁶ (Akin, 27 March 1987).

⁵³⁷ Hasan Hatipoğlu, (Akin, 15 Ocak 1988)

⁵³⁸ (Akin, 3 April 1987).

After the 1988 protest, the minority policy of Greece started to be criticized both at the European and international level. The most prominent NGOs like Human Rights Watch (HRW), Minority Rights Group (MRG) and Amnesty International (AI) started to put a special focus and importance on what was happening in Western Thrace. At the beginning of 1990s, it was likely that the aim of the 1988 protest achieved one of its fundamental goals, which was to be heard by the EU and international community. Federation of Western Thrace Turks in Europe (Avrupa Batı Trakya Türk Federasyonu-ABTTF), as a foundation formed by Western Thrace diaspora had an important role in internationalized the problems of the community in Europe- especially in Germany- and put the protest at the agenda later.⁵³⁹ On his speech, the President of ABTTF, Cafer Alioğlu informed the community members, Turkish and German press about the discrimination against the Western Thrace Turks, the events of 1988, and trial of Dr. Sadık Ahmet.⁵⁴⁰ Also, the first international report that severely criticized the minority policy of Greece regarding the situation in Western Thrace came from the HRW in 1990 and more pressures were exerted on Greece to change its minority policy of Western Thrace.

After the Summit, in the local newspapers of the Muslim Turks it was stressed that although the Davos Summit could be considered as the most significant historical event between Turkey and Greece after the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, the positive atmosphere created in Davos between Turkey and Greece was not likely to affect the conditions in Western Thrace.⁵⁴¹ It is interesting to see that in the article the Greek-Orthodox minority in Turkey was named as “İstanbul Elen Minority”, rather than Rum (Romioi), which signifies a retaliation demand by the Western Thrace minority for identity crisis, in addition *Akın* might aim to stress the kinship of Istanbul Greek-Orthodox with the Greek state.

⁵³⁹ Although the federation began its functions on 28 February 1988, it was assembled under the name “Western Thrace Turks Cultural Association” (Batı Trakya Türk Kültür Derneği) since 1978. Under the federation, many Turkish associations were gathered.

⁵⁴⁰ Cafer Alioğlu, *Batı Trakya Davasının Avrupa Cephesi (1982-1994)*, (ABTTF European Office, 1988), Alioğlu’s speech and report on 19 November 1988, p.347-351.

⁵⁴¹ “Batı Trakya’ya Uğramayan ‘Davos Ruhü’ İnfilak Etti, (Akın, 25 February 1989). “İstanbul Elen Azınlığı DAVOS Ruhunun Mutluluğu İçinde Bayram Yaparken, Bu Ortam Maalesef Henüz Daha Batı Trakya Türklüğünde Hissedilmedi” (Akın, 31 March 1988). The second title of the *Akın* newspaper seems to exaggerate the situation in Istanbul by stating that the Greeks of Istanbul celebrate due to the positive atmosphere of the Davos Spirit because the number of Greeks in Istanbul had declined from 110.000 to approximately 3.000 in sixty-years time. This has nothing to do with a celebration from the Orthodox Greek Minority of Istanbul.

In the spring of 1988, Turkey's foreign affairs minister, Mesut Yilmaz, raised the question of the "Turkish" minority in Greek Thrace and dismissed any possibility of a Turkish military withdrawal from Cyprus before the two communities came to an agreement on a solution. The Greek side soon realized that the Turks did not consider Cyprus as part of the Davos package while the Muslims of Thrace were being forcefully brought into the picture. PASOK announced the summit as a "no war agreement".⁵⁴² Although some progress was made toward developing a set of confidence-building measures regarding accident prevention in international waters of the Aegean, the Davos spirit gradually lost momentum and quietly expired in 1989.

The Trial of Sadık Ahmet and İbrahim Şerif- 1990

Another principal case for the denial of ethnic identity was that of Dr. Sadık Ahmet, a former parliamentarian and Ibrahim Serif in January 1990. Dr. Sadık Ahmet was first given sentence to prison on December 1988 for 30 months, due to making signature campaign to send a petition to the international organizations about Greek state's discrimination against the minority community.⁵⁴³ Later, Dr. Ahmet, as an independent candidate, was elected as a MP in the election of June 1989. After a short time period, a second election was called, to be held on 5 November 1989. Before the elections, in October 1989, Dr. Ahmet and I. Serif, as independent candidates for Parliament, distributed campaign leaflets in which the minority voters were referred as 'Turks'. After the elections both Ahmet and Serif received subpoenas for a trial to be held on 25 January 1990. They were accused of violating Article 192 of the Penal Code and disrupting public peace. On the day of trial, more than 5.000 Turks gathered in front of the court. They wanted to show that the two MPs were not alone in their struggle of "Turkishness". Leaving the courtroom, Sadık Ahmet shouted: "I am being taken into prison just because I am a Turk. If being a Turk is a crime, I repeat here that I am a Turk and I will remain so. My message to minority in Western Thrace is that they should not forget they are Turks".⁵⁴⁴

As a result of the trial, both Ahmet and Serif were sentenced to eighteen months of

⁵⁴² Clogg, *Concise History of Greece*, p. 189.

⁵⁴³ ATBF's announcement on 10 December 1988, calling for a miting against this trial in Frankfurt.

⁵⁴⁴ Hüseyinoğlu, Unpublished Master Thesis, p. 87.

imprisonment. They spent sixty-four days in prison in Thessalonica. An appeals court then affirmed their convictions, but released them from prison and ordered them to pay fines (about \$2800 for Ahmet, about \$1875 for Serif) in place of the remainder of their prison terms.⁵⁴⁵ On 15 February 1991 the Court of Cassation rejected Dr. Ahmet's appeal of this conviction. Therefore, he applied to the European Commission of Human Rights on 27 September 1991. In April 1995, the Commission in its Article 31 Report declared that Greece had violated Dr. Ahmet's right of free expression under Article 10 of the ECHR and forwarded the case to the European Court of Human Rights. On 15 November 1996, however, the court dismissed the case because Dr. Ahmet had not exhausted domestic legal remedies. ATBF claims due to their initiatives to Human Rights Commission regarding immunity demand of Greek state on January 1991 for Dr. Sadık Ahmet and Ahmet Faikoğlu, Helsinki Watch Community sent a protesto telegraph to the Greek Prime Minister.⁵⁴⁶ Later, on February 1994 Sadık Ahmet would be trialed again for stating "I am Turk, and the minority living in Western Thrace is Turk too" for 30 months sentence. Again on December 1994, Athens Court would ask both political leaders Sadık Ahmet and Ahmet Faikoğlu to renounce their citizenship.⁵⁴⁷

29 January 1990- Pogrom

Two days after the trial of Ahmet and Serif, a religious ceremony (mevlit) was organized in the Old Mosque (Eski Camii) in Komotini for the anniversary of the 29 January 1988 protest. However, a number of Greek groups decided to protest this ceremony. On 29 January 1990, violence erupted in Komotini before the religious ceremony. Mobs of Greeks – claimed to be 1000 fanatic Greeks by Cafer Alioğlu⁵⁴⁸-ran through the streets, beating Muslim Turks and smashing windows of the shops and offices of the Muslim Turks. More than thirty people were injured and most of the shops belonging to the Minority were damaged. Among the people who were injured, Ksanthi headmufti Hafız Mehmet Emin Ağa and Ksanthi ex-deputy Ahmet Faikoğlu were beaten to coma. However, at this point, Greek shops remained untouched. This event in Komotini was interpreted by Oran as a 'mini Greek 6-7 September'.⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴⁵ ABTF's announcement on 10 February 1990, p. 369.

⁵⁴⁶ ABTF Functions report, 16 November 1991, p. 380.

⁵⁴⁷ ABTF's announcement, 24 January 1994, p. 398.

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid. Alioğlu, p. 310.

⁵⁴⁹ Baskın Oran, *Yunanistan'ın Lozan İhlalleri* (Ankara:SAEMK, 1999), p.27.

1995- ‘Casus Belli’ on 12 miles

In March 1995, Greece lifted its objections to Turkey’s entry into the EU Customs Union agreement, with the understanding that the application of Cyprus for EU membership would be discussed after the intergovernmental meeting of 1997. Greece’s move elicited no positive response from Ms. Tansu Çiller’s government. A series of incidents between the two states that began in 1994 over Greece’s right to extend its territorial waters from six to twelve miles reached a high point on June 8, 1995, when the Turkish Parliament granted the government a “casus belli” license to take whatever necessary action (including military) if Greece exercised its right (foreseen by the International Law of the Sea Convention) to extend its territorial waters.

To sum up, from 1974 to 2002, Greek-Turkish relations were jeopardized due to Cyprus and Aegean issue, which affected the minority communities negatively in both countries. Western Thrace minority’s attempt to carry the problems to Turkey’s concern was not rational when the relations were not good. Following Greece’s EU membership, and end of Cold-War, it is seen that with the emergence of identity politics world-wide, Western Thrace Turks also benefited from the atmosphere to internalize their demands and problems. In this struggle, political leaders compared to the previous terms, managed to play an important role, signifying that effectiveness of political representation increased for the Muslim Turkish minority. On the other hand, while international and national political developments enabled a more democratic atmosphere for the community to stress their demands, changes in Greek political system deterred the political representation of the minority in terms of deputy numbers, and they became inclined to participate out of the main Greek parties.

5.5.2 Political System

After the restoration of democracy in July 1974, a transitional period began with the formation of a ‘national unity’ government under Constantine Karamanlis who had played a prominent role as Prime Minister during the late fifties and early sixties. Three major decisions were taken by this government: First, to organize free parliamentary elections for the election of a constitutional assembly; second, to organize a referendum

on the question of the monarchy and third, to legalize the Communist party (KKE), which had been illegal since its formation.⁵⁵⁰

For general information on electoral system, since 1974, Greece has been using open-list proportional representation electoral system, with some unique characteristics.⁵⁵¹ A national electoral threshold of 3% was added to the electoral law in 1993. In the four general elections held from 1993 to 2004, multi-member constituency seats were initially allocated in each constituency by the ‘Hagenbach-Bischoff’⁵⁵² method. The 2007 and 2009 general elections were held under a new electoral law introduced in 2004, which automatically grants the winning party a majority premium of 40 seats, while the remaining 260 seats are distributed by proportional representation. However, under the terms of a 2008 amendment to the electoral law, the majority premium increased to fifty seats in 2012, leaving 250 seats to be allocated by PR. Hence, Greek electoral system is also called “bonus-adjusted proportional representation” which states that the party who wins the most votes in an election will receive an additional 50 seats in Parliament. This rule enabled the country to use open list system in standard elections, which should result in a proportional system based on the high district magnitude, and yet elections have historically resulted in a two-party system where the two strongest parties alternatively

⁵⁵⁰ Christos Lyrintzis, and Elias Nikolakopoulos, “Political System and Elections in Greece”, p. 87. The Greek communist party was proclaimed illegal with emergency law 509 of 27 December 1947. It was legalized again in September 1974, following the breakdown of authoritarianism and Greece’s return to competitive politics.

⁵⁵¹ Electors cast a vote for one to five candidates on a constituency list, depending on the number of seats; voting is compulsory until the age of 70. In total, Greek Parliament has 300 seats; 238 are allocated to the 56 districts where candidates campaign in hopes of winning enough votes to secure one of these seats. Political parties, party coalitions and independents may present lists of candidates. Twelve of the remaining seats are national seats awarded to parties based on their overall national percentage of votes. In order to determine how many district seats a party will receive, Greece uses a formula called the Largest Remainder System, which uses a two-step process to allocate seats to each party. A quota of votes is determined by the size of the district by using the Droop quota formula $(\text{total valid poll}/\text{seats}+1)+1$. Once the quota is decided for a district, each party that meets this vote quota is awarded seats and then those votes are subtracted from the party total. The party with the largest remainder received the next remaining seat then this process repeats itself until all of the seats in a district have been distributed. <http://www.electionresources.org/gr/>

⁵⁵² An electoral quota was calculated by dividing the total number of valid votes by the number of seats to be allocated plus one. The number of votes polled by each party was then divided by the electoral quota, and the result, disregarding fractions, was the number of seats allocated to the party. Single-member seats were filled by the plurality or first-past-the-post method, in which the candidate obtaining the largest number of votes in the constituency was elected to office. The constituencies were then grouped into thirteen electoral regions, to distribute any remaining unallocated seats after the application of the Hagenbach-Bischoff rule. Party list votes were pooled at the electoral region level along with unfilled seats, which were then distributed in each region by the Hare method. Under this procedure, a new electoral quota was calculated by dividing the total number of valid votes by the number of available seats. The number of votes won by each party was divided by the quota, and the result, disregarding fractions, was the number of seats obtained by the party.

win the majority of seats in the parliament. The open list system means, each party produces a list of eligible candidates for each district then voters are allowed to select the specific candidate they want to be represented by placing a cross next to their name from the list of candidates.

In terms of the party system, there was a transition from polarized pluralism until 1981, to two-party system (between PASOK and ND) since 1981.⁵⁵³ Within this two-party system, minority deputies' number decreased to 2 in average. Their struggle to participate out-of the main Greek parties as independent candidates failed with electoral changes in 1993 that put 3% threshold for the independent candidates. In 2012 this party system changed as radical left and right parties involved with economic crisis, ND and PASOK lost power in general. Muslim deputies' number increased as SYRIZA increased its vote-share. Towards 2010s, the right was eliminated among minority community.

The 17 November 1974 national elections were held under reinforced proportional representation system. The outcome was a triumph for Karamanlis and his newly formed New Democracy Party which obtained 54 percent of the vote and 220 seats in Parliament. The Center Union–New Forces Party received 20.4 percent of the vote and 60 seats.⁵⁵⁴ The traditional left was represented by an alliance under the label United Left (E.A). The fourth group to contest the 1974 election was an entirely new party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), founded by Andreas Papandreou, son of George Papandreou, the ex-prime minister and leader of the Centre Union party during the 1961-67 period.⁵⁵⁵ PASOK received 13,6% of the vote and 15 seats, and United Left got 9,5% with 8 seats. In the newly polarized politics of the 1970s, it was evident that a centre party was not in great demand.⁵⁵⁶

The outcome of the referendum to decide the future of the monarchy in Greece was perhaps more in keeping with the public mood for change. The referendum of December

⁵⁵³ For the electoral results of the elections since 1974, see <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/To-Politevma/Ekloges/Eklogika-apotelesmata-New/>

⁵⁵⁴ Veremis, *Modern Greece: A History since 1821*, p.153.

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid. Lyrantzis, "Political System and Elections in Greece", p. 88.

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid. Pappas, "Transition in Greek party-system". EK-the party- the rapid decline of the once potent center party is certainly striking: the absolute majority of votes 53% the EK had won in 1964 was reduced to 20% in 1974 and to 12% in 1977, until its final liquidation with a mere 1.6% of the total vote in the elections of 1981.

1974, which was the sixth to be held on the issue of the crown in the twentieth century (1920, 1924, 1935, 1946, 1973), sealed the fate of the monarchy with 69 percent of the votes cast against the institution. Following the abolishment of monarchy, Christos Tsatsos was elected by Parliament as President and stayed for almost his entire term in office.

In the elections of 1977 New Democracy saw its share of the popular vote fall to 41.8% and its parliamentary seats reduced by 43. According to Lyrintzis, this decline was due to the emergence of an extreme right wing party (Ethniki Parataxis- National Front) that attracted a part of its electorate (6,3% of the total vote and 5 seats). During those elections the PASOK under Andreas Papandreou secured 25.3% of the vote- almost doubled its 1974 electoral vote, increasing its 12 seats to 93 in Parliament and pushing the Center Union, from which it had broken off, to third place with 11.9% of the vote and 16 seats. This performance marked the beginning of the end for the Greek Center.⁵⁵⁷ The vote share change between the two elections signified a high fragmentation and disintegration of the center (EDIK). Karamanlis, after the normalization of the internal situation, expressed his willingness to re-enter the military structure of NATO. Greek reintegration attempts were vetoed by Turkey, which, having raised a claim over the reallocation of the Athens FIR was, in effect, also demanding a reallocation of the operational control zones of the Aegean airspace. On April 17, 1980 Karamanlis revealed to his cabinet his intention to stand for president. Parliament did elect him on May 5, 1980. While, Greece's re-entry in NATO's military arm and accession to EEC, was a decision guaranteeing the country's new democratic institutions, and at the same time advancing its defence position in view of Greece's tense relations with Turkey; The change of ND's leader further weakened the party's position vis-à-vis the rising PASOK.

The general elections on 18 October 1981 resulted in a resounding victory for PASOK. The elections gave the Socialist party an absolute majority of seats in parliament for the first time in Greek history. Moreover it confirmed the tripartite structure of the Greek

⁵⁵⁷ The KKE and the KKE interior contested the election independently – they were under United Left alliance in 1974 elections- and it was the KKE with 9,4% and 11 seats that emerged as the dominant group, whereas the KKE interior, in alliance with four minor parties of the Greek center-left, received only 2,7% and 2 seats in parliament. Lyrintzis, “Political System and Elections in Greece”, p. 89.

Party system.⁵⁵⁸ PASOK and Papandreou would dominate the political scene during the eighties, as he would be prime minister until 1989. What best characterizes the broader left during the 1951–81 period is a continuous conflict between a major party representing orthodox communism and a minor party representing the revisionist left.⁵⁵⁹ PASOK's rise to power showed that Greece survived the test of power alternation peacefully, after uninterrupted right wing rule. Following a Brussels summit in March 1985, Papandreou finally declared that Greece was not going to withdraw from the community because, as he put it, "the cost of leaving would be much higher than the cost of staying".⁵⁶⁰

The new president- Christos Sartzetakis- authorized elections to be held on June 2, 1985. The parliamentary elections of June 1985 gave PASOK a comfortable margin (45.82% and 172 deputies) allowing it to pursue its program unhindered by a leftist or rightist opposition. Businesspeople, managers, and certain professional groups, as well as the legal and medical associations, opted for Mitsotakis' New Democracy. New Democracy, with 40.8% (126 deputies) of the vote, added 4.98% to its 1981 percentage while the Communist Party (KKE) with 9.89% of the vote (12 deputies) lost 1.4%. Finally the Euro-communists, with 1.84% of the vote, managed to elect one deputy.⁵⁶¹ The most significant deviation of PASOK's policy toward Turkey was introduced by the Davos meeting between the Greek and Turkish prime ministers in January 1988 that signified an easing of tensions between the two countries.

Between the years 1989-1990, the number of national elections held (2 June 1989; 5 November 1989; and 8 April 1990), signified political instability for Greek politics in general, and rise of identity politics for Muslim Turkish minority. 1989/90 elections showed that the Greek political system was unable to adapt to a coalition government.

⁵⁵⁸Lyrintzis calls the Greek party system since 1981 as tripartite, which goes back to the division of the first decades, when the monarchy and the People's Party were in acute conflict with the Center, which was led by Eleftherios Venizelos. The left has always been identified with the Communist Party (KKE). However, Pappas in his article describes the period since 1981 as two-party system. PASOK, under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou, gained 48.1 percent of the votes -again doubled its 1977 vote share- and 172 seats in Parliament. New Democracy became the opposition with 35.8 percent of the votes and 118 seats. The center parties were devastated and won no parliamentary representation, whereas the KKE increased its power (11% of the vote and 13 seats).

⁵⁵⁹ Michalis Papayannakis, "The Crisis in the Greek Left", in H.R.Penniman (ed.), *Greece at the Polls, the National Elections of 1974 and 1977*, (Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981).

⁵⁶⁰ Clogg, *Parties and Elections in Greece*, p. 189.

⁵⁶¹ Veremis, *Modern Greek: A History since 1821*, p. 161.

The presence of independent Muslim candidates in Western Thrace signified the change of participation strategy among the minorities, who had been formerly represented by Turkish-Muslim MPs belonging to the two major parties. The June 1989 elections confirmed the decline of PASOK and the rise of the ND party. Although the elections of June 1989 took a toll on PASOK, whose electoral percentage fell to 38 percent – it still maintained its core electorate-, New Democracy, with 43 percent with 145 seats, was unable to form a government and entered a coalition of limited mandate with the Synasmosis (Left Union of the KKE and the KKE interior). Although this coalition marked the end of the long conflict between left and right in Greek politics, it did not last long, in the elections of November 1989 that followed, the coalition broke down and gave New Democracy 46 percent of the vote but still produced no government. In 5 months, Synaspismos suffered for making a coalition with a right party by its electorates. The all-party government was due to elect a new President of the Republic in 1990, however it failed to obtain the necessary majority (180 votes) and consequently the parliament was dissolved and new elections were scheduled for April 1990. In the 8 April 1990 elections New Democracy finally managed to attain the narrow margin (47% votes and 150 seats) required for the formation of a government (with the aid of a deputy from the small DIANA party). PASOK won 39 percent of the vote and the Synaspismos (Alliance of Left Wing forces) declined to 11% and 21 seats. Following the ND's proposal, Constantine Karamanlis was elected President for the second time. This marked the end of the first PASOK era. The split between Prime Minister Mitsotakis and the Foreign Affairs Minister Samaras –advocating a hard line towards Macedonia issue- led to the separation of Samaras from ND and the formation of his party Political Spring Party (Politiki Anixi-POLAN). Mitsotakis called for early elections to take place in October 1993.

1990 alternation in electoral law and 1993 national elections

The October 1993 elections were conducted under a new electoral law. Given the experience of the 1989/90 period, the new electoral law voted in November 1990, was designed to secure parliamentary majority. The minority community perceived ND's policy as an attempt to close the way for the parliamentary representation.⁵⁶² Moreover,

⁵⁶² The total number of minority in Western Thrace (both in Ksanthi and Rhodopi electoral districts) is maximum 100,000. Considering that the minority candidates in Rhodopi (Komotini) can attain around 24,000 votes in total, and in Ksanthi can get 15,600 votes maximum together, it is impossible for any

the new electoral law introduced, for the first time in Greek politics a 3% threshold; any party failing to receive at least 3 % of the national vote would not be entitled to any parliamentary representation. As 3% electoral threshold would also be applied to independent candidates – which means any candidate needs to obtain almost 200,000 votes individually in order to be elected- this change in the electoral law also targeted minority politicians who ran as independent candidates in 1989/90 elections rather than taking the ticket from major Greek parties. In 1989/90 elections, beside the minority members, small groups such as environmentalist Ecology Party managed to get one seat in the parliament with 0,6% of the votes. The new law would deter both minority's political representation as independent representatives, and the small parties. On the other hand, although both the minority group and small parties had a low number of seats in the parliament, their bargaining power was high considering that in 1990 elections New Democracy Party has only 150 seats in the parliament and needed one vote for the confidence vote and legislature functioning. As a result, ND managed to form the government with the aid of a deputy from the small DIANA party.

The new law has discussion within the Greek Parliament about the various putcomes for the major and minor parties.⁵⁶³ There were a strong reaction to the new election law from Turkey. Typically, the Greek foreign minister Andonis Samaras criticized his Turkish counterpart, (15.12.1990), the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Alptemoçin, for intervention in the internal affairs of Greece after the Turkish Minister had said that “he cannot accept the Greek election law, because ‘it creates obstacles only to one side’, having in mind the ‘independent’ MPs of the Muslim minority of Thrace who are directed by Ankara.” (*Kathimerini*, 28.11.1990). Greece would also point to the 10% cut-off point in the Turkish election law, which had excluded large parties such as the Democratic Left Party (DSP of Ecevit) with 8.5 % and the Welfare Party (Refah of Erbakan) with 7.25 % in the 29.11.1987 elections (*Eleftherotipia*, 09.11.1990). The Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis used this argument when the Turkish PM Mesut Yılmaz complained to him about the 3% cut-off point (*To Vima*, 15.09.1991).⁵⁶⁴

As a result, in order to protest, minority candidates in 1993 elections ran as independents,

independent candidate to achieve 200,000 votes individually without the support of Greek votes. (Akin, 1004/11.09.1990). “Azınlığımıza Şimdi de Atina Meclisi Kapıları Kapatılmak İsteniyor”.

⁵⁶³ Praktika Voulis, 1 November, 1990.

⁵⁶⁴ Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p. 501.

and they failed to be elected. Minority community was not represented in the Greek Parliament for the first time since 1974, and for the first time when there was no dictatorship since 1920. This would lead to an alternation in strategy in minority's political participation. The elections held on October 10, 1993 gave PASOK close to 47 percent of the votes and 170 seats while Mitsotakis' New Democracy⁵⁶⁵ lost with 39.3 percent of the votes and 111 seats.⁵⁶⁶ Due his health problems, Papandreu resigned in January 1996 and PASOK's parliamentary group elected Kostas Simistis as the new Prime Minister, who would continue to bring PASOK success in 1996 and 2000 national elections.

In 1996 elections, it was seen that PASOK and ND continued to dominate the political scene. PASOK won the September 1996 elections with 41,6% of the votes and 162 seats. ND⁵⁶⁷ followed PASOK with 38% of the votes and 108 seats in the parliament. The left of the spectrum is represented by the Synaspismos which exceeded the 3% barrier and won 10 seats, and the KKE maintained its power with 5,6 % of the votes and 11 seats. POLAN could not pass the threshold and was left out of the parliament. Thus, we have two major political forces and three/four minor parties. The 2000 election proved one of the most closely contested in post war Greek electoral history, in which PASOK received 43,8% of the vote (158 seats) and New Democracy 42,7% (125 seats). The close vote shares enhanced the polarization of the party system. Only the KKE maintained its electoral influence with 5,5% and 11 seats, while Synaspismos gained 6 seats with 3,2% of the vote. In such a party system, new parties proved unsuccessful, which would change with 2012 elections with the rise of radical left and radical right.

The polarization of the party system was reconfirmed in the last national election held in March 2004. New Democracy after 11 years of opposition, under Kostas Karamanlis returned to power with 45% of the vote (165 seats) bringing with it the capacity to form a single-party government. Even though Simitis gave his position to George Papandreu –

⁵⁶⁵ Mitsotakis resigned from the leadership of the party and Miltiades took over until such time as he too, having lost the 1996 elections, was replaced in 1997 by Kostas Karamanlis, namesake and nephew of the founder of the party.

⁵⁶⁶ Samaras's party POLAN received 4,9% of the vote and 10 seats. Before the elections, the left was divided in 1991, as the KKE abandoned the Synaspismos. The Synaspismos failed to obtain more than 3% and thus had no parliamentary representation, whereas the KKE received 4,5% and 9 seats in parliament. Lyrintzis, "Political System and Elections in Greece", p. 95.

⁵⁶⁷ Before the elections, Konstatine Karamanlis- the young nephew of the ex president of the republic- was elected as ND' new party leader.

son of Andreas Papandreou- as the new party leader before the 2004 elections, PASOK followed ND with 40,5% of vote and 117 seats, and became the main opposition party.⁵⁶⁸

In the election held on 16 September 2007, conservative New Democracy, mainly because of Karamanlis' own personal popularity and continuing mistrust in previous socialist government, won a fresh mandate with 41,8% of the vote and 152 seats, while PASOK had its worst electoral performance since 1974 winning just 38,1% of the vote and 102 seats. Karamanlis' government with only a one-seat majority in parliament, in the midst of financial crisis, and losing legitimacy by the youth riots of December 2008 upon the death of a schoolboy shot by police, and an endless list of scandals (including illegal acts, nepotism, corruption, bribery and blackmail), also suffered defeat in the June 2009 European Parliament elections (voter turnout was 52,6%, the lowest ever recorded in the country).⁵⁶⁹ European Parliament elections displayed the losing ground of ND to far right Popular Orthodox Rally Party (Laikos Orthodoxos Sinagermos-LAOS) which offered ethno-nationalism, and signalled the rising power of the KKE with communism and nationalism policy and the emergence of far-left party Coalition of the Radical Left (Sinaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras-SYRIZA) which manifests post-material values and anti-globalism.

Considering the coming election for new president, Karamanlis called for early elections to be held on October 2009. Due to the political, economic and social crisis ND faced, a major and easy victory was expected from PASOK. Like in 2007, the 2009 national election was held under a system of reinforced proportional representation designed to secure an absolute majority for the front-running party. The country is divided into 56 electoral districts, of which 51 are multi-member. Parties crossing the electoral threshold of 3% nationwide share 260 of the 300 seats, while the remaining 40 seats are allocated to the leading party. With its 43,9% of the vote PASOK gained an absolute majority of seats (160 out of 300), while incumbent ND suffered the worst electoral defeat since its foundation in 1974 with 33,5% of the vote and its seats decreased from 152 in 2007 to 91 in 2009. The ultra-nationalist LAOS emerged as a winner, receiving 5,6% and increasing

⁵⁶⁸ Takis S. Pappas, "Winning by Default: the Greek Election of 2009", *South European Atlas*, Vol.15, No.2, June 2010, pp.273-287. On 16 August 2007, Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis called an early election in order to implement necessary but painful 'reforms in the national education system, the economy and the next year's budget'. Just a few days after that, wildfires destroyed farmland, forests and villages in different regions of Greece.

⁵⁶⁹ Ibid. p.274.

its seat from 10 to 15. On the left, both KKE (with 7,5% of the vote and 21 seats) and SYRIZA (with 4,6% of the vote and 13 seats) lost one seat each in parliament. Although it resulted with PASOK victory, 2009 national elections displayed an alternation in party systems as well. Since 1981, except the 1989/90 elections, the Greek party system has been clearly a two-party system, in which the existing of third parties does not prevent the two major parties from governing alone, and coalitions were unnecessary. Moreover, despite the high polarization, and political, economic crisis, compared to 2007 national elections, voter turnout decreased from 76,4% to 71%, especially in the regions where ND was dominant. This ratio decreased more to 65,1% and 62,49% in 6 May 2012 and 17 June 2012 elections respectively.

In the midst of economic crisis, the two parliamentary elections held in Greece during 2012 on 7 May and 17 June were closely watched by EU, especially when the Greek MPs were unable to form a government following May elections. More interesting point for this thesis study is that, between two elections the electoral system was changed. June election differed from the standard Greek election method used in the May elections. According to election law in Greece, if an election is held within 18 months of the previous election the electoral system in place changes from an open list system to a closed list system.⁵⁷⁰ In the open-list PR system the voters can vote for the candidate nominated by a party, and the candidates are elected according to the vote share they get, rather than the vote share of the party in that region. This system used to benefit the minority candidates, as in order to be elected they do not need to be in the first ranks of the list, they can grab votes by political mobilization and effective campaigns. For the Western Thrace minority, it enables more than one minority candidate to run for elections from the same party and from the same electoral district –although the possibility of being elected is low when competition is high- or increase their changes by running with different party's tickets. In this system the competition between the candidates is high; on the other hand their possibility of representation would not be determined by the ranking of the party leader.

⁵⁷⁰Because of the fact that the elections of 17th June 2012 would be held before the completion of eighteen months after the previous elections of 6th May 2012, the provisions of the presidential decree 26/2012 were not being applied. The provisions that would come into force instead are the ones of the presidential decree 152/1985 regarding the order of the occupation of the parliamentary seats -close list system (article 72 par.11 of p.d.26/2012). Ministry of Interior, General Information on June 2012 elections. <http://www.ypes.gr/en/Elections/NationalElections/DeputyElections/InterestCitizen/>

As open lists favors the voter's preference and keep MPs closer to their constituency's wishes, closed-lists favor parties' preference for selection of its parliament members and expected to yield tighter party cohesiveness.⁵⁷¹ Increasing party cohesiveness in time of need for solving the economic crisis and diminishing heavy disagreement within Greek parties, closed-list system was logical. On the other hand, considering May and June elections, with only four weeks between elections, parties were expected to use and also used the May election results as a primary, meaning they based their closed lists on the results of the voter preference during the open list elections that took place in May. From the party leader it is expected to change the list placement of the candidate that lost in the open list election, or exchange him/her for a new candidate. It should be noted, the all 3 of the Turkish Muslim minority deputies who managed to be elected in May 2012 elections, also became representatives in the parliament after the June 2012 elections, from the same parties. On the other hand, SYRIZA gained 19 seats from May 2012 to June 2012 elections, and became the largest party on the left-wing of the spectrum. The parties' vote share and seats allocation in the parliament has changed between elections, mainly by a slight reduction in the vote share of the extremist parties.

Even though the electoral system of 6 May 2012 elections similar to 2009 elections, designed to favor the largest party (but this time by giving extra 50 seats instead of 40 seats), none of the parties managed to sustain majority in the parliament, and Samaras the leader of ND, could not form the government. The electoral results of May 2012 elections were as follows: ND got 108 seats with 18,9%; SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) became the main opposition with 52 seat gained by 16,8% of the votes; PASOK's seats declined to 41 seats as it got 13,2% of the vote; the right-wing Independent Greeks (Anexartitoi Ellines) gained 33 seats with 10,6% of the vote; KKE got 26 seats with 8,48% share; while ultra-nationalist Golden Dawn although run in the elections for the first time got 21 seats with 7% of the vote; Democratic Left (Dimokratiki Aristera - DIMAR) received 19 seats with 6,11% share, and the LAOS got 2,90% and failed to pass the electoral threshold. As Samaras failed to form a government, and make any coalition with the other parties, early elections decided to be held within a month.

June 2012 elections indicated that in Greece party system was being transformed into a

⁵⁷¹ Michael Gallaher, and Mitchell Paul, *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2005.

relatively polarized pluralist system expressing a highly fragmented society. Although the vote share between ND (29,7%) and SYRIZA (26,9%) was less than 3%, electoral law favored ND and both parties increased their seats in the parliament with 129 and 71 seats respectively. Yet, this number of seats was not sufficient for ND to form a single-party government. It went to coalition with its old-rival PASOK (33 seats with 12,3%) and DIMAR (17 seats with 6,26% of the votes). Independent Greeks gained 20 seats with 7,51% of the vote, while far-left KKE has 12 seats with 4,5% and far-right Golden Dawn gained 18 seats with 6,92% of the vote. LAOS totally loses its vote power by receiving less than 1%. Coalition government with ND-PASOK-DIMAR was crucial for coping with the crisis period, as it was encompassing a large part of the society, and combining center-left, democratic left, and center-right parties of the spectrum. On the other hand, DIMAR left the coalition on 21 June 2012, leading to the reformation of cabinet.

In the eight elections held from 1981 to 2000, ND has averaged 41.8% of the national vote; its rival PASOK has averaged 43.1%.⁵⁷² The results of June 2012 elections in Greece reveal not only the deep fragmentation of the political system in Greece but also a polarised electoral environment within Greek society. Clearly the outcome of the elections signals the willingness of the Greeks to remain within the Eurozone and within the European Union structures, but also sends a stronger message domestically to the political establishment that the period of single party governments is long gone.⁵⁷³ In terms of electoral sociology Syriza gained working class votes and New Democracy gained votes from the upper classes. Syriza gained a very high share of votes in Attiki and Thessaloniki and other urban districts while New Democracy in rural areas. In the two elections held in 2012, all the seats of in Ksanthi and Rhodopi were filled with minority candidates. The high support for left-party SYRIZA and PASOK in Western Thrace can be a signal of voter behavior change among the minority community as well. The following section on political representation of minority since 1974 will issue the alternation of voting behavior too.

5.5.3 Political Representation of the Muslim Turkish Minority (1974-2013)

In the political representation of minorities, trust between the minority and majority in the

⁵⁷² Ibid. Pappas, Transformation of the Greek Party System since 1951, p. 112.

⁵⁷³Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos, "The Greek Elections of 2012 and Greece's Future in the Eurozone",SIEPS *European Policy Analysis*, (June 2012).

society is crucial in the preference of the minorities as party candidates. In both Turkey and Greece, the approach of the majority of the society to its minorities, and treatment of minority representatives by the deputies reveal significant examples of mistrust, prejudice and discrimination. On the other hand, compared to Turkey, in Greece Muslim minority members have been elected as MPs since 1920, which suggests that in the nomination of the minority candidates, other factors beside historical animosity, or Greek-Turkish relations affect the possibility of representation. This section on the political representation of Muslim minorities shows the effect of political institutions on political representation, and how the participation strategy of the community altered in parallel with the institutional changes. The change in the qualities of the minority deputies compared to the previous periods is important in this analysis to show why even though the number of Muslim MPs in the Greek Parliament decreased, their effectiveness increased.

As aforementioned in Chapter 1, political rights granted to the minorities have been predicted as individual citizenship rights, rather than collective rights although in some countries there are quota systems applied to them. In Greece and Turkey, minority rights are regarded as citizenship rights, and minority members should compete with the other citizens for the party ticket in the same electoral system without any privileges. In the chapter on political representation of Rourm community in Turkey, it was stated that in Turkish Parliament, minority representatives were excluded from some close discussions in the Parliament, due to mistrust to them. In Turkey, the close party list system, left the possibility of any minority candidate to be elected in the hands of the party leaders, and they have not been preferred as candidates since 1961, which suggests that although they are expected to compete equally in the elections, in practice they were deterred from political representation. On the other hand, it should be noted that when the number of minority community is low, close-list system would be more beneficial for them compared to the open-list system, if the party leader nominates a minority candidate in the first ranks. In terms of representation effectiveness, it was stated that although the number of Rourm deputies were very low, they managed to speak on the issues concerning the minority as they were fluent in Turkish, and identity was not a problem in Turkey. They could stress that they were representing the Rourm minority.

In Greece, as the Muslim minority is intensively populated in Komotini and Ksanthi,

plurality electoral system would be expected to increase their political representation, but to deter this, Greek state created two enlarged electoral districts in the region of Thrace, one for the prefectures of Ksanthi-Kavala-Drama, and the other for Rodopi-Evros regions. Hence, there is no electoral district as Komotini where the majority of the population is composed of Muslims. As a result, the electoral constituencies populated heavily by the minority are merged with the ones populated by the majority so as to avoid the possibility of the election of a Turkish governor. In order to cover the discriminatory nature of this implication, the system of enlarged electoral district is also imposed in the prefecture of Athens-Piraeus. However, the electoral system, which is open-list proportional representation, deters the Greek parties from excluding the minority candidates, as votes are given to the candidates rather than to a close ranked list designed by the party leader. On the other hand, even though they were not excluded from the politics, and have been in the parliament with at least two deputies in every election, they were deprived of the right to speak talking on their Turkish identity, or calling the minority community they are representing as Turkish in the parliament.

Electoral system in Greece enabled the minority to guarantee a seat in the Greek parliament, and deter the parties from any decisions of excluding the community. Vemund Aarbakke's study on Muslims of Western Thrace displays that in Greece, political representation of Muslim minorities even though granted as individual right, still continued to be perceived as collective rights and threatening. Aarbakke states that in 1974, in Rhodopi the mistrust between the communities was reflected by a petition from the Christians to the major political parties signed by some 7,000 people asking for the exclusion of minority candidates from the party tickets. Moreover, local newspapers would write both against the inclusion of the minority in general and against specific candidates. One newspaper stressed that everything should be done to prevent the minority from being represented in parliament. No Greek party should accept minority members on their ticket. The minority should show the courage to form independent tickets, in which case it would surely lose.⁵⁷⁴ Aarbakke says that leaders of the major parties discussed the possibility of excluding the minority from their tickets. In a meeting Andreas Papandreu for PASOK, Yeoryios Mavros for EK, and Konstandinos Papakonstandinu for ND, agreed in principle to close out the minority, but

⁵⁷⁴ Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p.224.

Papakonstandinu said he had to clear it with Konstandinos Karamanlis first. Allegedly, Karamanlis reacted by calling it a foolish initiative, but added that they should rather accept candidates who had no chance of being elected. However, this decision cannot be applied as the lack of agreement made the selection of candidates subject to party rivalry, as Greek parties would not risk to lose seats to the other parties who nominated a Muslim candidate. Considering that 3 seats in the Parliament is given to Rhodopi (reduced from 4 to 3 after 1981 census) and Ksanthi electoral districts (in total 6 seats), and minority has been represented with minimum 2 deputies since 1974, this would be a high risk for the Greek parties, as they would not prefer to offend the community and lose their votes in the following elections as well. Meanwhile, this mistrust between the minority and majority community would cause the minority leaders to run as independent candidates in late 1980s, and Greek parties would come up with implementing electoral threshold as a solution to deter them.

Open-list system therefore also prevents the Greek parties from ranking the candidates, as they would have to face with the reaction of the Greek population if it was a closed-list system and they put the Muslim candidates to the higher ranks. 1985 national elections in which close-list system was applied and led the minority to run with independent tickets is crucial for this thesis to show the alternations of participation strategy of minority according to the changes in political institutions. 2012 June elections, in which the electoral law stated it should be closed-list system as elections were held within 18 months (the previous one was on May 2012), showed that the 3 Muslim candidates who had succeeded to be elected in May 2012 and brought seats to their parties, were again ranked in the first position by their parties in the June 2012 elections, and managed to be elected again. However, it is not a sufficient example to analyze positive and negative effects of a close-list system, as these candidates were already elected one month before.

Political representation of Muslim minorities has been affected by the electoral system as stated and open-list system deters the parties from excluding the minority candidates and increases their chance for elections. In addition, compared to the Greek-Orthodox deputies in the Turkish Parliament, 'locality' of the Muslim MPs is higher, as they are elected with the open-list system. They should be trusted, and have large networks in the community. On the other hand, as a negative affect of the open-list system, it also increases the competition between the Muslim candidates in mobilizing the minority

votes as well. Hence Greek parties try to decrease the chance of minority candidates by nominating more than one Muslim candidate, and divide the Muslim vote, which in some periods cause non-representation of the minority in Ksanthi (1974, 1981, 1989, 2000, 2004 elections). In addition, open-list system decreases the intra-party loyalty and discipline as well. This is the reason why before every election, minority candidates are searching for the optimum party they can be elected from, rather than ideological identification or party loyalty. This also increases the volatility of the minority votes between the elections. Moreover it probably prevents any party from offering a long-term policy toward the minority, as there is a possibility of losing their vote in the next election if they cannot nominate the right candidate.

The period after 1974, is not just significant to show the influence of electoral system on the minorities' representation, it also displays the changes in the traditional schism among the community and alternation of the Muslim politicians' demography. As in Greece the liberal vs. royalist schism ended, among the Muslim community although in the first elections after 1974, the competition between traditional vs. modernist candidates continued, this cleavage diminished towards the late 1970s. The newspapers, which were published in Ottoman Turkish, disappeared after 1970s. This change also influenced the profiles of the minority MPs, who were composed of clergy, imam, landowner and merchants before 1974. Following the 1977 national elections, we begin to witness university educated (generally in Turkey) lawyers, doctors, dentists, pharmacists and architects, whose command of Greek was better and who had good connections in Turkey. Hasan İmamoğlu, Celâl Zeybek, Sadık Ahmet, İbrahim Şerif and İsmail Rodoplu are some examples of this group who represented the Muslim Turks in 1980s in the Greek Parliament and have been the leading figures in the struggle of the Muslim Turks against the discriminatory minority policies of the Greek administration by politically mobilizing the community. Hence it can be noted that, compared to previous period, even though the number of minority MPs in the Parliament decreased, their effectiveness in the Parliament increased. Selecting the candidates with high level of education and good command in Greek is also a rational preference by the minority community as a reaction to ineffective representation periods. Sadık Ahmet is without doubt the most prominent leader in the history of the minority.

Since Greece's transition to democracy in 1974 (Τη Μεταπολίτευση) there has been 15 national elections. In order to analyze the changes mentioned above, and to ease the comparison, this section will be given in two periods: 1974-1996 and 1996-2013.

5.5.3.1 Political Representation (1974- 1996)

The political behavior of the minority after 1974 is characterized by great instability and large volatility of votes between parties and candidates. They continued to vote for the candidate rather than ideological preferences and usually the candidate, which is nominated by the party, which is more likely to win.

17 November 1974 Parliamentary Elections

In 17 November 1974 elections, Karamanlis' New Democracy Party (ND) became the first party with 54% of the votes and 220 seats in the parliament enabled Karamanlis to form the single-party government. ND's Muslim candidates in Rhodopi and Ksanthi could not get the necessary votes to be elected. The minority elected two MPs, Hafız Yaşar Mehmetoğlu and Sebahaddin Galip, both representing Mavros' Center Union-New Forces (EK). In Ksanthi the minority was not able to elect any candidate, just as had been the case in the last elections before the dictatorship. Here the Muslims make up a smaller portion of the population than in Rodopi. This makes the possibility of electing a minority MP more difficult.

Yet, the preference of the candidates signaled the continuation of the traditionalist vs. modernist separation in the minority community, as Sebahaddin Galip who was from Galip family, was representing the Kemalist wing, while Hafız Yaşar represented the traditionalist wing, as he had been appointed chairman of the Muslim community during the junta regime, and as leader of the conservative wing he was generally preferred by the Greek authorities. Moreover, both candidates were grinds (*hafiz*), suggesting that the candidates did not represent any political innovation and change. In Rhodopi, where the total vote for minority candidates was 23,810 Sebahattin Galip received 11,213 votes, Hafız Yaşar Mehmetoğlu 5,135 votes.⁵⁷⁵ Hasan İmamoğlu, who was a graduate of the Thessaloniki Law Faculty and became appointed lawyer by the Rhodopi bar organisation

⁵⁷⁵ Osman Üstüner –deputy of 1950s and 1960s- was nominated by the winner ND party, but yet could not be elected with 3,902 votes, whereas prominent political figure of 1960s Hasan Hatipoğlu was not nominated from a major party and got 13 votes from EDE. Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p. 216.

in 1972, and who was the first representative of a new generation with a higher education from Greek universities, and had good command in Greek, would not succeed in the 1974 elections (with 3,547 votes from EDE Party), but would change the character of representation with his win in the 1977 elections.

In the elections in Ksanthi district, the minority vote was spread between the strongest candidates, with the result that none of them obtained enough votes to be elected. In Ksanthi, the total votes for minority was 15,558, and these votes were divided between 4 different minority candidates from 4 different parties.⁵⁷⁶

In terms of parliamentary effectiveness, both Galip and Mehmetoğlu did not leave a mark in parliament. This is no surprise, as especially Mehmetoğlu's Greek was weak. On this issue, Aarbakke states that one must also bear in mind that the political situation in general did not make it easy for the minority to take any initiatives, and as a rule the minority MPs could not expect much help from their parties. Sebahaddin Galip, who belonged to the Kemalist wing, was better equipped for the job. He had gone a couple of years to a Greek secondary school and was among the better-educated minority members. He is also known to have had good relations with the Turkish consulate, which means that he could co-ordinate his efforts to some degree with the Turkish priorities, and obtain practical support in preparing petitions etc. Nevertheless, he too did not leave much of a mark in parliament. Galip complained that the issues regarding the minority interest was taken in the parliament when he was not supposed to be in the parliament, and he was not informed about the law draft on the education law in 1977. It should be noted that the political climate caused by the tension with Turkey and the strong critique of the opposition during 1974, did not give the minority MPs the opportunity to do something. It would be impossible for the minority to regain the legal rights it had lost in the previous 5-10 years. Yet this example is crucial to show not only that the minority deputies were ineffective due to their lack of command in Greek, Greek parties were excluding them from the decision-making process for the issues regarding the minority interest as well. Moreover, even though there is a rapprochement between Turkey and Greece since late

⁵⁷⁶ The Kemalist Celâl Zeybek- represented the younger generation and was the son of Hüseyin Zeybek who had earlier (1946–1950) represented the minority in parliament- who ran on the ND ticket, could not be elected with his 5,934 votes (although higher than Yaşar Mehmetoğlu's vote number in Komotini) as the leading figure of the conservative wing Mehmet Emin Ağa (from EK party) fragmented the minority votes knowing that if Zeybek had been elected MP he would by the strength of his position also become the leader and spokesman for the Muslims of Ksanthi. Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p. 223.

1990s, the habit of not consulting the minority community about the issues concerning them continues in Greek politics.⁵⁷⁷

20 November 1977 Parliamentary Elections

20 November 1977 national election came with innovations in the representation of minorities. First beside the old generations of politicians, a new-generation of political figures with higher education and with sufficient level of Greek language began to compete in the elections. The education of the candidates became a greater issue. The minority had longed for someone with higher education to represent it politically. Within the old generation Osman Nuri was best educated, but he knew no Greek before his early twenties and his Greek was not good enough for the parliament. He did his politics and propaganda through his newspaper. The minority was inclined to vote for someone with higher education, and Hasan İmamoğlu had no lawyer, doctor, or even lycée graduate up against him. İmamoğlu came like a fresh wind in the 1977 elections, as for the first time the minority sent a lawyer to parliament, a lawyer who knew Greek well.⁵⁷⁸ Moreover, it was the first time a Muslim Turkish candidate (Mehmet Halil Çolak) was nomination by the Communist party KKE, who although he could not get enough votes (only 319 in Rhodopi), influenced the next generations of politicians to run for far-socialist parties, which would give its fruit in 1996 session with the election of Mustafa Mustafa with Synaspismos ticket.

For the 20 November 1977 national elections, within the minority community the goal was to obtain two MPs from Rhodopi and one from Ksanthi. Political representation was especially important for Ksanthi, as it had not sent a Muslim deputy since 1963 elections. The number of Muslim candidates running for elections increased to 7 from 4 compared to 1974 election. According to the election result in which the total number of votes for minority candidates was 23,762 in Rhodopi and 15,288 in Ksanthi district⁵⁷⁹, one Muslim representative succeeded from each district: the lawyer Hasan İmamoğlu from Rhodopi

⁵⁷⁷The case that minority affairs has been handled largely by the Foreign Department of Greece through the local offices in Komotini and Ksanthi shows that not only the minority tries to deal their issue within the framework of Turkish-Greek relations, but the Greek state as well. Yet, after 1981 it seems that the minority affairs were mainly handled by the “Offices of Cultural Relations”, again administered by the officers from Foreign Affairs.

⁵⁷⁸ Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p. 227.

⁵⁷⁹ In 1977 the Christians cast 34,301 votes in Rodopi.

by gaining 8,063 votes for National Alignment (Ethniki Parataksi /EP) party⁵⁸⁰, and the contractor Celâl Zeybek from Ksanthi by gaining 6,767 votes for Nea Demokratia. Eventually, the minority would elect the lawyer Orhan Sabri Hacıbram who ran for PASOK,⁵⁸¹ however, he lost his seat 6 months later after the final adjustments of the election results.⁵⁸² After this Celâl Zeybek represented the minority in Ksanthi.⁵⁸³

Hence in general the minority was represented by the right-wing parties, which were nationalist and expected to diminish the effectiveness of the minority representatives even though they were highly educated and had sufficient level of Greek. On the other hand, for the minority community, it was not a legitimate excuse for MPs to say, “we try to do something, but the parties do not allow us” anymore. Yet, it was Orhan Hacıbram who was elected from the left-wing PASOK party who made the finest performance in parliament, even though his tenure ended in 6 months. On the other hand, it should be noted that higher effectiveness in the parliament would decrease MPs’ chances of being accepted as candidates for a party in the following elections, as it is seen in the case of Hacıbram, İmamoğlu and Zeybek. On one hand they needed to satisfy their voters to have hopes of being re-elected, on the other they look for a Greek party ticket to run for.

Hasan Hatipoğlu with Hasan İmamoğlu ran in the election together, as they could not find a proper party, hence they were nominated by the far-right party EP, which means only one of them could be elected as a MP in the Greek Parliament. They together obtained 12,915 (54,4%) of the Muslim votes and were also aided by 3,130 (9,1%) Christian votes

⁵⁸⁰ EP succeeded EDE as the alternative on the far right.

⁵⁸¹ Aarbakke asserts in his thesis study (Unpublished PhD Thesis, p. 232) that the lawyer Orhan Hacıbram (1946–) had always been passionately occupied with politics. He became early a member of PASOK, which made him look odd to many minority members. He claimed that PASOK was the only party in the country, which had a different view on the minority, because it was a party, which cared about the living conditions of the individual and was against exploitation. It advocated equal rights for everybody regardless of religion and race. He claimed that those who said that only personalities and not ideology were important were only thinking about themselves and about exploiting the minority farmers.

⁵⁸² Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p.235. When the results were first announced in Ksanthi, Orhan received most votes on the PASOK ticket, and came some 150 votes before the second candidate, Haralambos Atmatzidis. However, after a second count of the votes Atmatzidis came ahead of Orhan with one vote. Orhan Hacıbram’s fall from first to second place on the PASOK ticket had no immediate personal consequences, as PASOK won two seats in Ksanthi. He was asked by the leader of PASOK, Andreas Papandreu, not to protest against the new result and followed loyally the advice of the party leader. However, when the final distribution of seats in parliament was regulated, the election court (Anótato Idikó Dikastírio) decided 27.05.1978 that the PASOK seat of the third distribution would be in Evros and not in Ksanthi. As a result Orhan Hacıbram lost his seat, while ND obtained two seats in Ksanthi, which secured the election of Celâl Zeybek.

⁵⁸³ Greek Parliament Archive. <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Vouleftes/Diatelesantes-Vouleftes-Apo-Ti-Metapolitefsi-Os-Simera/?Mpid=d6d71574-bdf8-4795-8378-40e0a1c0b95e>

for the EP ticket (although they wanted to run with PASOK ticket)⁵⁸⁴, which showed that the minority was able to elect an MP by itself, as it was sufficient with 12,420 votes to obtain a seat in the first distribution.⁵⁸⁵ As in the open-list system the votes are not wasted, the votes given to the Muslim candidates by the minority functions as carrying water for the Christian candidates.

The chances of becoming elected were to a great degree connected to how the minority distributed its forces. For instance, in 1974 Muzaffer Bey participated in Ksanthi and the minority remained without an MP, while Hatipoğlu withdrew and two MPs were elected in Rhodopi. In 1977 Hatipoğlu participated and only one minority MP was elected from Rhodopi. If Hatipoğlu had withdrawn in 1977 too, Galip would surely have been elected, and İmamoğlu's chances to become elected would decrease radically. This would have left Galip as the sole MP and he would secure his position as a leader for the rest of his life. Hâki said that the members of the old generation destroyed each other. Hatipoğlu did not get elected, but was able to take Galip with him.⁵⁸⁶ As is often the case, the minority candidates did not unite for a specific political cause. Aarbakke stresses that the political struggle was to a large degree tied to personal ambitions. When there are two candidates on one ticket and only one of them has a chance of being elected, the candidate who obtains less votes “works” for the other candidate. In the cases where the candidates are rivals the result it is thought that the stronger candidate “eats” the weaker, or as Aarbakke defines it the weaker candidate “carries water” for the stronger.⁵⁸⁷

Efficiency of the minority representatives was expected to increase as their education level and proficiency in Greek increased as well. Imamoğlu thought he could be a good voice for the minority and as a lawyer he had the knowledge to defend it. He also said

⁵⁸⁴ (Gerçek 1/16.12.1977).

⁵⁸⁵ Sebahattin Galip (leader of Kemalist wing) and Yaşar Mehmetoğlu (leader of conservative camp) who were elected in 1974 elections, again run with EDİK ticket, however gained 3,276 and 2,698 votes respectively and lost their seats. ND electoral success in the 1977 elections failed to guarantee a seat for the old generation politician Osman Üstüner who got only 3,206 votes in Rhodopi. Ahmet Mehmet who was nominated by PASOK in Rhodopi lost the elections by getting only 1,357 votes. However in the 1981 elections he maintained his position in PASOK and with its electoral victory, he became a MP. Aarbakke points out that in 1977, PASOK had problems with finding suitable minority candidates for its ticket. This was partly due to the fact that the minority traditionally voted for conservative parties, and partly due to that PASOK was not yet a large established party. Consequently the possible candidates had doubts about if they could become elected on the PASOK ticket.

⁵⁸⁶ Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p. 228.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid. p. 229.

that he would bring the issue to the UN if the Greek authorities would not co-operate.⁵⁸⁸ His law education was most probably a contributing factor to making him pose the problem first of all as a question of civil rights. Imamoğlu made big promises in elections campaigns; however he had done no preparations to internationalize the issue. Celâl Zeybek was able to retain his candidature for ND. In an article to promote his candidature, Celâl Zeybek claimed that all the parties were the same for the minority. He was not in the position to promise much, as the minority could not form a government or make one fall with its vote. Ankara and Athens would have to solve the big problems, while he could help the minority with their day-to-day questions.⁵⁸⁹ In order to understand whether their qualifications help them to fulfill the expected efficiency of their representation, we need to look at their work in the parliament as well.

Ksanthi MP Orhan Hacıbram, who was elected with PASOK ticket, was one of the most effective minority politicians; even though he only served 6 months in the parliament. Some of the ideas he expressed were not within the usual framework of minority centred politics, but directed toward Greek society as a whole. Contrary to normal practice he had declared that he was not only an MP for the minority, but for all Greek citizens. His attitude looks similar to Roum deputies in the Turkish Parliament, such that they were also trying to solve the problems of minority in the frame of national politics without the intervention of Greece. The active opposition politics of PASOK, as well as Orhan Hacıbram's interest in Greek society as a whole gave him more opportunities to speak than has been the case for other minority MPs. Unlike them, he did not act alone posing questions of exclusive minority interest. When he spoke in parliament he joined other PASOK MPs (usually 5) in posing questions to the responsible ministers and could in this fashion treat issues of vital interest to the minority within the general framework of Greek politics.⁵⁹⁰ He was able to participate in questions to the Ministry of Agriculture about the situation for animal husbandry,⁵⁹¹ the conditions for the tobacco growing farmers where he in particular mentioned the problems for the villages in Ksanthi,⁵⁹² and about the

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid. p.229.

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid. p. 230.

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid. p. 234.

⁵⁹¹ *Praktika Vulis* (Parliamentary proceedings), Session 9 - 13.01.1978, p. 196.

⁵⁹² *Praktika Vulis* , Session 15 - 24.01.1978, pp. 438–439, 442; *Praktika Vulis* , Session 52 - 02.03.1978, pp. 15-29.

determination of prices for certain agricultural products.⁵⁹³ He was also involved in questions concerning the use of agricultural vehicles⁵⁹⁴ and driving-tests.⁵⁹⁵

Imamoğlu did not participate in any discussions. His participation was limited to written questions to various ministers directly related to minority matters. Within the parliament where the “correction for the unbalanced numerical distribution of the two minority communities”⁵⁹⁶ and Greece’s attempts to take the Cyprus and Imbros Island issue to the UN has been debated, it was not possible for Imamoğlu and his friend to express the demands. Aarbakke states, a few months after his election he forwarded a petition by the Western Thrace Minority University Graduates Association (Batı Trakya Azınlık Yüksek Tahsillileri - BTAYD) to the foreign minister and the minister of interior.⁵⁹⁷ It protested against the various forms of discriminations directed at the minority. They had hoped that the rights they were deprived of during the junta regime would be returned quickly after 1974, but this had not been the case. In his written answer the vice Foreign Minister Zaimis claimed that there was no discrimination and mentioned among other things that the minority had made 5,485 applications to repair their houses between 1957 and 1977 and 5,000 were granted, while 8,886 property sales were approved in this period (*Gerçek*, 13/29.07.1978). The statistics are usually abused by the Greek state. However, in this case it is obvious that when the minister operated with statistics hailing back to 1957 concerning questions which appeared in earnest after 1967, he avoided addressing the problem seriously. The first question he asked was on 30th of March, 1978 and it was about the management of the Muslim foundations. Among the other problems Imamoğlu posed, Aarbakke mentions his questions to the relevant ministers concerning the return of hunting weapons which were confiscated in 1974 after the Cyprus events;⁵⁹⁸ the problems with obtaining the title deed for the “Turkish Teacher’s Union” building;⁵⁹⁹ the problems with obtaining permits to build and repair houses;⁶⁰⁰ the problems with obtaining driving

⁵⁹³ Praktika Vulis, Session 61 - 05.04.1978, 2277, 2279, 2287.

⁵⁹⁴ Praktika Vulis, Session 28 - 10.02.1978, p. 1028.

⁵⁹⁵ Praktika Vulis, Session 67 - 13.04.1978.

⁵⁹⁶ Pratika Vulis, 13.01.1977.

⁵⁹⁷ Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p.238.

⁵⁹⁸ Question 1194-28/8/1978 with answer 15/9/1978 No. 13656-6042/6, in İleri130/27.10.1978.

⁵⁹⁹ Question to the minister of interior and the foreign minister about the Union’s application dated 25.01.1978, İleri 136/02.03.1979.

⁶⁰⁰ Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p. 234. Question dated 05.04.1979 to minister of publish works, İleri 141/22.06.1979.

licenses;⁶⁰¹ the introduction of special entrance exams to the higher section of the minority secondary school.⁶⁰² At one point he sent a telegram to the foreign minister Konstandinos Mitsotakis that complained about the violation of the minority's constitutional rights. He mentioned the problems with buying land, obtaining permits to repair or construct houses, obtaining permits to carry on free vocations, and finally he protested against the large expropriations of minority farmland. As he voted for Karamanlis' to be elected as President in 1980, and for the membership to NATO again, he was forced to resign from his party. It was not a secret that İmamoğlu planned to run for ND ticket in the 1981 elections.

It is understood from the works and efforts of İmamoğlu that the Greek authorities took recourse to the old tactics of giving vague and uncommitted answers, as well as, endless delays. The lack of political will obstructed any real development, while it left little room for formal complaints. Therefore, the minority was dissatisfied with İmamoğlu, however he would not be able to change the minority policy single-handedly when the necessary political will was lacking. In comparison to the attitudes of the Turkish MPs towards the Greek-Orthodox deputies, it can be said that Greek MPs prefer to give more diplomatic answers rather than reacting immediately to the questions and speeches of the minority MPs. Aarbakke claims that İmamoğlu, was aware of the delicate balances between the Greek and Turkish interests, and as a Greek citizen with a successful business, Greece would ultimately carry greater weight. He did not in any way represent a radical attack on the Greek state. With the regime in force there was simply no way for him to balance between the incompatible interests of the minority and the state. Nevertheless he was more active in politics concerning minority issues compared to Celâl Zeybek.

Celâl Zeybek was himself a Pomak, but an ardent Turkish nationalist. Zeybek pointed out that the Pomaks are Turks and Muslims even though they speak a mixed dialect. He argued that their written language is Turkish because they are recognized as *établis* in connection with the Lausanne Treaty.⁶⁰³ The problems of the Pomaks in obtaining passports for education in Turkey, seems to be part of the general policy of limiting Turkish influence in the Pomak areas. The activity of Celâl Zeybek in parliament was

⁶⁰¹ Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p.234. Question dated 01.06.1979 to minister of communication.

⁶⁰² Question by İmamoğlu and Zeybek to the minister of education-dated 11.06.1981 (İleri 219/19.06.1981).

⁶⁰³ Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p.241.

limited to certain questions of narrow minority interests. Since he represented the governing party he was in a better position to influence the minority policy than İmamoğlu, but in a more sensitive position if he wanted to pose embarrassing questions. His questions were limited to issues like the prospect of building mosques in Salonica and Athens⁶⁰⁴ or road construction to the mountain village Thermes (Ilıca).⁶⁰⁵ As an answer to his question about building mosque in Athens and Thessaloniki- which is still a debate in Greece- the Minister of Foreign Affairs says that in 1979 during Karamanlis' visit to Saudi Arabia, the Greek government decided and announced to give as a gift to the Arabs a piece of land for the building, and this announcement satisfied the other party. Interestingly, the Minister only mentioned the Arabs, and ignored the needs of Turks. To his question about the problems in the roads of the village of Ksanthi, Minister of Foreign Affairs answers that they gave a certain amount of money in order to repair the streets.

The question about delay with the issuing of passports to Muslims in Ksanthi is of particular importance. The answer from the Ministry of Interior stated that:

[...] this delay is due to the procedure of preventive control during the issuing of passports, which as known has been kept for certain border areas of the country for security reasons and concerns all of the inhabitants in these areas and not only the Muslims.⁶⁰⁶

As usual the Ministry of Interior was able to keep up appearances, and did not give any formal reason for complaint. In reality, the problems of obtaining passports must have been related to the Pomak population.

As Abdürrahim Dede claimed in his newspaper *Trakya'nın Sesi* (Voice of Thrace), the discrimination applied toward the Muslim minority became a tool to demand for votes for the Christian candidates during the election periods. They promised to grant the rights and services such as giving driving licenses to the people, who were already eligible to take the permission, however failed to own the licenses due to discriminative state policy.⁶⁰⁷

Dede asserted that this approach humiliated the minority, as if having a license was not their natural constitutional citizenship right. They should not pay for their rights with their

⁶⁰⁴ (Praktika Vulis 13.02.1981),

⁶⁰⁵ (Praktika Vulis 15.05.1981).

⁶⁰⁶ Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p.242. Question by Celâl Zeybek to the Ministry of Interior dated 04.09.1980 with the answer 1632/12.09.1980 (Praktika Vulis, Session 109 - 02.04.1981, p. 5199).

⁶⁰⁷ (Trakya'nın Sesi, 3/05.10.1981)“Oylarınızla Ödemeyin”.

votes; vote is the honor of the citizens.⁶⁰⁸

18 October 1981 Parliamentary Elections

18 October 1981 elections resulted with Papandreou's PASOK Party's clear victory. As the Greek party system had its transition to two-party system in which ND and PASOK began to come to power in alternation, minority politicians' struggle and competition for these parties' ticket accelerated as well. Hasan İmamoğlu, Hasan Hatipoğlu, Sabahaddin Galip, Hafız Yaşar Mehmetoğlu, and Adnan Yusufoğlu all hoped to become candidates for ND after the death of Osman Üstüner.⁶⁰⁹ In this election, Yaşar Mehmetoğlu managed to run with ND ticket and was elected as a deputy of Rhodopi with 7,000 votes. In Ksanthi there was not such a large competition for the candidatures. Celâl Zeybek was the foremost minority candidate for ND, just as he was in the previous elections. The main concern before the elections in Ksanthi was that the large number of minority candidates with a certain vote potential would fragment the minority vote too much to make the election of a minority MP possible. Zeybek tried to play the Turkish nationalism card, in an attempt to oppose outflow of votes to Christian candidates.⁶¹⁰ In Rhodopi Ahmet Mehmet and Hasan Kaşıkçıoğlu became candidates from PASOK as expected. Ahmet Mehmet had already established his position in the previous elections, while Kaşıkçıoğlu had developed a relationship with the party during the previous 3–4 years. Ahmet Mehmet who ran with PASOK ticket in 1977 elections maintained its position and got the seat from PASOK for Rhodopi districts with 9,000 votes.

First attempts to create independent ticket also began after 1981 national elections as some of the prominent strong political figures (such as İmamoğlu and Hatipoğlu) failed to find a position in the major Greek parties, and when there was no result, the question about what they should do emerged.⁶¹¹ In these elections some of the younger minority

⁶⁰⁸ (Trakya'nın Sesi, 3/05.10.1981) "Oy kişinin namusudur. Bir kişinin de namusu bir ehliyet, bir ruhsat, bir silah izni değildir. Ehliyet ve buna benzer küçük şeyleri almak sizing doğal hakkınızdır. Anayasal Hakkınızdır. Namusunuz değildir...."

⁶⁰⁹ Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p.244.

⁶¹⁰ Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p.245.

⁶¹¹ At this point the idea of an "Independent Turkish Ticket" was suggested. Sebahattin Galip ran with an independent ticket from Rhodopi but gained only 1 vote. Another incentive for the candidates to run with independent ticket emerged after the Greek parties begin to rank their candidates and avoid to position minority members to the first rank with 1985 legislature election.

members, ran on the ticket of the Communist party (KKE).⁶¹² They have represented the left ever since, first for KKE and later for Synaspismos. Compared to the previous generations, they have more of an internationalist approach, and try to surpass the narrow nationalist stereotypes. As part of communist ideology the focus shifts from the minority as the only unit and into other political categories like class struggle, etc. This struggle would be realized later with 2012 elections when two minority MPs were elected with SYRIZA (far-left) ticket. The difference in the socialist MPs' parliamentary work is given in the following section.

Although the minority had about one third of the votes in Ksanthi (14,846 votes), there was no minority representative from Ksanthi due to the fragmentation of the vote, which was distributed among 10 minority candidates.⁶¹³ Aarbakke points out to a fact that particularly the religious conservatives (especially ones living in the mountainous areas) had a tendency to vote for Christian candidates, who obtained about 6–7,000 minority votes. In spite of the vote distribution if the votes given to the Christians had gone to Celâl Zeybek or Orhan Hacııbram one of them would have surely been elected. As aforementioned, the state mechanisms supported some of the candidates who could not be elected to split the minority vote. Before the election, there would be elected three Muslim MPs from Rodopi; two for PASOK and one for ND. There was 10 minority candidates in Rhodopi where the total vote for minority candidates was 24,203. The order of the PASOK candidates were as follows: 1. Ahmet Mehmet, 2. Hasan Kaşıkçioğlu, 3. Dimitris Tsetines, 4. Dimitrios Vradelis. The Prefect, Panayiotis Foteas, then conferred with the representatives of the parties present and it was agreed that for national reasons the results had to be modified.⁶¹⁴ Aarbakke states that this change in the position had repercussions in the following elections.

For political effectiveness, less should be expected from two MPs from two rival parties. Moreover, especially for Ahmet Mehmet, party loyalty was beyond minority issues, although they are not insignificant either. Before the elections Ahmet Mehmet mentioned his commitment to the party program, but stressed that he was first of all a minority MP.

⁶¹² Mustafa Mustafa in Rhodopi and Nazif Ferhat in Ksanthi. Mustafa Mustafa would be elected as representative in 1996 national elections by maintaining his position in Synaspismos.

⁶¹³ The Muslim community in Ksanthi would face with the same problem in 2000 and 2004 elections when they were not represented even though they had the electoral potential.

⁶¹⁴ Some 3,000 votes were taken from Kaşıkçioğlu and given to Dimitrios Vradelis who as a result obtained the second place on the PASOK ticket.

He pointed to the fact that PASOK was socialist and would give equal rights and opportunities to everybody. When he added that PASOK was in favor of “change”, he obviously hinted to a change in the minority regime. PASOK’s other minority candidate Kaşıkçioğlu countered the old minority slogan that “For us it is the persons who are important, not the parties”. He considered this opinion to be bankrupt, and stressed that he did not run as a personality, but relied on the party. After the elections, neither of the two minority MPs left any mark in the parliament. The only activity documented is their oath on the Koran⁶¹⁵ when they swore into parliament on 16 November 1981. Hafız Yaşar was not particularly suited for politics beyond the local level. Ahmet Mehmet avoided doing much with the minority problems, as he knew this would open new questions. He avoided propositions in parliament, statements to the press, or initiatives to organize protests. He preferred to defend the government’s policy when the minority problems led to confrontation.⁶¹⁶

2 June 1985 Parliamentary Elections

In the 1985 elections close-list system was implemented and the party determined the order of the candidates on the ticket, hence it was not possible for the voters to change this with a cross of preference. The last election result was taken as basis for the order. The first two, Ahmet Mehmet and Dimitrios Vradelis, headed the ticket but in reversed order because Ahmet Mehmet was from the minority. As the changes in the electoral system create incentives for the minority to develop a participation strategy, 1985 close-list applied by PASOK would cause the minority candidates to run independent in November 1989 elections.⁶¹⁷ As the number of MPs for each prefecture throughout Greece was established on the basis of the 1981 census the number of MPs for the Rhodopi prefecture went down from 4 to 3. Yet this did not decreased the competition for the major parties’ ticket.

⁶¹⁵ “I swear in the name of the Almighty God and his only Prophet, who is Mohammed, to keep my faith in the Fatherland, obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the State, and to fulfil conscientiously my duties”.

⁶¹⁶ Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p. 264.

⁶¹⁷ In June 1984 Euro-elections, minority punished PASOK for not realizing its promises and ND got the highest percentage of votes in Rhodopi district. Before 2 June 1985 elections, the electoral law has changed, and it became clear that to increase Papandreu’s control, the cross of preference in the elections would be abolished. Instead the party would determine the order of the candidates on the ticket leaving no possibility for the voters to influence their place (PR with close-list system). The minority candidates would have no chance of election if they were not in the first or second place on the ticket. Due to anti-minority attitude in Greece, it would not be easy to nominate minority candidates in the first ranks of the list; hence minority would be deprived of parliamentary representation. At this time, independent minority tickets, but not a minority party emerged as an option.

PASOK included Ahmet Mehmet and ND Mehmet Müftüoğlu in the second place on their respective ticket. Nazif Ferhat ran for KKE. Two of the strong candidates who were not accepted by ND, Sebahaddin Galip and Hasan İmamoğlu, decided to run on independent tickets. However, İmamoğlu was later to relinquish his independent candidature.⁶¹⁸ By now the idea of an independent minority ticket had come of age and the main division in these elections was between those who ran for the parties, and those who favored an independent minority ticket (i. e. who were not able to run for the parties). The strongest minority candidate on a party ticket was the lawyer Mehmet Müftüoğlu. He belongs to the generation educated in Greek Universities, and he is also the owner of the newspaper *Yeni Adım*. He claimed that only ND and Mitsotakis could secure the Greek-Turkish friendship, which would solve the minority's problems. He pointed to certain negative aspects of PASOK's minority policy such as the closing of the "Turkish association". The formation of the independent ticket in Ksanthi was influenced directly by the manoeuvres of the large parties. When ND of Ksanthi announced its ticket about three weeks before the elections the minority candidate was left in third place and had consequently no hope of election. This created a shock in the minority, as it had placed its hopes in ND. As a consequence, the independent ticket became unavoidable and Mehmet Emin Aga, Celâl Zeybek and Hikmet Cemiloğlu made a ticket in the first place. When the ND prefecture organisation learned about this they contacted Mitsotakis. On 15 May Hüsni Serdarzade was put second on the ND ticket. This can be seen as the result of the political pressure exerted by the minority.⁶¹⁹ It was a case of the opposing interests of excluding the minority from political representation, or attracting as many votes as possible to the party. Meanwhile the independent Barış (peace) ticket started its election campaign. It was announced that Faikoğlu was given the second place on the PASOK ticket, and Hüsni the third place on the ND ticket. In his election campaign Faikoğlu said: "If you for one reason or another will not vote for PASOK, then vote for 'Barış'"⁶²⁰ This statement was very rational: if PASOK became the largest party in Ksanthi, Faikoğlu would be elected as the second on the ticket. A vote for Barış was considered to be a vote lost for ND.

⁶¹⁸ Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p.274.

⁶¹⁹ Aarbakke, p. 275.

⁶²⁰ (Trakya'nın Sesi, 165/31.07.1985).

In 2 June 1985 elections, for Rodopi the 38,571 valid minority votes were distributed as follows: PASOK 5,504; ND 18,621; Sebahaddin Galip 10,344. The overall result for the two large parties was PASOK 22,597 (30.42%), which gave 1 MP, and ND 37,082 (49.92%), which gave 2 MPs. This result secured the election of Mehmet Müftüoğlu by a very strong support.⁶²¹ The minority vote in Ksanthi (25,814 vote in total) was distributed in the following manner: PASOK 4,405; ND 11,092; Barış 10,317.⁶²² The election resulted in two MPs for PASOK and 1 MP for ND in Ksanthi after the final adjustments in the third distribution. This secured the election of Ahmet Faikoğlu (imam) from PASOK, who has only primary education. In general, minority displayed their discontent with PASOK's policy in closing the Turkish associations.

For the work in the parliament, Mehmet Müftüoğlu, posed questions to the relevant ministers about matters such as the issue of giving passport for 5 years validation to the Muslim citizens⁶²³, entrance exams to secondary education,⁶²⁴ problems with obtaining driving license for tractors,⁶²⁵ two minority members' loss of citizenship,⁶²⁶ and the lack of Turkish interpreters in the courts of Komotini. Each time the Ministry gave nsatisfactory answers such as the minority member Şükrü Halil Bey and his wife lost their citizenship because their passport which was issued at the end of the year 1983 without they re-new it. For the lack of Turkish interpreters in the cours, he was told that the Ministry of Justice was looking for ways to solve this problem. Müftüoğlu spoke in parliament on two occasions in connection with problems particularly affecting the minority. The first time was about the problems of the tobacco farmers, where he criticized PASOK government' tobacco policy. The second was in connection with the proposed tax of \$100 on more than one trip a year to Turkey. This was possibly proposed in reciprocity with similar Turkish laws, which affected the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul, however Turkey had implemented the law for all the countries, while Greece applied this only for the visits to Turkey.

⁶²¹ Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, p.284.

⁶²² (Trakya'nın Sesi, 161/10.06.1985)

⁶²³ Question 2227/15.1.1986.

⁶²⁴ Question 2883/5.3.1986 by Mehmet Müftüoğlu, with answer from the Vice Minister of Education and Religious affairs Petros Moralis dated 24.03.1986 (Praktika Vulis, Session 113 -01.04.1986, pp. 5516–5517).

⁶²⁵ Question 1884/5.3.86 by Mehmet Müftüoğlu, with answer from the Minister of Agriculture dated 01.04.1986 (Praktika Vulis, Session 116 - 04.04.1986, p. 5681).

⁶²⁶ Question 927/02.10.86 by Mehmet Müftüoğlu, with answer from the Minister of Justice dated 21.10.1986 (Praktika Vulis, Session 18 - 07.11.1986, p.779).

Ahmet Faikoğlu did not leave much of a mark in parliament. This is to a certain degree natural, since he was a member of the party in power and he was a primary school graduate whose proficiency in Greek was not well. Consequently, he did not pose embarrassing questions to the government, but continued in his traditional role as middleman. The only time he spoke in parliament was when he introduced a law draft concerning blood donation.⁶²⁷ This had no relation to the minority and was done for PASOK.

Rise of Dr. Sadık Ahmet and Independent Muslim MPs: Parliamentary Elections (18 June 1989, 5 November 1989, and 8 April 1990)

Late 1980s would witness the struggle of minority for internationalization of their problems and wide protests by the community against the Greek state (given in political events sections), which opened the way to electoral success of the independent minority MPs in the Greek Parliament and rise of Sadık Ahmet as the leader of the community. Most of the minority politics from late 1988 to his premature death in 1995 revolved around the persona of Sadık Ahmet.

Sadık Ahmet (1947-1995) is without doubt the most prominent leader in the history of the minority. After finishing primary school in his village, he continued his education in the “Celâl Bayar” secondary minority school in Komotini where he graduated in 1967. He studied subsequently for one year at the faculty of medicine at the University of Ankara, before he transferred to the faculty of medicine at the University of Thessaloniki in 1968 where he graduated in 1974. He worked for two years at the Komotini hospital, and two years at the Aleksandrupoli Medical Faculty hospital and finished his specialisation in May 1984.⁶²⁸ Sadık Ahmet’s rapid prestige is to a large degree connected to circumstances, such as a signature campaign and his trial on December 1988 (aforementioned at political history section), where a large scale mobilization took place in support of Sadık. He came first to the forefront with the signature campaign. He stressed that on first view the minority issue could seem like a Greek-Turkish problem, but in reality it was a question of Greek civil rights and human rights. This caused him to

⁶²⁷ Praktika Vulis, Session 11 – 17.10.1988, pp. 364–365 and Session 13 – 19.10.1988, pp. 446, 458–459, 469–470, 474.

⁶²⁸ Cafer Alioğlu, *Dünden Bugüne Battı Trakya*, (Burcu, 2005), pp.134-135.

start a signature campaign⁶²⁹, which signified that the minority wanted first of all to solve its problems within the Greek political system. The two main purposes of the campaign were⁶³⁰: 1) To attract the attention of the Greek Parliament to all of the Minority's problems. 2) To achieve the democratic unification of the Greek citizen Turks and obtain an officially recognised organization (*tüzel kişilik*) for them (*Yeni Adım*, 1 October 1988).

When Sadık Ahmet tried to circulate the signature campaign to the neighbor provinces at Western Thrace, for some reason or other he aroused the suspicions of the police with his activities, and was stopped and searched when returning from the village. The police found the petition and some 1,300 signatures. According to the community this was a concocted scheme to break the motivation of the minorities (*Trakya'nın Sesi*, 210& 211)⁶³¹. On 25 September 1987 Sadık made a new solo initiative when he went secretly to Thessaloniki late one evening and distributed an English version of his petition "Grievances and Requests of the Turkish-Muslim Minority Living in Western Thrace" to people attending a conference on Democracy and Human Rights. As a consequence, Sadık was sentenced to 2.5 years prison and was set free after he appealed.

The successive rise of Sadık was largely due to promotion from centres outside Thrace. The fundamental links in this process were the minority workers' associations in Germany and the minority solidarity organisations in Turkey. Sadık would eventually draw his main support from other centres than the Turkish Foreign Department. Sadık became very close to Mesut Yılmaz, of the ANAP party, who was Foreign Minister under Özal. The old leader of the Kemalist wing Sebahaddin Galip, who had enjoyed the

⁶²⁹ The signature campaign was initiated on 27 July 1985 by the Association of Western Thracian Turks in Düsseldorf by Asım Ömeroğlu. The intention was to collect some 10,000 signatures under a petition that was voicing the grievances of the minority, and could be submitted to the Speaker of the Greek Parliament by the minority MPs.

⁶³⁰ In an open letter to PM Andreas Papandreu dated Frankfurt 27.09.1986, the associations pointed out that they hoped to solve their problems in a democratic fashion and distanced themselves from fanatic nationalism. That was why they embarked on the signature campaign. The purpose of it was summed up in 5 points: 1- We, the whole minority are sincere in our democratic struggle for equal citizen treatment; 2- We do not deviate from the principle of trying to solve our problems with democratic means within the framework of a state of law; 3- We are determined to first seek the solution to our problems in the Greek Parliament and within Greece and [only] later have recourse to our international rights. 4- Our goal is that our minority should not be the source of discomfort in our country and an obstacle in Greek-Turkish relations, on the contrary we are working towards fulfilling our duty to develop it into a bridge of friendship and co-operation between the two countries.

5- It [the campaign] was undertaken to show that we want peace at home and peace in the world

⁶³¹ (*Trakya'nın Sesi*, 210/16.08.1986) "Kınıyoruz"; (*Trakya'nın Sesi*, 211/27.08.1986), "Hayali Broşürlere Stop".

support of the Turkish consulate in Komotini during general elections, died 9 September 1987. His death meant the removal of one more obstacle to the massive and unconditional support of Sadık.⁶³² Sadık's success in mobilizing the community through signature campaign and during his trial opened the way for his independent candidacy as well.

The idea of being elected with independent ticket has been discussed within the minority community since the enforced close-list system at 1985 elections, in which the Greek parties avoided nominating Muslim candidates from the first ranks. The independent minority candidates could not sustain the necessary number of votes. However, 18 June 1989 parliamentary election was the first time that this dream was realized. This was again due to a change in the electoral law. Faced with the prospect of electoral defeat and legal persecution, Papandreu's right hand Agamemnon Kutsoyorgas drafted an election law, which made it very difficult for any party to obtain absolute majority. Just as before, the independent ticket was faced with the difficult task of obtaining enough votes in the first distribution to secure a seat. However, the political situation made the minority vote more important than ever. The competition for the minority vote by the major parties, coupled with the strong involvement of Turkey, brought the minority issue to the center of everybody's attention.

The independent minority ticket in Rhodopi Trust (Güven) appeared officially towards the end of April. It was made up of Sadık Ahmet, İsmail Molla (Rodoplü), and Sebahaddin Emin.⁶³³ The written propaganda of the Trust ticket claimed that its candidates would be able to voice the minority's grievances much better than the previous MPs, who had been restricted by the party discipline. It was emphasised that the candidates had neither political past nor relationship with the parties, and they would only have to answer to the minority. The person who appealed most to the villagers was Sadık Ahmet. Turkey also campaigned in favor of Sadık's candidature. In Ksanthi, beside the party candidates, Mehmet Emin Ağa headed the independent ticket Good Fortune (İkbal), and was joined by Kadir Yunusoğlu (teacher and chairman of the "Ksanthi Turkish Union"), Mustafa Hasanoğlu (secondary school teacher), and Rasim Murcaoğlu (farmer from the plain area). The nationality issue or the "Turkishness" of the minority played a prominent role in the independents' election campaign. They attacked previous minority

⁶³² Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p. 390.

⁶³³ Alioğlu, *Dünden Bugüne Batı Trakya*, (Dizayn Ofset, 2005), pp.110-112.

MPs for having used the term “Greek Muslims” about the minority. Aarbakke asserts that, the minority cadre was critical to the independent candidates’ methods and lack of political culture.⁶³⁴

In 18 June 1989 elections, an increase in the minority vote is observed. The total vote cast was 76,932, whereas the number of votes given to independents in Komotini (to Trust) was 25,131.⁶³⁵ The total number of votes given to Muslim candidates was 28,609. The following MPs were elected: Dimitris Tsetines (PASOK), Nikolaos Salikas (ND), and Sadik Ahmet (Trust) with 15,894 votes. In addition to the votes above there were 3,028 invalid minority votes. Before the elections Turkey tried to increase the number of voters for the independent tickets, by putting pressure on minority members who had settled in Turkey and Germany, and make them go to Greece and vote. The election result was very impressive for the Trust ticket. It received almost 90% of the votes cast for minority candidates. It had dealt a devastating blow to the minority candidates of the large parties. The main victims were the candidates of ND, who were thought to have had the best potential before the elections.

In Ksanthi, the total votes cast was 61,938, where total votes given to minority candidates (9 were nominated, 5 were independents) was 18,173. Hence, again an increase in the voter turnout for the Muslim candidates was observed. Total vote for independents was 9,030. The following MPs were elected: Panayiotis Sguridis (PASOK), Yeoryios Pavlakakis (ND), and Evangelos Kurtidis (ND). Dede reckoned that some 7,500 minority votes had gone to Christian candidates (*Trakya'nın Sesi* 322/30.06.1989). The independent ticket in Ksanthi did not obtain such overwhelming support as in Rhodopi, but still obtained about 45% of the votes cast for minority candidates. The ND minority candidates, who were considered to have had the greatest potential under normal circumstances, were again the great losers. It is seen if the minority candidate who run

⁶³⁴ Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p.399. As Mustafa Mustafa phrased it: “On the one hand, the independents touched the existing problems of the minority, but they have no program, no political proposition, no perspective. Even if they get a MP they will not be able to do anything. They exploit the bitterness and anguish of people. They tell people, putting them under psychological pressure, “do not let a single vote go to the parties.” We as Sinaspismos go to the Muslim villages, and they tell us: “We will listen to you because you struggled for us and because you have morals”. The responsibility for the situation rests to a large degree on PASOK and ND because they left the problems of the minority unsolved. On the other hand, there is clearly Turkish intervention, too”.

⁶³⁵ Dr. Sadik Ahmet claims that number of votes given to Trust list was 24,858 and he received 22,472 of them. http://www.batitrakyalilar.com/dev/sadik_liste.asp

with independent ticket is not strong enough, the minority in Ksanthi did not vote for the independents. As a result the minority remained without parliamentary representation in Ksanthi.

In general, the elections resulted with a great victory for the minority. The independent ticket had broken the monopoly of the parties, which brought an end to their practice of giving (false) promises, which enabled them to divide and rule. On the other hand, even though ND was the winner party; it failed to form the government with its 44% of the votes and 145 seats. Both socialists and conservatives tried to make coalition government with Sinaspismos that has 28 seats. Because of the corruption scandals surrounding PASOK, Sinaspismos came in the unusual position that it made a government coalition with ND led by Tzannis Tzannetakis. This was not considered by anybody to be a permanent arrangement. It was formed with the limited command to investigate the corruption charges against the outgoing PASOK government and to arrange for new elections on 5 November 1989.

For the 5 November 1989 general elections, in Komotini doctor Sadık Ahmet, journalist İsmail Molla Rodoplu and theologian İbrahim Şerif decided to participate with the Independent Trust ticket again. As Sadık Ahmet and İbrahim Şerif were ruled out of the elections when a lower court decided that they had failed to properly fill out the candidacy forms, Rodoplu became the substitute for Sadık Ahmet, and was elected with 18,766 votes. Nevertheless, Dr. Sadık Ahmet was the leader of the Western Thrace Turkish Community.⁶³⁶ The total votes cast in Komotini were 84,674, and the total votes for the 7 minority candidates were 28,237. Victory of Trust ticket (24,628) deterred the other strong candidates who were nominated by PASOK (as Ahmet Mehmet) and ND (as Mehmet Müftüoğlu). As a result, the MPs elected from Komotini were: Dimitris Tsetines (PASOK), Nikolaos Salikas (ND), and İsmail Molla “Rodoplu” (Trust).⁶³⁷

In Ksanthi, total votes cast 64,402, and total votes for the independent ticket was listed as

⁶³⁶ Dr. Sadık Ahmet even gets Hasan Hatipoğlu’s support (Akın, 1005/18.09.1990).

⁶³⁷ İsmail Molla was born in 1938, grew up in Simvola (Semetli), a village some 10 km north of Komotini. After finishing primary school in the village he entered the religious college (medrese) in Komotini in 1954. In 1958 he went to Egypt where he first studied at the El Ezher University. Later he studied history at the University of Alexandria. Upon completion he spent one year at the University of Thessaloniki. He served several terms as president of the YTD [Yüksek Tahsilliler Derneği (1983–6, 1988–9)] and his command in Greek is weak. Alioğlu, *Dünden Bugüne Batı Trakya*, p. 123.

11,732 but the individual votes add up to 11,855. The following MPs were elected: Panayiotis Sguridis (PASOK), Yeoryios Pavlakakis (ND), and Evangelos Kurtidis (ND). The Good Fortune (Íkbal) ticket increased its vote by 2,702 which must to a large degree be ascribed to the support of Ahmet Faikoğlu, and there was a decrease in the total votes of PASOK. Still the independent ticket was far short of obtaining the necessary votes to elect an MP. ND increased its overall share of the votes, but suffered a loss of minority votes. Hasan Hatipoğlu in his newspaper *Akın* stated that an obvious difference in the attitude of Greek state towards the minority in Komotini and Ksanthi was realized after 1989 elections, where Ksanthi Muslims began to be perceived as “good Muslim” for not block voting to the independent minority candidates, however the mayor of Komotini aimed to punish the “bad Muslims” (*Akın*, 1002/16.08.1990).

With this result the minority MP, İsmail Molla (Rodoplu), came in a decisive position. İsmail Molla Rodoplu was the first minority MP who in the Greek Parliament said ‘Turkish-Muslim minority of Western Thrace’ on 12 January 1990, showing that being independent from the parties increased the effectiveness of the minority MPs in terms of expressing the demands and identity of their community. However, they were ineffective in terms of turning these demands concrete without a party support. The combined power of PASOK and Sinaspismos, together with the independent MP Apostolos Lazaris who had been supported by these two parties, amounted to 150 seats, which was one short of absolute majority. This opened up the possibility of a government supported by Rodoplu. Rodoplu issued a declaration which read: “I am a deputy, member of the Greek Parliament, elected by the vote of the people of Rhodopi and I will make clear my position within the framework of the Constitution. I will support the front of the Progressive Democratic powers PASOK and Sinaspismos.”⁶³⁸ However, in the tense political situation it was a delicate matter to form a government depending on the vote of a minority member, who was regarded by many to be under Turkish influence. In contrast to the national interest, Greek parties agreed to set up an all-party cabinet due to the great political cost of forming a government based on a minority deputy’s support. This would get the country through until April, when another election became unavoidable (on 8 April 1990) because parliament had to choose a new president for Greece, which required a three-fifths majority.

⁶³⁸ Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p.400. (Eleftherotipia,17.11.1989).

For the 8 April 1990 elections, the most conspicuous question was what would happen with Sadık Ahmet. According to Aarbakke, in many ways the Greek authorities had put themselves in a difficult situation because of the severe and poorly argued conviction of him. The situation became even more difficult to untangle because the Turkish Foreign Ministry demanded the release of Sadık and Şerif. In the trial in Patras 30 April, attended by three Turkish MPs and a six-member committee of Turkish lawyers, the sentence was converted to a fine. This made Sadık eligible for the upcoming elections, and he was certain to succeed.

Since Sadık was the favored candidate, there was not much for Rodoplu to do, and he chose not to participate in the elections. Sadık was joined by the preacher Ahmet Hacıosman (MP for 2007, 2009, and 2012 elections), and the teacher-journalist Mustafa Hafız Mustafa (executive-editor of *Akın*). They were obviously only supporting cast to Sadık. Mustafa Hafız Mustafa and Ahmet Hacıosman made a declaration that they did not want any votes for themselves, everybody should vote for Sadık. There were equally radical changes to the independent ticket in Ksanthi. As mentioned earlier, Mehmet Emin Ağa and Ahmet Faikoğlu were injured in the 29 January events. The Greek prefect constituted Mehmet Emin Ağa deputy mufti. When Ağa took up the position as mufti, Faikoğlu declared that he would join the Good Fortune (İkbal) ticket and not “carry water” for the Christians.

According to the 8 April 1990 election results, total votes cast 83,747, and total votes for the independent ticket is given as 29,547, but the individual votes add up to 29,623 in Rhodopi, where 8 Muslim minority candidates were nominated, and got 31,365 votes in total. The following MPs were elected: Nikolaos Salikas (ND), Paschalis Konstandinidis (ND), and Sadık Ahmet (Trust). In Ksanthi, the total vote cast was 64,656 and Ahmet Faikoğlu was elected with Good Fortune ticket with 10,688 votes among the 18,927 votes cast for minority candidates. The following MPs were elected: Panayiotis Sguridis (PASOK), Yeoryios Pavlakakis (ND), and Ahmet Faikoğlu (Good Fortune). The result was a total victory for the independent ticket. Trust obtained 37% of the votes in Rhodopi and excelled both major parties. PASOK was even deprived of parliamentary representation from Rhodopi.

According to Aarbakke, the election of the two independent MPs created great enthusiasm in Turkey, and a corresponding panic in Greece. The Turkish newspapers had headlines such as “Turkish victory in Greece” (*Hürriyet*, 10.04.1990). Faikoğlu declared to a Turkish news agency that after the January episodes the “Turkish” minority realised that “for the Turk there is no other friend than the Turk” (*Protis*, 12.04.1990). Both the independent MPs stressed that the word Turkish could not in any way become the subject of negotiations in their consultations with the Greek political parties (*Hürriyet*, 12.04.1990). According to the distribution of seats in the parliament, ND got 150 seats with 47% of votes, and needed support from minority parties, and independents. A few months later (19.07.1990) the DIANA MP, Theodoros Katsikis, joined ND to give it the needed parliamentary majority. Meanwhile, on 27 November 1991, Dr.Sadık Ahmet announced that he became the representative of the Turkish party DEB (Friendship-Equality-Peace /Dostluk- Eşitlik- Barış) in the parliament.⁶³⁹

Parliamentary Work of the Independent MPs

The existence of independent minority MPs in the Greek Parliament is very crucial for this thesis study, as it enables us to compare the work of independent and party member minority representatives in the parliament. For the case of Roum MPs in Turkish Parliament, it was claimed that the minority representatives who were elected with a party ticket (after transition to democracy in 1946) were more effective compared to the independent MPs (before 1946). On the other hand, this difference might also emerge due to more democratic political atmosphere of the period. For the Muslim Turkish minority representatives, 1989-1990 period is the only terms they served as independent MPs in the Greek Parliament since the transition to democracy in 1974. Among the minority community and independent MPs, it was believed that it was the parties’ control that deterred the solution of minority problems and effective work of minority deputies. It would break the dilemma of the minority MPs who were expected to express the problems of the minority, yet should also go in line with the party policy. It should be noted that, although independent MPs expressed the concerns and problems of minority community more bravely, they also failed to win over the Greek establishment alone when there was no political will. Parliamentary speeches and work always differs from the pre-election promises and newspaper statements. The independent minority MPs

⁶³⁹ (*Balkan*,5/23.11.1991).

were: Sadık Ahmet (18 June 1989 and 8 April 1990 elections); İsmail Molla Rodoplu (5 November 1989 elections); and Ahmet Faikoğlu (8 April 1990 elections). Parliamentary work of minority MPs in Greek Parliament after 8 April 1990 was also crucial to scrutinize as two independent MPs worked in the same parliamentary term.

Dr. Sadık Ahmet was elected with Trust ticket in 18 June 1989 elections, and he was the only representative of the minority community in the parliament. When we examine Dr. Sadık Ahmet's work in the Greek Parliament, it can be said that Sadık's behavior was strikingly different before and after the elections of 18 June 1989. He abandoned his fierce rhetoric for a while, and became a passive spectator to the events. Of course, the work in parliament required totally different skills than shouting slogans to illiterate peasants.⁶⁴⁰ Sadık had many advantages when he began his work. He had been elected by an extraordinary amount of votes, and the strong backing by centers in Turkey meant that he had added possibilities to build a team around him. Greek MPs had congratulated him after making his vow as a representative. After his vow he stated "As a representative, I promised to protect the country's law and constitution. I have no demand except implementation of these laws to our society equally".⁶⁴¹ With his election as an independent candidate, Sadık said the Greek officers began to say "let Sadık save you" to the minority community complaining about the discriminations.⁶⁴²

He gave his vote of confidence to the New Democracy led coalition which, before the elections, he had accused for calling the minority Greek Muslims. He explained his action as an exchange of trust between the government and the community, as his primary duty was defending the rights of the community he was representing. Immediately following his election, he got in contact with several Ministers. First on 17 July 1989, he presented the problems of minority community on re-newing their buildings—which was not allowed, and their houses got the status of illegal- to the Ministry of Planning and Settlement Kavelas. To the Minister of Justice, he showed the voucher of 60 traffic penalties given to him during the electoral campaign. Sadık says, when the Minister saw the voucher, he was very surprised and stated he would take the issue to the Minister of Security Kefaloyannis. When Sadık met with Kefaloyannis on the heavy penalties applied

⁶⁴⁰ Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p.481.

⁶⁴¹ http://www.batitrakyalilar.com/dev/sadik_liste.asp

⁶⁴² When Roimioi community came to Greece with population exchange they faced with a similar treatment as "let Mustafa Kemal save you".

to the minority community, the Minister surprisingly stated “one should not make such injustice” and promised that he would investigate the issue, and asked Sadık to give a list of problems the community faced.⁶⁴³ Yet, how Sadık expressed his work and how the minority newspapers presented his work differs from the actual reaction of the Greek MPs. Also when Sadık tried to bring the issues to the parliament, he could not find the support which was promised by the ND cabinet.

On 16 August Sadık gave an 8-page memorandum consisting of 29 paragraphs to all the ministers and MPs and asked for their assistance to solve the minority’s problems. Apart from this, Sadık also submitted a memorandum about minority education and the petition he had used for the signature campaign. The next day he was informed that his letter and two memoranda were returned so that he could correct his wording “Turkish-Muslim minority” and write “Muslim minority”, which was the official terminology according to the Lausanne treaty. Sadık responded by writing a long polemic in his newspaper about the name and identity of the minority (*Güven*, 4/05.09.1989). He said he gave one month to the government for the solution of the problems. However, Sadık would state shortly after the 29-paragraph memorandum had been returned, that the time had come for Europe. In particular, he would go the Council of Europe meeting in Strasbourg at the end of September (*Güven*, 5/12.09.1989). Sadık’s other work in parliament consisted of submitting a proposal for changing article 19 of the citizenship code, and a question concerning “minority education in Western Thrace”.⁶⁴⁴ The Greek Parliament abrogated article 19 on June 1998. However it is not clear whether it was abandoned due to the work of the minority MPs (such as Sadık Ahmet or Mustafa Mustafa, MP elected in 1996 elections), or due to international pressure on Greece. Although it is believed among the community that it was Sadık that initiated the struggle for the abandonment of Article 19⁶⁴⁵, yet, we cannot claim that there was a direct influence of Dr. Sadık on this decree. Moreover, despite the demands for the solution of problems at national and local level, the Greek administration continued to apply their own programs.

⁶⁴³ http://www.batitrakyalilar.com/dev/sadik_liste.asp

⁶⁴⁴ (Batı Trakya’nın Sesi, no.10-12).

⁶⁴⁵ (İleri, 563/08.09.1989)“Candan Kutlarız”; “19. Madde Dr. Sadık Ahmet’in müracatından 9 sene sonra, vefatından 3 sene sonra 11.06.1998 tarihinde Yunan meclisinde yapılan oylama sonrasında kaldırıldı. Daha sonra olayı takip edenler kim olursa olsun, madde hangi sebeplerle kaldırılmış olursa olsun, bu mücadelenin bayraktarlığını Dr. Sadık Ahmet yapmıştır.” Batı Trakya’nın Sesi, “Sadık’s List”. [The Article 19 had been terminated 9 years after Sadık Ahmet’s recourse and 3 years after his death in 11.06.1998 by the Greek parliament. Whoever the person prosecutes the process, or whatever the reason caused the termination of the article, the leader of this struggle is Dr. Sadık Ahmet].

For 5 November 1989 elections, as Sadık Ahmet was not allowed to run as a candidate for misfilling the candidacy form, İsmail Molla Rodoplu was elected with Trust ticket from Komotini, and he was the only representative from the minority community in the parliament. Unlike from Sadık Ahmet, Rodoplu has a poor command of Greek and was unable to table properly a question in the Greek parliament because of serious problems in handling the Greek language and was not well equipped for politics outside the small territory between his office to the Turkish Consulate. As in the case of Sadık, Rodoplu's behavior changed radically after he was elected. After assembling all their documents against the parties in the election campaign, they gave their vote of confidence to the same parties in the parliament.

Rodoplu started his career as MP by asking the minister of interior about the intensified passport control and by submitting a question in parliament concerning minority education (*Güven*, 16/19.12.1989). Rodoplu distributed a 20 page memorandum to the MPs before the question was treated. The Minister of Education, Vasilios Kondoyiannopoulos, countered Rodoplu point by point, stressing that the education took place according to the Lausanne Treaty and the Education protocol signed with Turkey in 1968. Rodoplu displayed no ability to press his points. Rodoplu also tried to raise the 'vakıf issue'⁶⁴⁶. The criticism of the new law was centred on that it would fragment the *vakıfs* and their administration to the degree that they would become unmanageable. The minority MPs Hasan İmamoğlu and Celâl Zeybek would later protest, because the law was passed when they were at leave from the parliament and their voice had not been heard.⁶⁴⁷

For the question whether representation of the minorities with independent ticket made a difference, Aarbakke's analysis displays a negative process, as it is hard to see that Rodoplu did anything else than the previous minority MPs in this matter, nor that he had

⁶⁴⁶ The *vakıf* question has largely been dependent on Greek-Turkish relations. Until 1949 the committees which managed the schools, mosques and *vakıfs* in Didimotiho, Aleksandrupoli, Komotini and Ksanthi, were appointed by the prefect. The improvement of Greek-Turkish relations paved the way for the elections of the minority *vakıf* committees in both countries. The gradual worsening of Greek-Turkish relations led to a tightening of government control, but elections continued until the junta took control in 1967. It is important to have in mind that the *vakıf* issue was treated as a bilateral Greek-Turkish problem where the minorities played a subordinate role. The minorities were neither asked nor informed.

⁶⁴⁷ Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p. 420.

any more success. The heavy involvement of Turkey in favor of the independent candidates increased Greek suspicions. On the other hand, as aforementioned, Rodoplou was the first one who used ‘Turkish-Muslim minority’ in his speech, which suggests that they tried at least to create an atmosphere for the ethnic recognition of the minority. Later Ahmet Faikoğlu and Sadık Ahmet would also use that definition in their speeches. Moreover, they both raise the *vakıf* question towards the Greek authorities. They would take a more highhanded approach referring in particular to the junta’s role. Faikoğlu asked how long the decisions of the dictatorship would be in force in Thrace, while Sadık characterized the lack of elections as a continuation of the junta’s tactic.⁶⁴⁸ In January 1991 a new law was passed, which envisaged the election of the *vakıf* committee by general suffrage of adult Muslims. On the *vakıf* issue, the minority deputies got the support of the leftist parties, but not the support of the main central parties.⁶⁴⁹ In practice nothing changed. The parliamentary work of independent candidates indicates that no achievements were gained through the official tools, however, their work was presented in the minority public sphere and they helped the internationalization of the problems.⁶⁵⁰

The Two Independent MPs’ Work in Parliament (8 April 1990-10 October 1993)

With the 8 April 1990 elections, Sadık Ahmet was elected as representative of Komotini with Trust ticket, while Ahmet Faikoğlu (former PASOK MP) was elected as representative of Ksanthi with Good Fortune ticket. This was the first time that two independent minority MPs worked in the Greek Parliament. The independents’ first spells in parliament took place under special conditions, because of the unresolved political situation. The April 1990 elections finally produced a viable government, which would last for 3.5 years. This gave the two independent MPs, Sadık Ahmet and Ahmet Faikoğlu, more normal working conditions to the degree that this was possible. According to Aarbakke, like Sadık, Faikoğlu toned down his rhetoric after his elections. In an interview

⁶⁴⁸ Question from Faikoğlu to the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs 30.11.1990. Letter from Sadık Ahmet to Prime Minister Konstandinos Mitsotakis dated 09.06.1993.

⁶⁴⁹ At this point the two MPs of KKE made a new question in parliament. They asked:

1) When there would be election for the managing committee; 2) How the status of the *vakıfs* would be guaranteed; 3) If the *vakıf* law would be changed. They complained about the vague answer to their previous question, and mentioned that the memorandum by Cemali from 25.07.1995 had received no answer (*Trakya'nın Sesi* 544/14.03.1996). Soon a new presidential decree was issued that would be effective for a 3 year period. On the positive side it secured the status of the *vakıf* property. On the other hand it did nothing to implement the provisions about elections, but gave the district governor (*periferiárhis*) the right to appoint the managing committee.

⁶⁵⁰ Sadık took the case of Muslim minority of Greece with Mehmet Emin Ağa, Hasan Hatipoğlu, Ahmet Haciosman, Cafer Alioğlu (President of BTTF) to the European Council on 21-28 September, 1989 at Strasburg,

to a minority newspaper, Faikoğlu stressed that he would have more possibilities as an independent MP to present the minority's problems. He would try to find a solution to these problems within the country and not create a question for Greece. However, if he could not find a solution within the country, he would look to international human rights organizations as a last resort (*Yankı*, 80/21.04.1990). During the discussion in parliament before the new government obtained its vote of confidence both of them made use of their opportunity to speak, and mentioned some of the minority's problems. Sadık had more of a "conciliatory" approach and mentioned the positive features of ND's program. The ND government would finally obtain a vote of confidence by 152 votes; 150 from ND 1 from DIANA and the vote of Sadık Ahmet.⁶⁵¹ Faikoğlu abstained. This time the Greek parties could not risk going for another early elections by rejecting the vote of support of an independent minority MP. On the other hand, survival of the ND government was tied to the support of Sadık. Hasan Hatipoğlu would criticize the Prime Minister Mitsotakis who tried to underestimate the fact that his government got the confidence vote due to Sadık's support, and who said to the Rhodopi Mitropolitıs Damaskinos that "we do not count Sadık's vote power. Our power is based on 151 MPs in the parliament" (*Akın*, 1005/18.09.1990). 4 May 1990 both the independent MPs would vote for Konstandinos Karamanlis when he was elected president for a second term.⁶⁵² Again there was some confusion in minority circles about why Sadık would vote for ND, although some considered it to be positive. His support of the government could of course be seen as an attempt to approach ND in order to start a dialogue about the minority's problems. For the term in parliament as a whole Sadık tended to vote together with ND, while Faikoğlu tended to vote with his old colleagues in PASOK, suggesting that although the independent minority MPs were supporting different parties and ideologies, for the issues concerning the Muslim-Turkish minority, they managed to work together. Yet, Faikoğlu believes ND had deceived Dr. Sadık Ahmet as the party did not keep its promises in improving the minority's situation. The abolishment of entrance exam for the secondary school was one of these promises (*Akın*, 1003/30.08.1990).

The minority press, which was close to the independent MPs, promoted their work strongly. Characteristically, Hatipoğlu would write several times that they continued their "shower" of questions and proposals in the parliament (*Akın*, 1025/26.03.1991;

⁶⁵¹ (*Akın*, 1001/06.08.1990)

⁶⁵² (*Trakya'nın Sesi*, 355/10.05.1990)

1031/23.05.1991). Sadık's works in the parliament was also presented in his newspaper *Balkan*. The independent MPs were able to discuss the minority's problems with both leading Turkish and Greek politicians. From 2 to 5 December, 1991 Dr. Sadık Ahmet met with the Prime Minister Demirel, TGNA President Cindoruk, Vice PM İnönü, and with other party leaders Mesut Yılmaz and Necmettin Erbakan and with several Ministers (*Balkan*, 7/17.12.1991). In a message on the occasion of the religious holiday *Kurban Bayramı*, Sadık mentioned that he had met Greek Prime Minister Konstandinos Mitsotakis after the election and spoken with him about the mufti issue, the *vakıfs*, education, houses built without permission etc. He claimed to have received positive answers from the Prime Minister (*Gerçek*, 261/29.06.1990). In June Faikoğlu met with the government spokesman, Viron Polidoras, and spoke with him for about 40 minutes. He mentioned the need for a mufti election (*Akın*, 997/29.06.1990).

Similar to the previous terms, both Sadık and Faikoğlu submitted many questions related to the minority's problems to relevant ministers, particularly, in the beginning of their term. Some questions were related to the larger minority issues, while others were related to problems of individuals. For example, they presented questions related to education (the minority's right to select their own teachers, the need for contemporary books⁶⁵³, why the children in the controlled zone were not allowed to attend the minority secondary schools⁶⁵⁴, why the exchange teachers did not arrive in time⁶⁵⁵), *vakıfs*⁶⁵⁶, loss of citizenship by article 19 of the citizenship code⁶⁵⁷, building permits, protesting the proposal for establishment of an open-prison in Komotini,⁶⁵⁸ to legalization of illegal buildings, indemnification of minority shops broken in January 1990⁶⁵⁹, driving licenses for tractors⁶⁶⁰, permissions for building mosques, the need for land to landless peasants, problems in the villages related to electricity and telephone, people who had not received

⁶⁵³ Question given by Sadık Ahmet to Minister of Education and Minister of Foreign Affairs dated to 6 November 1991.

⁶⁵⁴ (*Akın*, 1003/30.08.1990). (*Balkan*, 69/06.07.1993).

⁶⁵⁵ (*Balkan*, 6/03.12.1991). Dr. Ahmet's question to Ministry of Education, dated 29 November 1991 and 16 December 1991.

⁶⁵⁶ (*Akın*, 1001/06.08.1990).

⁶⁵⁷ (*Balkan*, 6/03.12.1991). Dr. Ahmet's question to Ministry of Internal Affairs, dated 29 November 1991.

⁶⁵⁸ In October 1988 a decision was made to build agricultural prisons in Thrace- Arisvi, Filira, Arriana regions-possibly in imitation of previous Turkish politics at Gökçeada. (*Trakya'nın Sesi*, 475/03.02.1994). The first preparations for this decision began in 1977 (*Akın*, 1004/11.09.1990). Dr. Sadık Ahmet calls the community to ignore the decision of the mayor (*Balkan*, 5/26.11.1991).

⁶⁵⁹ (*Akın*, 1004/11.09.1990).

⁶⁶⁰ (*Balkan*, 4/19.11.1991) question given by Sadık Ahmet to Ministry of Internal Affairs dated to 13 November 1991.

title deeds after the redistribution of land in 1982 and other problems with title deeds (unrecognized title deeds tended to be recognized if the land was sold to Christians), difficulties with transferring their voting rights to other townships, fines to minority members because of unpaid tax, etc.⁶⁶¹ Similar attitudes can be observed in other questions of economic interest. Sadık Ahmet made a question to the minister of Transport and Communications asking why taxi permits were not granted to minority members. Not even one of the about 600 taxis in Thrace belonged to someone from the minority.⁶⁶²

The question about education⁶⁶³ similar to vakıf issue was a harder one, as what the independent MPs wanted, was in reality to return to the system, which had been agreed upon during the Greek-Turkish *rapprochement* of the early 1950s. That would mean the hiring of teachers educated in Turkey and increased Turkish influence over the curriculum. Apparently, the desire for Turkish patronage played a much larger part than purely educational considerations. On the other hand, Greece had tried to reverse “the mistakes of the 1950s” for at least the previous 25 years, and was not at all disposed towards accepting a greater role for Turkey again. To the questions of Faikoğlu in the parliament related to the education issue,⁶⁶⁴ it is seen that government tried to use comparison the conditions of the Roum minority in Istanbul. The Minister, Vasilios Kondoyiannopulos, reacted first to the tone of the question. He pointed out that the near disappearance of the Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul showed which state did not respect the Lausanne Treaty. While he admitted that there were surely problems, as was the case with every minority, he blamed Turkey for not sending books and delaying the arrival of the exchange teachers, which came on a basis of reciprocity. He further asserted that it was incorrect that the special secondary schools in the area were not accepted by the minority, and it was in accordance with international practice to provide education to children which would help them become integrated in the country where they lived.

⁶⁶¹ (Akin, 1004/11.09.1990)

⁶⁶² Question 2180/22.11.1990.

⁶⁶³ *Praktika Vulis*, Session 6 - 26.04.1990, p. 78. Faikoğlu was reminded several times by the Speaker that the discussion was about the government program [*programmatikés dilósis*] and not the minority demands. The minister of education, Vasilios Kondoyiannopulos reminded that he had answered all the points raised by Faikoğlu in his earlier answer to Rodoplu (*ibid.*), see *Praktika Vulis*, Session 16 - 12 January 1990, pp. 343–344.

⁶⁶⁴ Aarbakke, Unpublished PhD Thesis, *Praktika Vulis*, Session 82 - 16.11.1990, pp. 3777–3778. Treatment of question 137/13.11.1990 by Faikoğlu to the minister of education. “In Western Thrace both primary and secondary education present a picture of shame for our Country, which is celebrated as the cradle of civilisation and science. The Minister of Education and Religious Affairs is asked about which reasons led the Government into disrespecting the Lausanne Treaty etc.”

Faikoğlu repeated his accusations and stressed that: “The authorities do not allow us even to appoint teachers to our schools with our own money. You, however, send those Trojan Horses whom you educate contrary to our manners and customs”⁶⁶⁵. Faikoğlu’s accusations led to loud protests in parliament. This approach is similar to the reaction of the Turkish MPs in the Turkish Parliament towards the criticisms of the Roum deputies. It should be noted that when Faikoğlu and Sadık Ahmet wanted to take floor, the president announced them as “two Rhodopi Muslim minority MP wanted to speak to present their opinions” and emphasized their religion in the parliament, which was not done to any minority MP in Turkey. The president of the Greek Parliament also warned Faikoğlu severally for everytime he used the term ‘omogeneis’ when he referred to the Muslim minority, as omogeneis was referring to an ethnic group, he should not use it for his community.

In conclusion, it can be said the independent minority deputies were more effective in the Greek Parliament in terms of taking the floor, giving questions, publicizing their work and the issues, and internationalization of community’s problems. On the other hand, it is seen that without the political will of the Greek parties, it is difficult for an independent deputy to realize their political aims. To be elected with an independent ticket was a success for the minority community, showing their political power. However, independent ticket also created reactions in the Greek society. Independent MPs’ immunity is one of these reactions, when the “anti-Greek” activities of the independent MPs led to strong reactions in the Greek parliament and several proposals to lift their parliamentary immunity. 23 MPs from all parties⁶⁶⁶ asked Sadık to resign for treason after he had said it would be difficult to choose side in case of a Greek-Turkish war and after he declared “He is Turk” in the Greek parliament.⁶⁶⁷ As a result, Sadık declared that the minority did not identify with Turkey and denounced categorically every opinion, which

⁶⁶⁵ *Praktika Vulis*, Session 82 - 16.11.1990.

⁶⁶⁶ Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p.446. In the parliamentary committee 27 MPs voted against, 4 in favour, and 10 blank in the case of Sadık, while 25 voted against, 4 in favour, and 12 blank when it came to Faikoğlu. However, this was not binding for the voting in the plenary session of parliament and the parties were afraid that many MPs would not obey the expressed desire not to lift the immunity of the independent MPs. There was an episode in the parliamentary committee when the MP Stratis Korakas (*Sinaspismos*), who was against lifting the immunity, spoke about several instances of discrimination.

⁶⁶⁷ (*Balkan*, 8/ 24.12.1991) In fact, it all began when the MP of PASOK El. Konstandinidis, referring to the oppressed Greeks of the Pontos [Turkish Black Sea coast] and Istanbul, said: “They do not have the right to worship their religion. And here we have two alleged colleagues, traitors of this country who go and cry out how much their minority is oppressed.” And Sadık answered as “I am not alleged MP. I am MP” and “I am Turk”.

supported the secession of Western Thrace and its union with Turkey. The change in the electoral law on 23 October 1990 implementing a 3% national threshold for the parties and independent candidates was an excluding factor for representation which would end the period of independent candidates, but initiate the establishment of minority party DEB (Dostluk Eşitlik Barış Partisi/ Friendship Equality Peace) by Dr. Sadık Ahmet when he was still an independent MP in the parliament. This exclusion from the Greek political system also increased the minority community's getting more close to Turkey, as Faikoğlu expressed in his speech "They say that we will remain without MP, that we will be orphans. No, we are not orphans. When we have Süleyman Demirel as father and Tansu Çiller as mother we will never be orphans." and in Sadık Ahmet's statement "We elect the leader of the minority for the world parliament, and not MP for the Greek parliament. I want all the votes. Then, as the only leader of the minority, they will accept me in the Greek parliament whether they want it or not. The Greeks are afraid of me. Today we have beside us the MPs and ministers of the Mother Country Turkey who wish the victory to be great".⁶⁶⁸

10 October 1993 Parliamentary Elections

The new election law with the 3% cut-off point enacted in 1990, changed the political game. Although Turkey and independent MPs complained about the new law, it has not changed. As it was understood that there was no possibility to elect an independent MP, the tactics were adjusted. The behavior of the independent MPs would now decide the minority's possibilities to elect any MPs. Both Sadık and Faikoğlu tried to make deals with ND and PASOK to be included on their tickets, but this failed because of strong protests from other candidates (*Kathimerini*, 03.10.1993). After the elections were announced the DEB party made the following decision: DEB would definitively participate in the elections and was open for collaboration with all the other parties. Any party which was interested in discussing collaboration with DEB must a) fully respect the minority's rights; b) accept Sadık Ahmet as candidate in Rhodopi and someone indicated by the DEB party as candidate in Ksanthi. If DEB was not able to agree on collaboration with another party, an independent ticket would be formed (*Balkan*, 77/14.09.1993). ND proposed that Sadık could suggest some other candidate from his party who was less

⁶⁶⁸ (*Eleftherotipia*, 31.10.1993) in Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p.604.

controversial, but Sadık refused.⁶⁶⁹ Insisting on running with independent ticket suggests that the minority could not elect MP, and since 1920 for the first time left without parliamentary representation. Considering that Turkey also supported the decision of DEB, it can be claimed that the minority representation was sacrificed for Greek-Turkish relations. The established politicians who participated in the election campaign were Ahmet Mehmet (PASOK) and İbrahim Onsunoğlu (ND) in Rhodopi, and Orhan Hacıbram (ND) in Ksanthi. In Rodopi KKE and Sinaspismos were represented by candidates with long ties to the parties, Faik Faik and Nazif Ferhat, while in Ksanthi the candidates were little known. Mustafa Mustafa obtained a place on the “honorary” ticket of Sinaspismos.⁶⁷⁰

According to the parliamentary election results, registered voters were 108,931, total votes cast 81,601, invalid votes 1,528, valid votes 80,073, total votes for independents 26,228. Yet this number of votes was not sufficient to elect an independent. The following MPs were elected: Dimitris Tsetines (PASOK), Haralambos Damianidis (PASOK), and Paschalis Konstandinidis (ND).⁶⁷¹ In general, Trust succeeded in becoming the largest “party” in Rhodopi, showing that the independent ticket maintained its strength in spite of the fact that it had no chance of electing an MP. DEB party presented the results as a victory, which was obtained “in spite of all the disadvantages”. In a message to the voters he stressed that from now on only DEB represented the minority inside and outside Western Thrace, and nobody should take any initiatives without consulting it (*Balkan*, 87/13.10.1993). Due to fragmentation of votes, not only the independent candidates, but Muslim candidates nominated by the parties also failed to be elected. No Muslim MPs were elected, and the Christian candidate who came second on the PASOK ticket owed his election indirectly to the independent ticket.⁶⁷² Similar to the Trust ticket, Sinaspismos was not able to exceed the 3% cut-off threshold on a national basis and could not get a seat in the parliament. According to Aarbakke, this was also a loss for the minority, since its Muslim candidates were well integrated in the party and provided a model for normal participation in Greek political life.

⁶⁶⁹ Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p. 602.

⁶⁷⁰ Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p. 605.

⁶⁷¹ Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p.606.

⁶⁷²The relative strength of the parties was as follows: Trust 32.75%, PASOK 31.04 %, ND 28.47%, Politiki Aniksi 3.67%, Sinaspismos 1.54 %, and KKE 1.37%.

In Ksanthi, the results were similar. Registered voters were 88,044, total votes cast 67,198, invalid votes 1,051, valid votes 66,147; total votes for independents 12,458. The following MPs were elected: Panayiotis Sguridis (PASOK), Nikolaos Lambadaris (PASOK), and Evangelos Kurtidis (ND). In both Komotini and Ksanthi, PASOK got 2 seats, while ND remained in one. It should be noted that for the first time PASOK (24,437 votes-36.94%) surpassed ND (24,215 votes-36.61%) in Ksanthi. The Good Fortune ticket displayed a significant loss of votes and would not have been able to elect an MP even if the 3% provision had not been in force. On a national level the elections provided PASOK with a comfortable majority of 171 seats, against ND 110 seats, Politiki Aniksi 10 seats, and KKE 9 seats. This result signified an impressive come back for Andreas Papandreu after his government went down scandals in 1989.

For the 22 September 1996 parliamentary elections, the minority community would change its participation strategy, by giving their votes to the minority candidates nominated by the Greek parties. Two factors led to this alternation in their strategy. First, they understood that by supporting the independent ticket, they were left without parliamentary representation. In 1996 elections, they voted for the strong candidates, and few minority members ran for the election compared to the previous elections to avoid the fragmentation of the minority votes. Second, Dr. Sadık Ahmet's death on 27 July 1995 by a car accident left the minority community- and both the DEB party and the Consultation Council (DK) - without a leader, which managed the voting strategy and deterred the members for running with a party ticket.⁶⁷³ DEB was succeeded in 1999 by Sadık's former collaborator Ahmet Hacıosman (PASOK MP in 2007, 2009 and 2012 elections). After Sadık's death Ahmet Faikoğlu was made the new chairman of the DK. The party has never shown much activity, nor has it been a political force to reckon after Sadık's death, as it needs to pass 3% electoral threshold, and this is impossible without the votes of Christians.

⁶⁷³ Sadık's tragic death in a car accident near the village Sosti (Susurköy), 27 July 1995 was very significant event for the community as well as his first success for being elected with an independent ticket. His funeral was attended by a large Turkish parliamentary delegation of high-ranking Turkish politicians with Mesut Yılmaz as the most prominent, and condolences were expressed from the highest quarters. The Greek government also expressed its condolences. In general, to the Greeks he was a villain while to the Turks he was a hero. This difference played on the Sadık myth, which was cultivated in Turkish nationalist circles. After his death many streets, parks, squares etc. in Turkey have been named after Sadık Ahmet. It is no coincidence that the street in front of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul was immediately named "Dr. Sadık Ahmet Street" (İleri 808/04.08.1995).

5.5.3.2 Political Representation (1996- 2013)

As the political participation strategy and political representation of the minority had changed after the implementation of 3% electoral threshold on 1990, and minority community avoided voting for independent minority candidates as they were left without parliamentary representation, the political representation of the Muslim Turkish minority of Greece after 1996 is analyzed in another section. This section will scrutinize the electoral campaign, nominated minority candidates, their backgrounds, electoral results and minority MPs' work in the parliament for 1996, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, May 2012 and June 2012 elections.

22 September 1996 Parliamentary Elections

Before the 1996 parliamentary elections, the euro-elections held in 1994 signaled the Synaspismos' rise of power both at national level and among the minority community, beside the support to leftist party PASOK. In 1996 parliamentary elections both PASOK and Synaspismos got the result of this wind, although leader of PASOK Andreas Papandreu left his place to Kostas Simitis on 18 January 1996. Beside the changes in Greek politics, compared to 1993 national elections where minority was left without parliamentary representation, it was clear that the independent tickets had outplayed their role and had no other function than to exclude the minority from parliamentary representation. It would also suggest that the minority should unite around certain candidates of the large parties in order not to split the minority vote. There was also the question of which candidates would be acceptable to the Greek parties and on what conditions. The candidates need to keep a low "Turkism" profile, without denying the success of the previous independent MPs and the candidates. On 14 September the DEB party made an announcement that it did not participate in the elections because of certain conditions. It did not support any party or candidate but left the voters free to decide for themselves (*Gündem*, 12/17.09.1996).

The leader of Politiki Aniksi, Andonis Samaras, said in a press conference in Athens 30 August that he would not have Muslims on his ticket. Sure, it was politically costly, as ND would lose seats in Western Thrace without the minority support. The other parties criticized him for his attitude. Maria Damanaki (Synaspismos) was particularly crossed,

and called his decision to not have candidates from the minority nationalist racism.⁶⁷⁴ In Rhodopi, Ahmet Mehmet was considered to have had the best chance of election from PASOK before the nomination process began. The deal with Turkey paved the way for Galip Galip (son of Sebahattin Galip, and grandson of Hafız Ali Galip) as the second PASOK candidate. ND finally settled on the somewhat unlikely choices of Nazif Şakir (founding member of DEB) and Aydın Uzun. In Ksanthi the nomination process was simpler. Here PASOK and ND would have 1 Muslim and 3 Christians on their tickets, instead of 2 and 2 as in Rodopi. For PASOK İhsan Kahya was able to secure the nomination in competition with Mehmet İmam after his good result in the prefecture elections. In ND the possible candidates were Orhan Hacıbram, Hüsni Serdarzade, and Birol Akifoğlu. Sinaspismos was not influenced by any of the considerations of the large parties, because they had minority politicians who were well integrated in the party organization. It was represented by its previous candidates Mustafa Mustafa in Rhodopi, Nazif Ferhat in Ksanthi, and included the dentist Ekrem Hasan on the “honorary” ticket. Sinaspismos hoped to follow up the success of the prefecture elections. The election law provided the party with a realistic chance of electing an MP from Thrace if it could attract sufficient minority votes. This MP would in all likelihood be from the minority, and the party used this in its propaganda.⁶⁷⁵

In Rhodopi 7 minority candidates ran in the elections. The number had decreased compared to the early elections, to avoid the fragmentation of the votes. Registered voters were 111,304, total votes cast 77,014, invalid votes 2,408, valid votes 74,606. The following MPs were elected: Dimitris Tsetines (PASOK), Galip Galip (PASOK), and Mustafa Mustafa (Sinaspismos). Ahmet Mehmet was not elected with PASOK ticket, and ND was left without representation in Rhodopi. Its exclusion policy had been published by the community; moreover a leftist tendency became clearer. Ahmet Mehmet would be elected in 2000 parliamentary elections with PASOK ticket again; he would lose in the first distribution, but would take the place of Manoli Chrisanthi, and serve 4 years as a PASOK MP in the parliament.

In Ksanthi, 5 minority candidates ran in the elections. Registered voters were 95,193, total votes cast 68,294, valid votes 66,028. The following MPs were elected: Panayiotis

⁶⁷⁴Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p.627. (Trakya'nın Sesi, 561/16.09.1996).

⁶⁷⁵Aarbakke, *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, p. 634.

Sguridis (PASOK), N. Lambadaris (PASOK), and Birol Akifoğlu (ND). The relative strength of the parties was as follows: PASOK 36.1%, ND 48.7%, Sinaspismos 3.8 %, Politiki Aniksi 3.5%, KKE 3.2%, DIKKI 2.6%, others 1.1%. In Ksanthi, ND got a seat with its Muslim minority candidate.

The election law was created to provide absolute majority in parliament for the largest party. We can observe that a mere 41.5% of the votes gave PASOK 54% of the seats in parliament. All the other parties obtained a lower percentage of seats than their percentage of the votes. As regards the minority, the result signified an unprecedented success. For the first time since 1974 it elected as many as 3 MPs. The most conspicuous feature of the result was that for the first time the minority voted massively for a candidate of a left wing party. This came probably as a surprise for many in both Greece and Turkey.⁶⁷⁶ Mustafa Mustafa managed to get Christian votes as well, as political commitment is higher for the supporters of Synaspismos than ethnic considerations. Galip Galip came second on the PASOK ticket, and was eventually elected. After his election he declared that: “With the support of PASOK I intend to solve the existing problems and I will try to make the minority a bridge of friendship between Turkey and Greece”.⁶⁷⁷

Regarding their work in the parliament, it can be said that being elected from 3 different parties deterred the way to solution for the 3 minority deputies. However, their work was significant in the abolishment of Article 19. Galip Galip is the son of the former MP Sebahaddin Galip and belongs consequently to an old political “dynasty”. After completing the minority secondary school in Komotini, Galip went on to study architecture at the Istanbul Technical University where he graduated in 1972.⁶⁷⁸ He was elected with PASOK ticket in 2000 parliamentary elections as well. In the parliament he tried to find a solution to the economic problem of the minority, by criticizing the policy on “tobacco production”. He advised the producers to divert their products and advised them not to only limit themselves to tobacco production. Birol Akifoğlu was a doctor like Mustafa Mustafa. Mustafa Mustafa’s election and political conduct has improved the image of the minority in the eyes of the Greek public. He also continues to be well respected within the minority. However, his ability to influence is of course restricted by

⁶⁷⁶ Ibid. p.630.

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 632.

⁶⁷⁸ Alioğlu, *Dünden Bugüne Batı Trakya*, p. 137.

several factors. Firstly, he represents a small party outside government. Secondly, his commitment to the party means that to a certain degree he is restricted by the ideological and political limitations of Sinaspismos.⁶⁷⁹ However, it became clear that efforts by Greek authorities to improve its minority policy together with increased international pressure had made the time suitable to finally abolish article 19. During 1997 the initiatives against the article intensified. Both the MPs Korakas and Panayiotu of KKE and Mustafa Mustafa of Sinaspismos took separate initiatives in parliament for the abolishment of the article. The minority MP Mustafa Mustafa (Sinaspismos) made a question in parliament about the victims of article 19. He was glad that the article had been abolished (in 1998), but stressed the need to solve the problems for the people who were still stateless. The question was said to have been recently, but the date is not specified. In 1999 the minority representatives gave a question to the parliament regarding Greece's rejecting of signing European Council's "Framework on the Protection of Minority" (*Hürriyet*, 24.07.1999). They declared that minority's ethnic identity should be recognized.

9 April 2000 Parliamentary Elections

Among the minority community, it is seen that they usually vote to the candidates of the parties, which have a higher chance for coming to power. Moreover, minority politicians try to run with a powerful party ticket. This is a rational behavior as they believe; first their chance for election is higher in these parties' lists, and second they can protect the rights of the minority better if they are member of the incumbent party. In Western Thrace, the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, which began in 1999, was expected to reflect to the election results. On the other hand, fragmentation of minority votes continued to be an obstacle for the election of the deputies. In Komotini for 3 seats in the parliament 11 minority candidates ran in the elections, while in Ksanthi there were 4 minority candidates competing for the 3 seats. Total minority vote in Rhodopi was around 33,000, and in Ksanthi was 26,000. (*Hürriyet*, 10.04.2000). As a consequence, in 9 April 2000 parliamentary elections Galip Galip succeeded and became Rhodopi MP from PASOK for the second time, which was in power since 1993 elections. Although in the elections Ahmet Mehmet lost the elections with PASOK ticket, and became the third in the ranking, when it is realized that the elected MP Manoli Christira had not resigned from his office work before the deadline, his service as deputy failed, and his seat was given to

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid. p. 635.

Ahmet Mehmet. This means within the 3 total seats given to Rhodopi, 2 belonged to minority representatives, and both from PASOK. Despite the support of minority to Synaspismos candidate Mustafa Mustafa, as the party could not pass the 3% threshold, it could not get any seats in the parliament.⁶⁸⁰ This showed that Synaspismos and any leftist party needed minority vote support in order to gain seats in the Parliament. In Ksanthi, due to the fragmentation of votes among the minority candidates, and because certain number of minority members voted for the Christian candidates, it was left without minority MP.⁶⁸¹ Same result would be observed for 7 March 2007 parliamentary elections. In general PASOK's votes increased from 45% to 50% in Komotini, and from 36% to 45% in Ksanthi. (*Zaman Gazetesi*, 11.04.2000).

This critical support of the minority to PASOK was very crucial, as Simitis' PASOK came the first party just 1% ahead of ND, 43,80% (158 seats) and 42,73% (125 seats) respectively. Due to the Greek electoral system, PASOK got extra seats in the second and third distribution. It can be said that good relations with Turkey influenced the electoral results for the Greek parties. George Papandreu, who was one of the architects of Turkish-Greek rapprochement, received the highest vote share in Athens, while the ultra-nationalist DIKKI Party was left out of the parliament. These results were signals of Greek public's support to PASOK's Turkish policy.

Parliamentary work of the two minority MPs is important to analyze, as since 1977 it was the first time that two representatives were elected from the same incumbent party, PASOK. Ahmet Mehmet as aforementioned was elected due to the Manoli Christira's application problem. Hence, in fact he was not elected with minority votes. He had been a politician for 30 years, and had always been nominated by PASOK. In terms of parliamentary work he was not sufficient, as he preferred to have direct contacts with the related Ministries rather than giving questions in the parliament. In his interview with minority newspaper *Gündem*, he said he does not prefer to work like the opposition MPs and avoid making shows like them. As he was an MP of the incumbent party, this was a rational decision. For Ahmet Mehmet, education was the primary problem of the minority community in Western Thrace. Along with the Consultant Committee, he explained the minority's education concerns to the Minister of Education, gave a written note to the Minister asking for solutions to their problems. He declared that this was the first time in

⁶⁸⁰Synaspismos' total minority vote had decreased from 11.8% to 6.9% between 1996 and 2000 elections.

⁶⁸¹ (Öğretmenin Sesi, No.22), <http://www.ogretmeninsesi.org/dergi/22/Baslarken.asp>

50 years that Minister of Education accepted such an association (*Gündem*, 363/26.02.2004).

Compared to Ahmet Mehmet, Galip Galip played a more active role in the parliament. He believed minority politics should be regarded in parallel with the national politics. He also emphasized that his party's political approach is important, however even in his party he worked like an opposition deputy. In his first four year of service in the parliament, with Mustafa Mustafa and Birol Akifoğlu, he succeeded in the abolishment of Article 19 in 1998. The visit of the Turkish people who were born in Western Thrace but living in Turkey was deterred, and their initiative in the abolishment of this obstacle was realized. Galip says, they managed to renew the primary school books. Moreover, as he believes minority makes a friendship bridge between the countries, he contributed to the Turkish-Greek relations by visiting the Edirne Governor. Galip wrote letters to various Ministries concerning the problems of the minority. In his letter to the Minister of Communication Hristos Verselis, he demanded the preparation book for the driving license exam to be translated into Turkish (similar to the examples in Germany and Holland), as minority's command in Greek is not good. He gave 24 written interpellations and 28 investigation interpellations in the parliament, meaning among 160 PASOK MPs, he was the 24th in terms of parliamentary work. Most of these written interpellations were about minority rights. (*Gündem*, 363/26.02.2004) On the other hand, similar to Ahmet Mehmet, he also declared that the primary problem of the minority is education. Economic concerns, tobacco problem, citizenship problem, vakif issue, mufti issue and identity issue are other problems that Galip tried to find solutions to. For these concerns, he gave a written interpellation to the Minister of Environment and Public Affairs on 25 October 2001 regarding the mines' actual and potential environmental danger to the people living in Susurköy- Sendelli (Sosti- Dimi). In his written interpellation to Minister of Agriculture on 1 November 2001, he questioned the situation of the 81 tobacco producers living in Kurcalı (Likion) who could not get their money despite the agreement made by the producers and the company. (*Gündem*, 355/01.01.2004). During the budget debate in the parliament on 22 December 2003, Galip demanded solutions to the minority's problem about education, vakıfs, mufti, national identity and being at 'haymatlos' situation. He said Rhodopi province and Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, which is an agriculture region, should be supported by the state. He also demanded an increase in the wages of the minority farmers. (*Gündem*, 360/24.12.2003).

As an interesting point, in his parliamentary speeches and written interpellations, Galip used the term “minority, and people living in the Rhodopi region”, while the newspaper gave the works as “Galip mentioned the problems of ‘Western Thrace Turkish minority’ in his speech in the parliament. Nevertheless, if the last 15 years since 1989- the beginning of the political struggle- is analyzed, positive improvements regarding the minority’s conditions have been realized. Many de facto prohibitions such as buying and selling of real state; acquiring licenses for construction; acquiring driving licenses for tractors and cars; licenses to open a working place were criticized and their implementation diminished; termination of Article 19 in the Citizenship Law, bringing new school books to the primary schools, implementation of a quota for the minority students in the Greek universities, financial subsidies for the restoration of the school buildings are some of these positive examples. These developments have been achieved due to internationalization of the minority issue, political struggles of the political figures and EU’s pressure on Greece on its minority policy.

Regarding the facts about positive relationship between Turkey and EU, and Greece’s support for Turkey’s candidacy to the EU, the Muslim-Turkish minority’s expectation on their remaining demands- vakıfs, mufti election, recognition of their identity etc.- and on their political representation was high. With this reason, both Galip Galip and Ahmet Mehmet were be nominated as candidates by PASOK for the 7 March 2004 parliamentary elections, but their vote share would not be sufficient to take the ticket. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, the electoral results signaled that minority population might be left with political representation through one deputy. In the 2004 elections “Turk’s vote is to Turks” slogan would not be sufficient to increase the number of Turkish MP, and it would lead to a failure for the minority representation as only one minority MP would be elected to the Greek Parliament. Yet, again Turkish-Greek relationship did not make a direct and positive impact on the political representation of the minority community and internal factors were more significant.

7 March 2004 Parliamentary Elections

Similar to every election period, after the call for early elections by PASOK leader Simitis, the party leaders and their candidates began to visit to the Western Thrace region, and to make their promises. The Muslim candidates’ competition to have the optimum place in the party lists, and their bargaining with the Greek parties, which the newspaper

called “transfer stock-market” began as well, since “the person we used to know as leftist transferred to the right, and vice versa” (*Gündem*, 361/12.03.2004).

Towards the end of January 2004, the minority candidates of the parties became clearer. According to the list for Rhodopi, similar to 2000 elections PASOK nominated Galip Galip and Ahmet Mehmet, Nea Demokratia nominated Nazif Şakir- the founder of DEB Party- for the 3rd time, and a new candidate, lawyer İlhan Ahmet (grandson of ex-MP Osman Üstüner) . Synaspismos went to elections with Mustafa Mustafa again, and nominated Nazif Ferhat (dentist) as well, while Nazmi Ahmet (aluminum merchant) was KKE’s Muslim candidate. Beside the minority candidates, PASOK nominated Stergios Stavropoulos, and Manolia Chrisa – he was elected on 2000 elections but had lost his seat to Ahmet Mehmet later-, ND nominated Evripidis Stilyanidis, and Krikiakos Babasidis. (*Gündem*, 361/29.01.2004). Considering that Stilyanidis was a strong candidate from ND who had high positions up to Minister in ND, İlhan Ahmet’s chance for election was not likely unless ND got an unexpected victory in the elections and in the region.

In Ksanthi, Muslim Turkish candidates were not as strong and popular as the ones in Rhodopi. According to the rule applied for Western Thrace- 2 minority candidates from Rhodopi, and 1 minority candidate from Ksanthi- by the parties, PASOK’s minority candidate was Burhan Baran, ND nominated Türkeş Hacımemiş, KKE’s candidate was İhsan Ahmet Kahya. The Christian candidates in Ksanthi were: from PASOK Sotiris Stolidis, Triandafilos Papadopulos, Panayotis Sguridis; from ND Alekis Kontos, Filipos Çalidis, Kostas Zagnaferis; from KKE Fotiadis Dimitris, Kolaros Hristos, Neofidis Dimitris. The minority party DEB before the elections announced, it is not supporting any candidate.

In my interview with İlhan Ahmet on April 2013, he declared that he was not a member of ND party before his nomination from the party, but he was invited by Karamanlis to run with ND ticket in the elections. Upon his candidacy, İlhan Ahmet send a letter to Karamanlis about the expectations and demands of the minority, which was also signed by ND Rhodopi municipal council members and candidates. In the letter, they stressed their expectation on ND to declare its ‘minority policy’, in order to strengthen Greek-Turkish relations, and to deter Papandreu’s chance of convincing the minority and stealing their votes. The 11 demands declared in the letter were ordered as following:

1. Recognition of minority members' national identity.
2. Protection of the foundations and announcement of the election of their administrative council.
3. Respecting minority's religious freedom.
4. Improvement of the minority's education level to European standards by respecting international and bilateral agreements.
5. Foundation of a minority secondary school and high school with Greek state's support.
6. Increasing the number of teachers coming from Turkey.
7. Economical support of cultural associations belongs to minority community.
8. Continuity of the quota given to minority students for their entrance to Greek universities.
9. Regarding the minority as a special population, and supporting minority members from economical and occupational framework.
10. Termination of the special precautions towards the minority living in the mountainous region.
11. To guarantee the subsidy to the tobacco and cotton producers in Rhodopi province by the EU and Greek state.

In the letter, the ethnic character of the minority was not mentioned. In the interview, when I asked İlhan Ahmet about his priority among the problems minority faces, he positioned the problems related to education in the first rank. In the letter, it is seen that identity issue and problems related to the election of the foundations were ranked in the top. This indicates that minority's expectation and demand priority is not similar to İlhan Ahmet, but he needed to mention them to attract votes. In an interview with ND's other candidate Nazif Şakir by *Gündem* newspaper, he says "to me the most salient problem of our minority is economic hardship" (*Gündem*, 361/29.01.2004).

Before the elections İlhan Ahmet declared that his possibility for election is high, as in Rhodopi the minority has 36,000 votes, while ND has 15000 Christian votes and PASOK has 16000 Christian votes. If ND wins the election – and if PASOK's vote share is less than 51% in Rhodopi- ND would gain 2 seats in the province, and beside the strong candidate Evripidis –who got 17000 votes in 2000 elections, İlhan Ahmet can be elected – even from the first rank if he attracts sufficient Muslim votes- and he said his aim is to

get the ticket as the first preference. He said, PASOK's Muslim candidates can benefit from the competition between Stavropoulos and Manolia.

The 2004 parliamentary elections did not change the established two-party system in Greek politics, but ended 20 years of PASOK rule – excluding 1990-1993 ND period- as Konstantinos Karamanlis' ND got 45,36% of the votes and gained 165 seats, while George Papandreou's PASOK got 117 seats with 40,5% of the total votes. KKE and SYRIZA entered the parliament with 5,6% and 3,26% votes, and 12 seats and 6 seats respectively.⁶⁸² With this electoral result, Karamanlis formed the single-party government, which was expected to succeed in Olympic Games organization and Cyprus' EU membership.

According to the electoral results in Rhodopi, from ND Evripidis Stilyanidis (19,166 votes) and İlhan Ahmet (13,792 votes) were elected, while Nazif Şakir got only 1000 votes. From PASOK Hrisa Manolia took the seat (with 10,931 votes). Galip Galip ranked in the list with 10,063 votes and lost the election with 850 votes. Ahmet Mehmet gained 4,791 votes. Mustafa Mustafa's 2000 votes with Synaspismos ticket were not sufficient for election, and Nazmi Ahmet got only 240 votes for his party KKE. Similar to 2000 elections, the minority in Ksanthi was left without parliamentary representation. ND got 2 seats and PASOK got 1 seat from Ksanthi. PASOK's candidate Burhan Baran lost the seat to Panayotis Sguridis with 700 votes. The total votes Muslim candidates got were around 17,100. Considering that the minority has around 28,000 vote potential, the election result suggests that minority's votes were distributed too widely between the candidates and the parties, and also around 40% of the minority votes went to the Christian candidates. İlhan Ahmet became the only representative of the minority in the parliament.

Even though İlhan Ahmet (1968, Komotini) was the only minority representative in the Greek Parliament for the 2004-2007 period, and he was only 36 years old when he became a MP, it should be noted that he was one of the most effective minority politicians in terms of number of written interpellations and parliamentary speeches given in the parliament. İlhan Ahmet, has a good command of Greek. He got his primary,

⁶⁸² 11th Parliamentary Term: March 7, 2004 (<http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/To-Politevma/Ekloges/Eklogika-apotelesmata-New/>)

secondary and high school education in Greece, and graduated from Istanbul University Law Faculty in 1993. Similar to other minority politicians, he got a position in the Western Thrace Minority Association of University Graduates. He stated in the interview I made with him that, his interest in politics began during his university study in Turkey [although he was coming from a politician family], when he involved in the conversations about human rights, minority rights and socialism. His experience in speeches and writing improved when he began to write articles in his uncle Hafız Mustafa⁶⁸³'s journal *Yuvamız* (our home). He positions himself in the Kemalist, modern and liberal wing. He was not a member of any Greek party before, but his good command in Greek and success as a lawyer made Karamanlis invite him to join the party as a candidate and Karamanlis believed he had a potential for election. İlhan Ahmet's political view was close to liberalism; he was supporting free market economy and social justice, which he called as "social liberalism", which he believed serves best for minority rights compared to the other ideologies. This political positioning seems close to the political policy of Karamanlis' ND.

İlhan Ahmet believes partisanship within the minority would jeopardize the unity of the minority. Hence, the approach should be making minority politics in a party, not the vice versa. Radical left and radical right cannot attract minority votes according to İlhan Ahmet, and the community votes for the person they trust rather than a party they identify themselves with. The majority of the minority votes according to their positions, occupation and personal relations. His success in carrying 10,000 minority votes from center right to center left in 2012 elections (from May 2012 to June 2012) likely proves his statement. İlhan Ahmet ranks the problems of the minority as: education, economy, unemployment and foundations. His work in the parliament coincides with these priorities. Among the 25 written interpellations, 8 letters and parliamentary speeches he made in the parliament, the majority has been related to problems in the education field. He gave written interpellations about education, minority's identity issue, Article 19 victims, freedom of religion and conscience, economic problems and development, and social problems.⁶⁸⁴

⁶⁸³ Mustafa Hafız Mustafa was the chief-editor in the newspapers Akın, Balkan and Yuvamız during 1990s, and he was a strong support of Dr. Sadık Ahmet.

⁶⁸⁴ İlhan Ahmet collected his parliamentary work about Western Thrace Muslim Turkish minority (2004-2007) as a ND Komotini MP in a booklet.

İlhan Ahmet stated that the effectiveness of the minority representative is more important than the number of minority MP in the parliament. As a MP in the incumbent party, he worked like an opposition deputy, and tried to handle minority problems among the political system while he also supported Karamanlis in the parliamentary bills. When Karamanlis called for early election to be held in 2007, he nominated İlhan Ahmet again. Even though İlhan Ahmet increased his number of votes, he missed being elected in Komotini by 150 votes in a head to head race between New Democracy and PASOK in September 2007 elections.

16 September 2007 and 4 October 2009 Parliamentary Elections

2007 and 2009 national elections can be analyzed together as in both elections none of ND's minority candidates were elected, and the minority was represented by Çetin Mandacı (in Ksanthi) and Ahmet Hacıosman (in Rhodopi) both from PASOK party. The main difference between the two elections is the change of the party that came to power. In 2007 parliamentary elections ND became the first party with 41.82% of the votes, and PASOK became the second with 38% vote share; and in 2009 elections PASOK emerged with victory by receiving 44% of the votes and followed by ND with 34,5% vote share. This difference is crucial for the thesis work to compare how the minority MPs worked under different party governments. The electoral system in 2007 and 2009 enabled the first party to form a single-party government as extra 40 seats were given to the first party. However, the electoral system did not deter the involvement of extreme left and right parties in the parliament after 2007 elections and the transition of Greek political system from two-party to will also be taken as a factor in the analysis of parliamentary work and effectiveness of the minority deputies.

When the early elections were called, the parties began to list their minority candidates as well. The parties applied a formula for the nomination of the candidates such as 2 candidates from minority and 3 candidates from majority for each electoral district. In total 14 minority candidates ran from 5 different parties. ND nominated its former MP İlhan Ahmet and ex-municipal president of Susurköy Erdoğan Sait for Rhodopi and Dilek Hacıhalil and Orhan Hacıibram – lawyer and ex-MP- for Ksanthi. ND's Christian candidates for Rhodopi were: Evripidis Stilyanidis, Kiriakos Babasidis and Hristos Brancukakis. On the other hand, PASOK nominated Ahmet Hacıosman -DEB party

president and Rhodopi Vice-president mayor-⁶⁸⁵ and Rıdvan Kocamümin – Rhodopi member of municipal council and vice-president mayor- for Rhodopi. PASOK nominated Çetin Mandacı- doctor- and Cenar Maksum –university student- as minority MPs for Ksanthi. PASOK’s Christian candidates were: Hrisa Manolya, Yorgos Petalotis and Olga Çetine (*Gündem*, 545/23.08.2007). In addition to the major parties Syriza nominated Ekrem Hasan and Celâl ettin Yurtçu, and in Ksanthi, Syriza’s candidate was an agricultural engineer, Yiğit Alioğlu. KKE’s candidate in Rhodopi was Nazmi Ahmet as before, and it was construction worker Hasan Efendi in Ksanthi, and nationalist far right party LAOS did not nominate any minority candidate in Rhodopi but nominated the teacher Ahmet İmam in Ksanthi. (*Gündem*, 546/23.08.2007).

According to the 2007 parliamentary elections, conservative Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis won re-election with a diminished majority, with only 152 seats in the parliament, meaning it could manage to get the vote for confidence with 2 MPs. Compared to 2004 parliamentary elections, both of the major parties ND and PASOK lost votes, and an increase has been observed in the vote share of far left: KKE and SYRIZA, and also in the far right party LAOS. The elections came after a financial scandal surrounding the prime minister's party and devastating forest fires that killed more than 65 people in August 2007. Meanwhile, the small right-wing Popular Orthodox Alarm Party (LAOS), which campaigned on immigrant quotas and opposition to Turkey's efforts to join the European Union, appeared to have won 3.7 percent -above the 3 percent threshold needed to enter the parliament- enough for 10 seats. PASOK became the first party in Rhodopi (with 45.90% of votes), and İlhan Ahmet lost the seat with 60 votes. İlhan Ahmet later gave a petition to the court; however the electoral results remained the same. In the interview we made, he explained the results as a manipulation of the Greek state to avoid the election of 3 minority MPs.

2007 parliamentary election results in Rhodopi⁶⁸⁶: PASOK got 36.665 votes (45.90%) closely followed by Nea Demokratia with 36.540 votes (45.75%); KKE received 2.286 votes(2.86%); another leftist party Sinaspismos gained 1.546 votes (1.96%) and nationalist party LAOS could not attract the votes in Rhodopi as it got 1.256 votes

⁶⁸⁵ Haciosman got the highest votes for mayor elections in Greece in the 2002 and 2006 elections.

⁶⁸⁶16 September 2007 parliamentary election results for Rhodopi and Ksanthi: <https://www.abttf.org/html/index.php?link=detay&id=1302&grup=4&arsiv=0> ; Registered voters: 117.548; total number of votes: 82.042; Invalid votes: 1.603; Blank votes: 566.

(1.57%). According to the results, from Rhodopi the elected MPs were: from ND Evripidis Stilyanidis (15.088 votes); from PASOK Ahmet Haciosman (with 14.874 votes) and Yorgos Petalotis (7.772 votes). As PASOK became the first party in Rhodopi, although İlhan Ahmet got the highest third vote (with 14189 votes), he lost the seat to PASOK's candidate Yorgos Petalotis.

2007 parliamentary election results in Ksanthi⁶⁸⁷ were different from those in Rhodopi, where we see both far-right and far-left parties got higher number of votes. PASOK got 48,9% of the vote share with 37.375 votes, whereas Nea Demokratia with 30.549 votes became the second party (39.97%); KKE's vote number was 2.700 (3.53%); followed by ultra-nationalist LAOS (2.109 votes and 2.76%). Here Sinaspismos was the last party as it got 1.923 votes (2.52%).

Compared to Rhodopi, PASOK's vote share was higher in Ksanthi. In addition to minority vote for PASOK in Rhodopi, it can be said that minority community showed its discontent with previous ND rule. However, in nation-wide level PASOK fared the worst. PASOK looked set to win just 103 seats in parliament - the lowest number it has held since 1977, when it had 93 seats. According to this result, PASOK got two seats and ND got 1 seat from Ksanthi. The elected representatives for Ksanthi province were: from PASOK Çetin Mandacı (15.211) and Panayotis Sguridis (8.059), and from ND Alexandros Kondos (14.529). The female minority candidate from ND Dilek Hacıhalil received only 69 votes, which was the lowest number of votes in both Ksanthi and Rhodopi. Mandacı and Haciosman's parliamentary service ended when ND leader Prime Minister Karamanlis called for early elections to be held on October 2009⁶⁸⁸, instead of the regular term period until 2011.

For the 4 October 2009 parliamentary elections, similar to 16 September 2007 elections, 14 candidates of Muslim community– 13 men and one woman – contested in Western Thrace. Seven were candidates in the Ksanthi constituency and seven in the Rhodopi constituency and appeared on candidate lists of four parliamentary parties – ND, PASOK,

⁶⁸⁷ Registered voters: 112.007; Total number of votes: 78.870; Invalid votes: 1.824; Blank votes: 613

⁶⁸⁸The reasons for the early elections were: the killing of 15th years old Alexandros Grigoropoulos by a policeman resulted in large demonstrations and widespread riots in major Greek and foreign cities; economic crisis that Greek public accused Karamanlis government for; and both financial markets and Greece's EU partners chastised the country for vastly underestimated budget deficits under Karamanlis' watch.

SYRIZA and KKE. Similar to 2007 elections, only Hacıosman and Mandacı, have managed to enter the parliament from the socialists PASOK' ranks. According to the election results, PASOK won after 5 years of conservative rule. The resurgence of PASOK, led by the US-born George Papandreou, followed mass disillusionment with a government marred by scandal and criticised for its handling of the faltering economy and a string of natural disasters. PASOK got 160 seats in the parliament with 43.94% of the votes and ND got 91 seats and became the main opposition party in the parliament with 33.5% of votes.⁶⁸⁹ KKE, LAOS and SYRIZA got 21, 15 and 13 seats in the parliament respectively.⁶⁹⁰

For the electoral candidacy, in Rhodopi ND nominated Ahmet İdris beside its favorite candidate İlhan Ahmet; PASOK re-nominated Ahmet Hacıosman and Rıdvan Kocamümin; Mustafa Mustafa and Celâl ettin Yurtçu were at Syriza's list, and the only minority candidate at KKE's list was Faik Faik. In Ksanthi, ND nominated a female candidate Aysel Zeybek with Ahmet Bodur; PASOK re-nominated former MP Çetin Mandacı and Seval Osmanoğlu was also in its list; Syriza's candidates were Hüseyin Zeybek and Hasan Malkoç; whereas KKE put Hasan Efendi's name on its election list.

The 2009 election resulted with a clear victory of PASOK, especially in Western Thrace region. PASOK got the 53% of the votes in Rhodopi and 58,79% of the votes in Ksanthi electoral district, whereas the ratio was 34,5% and 26% for ND respectively. ND's favorite candidate İlhan Ahmet's vote share decreased to 8,323 compared to the previous elections which were around 14,000. According to the electoral results, Rhodopi MPs were Ahmet Hacıosman (PASOK-15,499 votes); Yorgos Petalotis (PASOK-14,319 votes); and Evaripidis Stilyanis (ND- 17,125 votes). In Ksanthi, again PASOK got 2 and ND got 1 seats: Çetin Mandacı (PASOK- 17,271 votes); Sokratis Ksinidis (PASOK- 9,617 votes); and Alexandros Kontos (ND- 10,876 votes)(Gündem, 654, 10.10.2009).⁶⁹¹ It is observed that KKE and Syriza managed to increase their vote share with Mustafa Mustafa and Hüseyin Zeybek respectively. The only female minority candidate Aysel Zeybek, who was a victim of Article 19 of citizenship law and granted her Greek

⁶⁸⁹ On 29 November 2009, Antonis Samaras was elected as the new leader of New Democracy by the party base at the 2009 leadership election.

⁶⁹⁰ <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/To-Politevma/Ekloges/Eklogika-apotelesmata-New/#Per-12>

⁶⁹¹ Gündem Gazetesi, "4 October 2009 election results in Rhodopi and Ksanthi"

http://www.gundemgazetesi.com/news/detay_01.php?h_id=286&0654&10-10-2009%20,%2006:03

citizenship after a long years of struggle, got 1,297 votes for ND's Ksanthi list, however could not receive enough votes to take the ticket. In our interview with Haciosman, I asked about the lack of female minority deputies. He could not remember the candidacy of female politicians in the elections, however mentioned about their success at local-level elections, and stated that they need to work hard to gain the confidence and votes of the community.

After the election Haciosman, who served as a PASOK lawmaker for two years in the previous parliament, said he would benefit from the advantages of being a member of the ruling party, adding: "For two years, I was in the opposition ranks. But now, our party is in charge and PASOK leader George Papandreu will become the next prime minister. The Turkish minority has been working hard for PASOK, and it is now PASOK's and Papandreu's turn to give". Yet, 2009-2012 were hard times for both Papandreu and minority deputies, because Greece was trying to cope with deep economic crisis and there were painful laws to pass through the parliament to make cuts on the public expenses. Even though they were minority MPs from the incumbent party, it was difficult for them to demand minority rights while the country and the region's primary concern was unemployment and reduction of the subsidies to agricultural producers. Çetin Mandacı was formally excluded from the PASOK parliamentary group on February 2012, along with 21 other MPs who had refused to vote a government memorandum on a new loan agreement. Haciosman voted in favor of Papandreu government, and explained that if he had also refused to vote for the new loan agreement, then it might be understood as if the minority had an aggregated reaction towards the government and majority. After being expelled from the parliamentary group, with the other MPs Mandacı joined DIMAR's group, however he had not been nominated from any Greek party's list for the following elections.

Work in the Parliament

PASOK Ksanthi MP Çetin Mandacı is a doctor, and PASOK's Komotini MP Ahmet Haciosman is a Marmara Theology School graduate, and an imam. This difference in their occupations suggested that they were representing the modern and traditional wings within the minority community respectively. Nevertheless, for 2007 and 2009 national elections, they were both elected with PASOK ticket, and for the issues regarding the minority, they collaborated. After his election for the second term Haciosman said "with

the experience I gained in Parliament for many years, I will try my best to serve the Turkish minority. It is a huge advantage for the Turkish minority to elect two MPs to the Parliament in these elections. Together with my brother Çetin Mandacı from Ksanthi, we will fight hand in hand for solutions.” Mandacı and Haciosman are two of the most effective minority representatives; especially Haciosman has the record with more than 500 written interpellations and 50 parliamentary speeches. Haciosman stated in our interview that, even though these written interpellations have not been realized and the demands regarding the problems of the minority have not been met; minority MPs should put all their efforts in the parliament.

As aforementioned, after the 2007 elections, Mandacı and Haciosman were elected from PASOK list; however it was the ND party that came to power. It was the first time a Muslim Turkish MP was elected from Ksanthi after 8 years, and was important to show that Turks went into unity. In 2009 elections, these two politicians became MP again from PASOK list, and the fact that PASOK came to power eased their parliamentary work in affecting the government’s policies. It should be noted that minority politics usually does not differ from one party to another, and it is usually regarded as state policy. On the other hand, in 21 March 2012- at their second parliamentary term- Haciosman’s ‘bill proposal’⁶⁹² given on 2 August 2011 about the illegal construction of houses built by the minority members was accepted by the two major parties PASOK and ND. This was the first time a written interpellation made by a minority MP was realized and a bill was implemented based on his proposals. Again this was the first time the Greek state accepted the mistake it had made in the past. This example is crucial to show that if there is more than 1 MP in one party and if that party is in power the possibility for more effective parliamentary work becomes higher. On the other hand, parliamentary work of the MP should also be analyzed with the consideration of other factors. Even though they were MPs at the incumbent party, Mandacı and Haciosman the two Turkish deputies, had to work harder than they had assumed due to the presence of LAOS in the parliament, which was playing on public discontent with a wave of immigration using firebrand nationalist rhetoric. LAOS leader Karatzaferis said after the election "The main role of LAOS in the next parliament will be to [make sure] Greece will be for the

⁶⁹² Because the minority unofficially was forbidden to make restoration on their properties, and also on the foundation estates they usually make the restorations illegally. This law would bring 80% discount on the fees they needed to pay. Millet Gazetesi, “Haciosman and Mandacı’s common public press” <http://www.milletgazetesi.gr/view.php?nid=458> (4 April, 2012)

Greeks”, he also has called on Greeks to unite against "the enemies surrounding" the nation in a reference to Albania, Macedonia and Turkey. For the 2012 parliamentary term, the far-rightist “fascist” Golden Dawn Party would be another obstacle for the minority MPs.

Çetin Mandacı was first elected as municipal councilman in Topeiros in 2002 and was its mayor until 2004. He was re-elected at the municipal council in 2006. He was elected as MP with PASOK ticket in the 2007 and 2009 parliamentary elections. Mandacı refused to support the Union government led by Papademos between PASOK, New Democracy and Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) in November 2011 because he was against the participation of the far right party LAOS in the government. When he voted against the government policy for taking a new loan in 12 February 2012. He was expelled from the parliamentary group and continued his service as an independent MP. (*Gündem*, 773, February 2012). After his election for the first time to the Greek Parliament in September 2007 elections, Mandacı said that despite being elected by minority votes in Ksanthi, he was not the representative of only the minority but rather the whole region. Interestingly, he explained his friendly attitude for the Christian voters as “I am Turkish, but we are all Ottoman descendants, that’s why I will not discriminate, just as my ancestors didn’t. Despite having different ethnic roots, we all live on this land”. Although I believe Christian citizens would not agree that they were also Ottoman descendants and Ottomans did not make any discrimination, I gathered Mandacı’s work in the parliament mostly from the Turkish newspapers of the period, and it is strikingly he mostly worked for the minority issues rather than the whole region. The reason that these news were taken from Turkish newspapers can also be decisive. On the other hand, it is crucial to see that the minority newspapers follow and present the minority MPs’ works, and also minority MPs prefer to explain their works in the parliament and the results they gained to the newspapers.

Çetin Mandacı defines the most important problems of the minority community as education and economics. (*Gündem*,628/13.04.2009). Mandacı gave written interpellations for the issues regarding the quality of education⁶⁹³; administration and

⁶⁹³ Prot. No. 1365/31.10.2007; 2661/29.11.2007; 3616/20.12.2007; 5309/29.01.2008; 5310/ 29.01.2008; 8434/13.03.2008; 11661/08.05.2008; 2183/15.07.2009.

refunding of the vakıf properties⁶⁹⁴; farmers' properties and compensation for the asparagus production⁶⁹⁵; changes in the self-employed persons' insurance systems⁶⁹⁶; usage of 'Turkish' word at the associations⁶⁹⁷; regulation of the property tax for the real estates at the mountainous areas of Ksanthi⁶⁹⁸; permission for the mosque construction⁶⁹⁹; and bill about the appointment of imams⁷⁰⁰. His work in the Greek parliament displays that, he primarily intended to solve the problems regarding minority's education quality. He was threatened to be expelled from the parliament when he said "Western Thrace is an indivisible part of the great Turkish nation" at the funeral of Turkey's former consulate of Athens.⁷⁰¹ More interestingly, his work in the parliament was more effective in his second term of service, when his party PASOK was in power. His parliamentary work stopped after he was expelled from the parliamentary group on February, 2012.

Ahmet (Raif) Hacıosman graduated from Superior Institute of Theology of Marmara University, Istanbul. From 1985 to 1990 he was chief editor of *Hakka Davet*. In 1986 he was elected as alderman at the Komotini municipality. In 1990 national elections he ran with independent ticket with Dr. Sadık Ahmet. He founded the DEB party with him. From 1991 to 2001 he was the President of the School Council of the Mastanlı Minority Elementary School in Komotini. In 1999 he was elected general secretary of the Association of West Thracian Minority Scientists. From 1999 to 2007 he was the president of the Party of Friendship, Equality and Peace, based in Komotini. He was elected in 2002 and 2006 at the Rhodopi Prefecture, and was its vice-prefect from 2002 to 2007, when he was elected to the Hellenic Parliament. Since 2007 elections, Hacıosman has served 4 parliamentary terms (2007, 2009, May 2012, June 2012 elections). As aforementioned, Ahmet Hacıosman has the record among the minority MPs in terms of parliamentary work. He claims that he has more than 500 written interpellations and 30 parliamentary speeches. In his first term at the parliament, he said he gave 300 questions

⁶⁹⁴ Prot. No. 18282/29.04.2009

⁶⁹⁵ Prot.No. 17403/02.06.2011

⁶⁹⁶ 28.07.2011

⁶⁹⁷ Prot. No. 21855/25.08.2011. Regarding EHRC's decision for the case of Ksanthi Turkish Union Association, in which EHRC found Greece guilty for abolishing the activities of the association, Mandacı asked whether Greece is planning to make any changes in its state policy.

⁶⁹⁸ Prot.No.1856/23.11.2011.

⁶⁹⁹ Prot. No.1857/23.11.2011.

⁷⁰⁰ Prot. No. 22768/15.09.2011.

⁷⁰¹ http://www.batitrakyalilar.com/dev/det_haber.asp?id=1542

and made 23 parliamentary speeches within 18 months.⁷⁰² Greek Parliament archive displays that between 2009-2014 (at his second, third and fourth service term), he gave 167 questions and made 19 parliamentary speeches, suggesting that he was more active as MP in his first term, or that he is overestimating the numbers.⁷⁰³ Since 2007- his first parliamentary term- 4 Prime Ministers have changed (Karamanlis; Papandreou; Papadimou; and Samaras), which made Haciosman meet with each Prime Minister and Ministers for the same issue several times. On the other hand, although he is not a lawyer, but a man of religion, he is also known as a law-maker, because he is the first minority MP that managed to legalize his proposal regarding the minority's real estate problems under his party PASOK's rule on 21 March 2012.⁷⁰⁴ The bill was passed from the parliament by the support of PASOK and ND, and it was not a coincidence that it was accepted just 1,5 months before the 6 May 2012 national elections.

In the interview I made with him on 19 April, 2013 in Komotini, he ranked the primary problems of the minority as: education, mufti issue, vakıf issue and identity recognition. Similar to Mandacı, the majority of his parliamentary work took place in the term when his party PASOK was in power (4 October 2009- 6 May 2012) and at the period close to the election dates. He gave written interpellations⁷⁰⁵ which were mostly related to regional problems (85 questions), and mostly interconnected with the problems regarding the agriculture sector (57 questions), followed by general issues of Greece (21 questions). The number of questions concerning the minority community is 23. These questions can be categorized as education⁷⁰⁶; religion⁷⁰⁷; health⁷⁰⁸; stateless members of the minority in Thrace⁷⁰⁹; threats towards the Muslims living in Greece⁷¹⁰; problems for acquiring

⁷⁰² <http://www.azinlikca.net/bati-trakya-haber/ahmet-haciosman-ve-cetin-mandac-bu-secimde-de-iddial.html>

⁷⁰³ Greek Parliament Archive. <http://www.parliament.gr/Koinovouleftikos-Elenchos/Mesa-Koinovouleutikou-Elegxou?type=&SessionPeriod=&partyId=&mpId=6139cdaa-fe6d-4173-806b-3e97e026a727&ministry=&datefrom=&dateto=&pageNo=17>

⁷⁰⁴ Former minority MP İlhan Ahmet claimed that the proposal belonged to him initially. (Birlik Gazetesi/06.09.2013). <http://www.birlikgazetesi.info/haberler/7871-lhan-ahmet-haciosman-halkimizi-kandiriyor.html>

⁷⁰⁵ Greek Parliament Archive. (05.04.2010- 12.02.2014) <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouleftes/Drastiriotita-Voulefti-sto-Koinovouljo/?partyId=1b0dc746-cc77-4035-8f39-914706d07482&MpId=6139cdaa-fe6d-4173-806b-3e97e026a727>

⁷⁰⁶ Prot.No. 5702/27.01.2014; Prot.No. 14137/31.03.2011; Prot.No. 8866/11.01.2011

⁷⁰⁷ Prot. No. 4392/11.29.2013;

⁷⁰⁸ Prot.No. 12687/07.07.2010

⁷⁰⁹ Prot.No. 721/ 28.08.2013; Prot.No. 9791/ 17.04.2013; Prot.No. 4985/11.12.2012; Prot.No.457/12.10.2011; Prot.No. 17559/07.06.2011; Prot.No. 9741/25.01.2011; Prot.No. 8867/11.01.2011

⁷¹⁰ Prot.No. 10958/23.05.2013

licenses⁷¹¹; PEKEM (Cultural Educational Society Minority of Western Thrace)⁷¹²; mosques⁷¹³; cemeteries⁷¹⁴; citizenship applications⁷¹⁵. As it is seen, majority of the written interpellations Haciosman gave are related to stateless people who were expelled from citizenship by the Article 19 of the citizenship law and have not been issued citizenship although the law was abandoned in 1998. Haciosman's parliamentary speeches were mostly on 'election of imams' which was highly discussed in his parliamentary term during the "240 Imam Law"; and also he named the problems regarding the minority's education at the parliamentary discussions. Haciosman abstained from using the term "Turkish" in his parliamentary work, but preferred to use "Muslims living in Greece; members of minority; minority of Western Thrace"; and regional references such as Komotini, Macedonia, Rhodopi.

Ahmet Haciosman was re-elected in May 2012 and June 2012 national elections with PASOK ticket. In 2012 parliamentary elections, his party lost substantial percentage of vote, but he managed to sustain his vote share. In both May and June 2012 elections, minority succeeded in sending 3 minority representatives to the parliament -after 16 years since 1996- 1 from center-left PASOK and 2 (Ayhan Karayusuf- Rhodopi; and Hüseyin Zeybek- Ksanthi) from radical-left SYRIZA, which for the first time put an ideological difference between the minority deputies serving in the parliament. This difference can also be seen in the topics of their written interpellations.

6 May 2012 and 17 June 2012 Parliamentary Elections

The period between 2004 and 2012 indicates instability in Greek politics as there have been 5 national elections in 8 years, none of the governments completed their 4 years of service. The number of parties in the parliament increased upto 7, major parties PASOK and ND lost power and failed to establish single-party government most of the time. Radical left and radical right –even fascist parties like Golden Dawn- entered the parliament. Center-right party ND could not succeed in attracting minority votes since 2004, and there were no minority MPs from ND since İlhan Ahmet, suggesting that minority lost its trust to the rightist parties that continued their discriminatory behavior

⁷¹¹ Prot.No. 9074/04.02.2013; Prot.No.457/12.10.2011

⁷¹² Prot.No. 8848/26.03.2013

⁷¹³ Prot.No. 4038/16.11.2012; Prot.No. 102/04.10.2011; 1314/ 26.09.2011; Prot.No. 9742/25.01.2011;

⁷¹⁴ Prot.No. 6704/14.03.2012

⁷¹⁵ Prot.No. 22299/06.09.2011; Prot.No. 21763/06.09.2011; Prot.No. 21632/23.08.2011;

against the community and ignored their identity. This created a tendency towards the leftist parties who approach the minority issue within human rights framework rather than seeing it as a national threat. Because early elections were called just 1 month after the May 2012 elections, according to the Greek Electoral Law closed list PR electoral system was applied in the June 2012 elections instead of the open-list PR system.

6 May 2012 and 17 June 2012 election results were a victory for the minority community that managed to send 3 MPs to the parliament after 16 years. Moreover, it was a huge disappointment for major parties such as Evangelos Venizelos' PASOK and Antonios Samaras' ND who were punished by the Greek public due to the economic crisis and the parties gained 13,18% and 18,85% of votes respectively (PASOK got 43.94% and ND got 33.49% of votes in 2009 elections). None of the parties got more than 20% of the votes. Unitary Social Front/ SYRIZA made a huge surprise under its young leader Alexis Tsipras and became the second party with 16,79% of votes (it was 4.6% in 2009 elections) and pushed PASOK to the third position. Independent Greeks got 10,62%; KKE gained a similar vote share with %8.48; the new ultra-nationalist party Golden Dawn (Chrysi Avgi) benefited from the economic crisis and issue of immigrant with 6,97% votes and DIMAR (Democratic Left) received 6,11% of the votes. So, the 2012 elections yielded a highly fragmented parliament.

According to the 6 May 2012 elections 3 minority MPs got seats in the parliament: from Rhodopi Ahmet Haciosman (PASOK) for the 3rd time with the highest vote share- 10,681 votes; dentist Ayhan Karayusuf (SYRIZA) with 2,866 votes; and from Ksanthi pharmacist Hüseyin Zeybek (SYRIZA) with 9,775 votes. Although İlhan Ahmet got around 10,000 votes in Rhodopi for his party DISI, because his party could not pass the 3% electoral threshold, Ayhan Karayusuf got his seat. After the elections Zeybek stated "the major parties which came to power postponed minority problems continuously. We demand minority's properties to be returned back and the elections of mufti to be applied as determined in the Lausanne Treaty. It was our party [SYRIZA] which stated the most realistic and concrete suggestions for the solution to Turkish minority's problems".⁷¹⁶ In Ksanthi due to Zeybek's success, SYRIZA became the first party, ND was the second with a minor difference, and PASOK came as the third party –which was the first party in

⁷¹⁶<http://www.batitrakya.org/bati-trakya/bati-trakya-haber/bati-trakya-turk-azinliginin-basarisi-3-milletvekili-secildi.html>

2009 elections-. In Rhodopi, PASOK became the first party, again mainly due to Haciosman's success, ND ranked as the second and Dora Bakoyannis' DISI (Coalition of Left) became the third party- again due to Ahmet İlhan's large number of votes. The results suggest that, minority and majority in general punished the major parties and center two parties –PASOK and ND- paid the price for the economic crisis. Even though the party that wins the elections gets extra 50 seats in the parliament, the party fragmentation in the parliament prevented to form a government. With only 108 seats in the parliament, Samaras could not form the government when SYRIZA and PASOK refused to join his coalition government, and early elections were announced to be held in June 2012.

In the 17 June 2012 national elections close-list PR system was implemented. To secure their seats, PASOK and SYRIZA nominated the minority MPs who were elected in 6 May 2012 elections from the first rank. In June 2012 elections, ND increased its vote share to %29,66 one became the first party, and got the extra 50 seats. ND was followed by SYRIZA who got an unexpected victory with 26,89% of the votes and gained 71 seats in the parliament. PASOK lost 1% more votes and got 33 seats in the parliament with 12,28% of votes. Independent Greeks got 20 seats with 7,51% of the votes. The ultra-nationalist Golden Dawn remained its vote share with 6,92%; Democratic Left Party (DIMAR) passed the threshold and got 17 seats with 6,25% and KKE's votes dropped to 4,5% which brought the party 12 seats in the parliament.⁷¹⁷ Hence the electoral results were similar to 6 May elections, where again 7 parties entered the parliament, major parties lacked the number of seats to form a single-party government, radical left and radical right parties' vote share was higher than the center-left and center-right parties. However, this time considering the national interest, political stability and urgent solutions required for economic problems, parties managed to form a coalition government. On 20 June, a new unity government (comprising ND, PASOK and DIMAR) was formed for a planned 4 year term, with Samaras appointed to be the new Prime Minister.

The minority community repeated its victory that it achieved in 6 May 2012 elections and send 3 MPs to the parliament again. In Rhodopi ND became the first party with Evripidis

⁷¹⁷<http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/To-Politevma/Ekloges/Eklogika-apotelesmata-New/#Per-14>

Stilyanidis who got 18,890 votes; followed by PASOK's candidate Ahmet Haciosman with 14,221 votes; and SYRIZA's dentist candidate Ayhan Karayusuf got the 3rd seat with 13,676 votes. İlhan Ahmet gained 12,283 votes for his party DISI but his party could not pass the threshold again and he got fewer votes than Karayusuf and could not be elected. Yet even though it was clear that DISI would not be able to pass the electoral threshold, people voted for İlhan Ahmet, showing that minority usually votes for the people rather than parties and ideologies. In Ksanthi, SYRIZA got the highest percentage of votes nation-wide as its candidate pharmacist Hüseyin Zeybek got a record number of votes with 24,962 (38,56% of the total votes) and made his party the first party in the district. He was followed by ND candidate Alexandros Kontos who got 17,124 votes and PASOK candidate Dimistris Salturos got the 3rd seat from Ksanthi with 6,308 votes. Interestingly, KKE got the lowest percentage of votes in Rhodopi with only 1,93%, suggesting that its votes mainly went to SYRIZA, which had a high possibility for coming to power. In general the 2012 elections indicated the discontent and mistrust of the Greek nation to politics, as the voter turnout was 65% in 6 May 2012 elections and reduced to 62,47% in 17 June 2012 elections. (*Birlik Gazetesi*/22.06.2012).

Work in the Parliament

2012 parliamentary term seems to be a chance for the minority where they had 3 effective MPs in the parliament. On the other hand, there are some obstacles for them to solve the long-standing problems of the minority. First, Haciosman is a MP from the coalition party PASOK, where Karayusuf and Zeybek are MPs of the main opposition party SYRIZA. Secondly, in the parliament the existence of ultra-nationalist- even fascist party- Golden Dawn prevents them from naming the problems of the minority in the parliamentary speeches where the issue all the time is regarded as Turkish-Greek relations and their loyalty to Greece is questioned. Thirdly, Greece is into a deep economic crisis and national issues are credited priority over minority rights and even human rights. Fourthly, and most importantly, there is ideological difference between the minority representatives where SYRIZA MPs are more communist oriented and the priority of the minority problems are not similar to those of PASOK MPs.

Yet, all 3 Muslim MPs beside their active work in the parliament are also members of 2 Committees and participate in 3 different international organizations of the Greek

Parliament.⁷¹⁸ Ahmet Haciosman is a member of Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs; and Committee on Social Affairs and participates in Greece- Azerbaijan; Greece-USA and Greece- Japan Friendship Groups. Ayhan Karayusuf is a member of Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs and Committee on Research and Technology, while he also participates in Friendship Groups for Greece- Azerbaijan; Greece- Germany and Greece- Czech Republic. Hüseyin Zeybek is a member of Committee on Economic Affairs and Committee on Research and Technology. He participates in the Friendship Groups related to Greece's international relations with Cuba; Bosnia; and Kuwait. Considering the Turkish origin of these MPs, and their close connection with Turkey, one would ask why they have not participated in Greece- Turkey Friendship Group? Despite the good terms between these two countries since 1999, in the Greek Parliament, there is no friendship group for Greece-Turkey relations.

Ayhan (Memet) Karayusuf graduated from Istanbul University Faculty of Dentistry in 1988. In 1995, he served as the secretary general of the Western Thrace Minority University Graduates Association, and between 1996 and 1999 as a member of the board of the Dentists Association of Rhodopi. When he returned to Greece, he became a member of Synaspismos in 1993. SYRIZA Party Rhodopi minority deputy Ayhan Karayusuf is again one of the most effective minority MPs in the parliament. He gave 204 written interpellations (25.01.2013- 12.03.2014) and took the floor 6 times in the parliamentary discussions (07.12.2012- 05.02.2014). Considering that the leader of the main opposition party Alexis Tsipras gave 296 written interpellations, Karayusuf put an important effort as an opposition MP as well. Karayusuf has been working at radical left Synaspismos party for a long time, and he managed to be elected at his first nomination from the party list. When I asked in our interview (20 April 2013) to rank the priority of the minority problems he said “economic poverty; identity; mufti issue; education; and unemployment”. He supports “human-centered” governance for the minority question. He separated his way from the communist groups and supported the fraction, which is supporting EU and aiming to make a balance between USA and SU. His party SYRIZA is supporting the abolishment of 3% national and regional threshold for the elections. Karayusuf stated in the interview that it is difficult to motivate people through political consciousness, and there are certain factors that mobilize minority's vote: party's

⁷¹⁸ Greek Parliament, Parliamentary Committees: <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Koinovouleftikes-Epitropes/Katigories/>.

possibility for coming to power; Turkish candidate at the first ranks; the Turkish candidates' possibility for election; and popularity of the candidate – to be a person who is loved. In his success for election, all these factors were combined. Karayusuf seems to benefit from his party's position as the main opposition in the parliament, and named the problems of Greek nation and minority in the parliament.

Even though for the issues regarding the minority, minority MPs work in hand to hand, his written interpellations display Karayusuf's ideological inclination. Compared to PASOK MP Haciosman, Karayusuf's work in the parliament focuses mostly on general issues regarding the whole Greek nation (71 questions). Among these questions, most of them are related to social services such as health sector and conditions of workers. In total, he gave 46 questions concerning the education field, but only 4 of them were related to the Muslim minority⁷¹⁹. He has not asked any questions about the religion, mosques, vakfs and mufti issues. The only question he gave about the minority except education area is a request of the Muslims of Macedonia/Thrace to create landfill for the Muslims in the city, Salonica⁷²⁰ and this interpellation was signed by 9 Syriza MPs including Hüseyin Zeybek as well. Karayusuf also presents his parliamentary and party activities in a report called *Saylav* which is published once in every 6 months.

SYRIZA Party's Ksanthi MP Hüseyin (Hasan) Zeybek, who is a pharmacist, comes from a politician family. His grandfather Hüseyin Zeybek was a minority MP in 1946 parliamentary term from the Labor and Peasant Party, and his uncle Celâl Zeybek was a MP from ND for 1977 parliamentary term. His uncle was a pioneer of independent candidates and inspired Sadık Ahmet and Faikoğlu for their struggle. Hüseyin Zeybek was involved in the youth branch of Synaspismos in his early ages, yet similar to his politician relatives he was a Kemalist. In our interview (21 April 2013) Hüseyin defines his identity as “minority and Greek”. He is a partisan believing in socialist ideology; however he defined “minority issue” as his red line. Hüseyin Zeybek in our interview stated that SYRIZA has a positive positioning against the ban on using the term “Turkish” for the minority associations. Zeybek says his party accepts the Turkish identity. He ranks the priority of minority issues as “education, mufti problem, administration of vakfs, and national identity”. He said the main problem is “there is no institution to train teachers

⁷¹⁹ Prot.No. 6761/ 06.03.2014; Prot.No. 4902/16.12.2013; Prot.No. 12564/ 04.07.2013; Prot.No. 8918/27.03.2013.

⁷²⁰ Prot.No. 8509/ 14.03.2013.

for the minority education, and the graduated teachers have not been appointed”. Because of these problems and the division between modern and traditional schools, minority children prefer to go to Greek schools. In terms of administration of the vakfs, Zeybek criticizes Greek policy for appointing the administrative officers and for not making elections as it used to be. Zeybek highlighted the issue that the unemployment increased to 30% in Western Thrace, and it is 50% within the minority community for 25-30 age group, and SYRIZA is trying to find a solution to that with its socialist policies such as demanding “cleaning of majority of Greece’s debt to EU; statist economy for electricity and water”.

Hüseyin Zeybek gave 128 written interpellations during his service in the parliament (30.07.2012-10.03.2014) and took the floor 7 times (15.01.2013- 20.12.2013). Similar to Karayusuf, the majority of his questions are related to general issues (82 questions) concerning the whole Greek nation, especially on social services areas. He gave 22 questions for the issues concerning the region he is representing, and 12 questions about the farmers’ problems. Among his 12 questions regarding education problems, only 5 of them were related to the minority community⁷²¹. Similar to Karayusuf, he has not asked any questions about the religion, mosques, vakfs and mufti issues. The only question he gave about the minority except education area is a request of the Muslims of Macedonia/Thrace to create landfill for Muslims in the city, Salonica⁷²² and this interpellation was signed by 9 Syriza MPs including Ayhan Karayusuf. Zeybek believes that if a MP cannot get the support of his party, he can not be successful. Both Karayusuf and Zeybek took the floor in the parliament to criticize the “240 Imam Law”.

In conclusion, I believe the main reason SYRIZA MPs name minority issues less in the parliament is their ideological orientation, where they mobilized Christian voters as well. In our interview, Ilhan Ahmet criticized Karayusuf for visiting the appointed mufti and recognizing Greece’s policy. For Karayusuf who is communist, religious institutions might not matter, and minority’s problems regarding unemployment and education are priorities. Both Karayusuf and Zeybek position Haciosman’ party PASOK as rightist party (right of social democrats). Ideologically based voting is in low percentage among

⁷²¹ Prot.No. 4902/16.12.2013; Prot. No. 55/372/31.07.2013; Prot. No. 12564/04.07.2013; Prot.No. 12285/26.06.2013; Prot.No. 8918/27.03.2013.

⁷²² Prot.No. 8509/ 14.03.2013.

the minority, and minority usually votes to the persons they trust rather than a party-identification motivation. Although both Karayusuf and Zeybek support the electoral campaigning “Turk’s vote is to Turks”, and 19,000 votes came from Turkish voters for Zeybek for his total 25,000 votes, they believe in their party leader and they believe with their party’s support they can find a more long-standing solution to the minority problems, which is based on a “human-centered” approach. Karayusuf said in our interview, to discuss the issues regarding the minority with the party leader might not bring solutions, as there are commissions in the party focusing on human rights and minority rights, and he is active at Western Thrace Muslim minority commission of the party [he said he hopes one day it will be named as “Western Thrace Muslim Turkish minority” commission, as “to say I am Turkish” should not be a problem for Greece]. Karayusuf and Zeybek prefer to give written interpellations by discussing with their party colleagues, and make the Christian MPs sign the interpellation as well. Karayusuf said he and Zeybek explained to their party leader and MPs why this bill should not be approved, and the other 69 SYRIZA MPs voted against the “240 Imam Law”.

On the other hand, Haciosman is working individually for the minority issue in his party. His party PASOK was one of the parties that approved “240 Imam Law”, which stated that a council composed of 3 Christians and 2 Muslim clergyman will appoint the imams in Greece”. Haciosman voted against this law. The Law passed with the support of ND, PASOK, Independents and Golden Dawn. SYRIZA MPs and leftist parties rejected the bill. Beside the ideological difference of the minority MPs and their approach to the minority issues, the existence of ultra-nationalist Golden Dawn in the parliament creates an obstacle for the minority representatives to bring the minority issues to the parliament. On the other hand, SYRIZA MPs reacted to Golden Dawn MPs attacks to Haciosman when he was accused of being a “Turkish agent” during the discussion in the parliament (15.01.2013). In general, the parliamentary work of the Muslim Turkish MPs in the period 2007-2012 suggest that, minority MPs can be more effective in the parliament when they get seats from a left-oriented party which is in power.

5.6 Concluding Remarks

In general, this chapter shows parliamentary representation of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace has a different character than the political representation of Roum community in Turkey. Comparing of the influence of electoral systems on the political

representation, it is observed that the alternation from plurality system to proportional representation system – and vice versa- does not directly change the number of minority deputies in the Greek Parliament. On the other hand, the difference between the implementation of open-list system and close-list system directly affects the political strategy of the minority community. Open-list system functions as the optimum electoral system for the Muslim-Turkish minority, as it enables them to enforce their numerical power; increases the connection between the electorate and representatives; and makes ‘localism’ an important factor. In this system, the major parties cannot risk not nominating any Muslim candidate. On the other hand, open-list system also accelerates competition between the Muslim candidates, such that fragmentation of the votes causes them to lose their seats from time to time. In the years when close-list system was applied (1985 elections) the major parties abstained from nominating the Muslim candidates in the first rank – to avoid losing Christian votes- and this forced the Muslim community to create new strategies such as running with independent ticket (1989/1990 elections). Hence, close-list system increases the tension between the minority and majority in Greek society. Due to the 3% national threshold- which was implemented with 1990 electoral law- minority community can be represented only within the Greek parties, since the election of independent MPs has become impossible. In terms of the party system, it is observed that the minority generally votes for the center-parties. The dominance of center-right parties in Western Thrace seems to have diminished since 2004, when minority began to prefer center-left and far-left parties. It should be noted that, minority deputies are more effective when they get the ticket from the same party, which is the incumbent party, and mainly a center-left or far-left party.

For the effectiveness of the minority representatives, the chapter demonstrates that the number of the deputies is insufficient to explain the level of effectiveness. It is observed that until 1977, the number of Muslim MPs in the parliament was 3-4 in average, whereas they were totally ineffective, as they did not do any work in the parliament. After 1977, although the number of minority MPs in the parliament decreased, as they were better educated and had a better command of Greek, they managed to name the problems of the minority community in the parliament, and after late 1980s, they succeeded in the internationalization of the minority issue.

CONCLUSION

The theoretical foundation of the thesis is based on Fredrik Barth's work asserting that "ethnic identities are not primordial and they are socially constructed through the competition of the groups for the distribution of resources", which suggests that political representation of the minorities are also socially constructed through the dynamics of the society that the minorities live in. In order to understand the political factors that influenced the possibility of political representation of the minorities, the study utilized the macro-level and micro-level factors that are given in Karen Bird's article. While macro-level factors are related to political system of the home-countries; features of the relevant minority community determine micro-level factors (given in Chapter 3). These factors for the political representation of Muslim Turkish minority in Western Thrace and of the Rourm minority in Turkey has been analyzed in Chapter 5 and 4 respectively. To understand the influence of these factors, a comparison between the Turkish and Rourm minority with respect to their political representation is needed.

As micro-level factors, Karen Bird emphasized the effects of group size; spatial concentration; participation in ethnic associational life; political cohesiveness and mobilization; educational attainment and language skills; and length of residency in host country. Beside these factors, for this comparative study, I added two additional factors: localism and political cleavages within the minority. As macro-level factors, beside the factors Karen Bird suggested such as effects of electoral rules; candidate nomination and selection processes; and party competition; I added reciprocity rule and regime type.

The findings of this thesis support Frederik Barth's theory by displaying that even though these two communities are recognized as minority, and bounded with reciprocity rule, and even though there was a numerical balance between them, their political representation and effectiveness of this representation differs according to the social and political

dynamics of the societies they are living in. Their ethnic boundaries are shaped through their interaction with the other groups in the society. Through this process, they determine and change their political participation strategies.

Referring to Karen Bird's study, this thesis reveals that in general micro-level and macro-level factors matter for the political representation of the Greek-Orthodox and Muslim-Turkish minority. On the other hand, the findings also contradict some of the assumptions. As Table 4 displays, groups size and localism matter for the election of the minority MPs, while in contrast to Bird's work, although language skills is not a requirement for the election of the Muslim MPs in Greece, it increases their effectiveness in the Parliament.

The group size- around 100,000- and spatial concentration of the minority in Western Thrace showed that they have the political power to elect an independent MP to the Greek parliament- before the electoral change in 1990 that implemented 3% national threshold-. Until 1946, Rourm MPs also served as independent deputies; however the People's Republican Party determined them. After 1964 as the population of Rourm community drastically reduced, election of the independent Rourm MP is impossible if the candidate does not take the majority support and also considering the 10% national threshold implemented since 1980. In terms of group size, Rourm population from 1927 to 1946 reduced from 15% to 10% of the total population of Istanbul. After 1964, they only composed 3% of Istanbul's total population, and today it is 0,03%, which is too low to be ignored in terms of electoral support. In terms of number of votes, even the Rourm community has an ethnic block vote, it does not have a significant influence on the result of the elections. Whereas, since the population exchange, Muslim vote in Western Thrace composes 1/3 of the total population, which increases when electoral power only in Rhodopi and Ksanthi are considered. The candidate and party preference of the Muslim minority directly changes the result of the elections, especially at the local-level. Mobilizing the minority votes with the right candidate would bring a definite seat in the parliament, especially in Komotini. The small parties in Greece need minority support to pass the threshold and sustain a seat in the parliament. The electoral power of the Muslim minority make it very complicated for the Greek parties, like a problem of 'game theory'. Such that even though the Greek parties discussed it in 1974 and in 1990 not to nominate a Muslim candidate, they could not venture the risk of losing the seat to their rivals who

would cheat and nominate a minority candidate.

The thesis added 'localism' as a micro-level factor to test and compare for these two communities. For the two communities, the main divergence emerges from the "locality" of the minority representatives. In Turkey the minority deputies between the years 1923-1946 (during one party rule) were nominated and elected from the provinces different than their place of birth or place of residence. After the transition to democracy, as politics became more competitive in Turkey locality of the minority representatives increased, however it was not as limited as we have observed in Western Thrace. Greek state provides the rights as a 'territorial minority rights', where minority community can benefit from their recognized rights only at Western Thrace. In Greece, there are 144 cities, and 55 electoral districts (including two constituencies in Athens and Salonica). When I searched 'locality' for the general of the country, it is seen that even in the big cities like Athens and Salonica, the MPs are representing the constituency they are born or living in. As the population of the constituency decreases, localism increases in Greek elections. In the profile of the Greek MPs, some even indicated that they are refugees from Asia Minor (Turkey) or from Pontus. This reveals that belonging to a refugee family from Anatolia is a prestigious identity for the Greek MPs. In Turkey, the Turkish MPs usually do not emphasize their family roots. Hence, in comparison to Turkish politics, localism is higher in Greece, mainly due to the electoral system (preference voting PR).

Related to this territorial constraint, Muslim Turkish minority MPs- since 1920- have been nominated and elected only from the district where they were born and registered. They have never been nominated outside Western Thrace. It is so restricted that the locality rule functions even between Komotini and Ksanthi. There are two factors for this high level of locality. First one is institutional, as open-list PR system increases the connection between the candidate and the electorates. On the other hand, the same locality has been observed in other types of electoral systems as well. Second factor is psychological, suggesting the huge cleavage between the majority and minority in the Greek public, where mistrust is very high and it is believed that Muslim minority cannot represent the Christian society. A similar differentiation has not been observed in Turkey even though the mistrust towards the minorities continues. On the other hand, in Western Thrace as the population of Muslims and Christians is almost same, Christian candidates

can also mobilize Muslim voters. Nevertheless, the high level of locality displays that Greek state failed to supply integration of the minority to the society.

Mistrust between majority and minority population in Greece has been reflected on language skills of the minority in general and the representation effectiveness of the minority MPs in the parliament. As it is aforementioned in this chapter, until 1977 the minority MPs had not take the floor in the Greek parliament, although they have been elected since 1920. The main reason for the deprivation of their effectiveness in the parliament is their low command of the Greek language. In general, the minority did not trust to the Greek state. On the other hand, Greek state could not provide the educational attainment of the minority – most of the time deliberately- by supporting the conservative wing in the community and emphasizing the Islamic feature of the group rather than its ethnic or national character. Until 1977, it was not the custom to participate in parliamentary debates for the Turkish-Muslim minority members and they did not leave a mark in the Parliament. The community's trust to minority candidates was the reason for their election for several times even though the Greek political system was not stable. There were cases where the Muslim MPs were elected to the Greek Parliament from Western Thrace for 6 terms between the years 1920-1936, and for 8 terms (1946-1963). Between 1920 and 1936, within 8 national elections, the Muslim minority was represented with 29 seats, but by 16 different MPs. For the period 1946-1967, for 9 national elections the Muslim minority was represented with 27 seats, but only with 8 different MPs. Considering that none of these Muslim MPs took the floor during the service, 'language skills' is not a necessity for the Muslim minority who has a concentrated group size in the Western Thrace. Moreover, this lack of good command in Greek language also increased 'localism' for the minority MPs, as they could not mobilize the Greek people outside of Western Thrace.

On the other hand, it is indicated that since the Ottoman Parliament, Roud deputies had good command of Turkish, as the general of the community. Moreover, Roud community did not have the deep cleavages that we observe in the Muslim minority population. Yet, this does not mean Turkish deputies were ineffective in politics. Most of them have their own newspapers, and had a chance to express their ideas within the community. However their main audience was not the Greek authorities or the Greek population. The minority population according to their religious views votes for the

candidate- not the party- that represents him/her the most. There were competitions for the leadership of the community, or leadership for the modernist and conservative part (especially in the 1940s and 1950s. It is seen that the Greek parties also tried to manipulate this schism to divide the minority votes. In the late 1980s and 1990s, Dr. Sadık Ahmet united the community under his leadership. Such a competition for leadership has not been observed among the Roum community, as the Patriarch is considered the legitimate leader. Yet, those who had even a little proficiency in Greek became prominent figures in the minority community, as these people were the ones who enabled the communication between the Greek authorities and the community. Chapter 5 has demonstrated that the majority of the work minority MPs put their effort was related to ‘education problem’, which shows that they are also aware that the community needs a highly educated young generation with a good level of Greek. Yet, beside the Greek state, which does not make the necessary adjustments to improve the education level of its minority, the community also resists ‘integration’ to the Greek society – living in the other cities outside of Western Thrace or intra-ethnic marriages- will bring the end of the community.

Political cleavage is another micro-level factor added and tested by this study. With the transition to democracy in Greece the schism between the Greek society and long-standing cleavage between modernist/Kemalist and traditionalist/Islamist has diminished. Minority community voted according to this political cleavage rather than the national schism observed in the Greek politics. However, although this cleavage influenced their candidate preference, it does not have an effect on their party choice. The end of political cleavage in the community also influenced the qualifications of the minority MPs, who were composed of clergy, imam, land-owner and merchants before 1974. Following the 1977 national elections, we begin to witness university educated (generally in Turkey) lawyers, doctors, dentists, pharmacists and architects, whose command in Greek was better and who had good connections in Turkey. Beside the institutional changes and historical events the reason that minority community supported the independent candidates in 1989-1990 elections was again their mistrust to the Greek political system. The only factor that has not changed for the political representation of the Muslim minority is, they vote for the person rather than parties or ideologies. The minority candidate should be trusted, and should have large networks in the community. The Greek parties seem to accept this relationship between the minority voters and candidates

therefore they do not look for 'loyalty' either and they try to nominate the minority politicians which are more likely to bring vote to them rather than the candidates that show a high level of loyalty to their parties. It is seen that the minority political figures also look for the party that will provide them the best possibility for election. The lack of partisanship has also been reflected in the political mobilization and cohesiveness.

Political mobilization of the Muslim minority is also different form that of the Greek-Orthodox minority. During the electoral campaign the minority candidates do not make party propaganda, and avoid using party slogans and symbols. They try to explain why the party they are nominated from is the best option for the community, however, they emphasize that they prefer to enforce minority rights within the party, and they avoid making partisanship within the minority community. "Turk's vote is to Turks" is the common slogan for political mobilization during the electoral campaign- especially in Ksanthi where minority also votes for Christian candidates-. On the other hand, the Roum population who has a higher level of education and lives in the urban areas position themselves according to their social status and party loyalty is higher among them compared to Muslim Turkish minority. That's why 'block voting' is in high-degree in Western Thrace. The regular Friday prayer is another tool for political mobilization beside the press. On the other hand, religious institutions and figures such as mufti have not been that effective for political representation and mobilization of the society as the Patriarch in Turkey. The role of the Turkish Consulate in political mobilization is another issue to be emphasized. In his book -Old and New Islam- Tsitselikis states that Turkish Consulate at Komotini is an important institution that mobilizes the community and determines the minority candidates. Even though the minority MPs have connections with the Turkish state and visit the political figures, the Consulate does not have the power to determine the candidates- it is the Greek parties that list them- or mobilizes the community to vote for a single candidate. As Aarbakke asserts, the Consulate informs the Turkish state on the character of the minority politicians- whether close to modernist or conservative wing- however despite the periods of the independent MPs, Turkey has not had a direct influence on the political representation of the Muslim minority.

Participation in ethnic associational life is vivid in both Roum and Muslim minority that enable them to protect their ethnic and religious identity. Yet, there is a difference because the social organization of the Muslim minority was faced with a new situation

when the Muslims ceased to be the ruling element. For the sake of comparison, the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul had long been adjusted to minority life, and had well developed minority institutions which survived more or less intact grouped around their spiritual leader, the Patriarch. On the other hand, participation in the ethnic associational life does not have an influence on the political representation of the minority communities.

In terms of the 'length of residency in host country among ethnic groups' if the Lausanne Treaty has been adopted as the starting date, both minorities has been regarded and accepted as minorities and benefit from the same rights given in the Treaty. Length of residency in contrast to Karen Bird's study, for these two communities is insignificant to determine their political representation. On the other hand, there is a common rhetoric within the Muslim Turkish minority that also finds its reflection on their political behavior. In the interviews I made, and during my research I realized that they use the statement "we were left here" usually which suggests that Turkey as 'the motherland' and party in the Lausanne Treaty should be responsible of community. The people who belong to the Roum community that I made interviewed have a different position. Even though they also make a numerical comparison with the Muslim minority in Western Thrace, they always try to position the minority problem out-of-the Turkish-Greek relations, and perceive the problem as an internal affair. Regarding the fact that the political rights and representation has not been affected by Turkish-Greek relations –as this thesis defends- and the great tension between the countries, choosing to base its political choices on being part of Greek-Turkish relations seems irrational, considering the minority in Istanbul has almost disappeared. On the other hand, lack of political effectiveness, mistrust to Greek authorities and political system are some of the reasons behind the rationale of this rhetoric. Moreover, while Roum community perceives the Lausanne Treaty as the beginning of the tragedy, it is regarded as a constitution by the Muslim minority so that their rights has been determined and protected according to this treaty. As a vicious cycle, Muslim minority's close ties with Turkey –and vice versa- increases the mistrust between the majority and minority population in Greece.

Between the macro-level factors, electoral system and party competition influences the election potential for the minority MPs, whereas regime type is significant to increase their effectiveness in the parliament. Comparison of Roum community and Muslim Turkish minority in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 respectively, displays the fact that political

representation of these groups has not been determined by the 'reciprocity rule'. While 'reciprocity rule' has a negative association for the Roum community, Lausanne Treaty has been perceived as a constitution by the Muslim minority.

In all my interviews, the participants stated that the 'other' minority's conditions are better than their conditions. In contrary, both Greek and Turkish states insist that their minorities are better treated and enjoy more rights than their kin-community living in the 'other' state. Yet, although there is a continuous comparison between the respected communities regarding the protection of their rights, there is no competition or bad-feelings between them. In the interviews I made, all of the participants said they would support political representation of the 'other' minority. On the other hand, none of them support the idea of a 'quota' system, by highlighting a common point: quota system increasing the differences between the minority and the majority would increase the tension. Each member of the society should fight within the political system/game, which is determined by the states. This common response indicates the fact that both majority and minority groups perceived 'political rights' as individual citizenship rights rather than collective rights.

Electoral design and changes in the laws matters for the political representation of the minorities. In Greece, as the Muslim minority is intensively populated in Komotini and Ksanthi, plurality electoral system would be expected to increase their political representation, but to deter this, the state created two enlarged electoral districts in the region of Thrace, one for the prefectures of Ksanthi-Kavala-Drama, and the other for Rhodopi-Evros regions. Hence, there is no electoral district as Komotini where the majority of the population is composed mainly of Muslims. As a result, the electoral constituencies populated heavily by the minority are merged with the ones populated by the majority so as to avoid the possibility of the election of a Turkish governor. In order to cover the discriminatory nature of this implication, the system of enlarged electoral district is also imposed in the prefecture of Athens-Piraeus. However, the electoral system which is open-list proportional representation deters the Greek parties from excluding the minority candidates, as votes are given to the candidates rather than to a close ranked list designed by the party leader. With 1981 census, Rhodopi's seat in the parliament decreased from 4 to 3, which suggests that maximum 2 minority MPs can be elected from the Rhodopi district. In the 1989-1990 elections, in order to diminish the minority's

political power to elect independent MPs, soldiers who were in military service at the neighbor provinces had been brought to Ksanthi and Komotini, and they were registered to vote in the elections. The ballot boxes were not put in the small villages. As a response to this maneuver of the Greek authorities, Turkish authorities put free buses for the Western Thrace Turks living in Turkey and Germany to enable them to vote on the election day. Another important institutional structure regarding the minorities was the reinforcement of electoral colleges for the Muslims in the Thrace and the Jews in Salonika in October 1923 and abolished in 1934. This electoral college was introduced after the massive support of these groups to Anti-Venizelist in the 1920 elections. The implementation of the electoral college enabled to control their votes by separating the minority votes, and granting them a fixed number of mandates.

Other macro-level factors are electoral system; party system; party competition, and party alignment. Each electoral system has pros and cons on the political representation of the minority.⁷²³ As seen in Table 4, the period between 1920-1936 portrays ‘unequal state of political representation’ when these two minority communities are compared. While between 1936-1946, Muslim minority was not represented due to political regime in Greece, both communities display ‘relatively equal political representation’ in the national parliaments. 1961 Founding Parliament remained as the last parliament where Roum minority was represented, however it was not a democratic regime. Since 1963 elections, Greek-Orthodox community is not visible in the Turkish Parliament. Hence the period 1974-2012 is defined as ‘empowering Muslim-Turkish political representation’ by this thesis.

⁷²³For each election in Greece since 1920, the name of the minority MPs, the electoral districts, the party they have been nominated from and the electoral systems are given at Appendix E.

Table 4. Summary of the Findings: Comparison of Political Representation for Roum and Muslim Minority

| Macro & Micro Factors | 1920- 1935* | | 1936-1946 | | 1946- 1964 | | 1974-2012 | |
|--|-------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|--------------------|--|--|---|---|
| | Bad until 1930 | | Good terms | | Good terms until 1955 | | Bad terms until 1999 | |
| Greek-Turkish Relation (good/bad) | Turkey | Greece | Turkey | Greece | Turkey | Greece | Turkey | Greece |
| Population (Minority/Electoral District) | 100.214/ 680,857 (1927) | 102.171/ 303,879 | 95.956 /741,148 (1935) | 112,535/ 355940 | 76.844/ 860,558 (1946) 47,207/ 1.742.978 (1965) | 98.839/ 333,268 | 7.000/ 2.547.364 (1975) 4.300/ 12.782.960 (2010) | 114.000/ 342,265 (1981) |
| Minority's Language Skill | Good | Weak | Good | Weak | Good | Weak | Good | Good |
| Party Competition | No | Two-party | No | No | Multi-party with dominant party | Multi-party | Multi-party | Two-party; Until 2004 then multi-party |
| Regime Type (authoritarian/democracy) | Single-Party | Instable Democracy | Single-Part | Military | Democracy until 1960, 1960-1961 military regime | Democracy until 1967, 1967-1974 junta regime | Illiberal Democracy 1980-1983 military regime | Consolidated democracy |
| Total Number of Elections | 4 | 8 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 9 | 13 | 15 |
| Electoral System | Two-round elections | 4 Plurality + 4 PR | Two-round elections | --- | Plurality with Block-Vote | 7 PR 1 Plurality 1 Mixed | PR with Closed-list | PR with Open list (except 1985 elections) |
| Number of Represented Sessions | 0 | 8 | 3 | 0 | 4+1 Founding Parliament | 9 | 0 | 14 |
| Presence in Parliament (average) | 0 | 3,6 | 2 | 0 | 1,7 | 3 | 0 | 2 |
| Effectiveness in the Parliament (Minority Issue/General) | --- | No | Yes-general issues | --- | Yes-minority issues & general | No | --- | Yes-minority issues & general |

* This period is from 1920 (accession of Western Thrace to Greece) to 1936 (Metaxas regime). For Turkey, 1923 is the first parliament of Turkish Republic.

Between the years 1920-36, from the accession of Western Thrace to Greece until Metaxas regime 8 national elections were conducted: 1920, 1923, 1926, 1928, 1932, 1933, 1935 and 1936; and the electoral system changed several times. For this period, the electoral system's influence on the political representation of the minority is insignificant, as whether the system was PR or majority, or electoral college was/was not implemented, the number of minority MPs in the parliament remained at 4 in average. On the other hand, the electoral system had effects on the party-preferences of the community, as when the system was majority the MPs were elected from a single party, but when it proportional representation minority seats were distributed between two major parties. Regarding the party the minority MPs were elected within this period, it is seen that party alignment was high in favor of Eleftherios Venizelos' Liberal Party until his exile to Paris in 1935. As a result it was not unusual to change their loyalties, because the aim of the minority (as a whole) was to achieve a degree of representation to the central authorities and that could be managed by siding with the Greek political party in power. For example, it looks strange that in post-1923 period the minority favors the Liberal Party, which was the party of Venizelos, who was the champion of the Great Idea. However, that was the main party in power and Muslim candidates had greater chances to be elected through the liberal ranks, as well as to achieve a greater degree of influence over minority affairs. If you belong to the party in government you are more likely to promote your issues. Similarly in 1934 when the people's party gains the upper hand, the minority switches towards their side. In general, whether their deputies are effective or not in the parliament, political representation is very significant for the minority community, where party alignment can be sacrificed.

This fact also indicates that despite the deep schism in the minority community, they did not reflect their differences in their party preferences but only display it through the candidate preferences. Two moderate traditionalists could be nominated and elected from the different parties. For the benefit of minority, the different groups did not hesitate to unite or collaborate. Political leaders in Western Thrace also managed to manipulate the instable political atmosphere in Greece and benefit from the high competitiveness between the parties. As a result, the party loyalty was not high for the minority MPs, as it is seen same minority MPs could be elected from different parties. Another interesting point is that, except the 1920 elections, the minority MPs were mainly elected from the party that won the elections.

For the Roum MPs, same with the other minority groups in Turkey, they have not been represented in the Turkish Parliament until 1935 elections. The decision regarding the minority members to enter the Parliament was given by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and 1935 parliament was crucial as it was the first time female deputies got seat in the assembly. It was a two-round election system, where the voters elected the notables who would elect the deputies. Interestingly, all of the Roum and also Armenian and Jewish MPs were elected as independent deputies. This preference shows that the minority MPs were not party members. Moreover, the number of minority population was sufficient to elect an independent candidate. Another common issue for the minority MPs until 1946 was the fact that they all had Turkish surnames.

In terms of party alignment, the Muslim community continued to support the old established parties until they totally lost power in 1950s. In a “polarized multiparty” system of Greece during the first 5 years of 1950s, this was a rational preference, as Muslim minority always has been supported by the state. The disdain to communism is a common point for the minority MPs and the community, which we also observe in their support to the rightist parties in general- until 1996. With the rise of PASOK in 1981, center-left parties began to mobilize minority votes.

With the transition to multi-party system in Turkey in 1946, Roum deputies were elected with RPP ticket, and Jewish MPs got DP ticket. This shows that despite the 1942 Wealth Tax implementation, the Roum community voted for RPP. After 1950 elections until 1961 Founding Parliament, all of the minority deputies were elected from DP. Competition between the Turkish parties increased the number of minority MPs in the Turkish Parliament, where DP nominated many minority candidates to mobilize minority votes. Here, “Block-Vote” plurality electoral system enabled the minority candidates to be elected in the Parliament, as DP dominated the politics until 1960 military coup. Since 1961 Founding Parliament, Roum community has not been represented in the parliament. Although, the drastically reduction in their population is given as the reason for that, the fact that other minority communities are also deprived of political representation signifies that this is a ‘state policy’ more than an institutional constraint. On the other hand, it should be noted that ‘close-list PR electoral system’ as an institutional setting would work in favor of the minorities, if any Turkish party nominates a minority candidate on the first

ranks of their lists.

Since 1974, Greece has been enforcing the open-list reinforced proportional representation system (except 1985 and June 2012 elections) that favors the major parties in the second and third distributions of the seats, and gives extra seats to the winner party (40 seats in 2007 and 2009 elections, increased to 50 seats in 2012 elections), all aim to maintain political stability, which is crucial for this society which has experienced many military coups. As aforementioned, the minority MPs should have large networks in the community and should be trusted by them. Preference voting system increases the connection between the candidate and the voters, such that if a party –even has a high change for winning the elections- nominates a candidate which is not liked by the community or known to be a Greek agent, that candidate would not be preferred and cause the party to lose a seat in the parliament. On the other hand, as a negative effect of the open-list system, it also increases the competition between the Muslim candidates in mobilizing the minority votes as well. Hence Greek parties try to decrease the chance of minority candidates by nominating more than one Muslim candidate, and dividing the Muslim vote, which in some periods has caused non-representation of the minority in Ksanthi (1974, 1981, 1989, 2000, 2004 elections).

The influence of the electoral system changes is more obvious for the term 1974-2013. The idea of running with the independent ticket emerged within the minority in 1985, in 1989 parliamentary elections, first time minority votes were mobilized for the election of the independent MP. In the 1989-1990 elections all minority MPs were elected with independent list tickets. This political participation method continued until Greek state found a solution of implementing a 3% national threshold for the smallest parties and independent candidates, which closed the way for the independent votes. Yet, despite the 3% threshold it became impossible for a single party to get enough vote shares to form a single-party government, and in 2007 it was decided to give extra 40 seats to the winner party. 2012 elections displayed that the electoral system changes do not guarantee a single-party government as the number of small parties and extreme left and right parties in the parliament increased. In general, although the comparison of plurality system to PR system does not give sufficient difference, the thesis shows that ‘open-list preference voting PR’ is better for the Muslim community compared to ‘close-list PR’ regarding their political representation.

In terms of party system, Appendix E shows that the number of Muslim minority MPs in the parliament decreases when there is a two-party system. The number of Muslim MPs increases to 3 only in the periods when far-left parties manage to get minority votes- as seen in 1996 and 2012 elections. The comparison between the periods reveals that party alignment has changed within the Muslim community. Until 1981, they were mostly voting for the center-right parties. Since 2004 elections, the center-right party New Democracy could not get a seat with the minority votes. The latest elections show that the minority began to vote for center-left and far-left parties. In contrast, for the Rourm population the effectiveness of their MPs increased when there was a multi-party system with a dominant party that nominates the minority candidates in the first ranks in a close-list electorate system or in majority system (block-vote for the Turkish case during 1946-1960).

Another important focus of the thesis is the effectiveness of political representation in the parliament. For the effectiveness of the Muslim minority MPs, as aforementioned it increased after 1977 when the features of the minority candidates altered. They began to give questions in the parliament, and to struggle within the political game. Yet, the effectiveness of the Muslim MPs brought a new dilemma for them. If they mention the problems of the minority community too much in the parliament they lose their chance for re-nomination in the next elections. If they do not work in the parliament for the benefit of the minority community, they lose their chance for mobilizing the minority votes for the next elections. That's why in contrast to the Rourm MPs, Turkish deputies make more ambiguous electoral campaigns, and they avoid declaring their loyalty to the Greek state or to the party in their parliamentary speeches. MPs of the radical-left parties have a higher chance for effectiveness, as they regard the minority issue in terms of 'human rights and social equality' and manage to get the support of the other party members. In the Greek Parliament, the minority MPs usually use the word "minority, Western Thrace minority, the region" rather than using the ethnic origin of the community. On the other hand, Rourm and other minority MPs in the Turkish Parliament, although there were some slight reactions, referred the community they represented as "Rourm, Armenian or Jewish community; minority". Consequently, Turkish MPs usually express the issues regarding the 'educational problems' rather than 'identity or mufti election problem' which they believe Greek parties and other Christian MPs would

support as well.

To break off this chain, independent MPs election was important, as they were also independent from party oppression. The term ‘Turkish Muslim minority of Western Thrace’ was used first time in the Greek Parliament by an independent minority MP. However, the study showed that independent MPs were treated as the agents of Turkey, and it is understood that without the political will of the Greek parties a solution to the minority problems does not seem possible. Until now, the most valid positive implementations regarding the minority problems have been achieved in the period of 2009-2012 when two minority MPs were elected from the incumbent party (center-left PASOK) suggesting that the voting strategy of the minority – preferring the candidate nominated from the party which will win the election- is the most rational choice. Hence, minority MPs’ work in the parliament is more effective when they are elected with a party ticket (especially from the party in power) rather than with an independent ticket.

Based on the findings of the thesis, the seven arguments given (in Introduction) are analyzed. The findings assert first, ethnic identities of respective minorities are shaped by structural constraints (macro-level and micro-level factors), rather than intrinsic variables. Urban-rural difference and language skills created different results in shaping of their ethnic boundaries. These differences also determined their political behavior. Rour community has been integrated with the Turkish society in a higher level compared to the Muslim-Turkish minority of Greece. Here, the number of the population is an insignificant factor, as Rour community has a better command in the official language of the state they live in. The higher tension between the Greek community/state and Muslim minority who were from Turkish origin created a closed community, which despite their numerical power and territorial concentration rejects integration. Compared to Komotini, in Ksanthi where the population of minority is smaller and where the mode of production is trading more than agriculture, number of Muslims who speak Greek is higher, and more integration is observed. Nevertheless, comparison of the Turkish minority in Greece with the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Kosovo would better show the influence of the hosting society on the construction of the ethnic identity.

Second, the study displayed that ‘reciprocity rule’ has been implemented in especially in educational, cultural, economic and social field – both positively in the periods of

rapprochement and negatively in the tension times- however, political rights and political representation have been independent from the ‘reciprocity rule. Thirdly, the relations between Greece and Turkey do not influence the political representation of these communities. The thesis showed that even in the periods when Greco-Turkish relations were friendly, there has never been an attempt or demand for the political representation of the respective minority. Similarly, the bad terms between the states have never influenced the political representation of the communities. On the other hand, it is observed that Greece used to support alternately the Kemalist or religious education among the Muslim minority depending on its relationship with Turkey. Similarly, the power of modernists and Islamists, the party’s nomination of the candidates altered according to this balance. Hence, Greek-Turkish relations not directly, however, indirectly influences the political representation of the minority. Forth, ‘reciprocity rule’ has not been applied in political sphere and Greco-Turkish relations do not influence the political rights; due to several factors. These are legal issues; lack of political will; mutual mistrust; and problems in negotiations. Political rights have been perceived as ‘individual rights’ granted equally to all citizens of the states, rather than ‘collective rights’, whereas economic, social and cultural rights are granted as collective rights. Although bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey have no direct influence on the political rights of the minorities, especially Muslim-Turkish side has a tradition to enforce Turkey as the guarantor of their political rights. They closely follow the political situation in Turkey, and the changes in the Turkish political dynamics have an influence on their leaders’ positioning.

Fifth, the thesis indicated that although group size matters, the difference of political representation of the Greek- Orthodox minority in Turkey has not been mainly determined by their population size. The population of the Greek-Orthodox community has not changed between 1923-1935, they gained their political representation only after 1935 elections, and this was with the order of Mustafa Kemal – not with an electoral system change as well- showing ‘political will’ and party’s attitudes are very important for the political representation. Hence, even today the difference of political representation between the two communities has been originated mainly due to their population size; the political system in Turkey (close-list PR electoral system and multi-party system with a dominant party) in fact has the optimum capacity for political representation of the Roum community, if the Turkish parties nominates the community

members in their lists at the upper ranks. However, for the Muslim-Turkish minority case, even time to time the Greek parties mentioned they would prefer not to nominate any Muslim candidate, the numerical size and territorial density of the population provides such a political power to the community that the Greek parties cannot risk to lose seat to their rivals who nominate and get the whole Muslim votes. Greek parties nominated Muslim candidates in their lists even when they did not have a good command of Greek. Hence, when Muslim minority was lacking the language skills, their group size prevented them to be deprived of political representation.

To the sixth argument questioning whether the international conjecture, mainly the accession process of Turkey to EU influences the political representation of these communities, the thesis emphasized that even after the beginning of the accession process of Turkey to EU positive steps have been taken by the Turkish state regarding its minorities in social, cultural and economic fields, minority members have not been nominated by any Turkish party – nor by the incumbent JDP either-. Mainly, problems regarding the minority communities of both Greece and Turkey still remain. The fact that Greece is a member of EU since 1981, but continues to ignore the problems of its Muslim minority suggests that EU membership does not directly guarantee improvement of the minority's conditions, or political representation. It is observed that political representation of the minority increases the internationalization of the minority problems; however not the visa versa. Although international institutions do not have a direct influence on the political representation of the minorities, for this two communities it can be said that Turkey's accession to the EU would diminish the implementation of 'reciprocity rule' in all aspects of life.

The seventh argument questioning the effectiveness of the minority MPs' work in the parliament and party-identification of the communities are one of the main contributions of this thesis to the literature. It is indicated that Rourm MPs, especially after the transition to democracy were effective in the Turkish Parliament in naming the problems of their representative group. Again, after the transition to democracy, party identification was high among them and they mainly supported DP. Chapter 5 emphasized an interesting point for the Muslim MPs such that they did not take the floor in the Greek Parliament until 1977, and they were ineffective politically. After 1974, even though the number of Muslim MPs in the parliament decreased, their effectiveness has increased. Effectiveness

of the minority MPs in the parliament is not directly determined by the size of neither the community nor their electoral power. Moreover, in general, party-identification has not developed within the Muslim community, they usually vote for the person rather than for a certain party or ideology.

In conclusion, although the thesis displayed that Turkish-Greek relations does not influence the political representation of the respective minorities, especially parliamentary elections in Greece displayed that both Greece and Turkey are basically handling the minority as a bilateral issue. Although the minority MPs in the national parliaments try to emphasize the problems their communities face, the solution to these problems are tied to the political will of the parties, and Greek-Turkish relations, negotiations depending on the reciprocity rule still matters. If we look at the power relations within the triangle Greece-Turkey-minority, the minority was always the weakest part. Negotiations between the states on the improvement of the minority rights are not focusing on the real demands, and the minority communities are not involved in these bargaining, neither in the decision-making process for the issues interesting them. It did not have a sufficient political, cultural, and economic strength to carry much weight on its own. Since it became impossible for the minority politicians to find a balance between the demands of their parties and the demands of their electorate, there were massive movements of voters between parties and candidates. Especially, the Muslim minority politicians behaved thus mainly as middlemen and without any particular ideological motives.

To break off the chains of the reciprocity rule, political representation of the minorities is very important. Not only for the solution, but to decrease the ethnic tensions and increase the integration of the community to the society. In both countries, the current political system is suitable for empowering the political representation, and effective work in the parliament; however, 'political will' is the missing point, where loyalty of the minority is still in question. Nevertheless, both the states and minority communities are against the implementation of the 'quota system' for the minority, believing that it would increase the ethnic tension. In this point, apart from the 'quota system', I would suggest cooperation of both minority communities, to handle their own problems in education, identity, management of foundations and associations, independent of their home-states, while continuing to benefit from the collective rights granted by the Lausanne Treaty.

This thesis examined political participation of the respective minority communities only for the national elections. Adding political behavior of the minorities, work of the elected members at the municipalities would enlarge the scope of this work for the future studies. In addition, a general comparison for the political behavior of the Muslim-Turkish minority should be done by adding analyses from other countries where there is a valid Turkish minority, which would also bring more quantitative results to test theoretical foundation of this thesis, and institutional factors' influence on political representation. The large Muslim immigrant population in Greece also enables the political scientists to study the differences on political behavior of this group and Muslim minority, which would also contribute to the theory of Frederik Barth.

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APPENDIX A: TREATY of LAUSANNE (24 July 1923)

PROTECTION OF MINORITIES.

ARTICLE 37.

Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44 shall be recognized as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, nor official action prevail over them.

ARTICLE 38.

The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals.

Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defence, or for the maintenance of public order.

ARTICLE 39.

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems.

All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts.

ARTICLE 40.

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.

ARTICLE 41.

As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for educational, religious, or charitable purposes.

The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the establishments and institutions concerned.

ARTICLE 42.

The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities.

These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers.

The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorization will be granted to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present existing in

Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are guaranteed to other private institutions of that nature.

A R T I C L E 4 3 .

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith or religious observances, and shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend Courts of Law or to perform any legal business on their weekly day of rest.

This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the preservation of public order.

A R T I C L E 4 4 .

Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect non-Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of the majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of fact arising out of these Articles between the Turkish Government and any one of the other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

A R T I C L E 4 5 .

The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory.

APPENDIX B: Greek-Orthodox MPs in TGNA

| Name of the Deputy | Political Party | Term |
|------------------------|---|--|
| İstamati Zihni Özdemir | Independent Turkish-Orthodox | 1 March 1935- 5 August 1946 V, VI and VII Term |
| Nikola Taptas | Independent | 1 March 1935- 8 March 1943 V and VI Term |
| Mihal Kayaoğlu | Independent | 8 March 1943-5 August 1946 VIII Term |
| Nikola Fakaçelli | CHP | 5 August 1946-22 May 1950 VIII Term |
| Vasil Konos | CHP | VIII Term, resigned before participating to the Parliament. |
| Ahilya Moshos | DP | 22 May 1950-14 May 1954 IX Term |
| Aleksandros Hacopulos | DP | 22 May 1950-27 May 1960 IX-X-XI Term |
| Hristaki Ioannidis | DP | 1 November 1957-27 May 1960 XI Term |
| Kaludi Laskari | Founding Parliament, Representative of State President | 6 January-25 October 1961 |

Source: Rifat Bali, Cumhuriyet Döneminde Azınlık Milletvekilleri, Minority Deputies in the Republican Period, Toplumsal Tarih, Sayı 186, Haziran 2009.

APPENDIX-C: List of Non-Muslim Minority Deputies in Turkish Parliament since 1935⁷²⁴

| Name and Surname of the Deputy | Ethnicity | Occupation | Place of Birth | Represented District-Political Party | Term |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| Berç Türker (Keresteci) | Armenian | Accountant | Istanbul | Afyon-Independent | 1 March 1935-5 August 1946 V-VI-VII Term |
| Nikola Tapias | Greek-Orthodox | Doctor | Istanbul | Ankara-Independent | 1 March 1935-8 March 1943 V and VI Term |
| Samuel Abravaya Marmaralı | Jewish | Doctor | Izmir | Niğde-Independent | 1 March 1935-8 March 1943 V and VI Term |
| İstamat Zihni Özdamar | Turkish-Orthodox | Lawyer | Bodrum | Eskişehir-Independent | 1 March 1935-5 August 1946 |
| Mihal Kayaoğlu | Greek-Orthodox | Lawyer | Skopje | Ankara-Independent | 8 March 1943-5 August 1946 VIII Term |
| Avram Galanti Bodrumlu | Jewish | Journalist, Academician | Bodrum | Ankara-Independent | 8 March 1943-5 August 1946 VIII Term |
| Nikola Fakaçelli | Greek-Orthodox | Doctor | Istanbul | Istanbul-CHP | 5 August 1946-22 May 1950 VIII Term |
| Vasil Konos | Greek-Orthodox | Doctor | Leskovik, 1880 (Greece) | Istanbul-CHP | VIII Term, resigned before participating to the Parliament. |
| Salamon Adato | Jewish | Lawyer | Edirne | Istanbul-DP | 6 August 1946-3 April 1954 VIII and IX Term |
| Ahilya Moshos | Greek-Orthodox | Lawyer | Ioannina (Greece) | Istanbul-DP | 22 May 1950-14 May 1954 IX Term |
| Andre Vahram Bayar | Armenian | Doctor | Istanbul | Istanbul- | 22 May 1950-14 May |

⁷²⁴ The table is taken from the article: Bali, Rifat N., Cumhuriyet Döneminde Azınlık Milletvekilleri, Toplumsal Tarih, Vol. 186, June 2009. The occupation and place of birth informations are derived from TBMM Member of Parliament Albums (1923-1950; 1950-1961). CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (People's Republican Party/RPP); DYP: Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party/TPP); DP: Demokratik Parti (Democratic Party/DP); AP: Adalet Partisi (Justice Party/JP). DTP: Demokrat Türkiye Partisi (Democratic Turkey Party/DTP)

| | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|---|---|
| Aleksandros Hacopoulos | Greek-Orthodox | Merchant | Istanbul | DP | 1954 IX Term 22 May 1950-27 May 1960 IX-X-XI Term |
| Zakar Tarver | Armenian | Doctor | Eğin (1893) | Istanbul- DP | 14 May 1954-27 May 1960 X and XI Term |
| Henri Soryano | Jewish | Insurance Agent | Rodos (1882) | Istanbul- DP | 14 May 1954-1 November 1957 X Term |
| Yusuf Salman | Jewish | Merchant | Salonica (1888) | Istanbul- DP | 1 November 1957-27 May 1960 XI Term |
| Isak Altabev | Jewish | Merchant | Istanbul | Istanbul- DP | 1 November 1957-27 May 1960 XI Term |
| Hristaki Ioannidis | Greek-Orthodox | Tobacco Merchant | Istanbul | Istanbul- DP | 1 November 1957-27 May 1960 XI Term |
| Migürcü Şellefyan | Armenian | Merchant | Adapazarı | Istanbul- DP | 1 November 1957-27 May 1960 XI Term |
| Erol Dilek | Jewish | n/a | n/a | Founding Parliament, Representative of State President | 6 January-25 October 1961 |
| Hermine Agavni Kalustyan (female) | Armenian | Academician, Mathematician | Istanbul | Founding Parliament, Representative of State President | 6 January-25 October 1961 |
| Kaludi Laskari | Greek-Orthodox | Lawyer and clergyman | Kırklareli | Founding Parliament, Representative of State President | 6 January-25 October 1961 |
| Berç Şahak Turan | Armenian | Architect | Kahramanmaraş | Istanbul-Member of the Republican Senate- AP Istanbul- DYP then DTP | 15 October 1961-7 June 1964 8 January 1996-18 April 1999 XX Term |
| Cefi Jozef Kamhi | Jewish | Businessman | Istanbul | | |

Appendix D: Greek Orthodox Foundations⁷²⁵

1. Altimermer Panayia Greek Church Foundation
2. Arnavutköy Greek Orthodox Taksiarhi Church and Cemetery Foundation
3. Ayvansaray Aya Dimitri and Aya Vlaherna Churches and School Foundation
4. Bademliköy Panayia Kimisiz Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
5. Cibali Aya Nikola Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
6. Bakırköy Aya Yorgi and Aya Analipsis Churches and Schools Foundation
7. Balat Aya Strati Greek Church Foundation
8. Balat Panayia Balino Greek Church Foundation
9. Balıklı Greek Hospital Foundation
10. Bebek Aya Haralambos Church Foundation
11. Beşiktaş Cihannüma Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
12. Beşiktaş Panayia Church Foundation
13. Beykoz Greek Orthodox Community Aya Paraskevi Church and Cemetery Foundation
14. Beyoğlu Greek Orthodox Community Churches and Schools Foundation
15. Evangelistria Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
16. Boyacıköy Panayia Evangelistra Church and School Foundation
17. Bozcaada Kimisiz Teodoku Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
18. Burgazada Aya Yani Church and Greek Cemetery Foundation
19. Burgazada Aya Yorgi (Karipi) Monastery Foundation
20. Büyükada Greek Primary School and Panayia Aya Dimitri and Profiti İliya Churches and Greek Cemetery Foundation
21. Büyükkdere Aya Paraskevi Church And Primary School Foundation
22. Çengelköy Aya Yorgi Greek Church and Aya Tantalı Holy Spring and Greek Mixed Primary School and Two Old Cemeteries Foundation
23. Dereköy Aya Marina Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
24. Eğrikapı Panayia Church Foundation
25. Fener Maraşlı Primary School Foundation
26. Fener Panayia [Kanlı] Church Foundation
27. Fener High School Foundation
28. Foundation For Aya Yorgi Church, Fener Greek Patriarchate
29. Hançerli Panayia Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
30. Fener Vlahsaray Panayia Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
31. Fener Ioakeimion Girls School Foundation
32. Feriköy Greek Orthodox 12 Apostles Church and School Foundation
33. Galata Primary Greek School Foundation
34. Gökçeada Merkez Panayia Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
35. Hasköy Aya Paraskevi Church Foundation
36. Heybeliada Aya Nikola Church and Greek Orthodox Cemetery and Ufak Aya Varvara Church Foundation In The Cemetery
37. Heybeliada Aya Triada A.K.A. Tepe Monastery Foundation
38. Heybeliada Seminary Foundation
39. Kadıköy Greek Orthodox Community Churches, Schools, and Cemetery Foundation
40. Kandilli Aya Metamorfosis Church and Primary School Foundation
41. Belgradkapı Panayia Church Foundation
42. Samatya Aya Konstantin and Eleni Greek Church Primary School Foundation
43. Samatya Aya Nikola Church Foundation
44. Samatya Aya Yorgi Kiparisa Church Foundation
45. Kumkapı Greek Community Aya Kiriaki and Panayia Elpida Churches and School Foundation

⁷²⁵ The source of the list is, Dilek, Kurban and Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *A Tale of Reciprocity: Minority Foundations in Greece and Turkey*, (TESEV 2010).

46. Kurtuluş Aya Tanaş Aya Dimitri Aya Lefter Greek Church and School Foundation
47. Kuruçeşme Aya Dimitri and Aya Yani Churches Foundation
48. Kuzguncuk Aya Pandeliimon Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
49. Ortaköy Aya Foka Greek Church and Aya Yorgi Church, Cemetery and Schools Foundation
50. Paşabahçe Ayios Konstantinos Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
51. Salmatomruk Rum Panayia Church Foundation
52. Samatya Analipsiz Church Foundation
53. Samatya Aya Mina Church Foundation
54. Sarmaşık Aya Dimitri Church Foundation
55. Tarabya Aya Paraskevi Greek Church and Greek Primary School Foundation
56. Tepeköy Evangelismos Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
57. Topkapı Aya Nikola Church Foundation
58. Üsküddar Profiti İliya Greek Church and Holy Spring and Cemetery and Greek Mixed Primary School Foundation
59. Yeniköy Aya Nikola Church Foundation
60. Yeniköy Panayia Church and Greek School Foundation
61. Yenimahalle Aya Yani Greek Church and Primary School Foundation
62. Yeşilköy Aya Stefanos Church-Primary School and Cemetery Foundation
63. Beyoğlu Zapyon Greek Girl High School Foundation
64. Zeytinliköy Aya Yorgi Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
65. Kınalıada Panayia Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
66. Aksaray Langa Aya Todorı Greek Orthodox Church Foundation

Greek Orthodox Foundations of the Communities of Hatay

67. Antakya Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
68. Altınözü Sarılar Mahallesi Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
69. Samandağı Foundation
70. İskenderun Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
71. İskenderun Arsuz Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
72. Altınözü Tokaçlıköyü Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
73. Foundation of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem
74. Yeniköy Aya Yorgi Church and Monastery Foundation
75. Autocephalous Turkish Orthodox Patriarch⁷²⁶

⁷²⁶ The ‘Autocephalous Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate’ was established by the state in 1923 in order to undermine the Istanbul Greek Patriarchate, to damage its ecumenical capacity and create a counterbalance. Selçuk Erenerol, who was made patriarch by the state confiscated the Panayia Kafatiani, Ayios Ioannis ton Hion, and Ayios Nikolaos churches in Galata in 1965, and registered these churches in the name of the ‘Foundation for the Turkish Orthodox Church’ with the consent of the state, thus confiscating churches of the Istanbul Greek Patriarchate de jure and de facto.

APPENDIX E: List of Muslim Minority Deputies in Greek Parliament since 1920s

| Parliamentary Elections | Name of MP | Electoral District | Occupation | Affiliation (Kemalist vs. Traditionalists) | Party/ *Winner Party | Electoral System |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------|--|-------------------------|--|
| Interwar Years 1 November 1920 | 1. Müderris Hafız Salih Mehmetoğlu | Komotini | Grind | Traditionalist | LP | Majority system |
| | 2. Müderris Hafız Ali Galip | Komotini | Grind & Farm-owner | Moderate Traditionalist | LP | |
| | 3. Arifzade Arif Bey | Komotini | State Officer of Ottoman (Mutasarrıf) | Kemalist | LP | |
| | 4. Hasan Abdürrahimoğlu | Ksanthi | Land-owner | Kemalist | *PP | |
| 16 December 1923 | 1. Mustafa Ağa Deveci | Komotini | Farm-owner | Moderate Traditionalist | LP | *Electoral College + Majority system |
| | 2. Emin Beyzade Hasan | Komotini | n/a | Kemalist | LP | |
| | 3. Hoca Mestan Efendi | Ksanthi | n/a | Kemalist | LP | |
| 7 November 1926 | 1. Müderris Hafız Ali Galip | Komotini | Grind & Farm-owner | Moderate Traditionalist | DUP | Proportional Representation |
| | 2. Mustafa Ağa Deveci | Komotini | Farm-owner | Moderate Traditionalist | LP | |
| | 3. Şükrü Mahmutoğlu | Ksanthi | Merchant | Moderate Traditionalist | DUP | |
| | 4. Fehmi Bey Haşımzade | Ksanthi | n/a | Kemalist | LP | |
| 19 August 1928 | 1. Müderris Hafız Ali Galip | Komotini | Grind & Farm-owner | Moderate Traditionalist | LP | *Electoral College + Majority System |
| | 2. Cezayirli Muhtar Ali Rıza | Komotini | Land-owner | Traditionalist | LP | |
| | 3. Hafız Niyazi Mumcu | Ksanthi | Grind & Merchant | Traditionalist | LP later PP | |
| | 4. Halil Hüseyin Karaçanlı | Ksanthi | Tobacco Merchant | Kemalist | LP | |
| 25 September 1932 | 1. Müderris Hafız Ali Galip | Komotini | Grind & Farm-owner | Moderate Traditionalist | *LP | *Electoral College + Proportional Representation |
| | 2. Mustafa Ağa Deveci | Komotini | Farm-owner | Moderate Traditionalist | ALP | |
| | 3. Hatip Yusuf Salihoğlu | Komotini | Grocer | Kemalist | LP | |
| | 4. Hasan Abdürrahimoğlu | Ksanthi | Land-owner | Kemalist | LP | |
| 5 March 1933 | 1. Müderris Hafız Ali Galip | Komotini | Grind & Farm-owner | Moderate Traditionalist | * ALP | *Electoral College + Majority System |
| | 2. Mustafa Ağa Deveci | Komotini | Farm-owner | Moderate Traditionalist | ALP | |
| | 3. Hasan Abdürrahimoğlu | Ksanthi | Land-owner | Kemalist | LP | |
| | 4. İbrahim Demir Sertdarzade | Ksanthi | Land-owner | Kemalist | LP | |

| | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|---|---|--|--|
| 8 June 1935 | 1. Hatip Yusuf Salihoğlu 2. Mehmet Mustafaoğlu 3. Hafiz Niyazi Mumcu 4. Hamdi Hüseyin Fehmi | Komotini Komotini Ksanthi Ksanthi | Grocer n/a Grind & Merchant Merchant | Kemalist Kemalist Traditionalist Kemalist | PP PP PP PP * PP | Majority System |
| 26 January 1936 | 1. Müterris Hafiz Ali Galip 2. Hamdi Hüseyin Fehmi | Komotini Ksanthi | Grind & Farm-owner Merchant | Moderate Traditionalist Kemalist | NC PP *royalist camp | Proportional Representation |
| Senate Elections 21 April 1929 | Müterris Hafiz Salih Mehmetoğlu | Komotini | Grind | Traditionalist | PP | *Electoral college |
| 25 September 1932 | Müterris Hafiz Salih Mehmetoğlu | Komotini | Grind | Traditionalist | PP | |
| 14 April 1934 | Hatip Yusuf Salihoğlu after the death of Hafiz Salih Mehmetoğlu | Komotini | Grocer | Kemalist | PP | *Electoral college |
| Post II. World War 31 March 1946 | 1. Osman Üstüner 2. Hafiz Faik Engin 3. Osman Nuri Fethahoğlu 4. Hüseyin Zeybek | Komotini Komotini Ksanthi Ksanthi | Leather Merchant Grind & Teacher Journalist Land-owner | Kemalist Moderate Traditionalist Kemalist Traditionalist | LP ALP LP ALP *United Camp | Proportional Representation |
| 5 March 1950 | 1. Osman Üstüner 2. Fehmi Otmanlı 3. Osman Nuri Fethahoğlu | Komotini Komotini Ksanthi | Leather Merchant Tailor Journalist | Kemalist Moderate Traditionalist Kemalist | LP PP LP *PP (coalition governments) | Proportional Representation |
| 9 September 1951 | 1. Osman Üstüner 2. Osman Nuri Fethahoğlu 3. Hamdi Hüseyin Fehmi | Komotini Ksanthi Ksanthi | Leather Merchant Journalist Merchant | Kemalist Kemalist Kemalist | LP LP PP *GR (coalition government is formed under LP & NPP) | Modified PR (favoring the larger parties-17% popular vote is required for 2 nd and 3 rd distribution of seats) |
| 16 November 1952 | 1. Hasan Hatipoğlu 2. Molla Yusuf Hasanoğlu 3. Osman Nuri Fethahoğlu | Komotini Komotini Ksanthi | Merchant & Journalist Journalist Journalist | Kemalist Traditionalist Kemalist | GR GR LP *GR | Simple Majority System |

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|------------------|---|---------------------------------|---|--|---|--|
| 19 February 1956 | 1. Osman Üstüner 2. Molla Yusuf Hasanoğlu 3. Osman Nuri Fetahoğlu | Komotini Komotini Ksanthi | Leather Merchant Journalist Journalist | Kemalist Traditionalist Kemalist | NRU NRU NRU *NRU | Mixed System (simple majority for smaller constituencies with over three seats some were determined by proportional representation) *Universal Suffrage |
| 10 May 1958 | 1. Osman Üstüner 2. Molla Yusuf Hasanoğlu 3. Osman Nuri Fetahoğlu | Komotini Komotini Ksanthi | Leather Merchant Journalist Journalist | Kemalist Traditionalist Kemalist | NRU NRU NRU *NRU | Reinforced PR (favoring larger parties) |
| 29 October 1961 | 1. Hasan Hatipoğlu 2. Molla Yusuf Hasanoğlu 3. Osman Nuri Fetahoğlu | Komotini Komotini Ksanthi | Merchant & Journalist Journalist Journalist | Kemalist Traditionalist Kemalist | Progressive P. NRU NRU *NRU | Reinforced PR (favoring larger parties) |
| 3 November 1963 | 1. Hasan Hatipoğlu 2. Molla Yusuf Hasanoğlu 3. Osman Nuri Fetahoğlu | Komotini Komotini Ksanthi | Merchant & Journalist Journalist Journalist | Kemalist Traditionalist Kemalist | CU NRU CU *CU | Reinforced PR (favoring larger parties) |
| 16 February 1964 | 1. Hasan Hatipoğlu 2. Molla Yusuf Hasanoğlu | Komotini Komotini | Merchant & Journalist Journalist | Kemalist Traditionalist | NRU & Progress NRU & Progress *CU | Reinforced PR (favoring larger parties) |
| Post 1974 | | | | | | |
| 17 November 1974 | 1. Hafız Yaşar Mehmetoğlu 2. Hatiz Sebahaddin Galip | Komotini Komotini | Grind & Journalist State Officer | Traditionalist Kemalist | CU-New Forces CU-New Forces *ND | Reinforced PR with open-list system + largest remainder system |
| 20 November 1977 | 1. Hasan İmamoğlu 2. Orhan Hacitrahim* (lost his seat 6 months later) 3. Celâl Zeybek | Komotini Ksanthi Ksanthi | Lawyer Lawyer Contractor | n/a n/a Kemalist | NC PASOK ND *ND | Reinforced PR with open-list system + largest remainder system |
| 18 October 1981 | 1. Hafız Yaşar Mehmetoğlu 2. Ahmet Mehmet | Komotini Komotini | Grind & Journalist n/a | Traditionalist n/a | ND PASOK *PASOK | Reinforced PR with open-list system + largest remainder system |

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|-------------------|---|---------------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|---|---|
| 2 June 1985 | 1. Mehmet Müftuoğlu 2. Ahmet Faikoğlu | Komotini Ksanthi | Lawyer & Journalist Clergman (imam) | Kemalist Moderate Traditionalist | ND PASOK *PASOK | PR with closed-list system *Rhodopi's seat number in the parliament dropped from 4 to 3 (after 1981 census) |
| 18 June 1989 | 1. Sadık Ahmet | Komotini | Doctor | Kemalist | Independent-Trust *ND | Reinforced PR with open-list system + largest remainder system |
| 5 November 1989 | 1. İsmail Molla Rodoplu | Komotini | Journalist | Moderate Traditionalist | Independent-Trust *ND | Reinforced PR with open-list system + largest remainder system |
| 8 April 1990 | 1. Sadık Ahmet 2. Ahmet Faikoğlu | Komotini Ksanthi | Doctor Clergman (imam) | Kemalist Moderate Traditionalist | Indep.-Trust Indep.- Good Fortune *ND | Reinforced PR with open-list system + largest remainder system |
| 10 October 1993 | ---- | | | | *PASOK | *3% electoral threshold is implemented * Hagenbach-Bischoff method until 2004 * Single-member seats are filled by the plurality |
| 22 September 1996 | 1. Mustafa Mustafa 2. Galip Galip 3. Birol Akifoğlu | Komotini Komotini Ksanthi | Doctor Architect Doctor | Kemalist Kemalist Kemalist | Synaspismos PASOK ND *PASOK | Reinforced PR with open-list system |
| 9 April 2000 | 1. Galip Galip 2. Ahmet Mehmet | Komotini Komotini | Architect n/a | Kemalist n/a | PASOK PASOK *PASOK | Reinforced PR with open-list system |
| 7 March 2004 | 1. İlhan Ahmet | Komotini | Lawyer | Kemalist | ND *New Democracy | Reinforced PR with open-list system |
| 16 September 2007 | 1. Ahmet Hacrosman 2. Çetin Mandacı | Komotini Ksanthi | Theologian Doctor | Moderate Traditionalist Kemalist | PASOK PASOK *ND | Reinforced PR open-list + New law: 40 seats granted to the winning party |

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|----|--------------|---|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|---|---|
| 3 | October 2009 | 1. Ahmet Hacıosman 2. Çetin Mandacı | Komotini Ksanthi | Theologian Doctor | Moderate Traditionalist Kemalist | PASOK PASOK *PASOK | Reinforced PR open- list+ New law: 40 seats granted to the winning party |
| 6 | May 2012 | 1. Ahmet Hacıosman 2. Ayhan Karayusuf 3. Hüseyin Zeybek | Komotini Komotini Ksanthi | Theologian Dentist Pharmacist | Moderate Traditionalist Kemalist Kemalist | PASOK SYRIZA SYRIZA *ND (government cannot be formed) | Reinforced PR open- list+ New law: 50 seats granted to the winning party |
| 17 | June 2012 | 1. Ahmet Hacıosman 2. Ayhan Karayusuf 3. Hüseyin Zeybek | Komotini Komotini Ksanthi | Theologian Dentist Pharmacist | Moderate Traditionalist Kemalist Kemalist | PASOK SYRIZA SYRIZA * ND (coalition government with PASOK) | Reinforced PR (extra 50 seats to the first party) with close-list system |

Source: The list of the minority MPs are taken from <http://www.westtrakien.com/haberler/b-trakyada-1920denbuyanamilletvekilisejenti.html>. The names of 2007, 2009 and 2012 MPs are added by the author. The electoral districts, their parties, the winning party of the election and electoral system data are added by the author.

Affiliation of the minority MPs until 1936 is taken from Featherstone, Niarchos, p.49. 1936-1964, derived from Aarbakke's PhD Thesis. The data from 1974-2012 is added by the author. * After 1977, the Kemalist- antiKemalist cleavage within the minority community has diminished, hence the affiliation of the MPs are not so clear. Yet, it is given in the Appendix, depending on the background and discourses of the minority MPs. Occupations of the MPs are derived from Azmlıkça Journal, No. 39, (August, 2008).

LP: Liberal Party (Venizelist); PP: People's Party (Anti-Venizelist); DU: Democratic Union (Venizelist); ALP: Agrarian and Labour Party (Venizelist); NC: National Coalition (Venizelist); NPP: National Progress Party; GR: Greek Rally; NC: National Camp; CU: Centre Union; NRU: National Radical Union; PASOK: Panhellenic Socialist Movement; ND: New Democracy; Progressive P: Party of Progressives; Sinasmos: Coalition of the Left and the Progressive; SYRIZA: The Coalition of the Radical Left

APPENDIX F: List of Muslim Foundations in Western Thrace⁷²⁷

Ksanthi/İskeçe The foundation of Ksanthi [Under a unified legal entity: 10 mosques, one school, four cemeteries]

Yenisea/Yenice The foundation of Yenisea [two mosques, one tekke, one school, one cemetery.

Komotini/Gümülçine 35 foundations [16 mosques, six cemeteries, five mescits, eight schools]

1 Yeni cami

2 Eski cami

3 Tabak hane cami

4 Osmanyeye cami

5 Mestanai cami

6 Kayalı cami

7 Tekke cami

8 Serdar cami

9 Yenice cami

10 Kırmahalle cami

11 Kesikbas cami

12 Şehreküştü cami

13 Yeni Şehreküştü cami

14 Alan Kuyu mescit

15 Kırmahalle mescit

16 Süppüren mescit

17 Arifhane mescit

18 Yüksek mescit

19 Kalkantza cami

20 Sohtalar-Hayriye

21 Cemetery Pos-pos

22 Cemetery yenice

23 Cemetery kahveci

24 Cemetery Osmanyeye

25 Cemetery mestanlı

26 Cemetery Alan Kuyu

27 Idadiye

28 2d minority school

29 3d minority school

30 4d minority school

31 Mestanli school

32 Osmanyeye school

33 Edirneyolu cami

34 Boy's boarding school

35 Kadikoy arasi cami

Evros The foundation of Didimotiho/Dimetoka: [one mosque, one school, two cemeteries]

The foundation of Alexandroupolis/Dedeğaç [one school, two cemeteries, one mosque]

In each village of Thrace there is a local foundation, often comprising a mosque, a cemetery and a school building. Approximately there are about foundations of this kind in Thrace

⁷²⁷ The source of the list is, Dilek, Kurban and Konstantinos Tsitselikis, A Tale of Reciprocity: Minority Foundations in Greece and Turkey, (TESEV 2010).